ABSTRACT
Zika virus infection can occur as a result of mosquitoborne or sexual transmission of the virus. Infection during pregnancy is a cause of fetal brain abnormalities and other serious birth defects (1,2). CDC has updated the interim guidance for men with possible Zika virus exposure who 1) are planning to conceive with their partner, or 2) want to prevent sexual transmission of Zika virus at any time (3). CDC now recommends that men with possible Zika virus exposure who are planning to conceive with their partner wait for at least 3 months after symptom onset (if symptomatic) or their last possible Zika virus exposure (if asymptomatic) before engaging in unprotected sex. CDC now also recommends that for couples who are not trying to conceive, men can consider using condoms or abstaining from sex for at least 3 months after symptom onset (if symptomatic) or their last possible Zika virus exposure (if asymptomatic) to minimize their risk for sexual transmission of Zika virus. All other guidance for Zika virus remains unchanged. The definition of possible Zika virus exposure remains unchanged and includes travel to or residence in an area with risk for Zika virus transmission (https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/page/world-map-areas-with-zika) or sex without a condom with a partner who traveled to or lives in an area with risk for Zika virus transmission. CDC will continue to update recommendations as new information becomes available.
Subject(s)
Directive Counseling , Preconception Care , Pregnancy Complications, Infectious/prevention & control , Sexually Transmitted Diseases, Viral/prevention & control , Zika Virus Infection/prevention & control , Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. , Condoms/statistics & numerical data , Female , Humans , Male , Pregnancy , Residence Characteristics/statistics & numerical data , Travel/statistics & numerical data , United States , Zika Virus Infection/transmissionSubject(s)
Chiroptera/virology , Environmental Exposure , Rabies virus/isolation & purification , Rabies/veterinary , Travel , Animals , Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. , Female , Humans , International Health Regulations , Middle Aged , Post-Exposure Prophylaxis , Rabies/prevention & control , Switzerland , United States , World Health OrganizationABSTRACT
In 2014, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention conducted conveyance contact investigations for 2 Middle East respiratory syndrome cases imported into the United States, comprising all passengers and crew on 4 international and domestic flights and 1 bus. Of 655 contacts, 78% were interviewed; 33% had serologic testing. No secondary cases were identified.
Subject(s)
Contact Tracing , Coronavirus Infections/diagnosis , Infection Control , Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus/isolation & purification , RNA, Viral/genetics , Adult , Aged , Aviation , Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. , Coronavirus Infections/transmission , Humans , Male , Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus/genetics , Saudi Arabia , Travel , United StatesABSTRACT
The International Health Regulations (IHR), an international law under the auspices of the World Health Organization (WHO), mandates that countries notify other countries of "travelers under public health observation." Between November 10, 2014, and July 12, 2015, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) made 2,374 notifications to the National IHR Focal Points in 114 foreign countries of travelers who were monitored by US health departments because they had been to an Ebola-affected country in West Africa. Given that countries have preidentified focal points as points of contacts for sharing of public health information, notifications could be made by CDC to a trusted public health recipient in another country within 24 hours of receipt of the traveler's information from a US health department. The majority of US health departments used this process, offered by CDC, to notify other countries of travelers intending to leave the United States while being monitored in their jurisdiction.
Subject(s)
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. , Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola/prevention & control , Public Health Surveillance , Travel , Africa, Western , Epidemiological Monitoring , Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola/epidemiology , Humans , International Cooperation , Internationality , Sentinel Surveillance , United States , World Health OrganizationABSTRACT
The introduction of Zika virus into the Region of the Americas (Americas) and the subsequent increase in cases of congenital microcephaly resulted in activation of CDC's Emergency Operations Center on January 22, 2016, to ensure a coordinated response and timely dissemination of information, and led the World Health Organization to declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on February 1, 2016. During the past year, public health agencies and researchers worldwide have collaborated to protect pregnant women, inform clinicians and the public, and advance knowledge about Zika virus (Figure 1). This report summarizes 10 important contributions toward addressing the threat posed by Zika virus in 2016. To protect pregnant women and their fetuses and infants from the effects of Zika virus infection during pregnancy, public health activities must focus on preventing mosquito-borne transmission through vector control and personal protective practices, preventing sexual transmission by advising abstention from sex or consistent and correct use of condoms, and preventing unintended pregnancies by reducing barriers to access to highly effective reversible contraception.
Subject(s)
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. , Public Health Practice , Zika Virus Infection/prevention & control , Achievement , Forecasting , Health Priorities/trends , Humans , United StatesABSTRACT
Vaccination during pregnancy is increasingly being used as an effective approach for protecting both young infants and their mothers from serious infections. Drawing conclusions from published studies in this area can be difficult because of the inability to compare vaccine trial results across different studies and settings due to the heterogeneity in the definitions of terms used to assess the safety of vaccines in pregnancy and the data collected in such studies. The guidelines proposed in this document have been developed to harmonize safety data collection in all phases of clinical trials of vaccines in pregnant women and apply to data from the mother, fetus and infant. Guidelines on the prioritization of the data to be collected is also provided to allow applicability in various geographic, cultural and resource settings, including high, middle and low-income countries.
Subject(s)
Clinical Trials as Topic , Pregnancy , Vaccination/adverse effects , Vaccines/adverse effects , Female , Humans , Infant , Pregnancy Complications, Infectious/prevention & control , Statistics as Topic , Vaccines/administration & dosageABSTRACT
During the 2014-2016 Ebola virus disease (Ebola) epidemic in West Africa, CDC implemented travel and border health measures to prevent international spread of the disease, educate and protect travelers and communities, and minimize disruption of international travel and trade. CDC staff provided in-country technical assistance for exit screening in countries in West Africa with Ebola outbreaks, implemented an enhanced entry risk assessment and management program for travelers at U.S. ports of entry, and disseminated information and guidance for specific groups of travelers and relevant organizations. New and existing partnerships were crucial to the success of this response, including partnerships with international organizations, such as the World Health Organization, the International Organization for Migration, and nongovernment organizations, as well as domestic partnerships with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and state and local health departments. Although difficult to assess, travel and border health measures might have helped control the epidemic's spread in West Africa by deterring or preventing travel by symptomatic or exposed persons and by educating travelers about protecting themselves. Enhanced entry risk assessment at U.S. airports facilitated management of travelers after arrival, including the recommended active monitoring. These measures also reassured airlines, shipping companies, port partners, and travelers that travel was safe and might have helped maintain continued flow of passenger traffic and resources needed for the response to the affected region. Travel and border health measures implemented in the countries with Ebola outbreaks laid the foundation for future reconstruction efforts related to borders and travel, including development of regional surveillance systems, cross-border coordination, and implementation of core capacities at designated official points of entry in accordance with the International Health Regulations (2005). New mechanisms developed during this response to target risk assessment and management of travelers arriving in the United States may enhance future public health responses. The activities summarized in this report would not have been possible without collaboration with many U.S. and international partners (http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/partners.html).
Subject(s)
Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control , Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola/prevention & control , Internationality , Mass Screening , Travel , Africa, Western/epidemiology , Airports , Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S./organization & administration , Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola/epidemiology , Humans , International Cooperation , Professional Role , Risk Assessment , United StatesABSTRACT
Applying qualitative historical methods, we examined the consideration and implementation of school closures as a nonpharmaceutical intervention (NPI) in thirty US cities during the spring 2009 wave of the pA(H1N1) influenza pandemic. We gathered and performed close textual readings of official federal, state, and municipal government documents; media coverage; and academic publications. Lastly, we conducted oral history interviews with public health and education officials in our selected cities. We found that several local health departments pursued school closure plans independent of CDC guidance, that uncertainty of action and the rapidly evolving understanding of pA(H1N1) contributed to tension and pushback from the public, that the media and public perception played a significant role in the response to school closure decisions, and that there were some notable instances of interdepartmental communication breakdown. We conclude that health departments should continue to develop and fine-tune their action plans while also working to develop better communication methods with the public, and work more closely with education officials to better understand the complexities involved in closing schools. Lastly, state and local governments should work to resolve lingering issues of legal authority for school closures in times of public health crises.
Subject(s)
Communicable Disease Control/history , Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype , Influenza, Human/history , Pandemics/history , Public Health Administration/history , Schools/history , Cities , Communicable Disease Control/methods , History, 20th Century , History, 21st Century , Humans , Influenza, Human/epidemiology , Influenza, Human/prevention & control , Public HealthABSTRACT
Before the current Ebola epidemic in West Africa, there were few documented cases of symptomatic Ebola patients traveling by commercial airline, and no evidence of transmission to passengers or crew members during airline travel. In July 2014 two persons with confirmed Ebola virus infection who were infected early in the Nigeria outbreak traveled by commercial airline while symptomatic, involving a total of four flights (two international flights and two Nigeria domestic flights). It is not clear what symptoms either of these two passengers experienced during flight; however, one collapsed in the airport shortly after landing, and the other was documented to have fever, vomiting, and diarrhea on the day the flight arrived. Neither infected passenger transmitted Ebola to other passengers or crew on these flights. In October 2014, another airline passenger, a U.S. health care worker who had traveled domestically on two commercial flights, was confirmed to have Ebola virus infection. Given that the time of onset of symptoms was uncertain, an Ebola airline contact investigation in the United States was conducted. In total, follow-up was conducted for 268 contacts in nine states, including all 247 passengers from both flights, 12 flight crew members, eight cleaning crew members, and one federal airport worker (81 of these contacts were documented in a report published previously). All contacts were accounted for by state and local jurisdictions and followed until completion of their 21-day incubation periods. No secondary cases of Ebola were identified in this investigation, confirming that transmission of Ebola during commercial air travel did not occur.
Subject(s)
Aircraft , Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control , Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola/prevention & control , Public Health Practice , Travel , Contact Tracing , Health Personnel , Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola/epidemiology , Humans , Nigeria/epidemiology , Occupational Diseases , United States/epidemiologyABSTRACT
In response to the largest recognized Ebola virus disease epidemic now occurring in West Africa, the governments of affected countries, CDC, the World Health Organization (WHO), and other international organizations have collaborated to implement strategies to control spread of the virus. One strategy recommended by WHO calls for countries with Ebola transmission to screen all persons exiting the country for "unexplained febrile illness consistent with potential Ebola infection." Exit screening at points of departure is intended to reduce the likelihood of international spread of the virus. To initiate this strategy, CDC, WHO, and other global partners were invited by the ministries of health of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to assist them in developing and implementing exit screening procedures. Since the program began in August 2014, an estimated 80,000 travelers, of whom approximately 12,000 were en route to the United States, have departed by air from the three countries with Ebola transmission. Procedures were implemented to deny boarding to ill travelers and persons who reported a high risk for exposure to Ebola; no international air traveler from these countries has been reported as symptomatic with Ebola during travel since these procedures were implemented.
Subject(s)
Airports , Epidemics/prevention & control , Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola/prevention & control , Mass Screening/statistics & numerical data , Travel , Africa, Western/epidemiology , Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola/epidemiology , Humans , Risk Assessment , United States/epidemiologyABSTRACT
Since mid-March 2014, the frequency with which cases of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection have been reported has increased, with the majority of recent cases reported from Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE). In addition, the frequency with which travel-associated MERS cases have been reported and the number of countries that have reported them to the World Health Organization (WHO) have also increased. The first case of MERS in the United States, identified in a traveler recently returned from Saudi Arabia, was reported to CDC by the Indiana State Department of Health on May 1, 2014, and confirmed by CDC on May 2. A second imported case of MERS in the United States, identified in a traveler from Saudi Arabia having no connection with the first case, was reported to CDC by the Florida Department of Health on May 11, 2014. The purpose of this report is to alert clinicians, health officials, and others to increase awareness of the need to consider MERS-CoV infection in persons who have recently traveled from countries in or near the Arabian Peninsula. This report summarizes recent epidemiologic information, provides preliminary descriptions of the cases reported from Indiana and Florida, and updates CDC guidance about patient evaluation, home care and isolation, specimen collection, and travel as of May 13, 2014.
Subject(s)
Coronavirus Infections/diagnosis , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Coronavirus/isolation & purification , Adolescent , Adult , Aged , Aged, 80 and over , Child , Child, Preschool , Coronavirus Infections/prevention & control , Female , Guidelines as Topic , Humans , Infant , Infection Control , Male , Middle Aged , Middle East , Patient Isolation , Practice Guidelines as Topic , Public Health Administration , Travel , United States/epidemiology , Young AdultABSTRACT
OBJECTIVES: We assessed local health departments' (LHDs') ability to provide data on nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) for the mitigation of 2009 H1N1 influenza during the pandemic response. DESIGN: Local health departments voluntarily participated weekly in a National Association of County and City Health Officials Web-based survey designed to provide situational awareness to federal partners about NPI recommendations and implementation during the response and to provide insight into the epidemiologic context in which recommendations were made. SETTING: Local health departments during the fall 2009 H1N1 pandemic response. PARTICIPANTS: Local health departments that voluntarily participated in the National Association of County and City Health Officials Sentinel Surveillance Network. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Local health departments were asked to report data on recommendations for and the implementation of NPIs from 7 community sectors. Data were also collected on influenza outbreaks; closures, whether recommended by the local health department or not; absenteeism of students in grades K-12; the type(s) of influenza viruses circulating in the jurisdiction; and the health care system capacity. RESULTS: One hundred thirty-nine LHDs participated. Most LHDs issued NPI recommendations to their community over the 10-week survey period with 70% to 97% of LHDs recommending hand hygiene and cough etiquette and 51% to 78% voluntary isolation of ill patients. However, 21% to 48% of LHDs lacked information of closure, absenteeism, or outbreaks in schools, and 28% to 50% lacked information on outpatient clinic capacity. CONCLUSIONS: Many LHDs were unable to monitor implementation of NPI (recommended by LHD or not) within their community during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. This gap makes it difficult to adjust recommendations or messaging during a public health emergency response. Public health preparedness could be improved by strengthening NPI monitoring capacity.
Subject(s)
Civil Defense/organization & administration , Civil Defense/statistics & numerical data , Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype , Influenza, Human/epidemiology , Local Government , Pandemics/statistics & numerical data , Public Health , Absenteeism , Ambulatory Care Facilities/statistics & numerical data , Hand Hygiene/statistics & numerical data , Humans , Masks/statistics & numerical data , Quarantine/statistics & numerical data , Schools/statistics & numerical dataABSTRACT
Shortly after the influenza A (H1N1) 2009 pandemic began, the U.S. government provided guidance to state and local authorities to assist decision-making for the use of nonpharmaceutical strategies to minimize influenza spread. This guidance included recommendations for flexible decision-making based on outbreak severity, and it allowed for uncertainty and course correction as the pandemic progressed. These recommendations build on a foundation of local, collaborative planning and posit a series of questions regarding epidemiology, the impact on the health-care system, and locally determined feasibility and acceptability of nonpharmaceutical strategies. This article describes -recommendations and key questions for decision makers.
Subject(s)
Communicable Disease Control/methods , Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype/pathogenicity , Influenza, Human/prevention & control , Cooperative Behavior , Decision Making , Health Communication , Health Planning Guidelines , Humans , Influenza, Human/epidemiology , Influenza, Human/transmission , Pandemics , United StatesABSTRACT
BACKGROUND: Many important strategies to reduce the spread of pandemic influenza need public participation. To assess public receptivity to such strategies, we compared adoption of preventive behaviours in response to the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic among the public in five countries and examined whether certain non-pharmaceutical behaviours (such as handwashing) were deterrents to vaccination. We also assessed public support for related public health recommendations. METHODS: We used data from simultaneous telephone polls (mobile telephone and landline) in Argentina, Japan, Mexico, the UK, and the USA. In each country, interviews were done in a nationally representative sample of adults, who were selected by the use of random digit dial techniques. The questionnaire asked people whether or not they had adopted each of various preventive behaviours (non-pharmaceutical--such as personal protective and social distancing behaviour--or vaccinations) to protect themselves or their family from H1N1 at any point during the pandemic. Two-tailed t tests were used for statistical analysis. FINDINGS: 900 people were surveyed in each country except the USA where 911 people were contacted. There were wide differences in the adoption of preventive behaviours between countries, although certain personal protective behaviours (eg, handwashing) were more commonly adopted than social distancing behaviours (eg, avoiding places where many people gather) across countries (53-89%vs 11-69%). These non-pharmaceutical behaviours did not reduce the likelihood of getting vaccinated in any country. There was also support across all countries for government recommendations related to school closure, avoiding places where many people gather, and wearing masks in public. INTERPRETATION: There is a need for country-specific approaches in pandemic policy planning that use both non-pharmaceutical approaches and vaccination. FUNDING: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Public Health Information Coalition.
Subject(s)
Communicable Disease Control/methods , Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype/isolation & purification , Influenza, Human/epidemiology , Influenza, Human/prevention & control , Pandemics , Patient Acceptance of Health Care/statistics & numerical data , Adolescent , Adult , Aged , Aged, 80 and over , Argentina , Female , Humans , Influenza, Human/virology , Interviews as Topic , Japan , Male , Mexico , Middle Aged , Surveys and Questionnaires , United Kingdom , United States , Young AdultABSTRACT
Under the current International Health Regulations, 194 states parties are obligated to report potential public health emergencies of international concern to the World Health Organization (WHO) within 72 hours of becoming aware of an event. During July 2007-December 2011, WHO assessed and posted on a secure web portal 222 events from 105 states parties, including 24 events from the United States. Twelve US events involved human influenza caused by a new virus subtype, including the first report of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, which constitutes the only public health emergency of international concern determined by the WHO director-general to date. Additional US events involved 5 Salmonella spp. outbreaks, botulism, Escherichia coli O157:H7 infections, Guillain-Barré syndrome, contaminated heparin, Lassa fever, an oil spill, and typhoid fever. Rapid information exchange among WHO and member states facilitated by the International Health Regulations leads to better situation awareness of emerging threats and enables a more coordinated and transparent global response.
Subject(s)
Communicable Disease Control/legislation & jurisprudence , Communicable Diseases/epidemiology , Disease Notification/legislation & jurisprudence , Guillain-Barre Syndrome/epidemiology , Petroleum Pollution/statistics & numerical data , Disease Notification/methods , Humans , Population Surveillance/methods , Public Health/legislation & jurisprudence , United States/epidemiology , World Health OrganizationSubject(s)
Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting Systems/standards , Drug-Related Side Effects and Adverse Reactions/diagnosis , Drug-Related Side Effects and Adverse Reactions/epidemiology , Vaccination/adverse effects , Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting Systems/statistics & numerical data , Drug-Related Side Effects and Adverse Reactions/pathology , HumansSubject(s)
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S./history , Periodicals as Topic/history , Public Health/history , Disease Outbreaks , Epidemiology , History, 20th Century , History, 21st Century , Humans , Periodicals as Topic/trends , Population Surveillance , Practice Guidelines as Topic , United StatesABSTRACT
BACKGROUND: On March 22, 2002, Internet-based reports (IBRs) were added to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) to allow rapid, expedited reporting of adverse events (AEs) in anticipation of wider use of counter-bioterrorism vaccines such as those against smallpox and anthrax. OBJECTIVES: To evaluate the impact of IBRs on the timeliness and completeness of vaccine AE reporting. METHODS: To evaluate timeliness and completeness, we compared the proportions of IBRs with non-Internet-based reports (NIBRs). Report interval was analyzed for timeliness and age at vaccination, birth date, and onset date for report completeness. To evaluate the impact of the smallpox vaccination program, we compared smallpox vaccine reports separately. Because influenza vaccine is the most widely used vaccine in adults each year, we compared influenza vaccine reports separately. RESULTS: During the study period, VAERS received 54 364 NIBRs (85.8%) and 9008 IBRs (14.2%). Sixteen percent (1455) of IBRs followed smallpox vaccination. Overall, for all vaccines and for smallpox vaccine alone, IBRs had a greater proportion of completeness and a shorter report interval. The proportion of most frequently reported AEs did not differ between IBRs and NIBRs. A higher proportion of adults (18-64 years old) who received influenza vaccine chose to complete an IBR (62% vs 48%). CONCLUSIONS: The improved timeliness and completeness of IBRs allow VAERS to more rapidly detect new or rare vaccine AEs. This important advantage is critical in times of increased public concern about vaccine safety. Clinical vaccine providers should be aware of VAERS and use IBRs whenever feasible to report vaccine AEs.