Ethics Inside the Black Box: Integrating Science and Technology Studies into Engineering and Public Policy Curricula.

There is growing need for hybrid curricula that integrate constructivist methods from Science and Technology Studies (STS) into both engineering and policy courses at the undergraduate and graduate levels. However, institutional and disciplinary barriers have made implementing such curricula difficult at many institutions. While several programs have recently been launched that mix technical training with consideration of "societal" or "ethical issues," these programs often lack a constructivist element, leaving newly-minted practitioners entering practical fields ill-equipped to unpack the politics of knowledge and technology or engage with skeptical publics. This paper presents a novel format for designing interdisciplinary coursework that combines conceptual content from STS with training in engineering and policy. Courses following this format would ideally be team taught by instructors with advanced training in diverse fields, and hence co-learning between instructors and disciplines is a key element of the format. Several instruments for facilitating both student and instructor collaborative learning are introduced. The format is also designed for versatility: in addition to being adaptable to both technical and policy training environments, topics are modularized around a conceptual core so that issues ranging from biotech to nuclear security can be incorporated to fit programmatic needs and resources.

The Vanishing Square: Civic Learning in the Internet Age.

Nation states in the twenty-first century confront new challenges to their political legitimacy. Borders are more porous and less secure. Infectious disease epidemics, climate change, financial fraud, terrorism, and cybersecurity all involve cross-border flows of material, human bodies, and information that threaten to overwhelm state power and expert knowledge. Concurrently, doubts have multiplied about whether citizens, subject to manipulation through the internet, have lost the critical capacity to hold rulers accountable for their expert decisions. I argue that the primary threat to democracy is not the public's epistemic incompetence but a slow dissolution of the deliberative practices that are essential for self-rule. We need a radical reimagining of the sites, forms, and performances of democratic deliberation. For this purpose, the American state needs to reconstitute a public square open to citizens who are deemed to be epistemically competent and capable of informed judgment.

Democratic Governance of Human Germline Genome Editing.

An international regulatory commission convened by scientific academies is a premature and problematic approach to governing human germline genome editing. Given the complex, international landscape of genome editing and significant cross-national differences among regulatory cultures, deferring to a single commission to set the agenda for global governance raises troublesome questions of framing and representation. Rather, democratic governance on a global level demands a new mechanism for active, sustained reflection by scientists on their own practices, conducted in partnership with scholars from other disciplines, as well as public representatives from varied social, political, and religious backgrounds. To be legitimate, ideas of the right form of governance in this emerging and highly consequential area of research need to be opened up to a wider diversity of views and voices.

Bodies in Transition: Ethics in Xenotransplantation Research.

Xenotransplantation, or the grafting of organs from one species to another, may seem at first a far cry from brain death, but there is rising hope in some quarters of the biomedical community that such transplants may reduce, even obviate, the need to harvest human organs-and hence eliminate the primary reason for needing an unambiguous definition of brain death. As with all research on the frontiers of biomedicine, xenotransplantation raises its own ethical quandaries. One concern that has long occupied ethical thought is the degree to which advances in science and technology should control the boundaries between the human and the nonhuman. Might the dimming of a previously entrenched bright line between species entail negative consequences for concepts, such as human dignity and bodily integrity, that historically anchored the protection of both human and animal subjects in biomedical treatment and research? To date, ethical thinking about xenotransplantation, and about gene editing, has largely been left in the hands of scientists, subject only to loose supervision by institutional review boards and animal welfare committees whose remit may be too narrow to address age-old moral concerns.

Response to Beriain.

Professor Beriain's criticism rests on a narrow conception of human dignity pertaining only to individuals within a society. The social relations and norms that underpin human dignity are treated as mere group interests that are secondary to the dignity of the individual. In our view, this is a false dichotomy.

Building Capacity for a Global Genome Editing Observatory: Institutional Design.

A new infrastructure is urgently needed at the global level to facilitate exchange on key issues concerning genome editing. We advocate the establishment of a global observatory to serve as a center for international, interdisciplinary, and cosmopolitan reflection. This article is the second of a two-part series.

Building Capacity for a Global Genome Editing Observatory: Conceptual Challenges.

A new infrastructure is urgently needed at the global level to facilitate exchange on key issues concerning genome editing. We advocate the establishment of a global observatory to serve as a center for international, interdisciplinary, and cosmopolitan reflection. This article is the first of a two-part series.

ST(&)S: Martyn Pickersgill Talks with Sheila Jasanoff.

In this interview, Sheila Jasanoff and Martyn Pickersgill discuss the contested meanings of STS, defined as either "science and technology studies" (often associated with European origins) or "science, technology, and society" (commonly seen as originating in the US). The interview describes how Jasanoff entered STS, and the ways in which she sought to bring together different traditions within the field. Jasanoff underscores how her intellectual and professional journeys were shaped through a mix of institutional context and personal choices, and reflects on the role she has played in shaping STS networks, programs, and departments. Jasanoff remains excited about the future of STS, yet also highlights the need for disciplining within the field. For her, STS represents a distinct mode of researching, approaching, and engaging with the world. This distinctiveness, Jasanoff argues, needs to be carefully cultivated and reproduced through creative but rigorous teaching and training. A reflection by Martyn Pickersgill follows the interview.

No funeral bells: Public reason in a 'post-truth' age.

The label 'post-truth' signals for many a troubling turn away from principles of enlightened government. The word 'post', moreover, implies a past when things were radically different and whose loss should be universally mourned. In this paper, we argue that this framing of 'post-truth' is flawed because it is ahistorical and ignores the co-production of knowledge and norms in political contexts. Debates about public facts are necessarily debates about social meanings, rooted in realities that are subjectively experienced as all-encompassing and complete, even when they are partial and contingent. Facts used in policy are normative in four ways: They are embedded in prior choices of which experiential realities matter, produced through processes that reflect institutionalized public values, arbiters of which issues are open to democratic contestation and deliberation, and vehicles through which polities imagine their collective futures. To restore truth to its rightful place in democracy, governments should be held accountable for explaining who generated public facts, in response to which sets of concerns, and with what opportunities for deliberation and closure.

Panacea or diagnosis? Imaginaries of innovation and the 'MIT model' in three political cultures.

Innovation studies continue to struggle with an apparent disconnect between innovation's supposedly universal dynamics and a sense that policy frameworks and associated instruments of innovation are often ineffectual or even harmful when transported across regions or countries. Using a cross-country comparative analysis of three implementations of the 'MIT model' of innovation in the UK, Portugal and Singapore, we show how key features in the design, implementation and performance of the model cannot be explained as mere variations on an identical solution to the same underlying problem. We draw on the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries to show how implementations of the 'same' innovation model - and with it the notion of 'innovation' itself - are co-produced with locally specific diagnoses of a societal deficiency and equally specific understandings of acceptable remedies. Our analysis thus flips the conventional notion of 'best-practice transfer' on its head: Instead of asking 'how well' an innovation model has been implemented, we analyze the differences among the three importations to reveal the idiosyncratic ways in which each country imagines the purpose of innovation. We replace the notion of innovation as a 'panacea' - a universal fix for all social woes - with that of innovation-as-diagnosis in which a particular 'cure' is 'prescribed' for a 'diagnosed' societal 'pathology,' which may in turn trigger 'reactions' within the receiving body. This approach offers new possibilities for theorizing how and where culture matters in innovation policy. It suggests that the 'successes' and 'failures' of innovation models are not a matter of how well societies are able to implement a sound, universal model, but more about how effectively they articulate their imaginaries of innovation and tailor their strategies accordingly.

A mirror for science.

Early conceptions of the public understanding of science suffered from a narrow framing of what science means and a presumption that science is divided from its publics by walls of ignorance and indifference. Those assumptions amplified misunderstanding and led to faulty policies. It is time to reopen each element in the term "public understanding of science" to renewed reflection. This journal can advance that goal by encouraging research on actual rather than imagined public responses to science, on representations of science in the public sphere, and on interactions between science, technology and society.

Constitutional moments in governing science and technology.

Scholars in science and technology studies (STS) have recently been called upon to advise governments on the design of procedures for public engagement. Any such instrumental function should be carried out consistently with STS's interpretive and normative obligations as a social science discipline. This article illustrates how such threefold integration can be achieved by reviewing current US participatory politics against a 70-year backdrop of tacit constitutional developments in governing science and technology. Two broad cycles of constitutional adjustment are discerned: the first enlarging the scope of state action as well as public participation, with liberalized rules of access and sympathetic judicial review; the second cutting back on the role of the state, fostering the rise of an academic-industrial complex for technology transfer, and privatizing value debates through increasing delegation to professional ethicists. New rules for public engagement in the United Sates should take account of these historical developments and seek to counteract some of the anti-democratic tendencies observable in recent decades.

Dismantling boundaries in science and technology studies.

The boundaries between the history of science and science and technology studies (STS) can be misleadingly drawn, to the detriment of both fields. This essay stresses their commonalities and potential for valuable synergy. The evolution of the two fields has been characterized by lively interchange and boundary crossing, with leading scholars functioning easily on both sides of the past/present divide. Disciplines, it is argued, are best regarded as training grounds for asking particular kinds of questions, using particular clusters of methods. Viewed in this way, history of science and STS are notable for their shared approaches to disciplining. The essay concludes with a concrete example--regulatory science--showing how a topic such as this can be productively studied with methods that contradict any alleged disciplinary divide between historical and contemporary studies of science.

Representation and re-presentation in litigation science.

Federal appellate courts have devised several criteria to help judges distinguish between reliable and unreliable scientific evidence. The best known are the U.S. Supreme Court's criteria offered in 1993 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. This article focuses on another criterion, offered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, that instructs judges to assign lower credibility to "litigation science" than to science generated before litigation. In this article I argue that the criterion-based approach to judicial screening of scientific evidence is deeply flawed. That approach buys into the faulty premise that there are external criteria, lying outside the legal process, by which judges can distinguish between good and bad science. It erroneously assumes that judges can ascertain the appropriate criteria and objectively apply them to challenged evidence before litigation unfolds, and before methodological disputes are sorted out during that process. Judicial screening does not take into account the dynamics of litigation itself, including gaming by the parties and framing by judges, as constitutive factors in the production and representation of knowledge. What is admitted through judicial screening, in other words, is not precisely what a jury would see anyway. Courts are sites of repeated re-representations of scientific knowledge. In sum, the screening approach fails to take account of the wealth of existing scholarship on the production and validation of scientific facts. An unreflective application of that approach thus puts courts at risk of relying upon a "junk science" of the nature of scientific knowledge.