Bounding the outcome of a two-photon interference measurement using weak coherent states.

The interference of two photons at a beam splitter is at the core of many quantum photonic technologies, such as quantum key distribution or linear-optics quantum computing. Observing high-visibility interference is challenging because of the difficulty of realizing indistinguishable single-photon sources. Here, we perform a two-photon interference experiment using phase-randomized weak coherent states with different mean photon numbers. We place a tight upper bound on the expected coincidences for the case when the incident wavepackets contain single photons, allowing us to observe the Hong-Ou-Mandel effect. We find that the interference visibility is at least as large as 0.995-0.013+0.005.

Provably secure and high-rate quantum key distribution with time-bin qudits.

The security of conventional cryptography systems is threatened in the forthcoming era of quantum computers. Quantum key distribution (QKD) features fundamentally proven security and offers a promising option for quantum-proof cryptography solution. Although prototype QKD systems over optical fiber have been demonstrated over the years, the key generation rates remain several orders of magnitude lower than current classical communication systems. In an effort toward a commercially viable QKD system with improved key generation rates, we developed a discrete-variable QKD system based on time-bin quantum photonic states that can generate provably secure cryptographic keys at megabit-per-second rates over metropolitan distances. We use high-dimensional quantum states that transmit more than one secret bit per received photon, alleviating detector saturation effects in the superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors used in our system that feature very high detection efficiency (of more than 70%) and low timing jitter (of less than 40 ps). Our system is constructed using commercial off-the-shelf components, and the adopted protocol can be readily extended to free-space quantum channels. The security analysis adopted to distill the keys ensures that the demonstrated protocol is robust against coherent attacks, finite-size effects, and a broad class of experimental imperfections identified in our system.