Ghosting: Social rejection without explanation, but not without care.

Many social ties end when one side rejects the other, but rejection does not need to happen directly. Ghosting-the act of ending a relationship by ignoring another person's attempts to connect-is a common way of ending social ties. The present experiments first establish the key characteristics of ghosting and distinguish it from other rejection behaviors (Pilot Studies 1a-1c). The experiments then proceed to explore the relational and motivational implications of this behavior, finding that ghosters (those who ghost) care about the well-being of ghostees (those who are ghosted) more than ghostees realize. This result occurs in recalled instances of ghosting (Experiment 1), when ghosting in real time (Experiment 2), and when refraining from ghosting is monetarily costly (Experiment 3). We find that this occurs partly because ghostees underestimate the other-oriented motives involved in ghosting, misunderstanding that ghosters ghost partly as a way to end a tie while avoiding hurting ghostees' feelings (Experiments 4-6). Indeed, greater other-oriented motives lead to a higher likelihood of ghosting others (Experiment 7). A final experiment finds relational consequences whereby ghostees miss out on opportunities for future help exchange due to their underestimation of the extent to which ghosters care about them (Experiment 8). Ghosting is social rejection without explanation or feedback, but not without care. This study highlights how prosocial motives can drive rejection behaviors and the role of interpersonal accuracy in mitigating the negative effects of social rejection. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Too naïve to lead: When leaders fall for flattery.

Flattery is one of the oldest and most commonly used impression-management tactics in everyday life. Though it often brings benefits to the flatterer, less is known about how it affects the target. In the present research, we explore when and why being flattered can be costly for leaders-common targets of flattery-depending on how they respond to it. We suggest that leaders who are observed rewarding flatterers risk appearing naïve to others. Across seven studies and six supplementary studies (N = 4,612), we find evidence that leaders who grant favors to flatterers are often perceived to have naively "fallen for flattery," which shapes observers' impressions of the leaders and the organizations they represent. A first set of studies (Studies 1-4) detail the variety of factors that lead observers to conclude their leader has fallen for flattery and the resulting impacts to the leaders' reputation and their organization (e.g., competence, warmth, commitment to the leader, organizational fairness). The second set of studies look at the contextual factors that impact what costs leaders pay for being perceived to have fallen for flattery, including the type of flattery (Study 5), who is harmed by the favor (Study 6), and the leader's apparent awareness of the motives underlying flattery (Study 7). Whereas previous research highlights positive consequences of flattery for the flatterer, we find that flattery comes with costs for leaders and their organizations. We discuss theoretical and practical implications for leaders who are frequently flattered. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Threshold violations in social judgment.

People commonly establish in advance the thresholds they use to pass social judgment (e.g., promising reward/punishment after a fixed number of good/bad behaviors). Ten preregistered experiments (N = 5,542) reveal when, why, and how people violate their social judgment thresholds, even after formally establishing them based on having full information about what might unfold. People can be swayed to be both "quicker to judge" (e.g., promising reward/punishment after 3 good/bad behaviors, yet then acting after 2 such behaviors) and "slower to judge" (e.g., promising reward/punishment after 3 good/bad behaviors, yet then withholding until 4 such behaviors)-despite all behaviors obeying their threshold. We document these discrepancies across many parameters. We also propose and test an integrative theoretical framework to explain them, rooted in psychological support: Being both "quicker" and "slower" to judge reflect a shared function of the distinct modes of evaluation involved in the act of setting social judgment thresholds (involving a packed summary judgment extending across myriad possible realities) versus following them in real time (involving an unpacked focus on whatever specific reality unfolds, which could provide higher or lower support than threshold setters had accounted for). Manipulating the degree of psychological support thus determines the direction of threshold violations: Higher support produces "quicker to judge" effects while lower support produces "slower to judge" effects. Finally, although violating one's preset threshold may sometimes be to one's benefit, we document initial evidence that it also risks damaging people's reputations and relationships. When it comes to treating others, making exceptions to the rule may often be the rule-for better or worse. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Transient Clozapine-induced Myocarditis Without Discontinuation of Medication: A Series of 2 Patients.

BACKGROUND: Clozapine, an antipsychotic medication used to treat treatment-refractory schizophrenia, has been associated with various dangerous side effects, including myocarditis. However, there have been few published cases reporting on patients with clozapine-induced myocarditis confirmed by cardiac magnetic resonance imaging or the management, treatment, and follow-up of these patients. METHODS: This report describes 2 cases of patients with treatment-refractory schizophrenia evidencing transient clozapine-induced myocarditis. Detailed information including laboratory values, imaging results, and clinical notes were gathered. FINDINGS: The 2 cases demonstrated differing manifestations of clozapine-induced myocarditis. Both cases showed that such myocarditis can be transient and can be treated clinically with close observation without discontinuation of clozapine. IMPLICATIONS: These cases show that clozapine-induced myocarditis is transient at times and can self-resolve without discontinuation of clozapine. These observations may suggest a change in clinical practice so that, with close observation, we can avoid risking psychiatric decompensation in select patients with a history of treatment-resistant schizophrenia.

Incentives can reduce bias in online employer reviews.

Online reviews are widely used to propagate the reputations of employers. However, existing research suggests that online reviews often suffer from selection bias-people with extreme opinions are more motivated to select into sharing them than people with moderate opinions, resulting in more extreme ratings. We find that providing incentives for reviewing can reduce this selection bias, because incentives can mitigate the motivational deficit of people who hold moderate opinions. Using data from Glassdoor, a leading employer review website, we find that incentivized ratings are less extreme than voluntary (self-selected) ratings. The likely bias in the distribution of voluntary reviews can affect workers' choice of employers. We complement our investigation with a randomized experiment that provides a cleaner test of selection bias. We again find that voluntary reviews of employers lead to more extreme reviews compared to non-voluntary reviews. Moreover, providing relatively high monetary rewards or a pro-social cue as incentives for reviewing also lowers the relative prevalence of extreme reviews. Although voluntary employer reviews often suffer from selection bias, incentives can reduce it and help workers make more informed employment choices. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

People use less information than they think to make up their minds.

A world where information is abundant promises unprecedented opportunities for information exchange. Seven studies suggest these opportunities work better in theory than in practice: People fail to anticipate how quickly minds change, believing that they and others will evaluate more evidence before making up their minds than they and others actually do. From evaluating peers, marriage prospects, and political candidates to evaluating novel foods, goods, and services, people consume far less information than expected before deeming things good or bad. Accordingly, people acquire and share too much information in impression-formation contexts: People overvalue long-term trials, overpay for decision aids, and overwork to impress others, neglecting the speed at which conclusions will form. In today's information age, people may intuitively believe that exchanging ever-more information will foster better-informed opinions and perspectives-but much of this information may be lost on minds long made up.

Less Evil Than You: Bounded Self-Righteousness in Character Inferences, Emotional Reactions, and Behavioral Extremes.

Recent research suggests that self-righteousness is bounded, arising more reliably in evaluations of immoral actions than in evaluations of moral actions. Here, we test four implications of this asymmetry in self-righteousness and the mechanism explaining it. We find that people are less likely to make negative character inferences from their own unethical behavior than from others' unethical behavior (Experiment 1), believe they would feel worse after an unethical action than others (Experiment 2), and believe they are less capable of extreme unethical behavior than others (Experiment 3). We observe weaker self-other differences in evaluations of ethical actions. This occurs partly because people base evaluations of themselves on their own moral intentions, leading to predictable individual differences. People more likely to ascribe cynical motives to their own behavior exhibit a smaller asymmetry in self-righteousness (Experiment 4). Self-righteousness seems better characterized as feeling "less evil than thou" than feeling "holier than thou."

The power and limits of personal change: When a bad past does (and does not) inspire in the present.

Observing other people improve their lives can be a powerful source of inspiration. Eight experiments explore the power, limits, and reasons for this power of personal change to inspire. We find that people who have improved from undesirable pasts (e.g., people who used to abuse extreme drugs but no longer do) are more inspiring than people who maintain consistently desirable standings (e.g., people who have never used extreme drugs to begin with), because change is perceived as more effortful than stability (Experiments 1a and 1b). The inspirational power of personal change is rooted in people's lack of access to the internal struggles and hard work that many others may endure to successfully remain 'always-good.' Accordingly, giving observers access into the effort underlying others' success in maintaining consistently positive standings restores the inspiring power of being 'always-good' (Experiments 2-4). Finally, change is more inspiring than stability across many domains but one: people who used to harm others but have since reformed (e.g., ex-bullies or ex-cheaters) do not inspire, and in many cases are indeed less inspiring than people who have never harmed others to begin with (Experiments 5-7). Together, these studies reveal how, why, and when one's past influences one's present in the eyes of others: having some "bad" in your past can be surprisingly positive, at least partly because observers assume that becoming "good" is harder than being "good" all along. (PsycINFO Database Record

The tipping point of perceived change: Asymmetric thresholds in diagnosing improvement versus decline.

Change often emerges from a series of small doses. For example, a person may conclude that a happy relationship has eroded not from 1 obvious fight but from smaller unhappy signs that at some point "add up." Everyday fluctuations therefore create ambiguity about when they reflect substantive shifts versus mere noise. Ten studies reveal an asymmetry in this first point when people conclude "official" change: people demand less evidence to diagnose lasting decline than lasting improvement, despite similar evidential quality. This effect was pervasive and replicated across many domains and parameters. For example, a handful of poor grades, bad games, and gained pounds led participants to diagnose intellect, athleticism, and health as "officially" changed; yet corresponding positive signs were dismissed as fickle flukes (Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c). This further manifested in real-time reactions: participants interpreted the same graphs of change in the economy and public health as more meaningful if framed as depicting decline versus improvement (Study 2), and were more likely to gamble actual money on continued bad versus good luck (Study 3). Why? Effects held across self/other change, added/subtracted change, and intended/unintended change (Studies 4a, 4b, and 4c), suggesting a generalized negativity bias. Teasing this apart, we highlight a novel "entropy" component beyond standard accounts like risk aversion: good things seem more truly capable of losing their positive qualities than bad things seem capable of gaining them, rendering signs of decline to appear more immediately diagnostic (Studies 5 and 6). An asymmetric tipping point raises theoretical and practical implications for how people might inequitably react to smaller signs of change. (PsycINFO Database Record

Maybe holier, but definitely less evil, than you: Bounded self-righteousness in social judgment.

Few biases in human judgment are easier to demonstrate than self-righteousness: the tendency to believe one is more moral than others. Existing research, however, has overlooked an important ambiguity in evaluations of one's own and others' moral behavior that could lead to an overly simplistic characterization of self-righteousness. In particular, moral behavior spans a broad spectrum ranging from doing good to doing bad. Self-righteousness could indicate believing that one is more likely to do good than others, less likely to do bad, or both. Based on cognitive and motivational mechanisms, we predicted an asymmetry in the degree of self-righteousness such that it would be larger when considering unethical actions (doing bad) than when considering ethical actions (doing good). A series of experiments confirmed this prediction. A final experiment suggests that this asymmetry is partly produced by the difference in perspectives that people adopt when evaluating themselves and others (Experiment 8). These results all suggest a bounded sense of self-righteousness. Believing one "less evil than thou" seems more reliable than believing one is "holier than thou." (PsycINFO Database Record

Integrative Approaches to Caring for Children with Autism.

Parents commonly integrate complementary and alternative medical (CAM) treatments for autism spectrum disorder (ASD) with conventional care. The aims of this article are to (1) describe the most commonly used treatments, (2) assess their efficacy and safety, and (3) organize the information in practical format for practitioners. We organized treatment modalities into four categories: recommended, monitored, tolerated, and therapies that should be avoided. These four categories are based on a two by two table weighing a therapy׳s effectiveness and safety. To meet the threshold for "recommended," its effectiveness needed to be supported by two or more randomized, controlled trials. In addition to promoting an overall healthy lifestyle via nutrition, exercise, sleep, stress management, social support, and avoiding neurotoxins (healthy habits in a healthy habitat), the most promising therapies recommend are applied behavior analysis, parent-implemented training, melatonin supplements to improve sleep, supplements to correct deficiencies, and music therapy. Medications and restrictive diets may be helpful for some children, but use should be monitored given the risk of side effects. Most complementary therapies are safe, so they can be tolerated, but additional research is needed before they should be recommended. Given their risks, costs, and limited evidence of efficacy, chelation, secretin, and hyperbaric oxygen should be avoided.

Group discussion improves lie detection.

Groups of individuals can sometimes make more accurate judgments than the average individual could make alone. We tested whether this group advantage extends to lie detection, an exceptionally challenging judgment with accuracy rates rarely exceeding chance. In four experiments, we find that groups are consistently more accurate than individuals in distinguishing truths from lies, an effect that comes primarily from an increased ability to correctly identify when a person is lying. These experiments demonstrate that the group advantage in lie detection comes through the process of group discussion, and is not a product of aggregating individual opinions (a "wisdom-of-crowds" effect) or of altering response biases (such as reducing the "truth bias"). Interventions to improve lie detection typically focus on improving individual judgment, a costly and generally ineffective endeavor. Our findings suggest a cheap and simple synergistic approach of enabling group discussion before rendering a judgment.

The topography of generosity: asymmetric evaluations of prosocial actions.

Prosociality is considered a virtue. Those who care for others are admired, whereas those who care only for themselves are despised. For one's reputation, it pays to be nice. Does it pay to be even nicer? Four experiments assess reputational inferences across the entire range of prosocial outcomes in zero-sum interactions, from completely selfish to completely selfless actions. We observed consistent nonlinear evaluations: Participants evaluated selfish actions more negatively than equitable actions, but they did not evaluate selfless actions markedly more favorably than equitable actions. This asymptotic pattern reflected monotonic evaluations for increasingly selfish actions and insensitivity to increasingly selfless actions. It pays to be nice but not to be really nice. Additional experiments suggest that this pattern stems partly from failing to make spontaneous comparisons between varying degrees of selflessness. We suggest that these reputational incentives could guide social norms, encouraging equitable actions but discouraging extremely selfless actions.