Finding Purpose in the Conservation of Biodiversity by the Commingling of Science and Ethics.

Averting the biodiversity crisis requires closing a gap between how humans tend to behave, individually and collectively, and how we ought to behave-"ought to" in the sense of behaviors required to avert the biodiversity crisis. Closing that gap requires synthesizing insight from ethics with insights from social and behavioral sciences. This article contributes to that synthesis, which presents in several provocative hypotheses: (i) Lessening the biodiversity crisis requires promoting pro-conservation behavior among humans. Doing so requires better scientific understanding of how one's sense of purpose in life affects conservation-relevant behaviors. Psychology and virtue-focused ethics indicate that behavior is importantly influenced by one's purpose. However, conservation psychology has neglected inquiries on (a) the influence of one's purpose (both the content and strength of one's purpose) on conservation-related behaviors and (b) how to foster pro-conservation purposes; (ii) lessening the biodiversity crisis requires governance-the regulation of behavior by governments, markets or other organization through various means, including laws, norms, and power-to explicitly take conservation as one of its fundamental purposes and to do so across scales of human behaviors, from local communities to nations and corporations; (iii) lessening the biodiversity crisis requires intervention via governance to nudge human behavior in line with the purpose of conservation without undue infringement on other basic values. Aligning human behavior with conservation is inhibited by the underlying purpose of conservation being underspecified. Adequate specification of conservation's purpose will require additional interdisciplinary research involving insights from ethics, social and behavioral sciences, and conservation biology.

The evolution of offensive realism.

Offensive realism, a theory of international relations, holds that states are disposed to competition and conflict because they are self-interested, power maximizing, and fearful of other states. Moreover, it argues that states are obliged to behave this way because doing so favors survival in the international system. Debate continues as to whether modern states actually do, or should, behave in this way, but we are struck by a different question. In this article, we ask whether the three core assumptions about behavior in offensive realism-self-help, power maximization, and outgroup fear-have any basis in scientific knowledge about human behavioral evolution. We find that these precise traits are not only evolutionarily adaptive but also empirically common across the animal kingdom, especially in primate and human societies. Based on these findings, we hypothesize that states behave as offensive realists predict not just because of anarchy in the modern international system but also because of the legacy of our evolution. In short, offensive realism may really be describing the nature of the human species more than the nature of the international system. If our hypothesis is correct, then evolutionary theory offers the following: (1) a novel ultimate cause of offensive realist behavior; (2) an extension of offensive realism to any domain in which humans compete for power; and (3) an explanation for why individual leaders themselves, and not just states, seek power. However, a key insight from evolution is that the primacy of self-help, power maximization, and outgroup fear does not necessarily condemn individuals or groups to competition and conflict; rather, these traits can in themselves give rise to cooperation and alliances.

The evolution of error: error management, cognitive constraints, and adaptive decision-making biases.

Counterintuitively, biases in behavior or cognition can improve decision making. Under conditions of uncertainty and asymmetric costs of 'false-positive' and 'false-negative' errors, biases can lead to mistakes in one direction but - in so doing - steer us away from more costly mistakes in the other direction. For example, we sometimes think sticks are snakes (which is harmless), but rarely that snakes are sticks (which can be deadly). We suggest that 'error management' biases: (i) have been independently identified by multiple interdisciplinary studies, suggesting the phenomenon is robust across domains, disciplines, and methodologies; (ii) represent a general feature of life, with common sources of variation; and (iii) offer an explanation, in error management theory (EMT), for the evolution of cognitive biases as the best way to manage errors under cognitive and evolutionary constraints.

Dead certain: confidence and conservatism predict aggression in simulated international crisis decision-making.

Evolutionary psychologists have suggested that confidence and conservatism promoted aggression in our ancestral past, and that this may have been an adaptive strategy given the prevailing costs and benefits of conflict. However, in modern environments, where the costs and benefits of conflict can be very different owing to the involvement of mass armies, sophisticated technology, and remote leadership, evolved tendencies toward high levels of confidence and conservatism may continue to be a contributory cause of aggression despite leading to greater costs and fewer benefits. The purpose of this paper is to test whether confidence and conservatism are indeed associated with greater levels of aggression-in an explicitly political domain. We present the results of an experiment examining people's levels of aggression in response to hypothetical international crises (a hostage crisis, a counter-insurgency campaign, and a coup). Levels of aggression (which range from concession to negotiation to military attack) were significantly predicted by subjects' (1) confidence that their chosen policy would succeed, (2) score on a liberal-conservative scale, (3) political party affiliation, and (4) preference for the use of military force in real-world U.S. policy toward Iraq and Iran. We discuss the possible adaptive and maladaptive implications of confidence and conservatism for the prospects of war and peace in the modern world.

The evolution of overconfidence.

Confidence is an essential ingredient of success in a wide range of domains ranging from job performance and mental health to sports, business and combat. Some authors have suggested that not just confidence but overconfidence--believing you are better than you are in reality--is advantageous because it serves to increase ambition, morale, resolve, persistence or the credibility of bluffing, generating a self-fulfilling prophecy in which exaggerated confidence actually increases the probability of success. However, overconfidence also leads to faulty assessments, unrealistic expectations and hazardous decisions, so it remains a puzzle how such a false belief could evolve or remain stable in a population of competing strategies that include accurate, unbiased beliefs. Here we present an evolutionary model showing that, counterintuitively, overconfidence maximizes individual fitness and populations tend to become overconfident, as long as benefits from contested resources are sufficiently large compared with the cost of competition. In contrast, unbiased strategies are only stable under limited conditions. The fact that overconfident populations are evolutionarily stable in a wide range of environments may help to explain why overconfidence remains prevalent today, even if it contributes to hubris, market bubbles, financial collapses, policy failures, disasters and costly wars.

Fortune favours the bold: an agent-based model reveals adaptive advantages of overconfidence in war.

Overconfidence has long been considered a cause of war. Like other decision-making biases, overconfidence seems detrimental because it increases the frequency and costs of fighting. However, evolutionary biologists have proposed that overconfidence may also confer adaptive advantages: increasing ambition, resolve, persistence, bluffing opponents, and winning net payoffs from risky opportunities despite occasional failures. We report the results of an agent-based model of inter-state conflict, which allows us to evaluate the performance of different strategies in competition with each other. Counter-intuitively, we find that overconfident states predominate in the population at the expense of unbiased or underconfident states. Overconfident states win because: (1) they are more likely to accumulate resources from frequent attempts at conquest; (2) they are more likely to gang up on weak states, forcing victims to split their defences; and (3) when the decision threshold for attacking requires an overwhelming asymmetry of power, unbiased and underconfident states shirk many conflicts they are actually likely to win. These "adaptive advantages" of overconfidence may, via selection effects, learning, or evolved psychology, have spread and become entrenched among modern states, organizations and decision-makers. This would help to explain the frequent association of overconfidence and war, even if it no longer brings benefits today.

The origins and evolution of leadership.

How groups of individuals achieve coordination and collective action is an important topic in the natural sciences, but until recently the role of leadership in this process has been largely overlooked. In contrast, leadership is arguably one of the most important themes in the social sciences, permeating all aspects of human social affairs: the election of Barack Obama, the war in Iraq, and the collapse of the banks are all high-profile events that draw our attention to the fundamental role of leadership and followership. Converging ideas and developments in both the natural and social sciences suggest that leadership and followership share common properties across humans and other animals, pointing to ancient roots and evolutionary origins. Here, we draw upon key insights from the animal and human literature to lay the foundation for a new science of leadership inspired by an evolutionary perspective. Identifying the origins of human leadership and followership, as well as which aspects are shared with other animals and which are unique, offers ways of understanding, predicting, and improving leadership today.

Monoamine oxidase A gene (MAOA) predicts behavioral aggression following provocation.

Monoamine oxidase A gene (MAOA) has earned the nickname "warrior gene" because it has been linked to aggression in observational and survey-based studies. However, no controlled experimental studies have tested whether the warrior gene actually drives behavioral manifestations of these tendencies. We report an experiment, synthesizing work in psychology and behavioral economics, which demonstrates that aggression occurs with greater intensity and frequency as provocation is experimentally manipulated upwards, especially among low activity MAOA (MAOA-L) subjects. In this study, subjects paid to punish those they believed had taken money from them by administering varying amounts of unpleasantly hot (spicy) sauce to their opponent. There is some evidence of a main effect for genotype and some evidence for a gene by environment interaction, such that MAOA is less associated with the occurrence of aggression in a low provocation condition, but significantly predicts such behavior in a high provocation situation. This new evidence for genetic influences on aggression and punishment behavior complicates characterizations of humans as "altruistic" punishers and supports theories of cooperation that propose mixed strategies in the population. It also suggests important implications for the role of individual variance in genetic factors contributing to everyday behaviors and decisions.

Overconfidence in wargames: experimental evidence on expectations, aggression, gender and testosterone.

Overconfidence has long been noted by historians and political scientists as a major cause of war. However, the origins of such overconfidence, and sources of variation, remain poorly understood. Mounting empirical studies now show that mentally healthy people tend to exhibit psychological biases that encourage optimism, collectively known as 'positive illusions'. Positive illusions are thought to have been adaptive in our evolutionary past because they served to cope with adversity, harden resolve, or bluff opponents. Today, however, positive illusions may contribute to costly conflicts and wars. Testosterone has been proposed as a proximate mediator of positive illusions, given its role in promoting dominance and challenge behaviour, particularly in men. To date, no studies have attempted to link overconfidence, decisions about war, gender, and testosterone. Here we report that, in experimental wargames: (i) people are overconfident about their expectations of success; (ii) those who are more overconfident are more likely to attack; (iii) overconfidence and attacks are more pronounced among males than females; and (iv) testosterone is related to expectations of success, but not within gender, so its influence on overconfidence cannot be distinguished from any other gender specific factor. Overall, these results constitute the first empirical support of recent theoretical work linking overconfidence and war.

Preliminary comparison of four anaesthetic techniques in badgers (Meles meles).

OBJECTIVE: To investigate the use of four ketamine-based anaesthetic combinations in wild badgers. STUDY DESIGN: Prospective, randomized, clinical trial. ANIMALS: Twenty-four adult badgers. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Animals were divided into four groups of six and were anaesthetized using either intramuscular (IM) ketamine alone (20 mg kg(-1)), ketamine (15 mg kg(-1) IM) and midazolam (0.4 mg kg(-1) IM), ketamine (10 mg kg(-1) IM) and midazolam (1 mg kg(-1) IM) or ketamine (5 mg kg(-1) IM) and medetomidine (80 microg kg(-1) IM) antagonized with atipamezole (0.8 mg kg(-1); IM). Features of each technique, i.e. quality of induction, maintenance and recovery, and the need for additional doses, were assessed using a simple descriptive scale. Physiological variables, i.e. rectal temperature, respiratory rate, heart rate and blood pressure, were also recorded. RESULTS: Combinations of ketamine and midazolam did not produce adequate anaesthesia. The combination of medetomidine and ketamine had few advantages over ketamine alone. CONCLUSIONS AND CLINICAL RELEVANCE: These data will contribute to a wider study attempting to refine anaesthetic techniques in badgers.

God's punishment and public goods : A test of the supernatural punishment hypothesis in 186 world cultures.

Cooperation towards public goods relies on credible threats of punishment to deter cheats. However, punishing is costly, so it remains unclear who incurred the costs of enforcement in our evolutionary past. Theoretical work suggests that human cooperation may be promoted if people believe in supernatural punishment for moral transgressions. This theory is supported by new work in cognitive psychology and by anecdotal ethnographic evidence, but formal quantitative tests remain to be done. Using data from 186 societies around the globe, I test whether the likelihood of supernatural punishment-indexed by the importance of moralizing "high gods"-is associated with cooperation.

The evolution and maintenance of delayed implantation in the mustelidae (mammalia: carnivora).

Diapause, the temporary cessation of development at an early life-history stage, is widespread among animals and plants. The range of taxa exhibiting various forms of diapause indicates its enormous ecological significance and highlights its value as a model for examining life-history trait evolution. However, despite the impact of diapause on species ecology, there is little understanding of its adaptive value in many groups. Furthermore, the relative roles of phylogeny and ecology in determining the contemporary expression of the trait remain unresolved. Delayed implantation (DI) is a type of diapause found in several orders of mammals. It is particularly prevalent in the Mustelidae, with mustelids making up more than half of all mammals known to exhibit DI. This taxon is thus ideal for examining life-history predictors of DI and investigating the mode of evolution. Both maximum likelihood and maximum parsimony methods of ancestral state reconstruction indicated DI to be plesiomorphic in the mustelids, although multiple state changes are required to explain its contemporary distribution. After controlling for phylogeny, species with and without DI could be discriminated using just three variables: longevity, maximum latitude of the geographical distribution, and a term describing maternal investment. Our analyses supported the hypothesis that DI is more prevalent in seasonal climates. We also showed that longer-lived species are more likely to exhibit DI, suggesting a time cost to the trait. We found no correlate for the highly variable duration of DI, which remains unexplained. Although ecological factors can predict the distribution of DI in modern mustelids, phylogenetic constraint is likely to play an important role.

Individual variation evades the prisoner's dilemma.

BACKGROUND: The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) is a widely used paradigm to study cooperation in evolutionary biology, as well as in fields as diverse as moral philosophy, sociology, economics and politics. Players are typically assumed to have fixed payoffs for adopting certain strategies, which depend only on the strategy played by the opponent. However, fixed payoffs are not realistic in nature. Utility functions and the associated payoffs from pursuing certain strategies vary among members of a population with numerous factors. In biology such factors include size, age, social status and expected life span; in economics they include socio-economic status, personal preference and past experience; and in politics they include ideology, political interests and public support. Thus, no outcome is identical for any two different players. RESULTS: We show that relaxing the assumption of fixed payoffs leads to frequent violations of the payoff structure required for a Prisoner's Dilemma. With variance twice the payoff interval in a linear PD matrix, for example, only 16% of matrices are valid. CONCLUSIONS: A single player lacking a valid PD matrix destroys the conditions for a Prisoner's Dilemma, so between any two players, PD games themselves are fewer still (3% in this case). This may explain why the Prisoner's Dilemma has hardly been found in nature, despite the fact that it has served as a ubiquitous (and still instructive) model in studies of the evolution of cooperation.