A multivariable analysis to predict variations in hospital mortality using systems-based factors of healthcare delivery to inform improvements to healthcare design within the English NHS.

Over the last decade, the strain on the English National Health Service (NHS) has increased. This has been especially felt by acute hospital trusts where the volume of admissions has steadily increased. Patient outcomes, including inpatient mortality, vary between trusts. The extent to which these differences are explained by systems-based factors, and whether they are avoidable, is unclear. Few studies have investigated these relationships. A systems-based methodology recognises the complexity of influences on healthcare outcomes. Rather than clinical interventions alone, the resources supporting a patient's treatment journey have near-equal importance. This paper first identifies suitable metrics of resource and demand within healthcare delivery from routinely collected, publicly available, hospital-level data. Then it proceeds to use univariate and multivariable linear regression to associate such systems-based factors with standardised mortality. Three sequential cross-sectional analyses were performed, spanning the last decade. The results of the univariate regression analyses show clear relationships between five out of the six selected predictor variables and standardised mortality. When these five predicators are included within a multivariable regression analysis, they reliably explain approximately 36% of the variation in standardised mortality between hospital trusts. Three factors are consistently statistically significant: the number of doctors per hospital bed, bed occupancy, and the percentage of patients who are placed in a bed within four hours after a decision to admit them. Of these, the number of doctors per bed had the strongest effect. Linear regression assumption testing and a robustness analysis indicate the observations have internal validity. However, our empirical strategy cannot determine causality and our findings should not be interpreted as established causal relationships. This study provides hypothesis-generating evidence of significant relationships between systems-based factors of healthcare delivery and standardised mortality. These have relevance to clinicians and policymakers alike. While identifying causal relationships between the predictors is left to the future, it establishes an important paradigm for further research.

Financial incentives for integrated care: A scoping review and lessons for evidence-based design.

BACKGROUND: In response to the increasing prevalence of people with chronic conditions, healthcare systems restructure to integrate care across providers. However, many systems fail to achieve the desired outcomes. One likely explanation is lack of financial incentives for integrating care. OBJECTIVES: We aim to identify financial incentives used to promote integrated care across different types of providers for patients with common chronic conditions and assess the evidence on (cost-)effectiveness and the facilitators/barriers to their implementation. METHODS: This scoping review identifies studies published before December 2021, and includes 33 studies from the United States and the Netherlands. RESULTS: We identify four types of financial incentives: shared savings, bundled payments, pay for performance, and pay for coordination. Substantial heterogeneity in the (cost-)effectiveness of these incentives exists. Key implementation barriers are a lack of infrastructure (e.g., electronic medical records, communication channels, and clinical guidelines). To facilitate integration, financial incentives should be easy to communicate and implement, and require additional financial support, IT support, training, and guidelines. CONCLUSIONS: All four types of financial incentives may promote integrated care but not in all contexts. Shared savings appears to be the most promising incentive type for promoting (cost-)effective care integration with the largest number of favourable studies allowing causal interpretations. The limited evidence pool makes it hard to draw firm conclusions that are transferable across contexts.

Integrated care in a Beveridge system: experiences from England and Denmark.

Health systems internationally face demands to deliver care that is better coordinated and integrated. The health system financing and delivery model may go some, but not all the way in explaining health system fragmentation. In this paper, we consider the road to care integration in two countries with Beveridge style health systems, England and Denmark, that are both ranked as highly Integrated systems in Toth's health integration index. We use the SELFIE framework to compare the policies and reforms that have affected care integration over the past 30 years in the two countries. The countries both started their reform path by reforming to introduce choice and competition, but did so in different ways that set them on different pathways. Nevertheless, after two decades, the countries ended the period with largely similar structures that emphasised the creation of a cross-sectoral governance structure. In the relatively centralised England, by introducing decentralised Integrated Care Systems, and in the relatively decentralised Denmark with a centralising element in the form of new Health Clusters.

Pay-for-Performance incentives for specialised services in England: a mixed methods evaluation.

BACKGROUND: A Pay-for-Performance (P4P) programme, known as Prescribed Specialised Services Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (PSS CQUIN), was introduced for specialised services in the English NHS in 2013/2014. These services treat patients with rare and complex conditions. We evaluate the implementation of PSS CQUIN contracts between 2016/2017 and 2018/2019. METHODS: We used a mixed methods evaluative approach. In the quantitative analysis, we used a difference-in-differences design to evaluate the effectiveness of ten PSS CQUIN schemes across a range of targeted outcomes. Potential selection bias was addressed using propensity score matching. We also estimated impacts on costs by scheme and financial year. In the qualitative analysis, we conducted semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions to gain insights into the complexities of contract design and programme implementation. Qualitative data analysis was based on the constant comparative method, inductively generating themes. RESULTS: The ten PSS CQUIN schemes had limited impact on the targeted outcomes. A statistically significant improvement was found for only one scheme: in the clinical area of trauma, the incentive scheme increased the probability of being discharged from Adult Critical Care within four hours of being clinically ready by 7%. The limited impact may be due to the size of the incentive payments, the complexity of the schemes' design, and issues around ownership, contracting and flexibility. CONCLUSION: The PSS CQUIN schemes had little or no impact on quality improvements in specialised services. Future P4P programmes in healthcare could benefit from lessons learnt from this study on incentive design and programme implementation.

Patient and peer: Guideline design and expert response.

We examine how patients' medical expertise influences adherence to clinical guidelines for a treatment that is common, costly, and rationed by the clinical guidelines. Using administrative data on prenatal diagnostic testing (PDT), we compare the testing rates of medically trained patients (experts) and non-medically trained patients (non-experts) on the margin of eligibility thresholds in clinical guidelines. We find that experts are 9 percentage points more likely to receive PDT than non-experts when they are not eligible for testing and that more than 80% of the difference can be attributed to medical expertise. Our results suggest that the design of clinical guidelines is important for adherence and that having medical expertise as a patient affects treatment, when there is room for a deviation from the guideline.

Spillover effects of financial incentives for providers onto non-targeted patients: daycase surgery in English hospitals.

BACKGROUND: Incentives for healthcare providers may also affect non-targeted patients. These spillover effects have important implications for the full impact and evaluation of incentive schemes. However, there are few studies on the extent of such spillovers in health care. We investigated whether incentives to perform surgical procedures as daycases affected whether other elective procedures in the same specialties were also treated as daycases. DATA: 8,505,754 patients treated for 92 non-targeted procedures in 127 hospital trusts in England between April and March 2016. METHODS: Interrupted time series analysis of the probability of being treated as a daycase for non-targeted patients treated in six specialties where targeted patients were also treated and three specialties where they were not. RESULTS: The daycase rate initially increased (1.04 percentage points, SE: 0.30) for patients undergoing a non-targeted procedure in incentivised specialties but then reduced over time. Conversely, the daycase rate gradually decreased over time for patients treated in a non-incentivised specialty. DISCUSSION: Spillovers from financial incentives have variable effects over different activities and over time. Policymakers and researchers should consider the possibility of spillovers in the design and evaluation of incentive schemes.

Back to basics: A mediation analysis approach to addressing the fundamental questions of integrated care evaluations.

Health systems around the world are aiming to improve the integration of health and social care services to deliver better care for patients. Existing evaluations have focused exclusively on the impact of care integration on health outcomes and found little effect. That suggests the need to take a step back and ask whether integrated care programmes actually lead to greater clinical integration of care and indeed whether greater integration is associated with improved health outcomes. We propose a mediation analysis approach to address these two fundamental questions when evaluating integrated care programmes. We illustrate our approach by re-examining the impact of an English integrated care program on clinical integration and assessing whether greater integration is causally associated with fewer admissions for ambulatory care sensitive conditions. We measure clinical integration using a concentration index of outpatient referrals at the general practice level. While we find that the scheme increased integration of primary and secondary care, clinical integration did not mediate a decrease in unplanned hospital admissions. Our analysis emphasizes the need to better understand the hypothesized causal impact of integration on health outcomes and demonstrates how mediation analysis can inform future evaluations and program design.

The impact of patient safety incidents during hip and knee replacements on patients' health related quality of life: a before and after study using longitudinal data linked to patient-reported outcome measures.

BACKGROUND: The burden of patient safety incidents (PSIs) is often characterized by their impact on mortality, morbidity, and treatment costs. Few studies have attempted to estimate the impact of PSIs on patients' health-related quality of life (HRQoL) and the studies that have made such estimates primarily focus on a narrow set of incidents. The aim of this paper is to estimate the impact of PSIs on HRQoL of patients undergoing elective hip and knee surgery in England. PATIENTS AND METHODS: A unique linked longitudinal data set consisting of patient-reported outcome measures for patients with hip and knee replacements linked to Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) collected between 2013/14 and 2016/17 was examined. Patients with any of nine US Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) PSI indicators were identified. HRQoL was measured using the general EuroQol five dimensions questionnaire (EQ-5D) before and after surgery. Exploiting the longitudinal structure of the data, exact matching was combined with difference in differences to estimate the impact of experiencing a PSI on HRQoL and its individual dimensions, comparing HRQoL improvements after surgery in similar patients with and without a PSI in a retrospective cohort study. This design compares the change in HRQoL before and after surgery in patients who experience a PSI to those who do not. RESULTS: The sample comprised 190 697 and 204 649 observations for patients undergoing hip replacement and knee replacement respectively. For six out of nine PSIs, patients who experienced a PSI reported improvements in HRQoL that were 14-23% lower than those who did not experience a PSI during surgery. Those who experienced a PSI were also more likely to report worse health states after surgery than those without a PSI on all five dimensions of HRQoL. CONCLUSION: PSIs are associated with a substantial negative impact on patients' HRQoL.

Pay-for-performance for primary health care in Brazil: A comparison with England's Quality Outcomes Framework and lessons for the future.

Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been widely applied in OECD countries to improve the quality of both primary and secondary care, and is increasingly being implemented in low- and middle-income countries. In 2011, Brazil introduced one of the largest P4P schemes in the world, the National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ). We critically assess the design of PMAQ, drawing on a comparison with England's quality and outcome framework which, like PMAQ, was implemented at scale relatively rapidly within a nationalised health system. A key feature of PMAQ was that payment was based on the performance of primary care teams but rewards were given to municipalities, who had autonomy in how the funds could be used. This meant the incentives felt by family health teams were contingent on municipality decisions on whether to pass the funds on as bonuses and the basis upon which they allocated the funds between and within teams. Compared with England's P4P scheme, performance measurement under PMAQ focused more on structural rather than process quality of care, relied on many more indicators, and was less regular. While PMAQ represented an important new funding stream for primary health care, our review suggests that theoretical incentives generated were unclear and could have been better structured to direct health providers towards improvements in quality of care.

Performance bonuses and the quality of primary health care delivered by family health teams in Brazil: A difference-in-differences analysis.

BACKGROUND: Pay-for-performance (P4P) programmes to incentivise health providers to improve quality of care have been widely implemented globally. Despite intuitive appeal, evidence on the effectiveness of P4P is mixed, potentially due to differences in how schemes are designed. We exploited municipality variation in the design features of Brazil's National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ) to examine whether performance bonuses given to family health team workers were associated with changes in the quality of care and whether the size of bonus mattered. METHODS AND FINDINGS: For this quasi-experimental study, we used a difference-in-differences approach combined with matching. We compared changes over time in the quality of care delivered by family health teams between (bonus) municipalities that chose to use some or all of the PMAQ money to provide performance-related bonuses to team workers with (nonbonus) municipalities that invested the funds using traditional input-based budgets. The primary outcome was the PMAQ score, a quality of care index on a scale of 0 to 100, based on several hundred indicators (ranging from 598 to 660) of health care delivery. We did one-to-one matching of bonus municipalities to nonbonus municipalities based on baseline demographic and economic characteristics. On the matched sample, we used ordinary least squares regression to estimate the association of any bonus and size of bonus with the prepost change over time (between November 2011 and October 2015) in the PMAQ score. We performed subgroup analyses with respect to the local area income of the family health team. The matched analytical sample comprised 2,346 municipalities (1,173 nonbonus municipalities; 1,173 bonus municipalities), containing 10,275 family health teams that participated in PMAQ from the outset. Bonus municipalities were associated with a 4.6 (95% CI: 2.7 to 6.4; p < 0.001) percentage point increase in the PMAQ score compared with nonbonus municipalities. The association with quality of care increased with the size of bonus: the largest bonus group saw an improvement of 8.2 percentage points (95% CI: 6.2 to 10.2; p < 0.001) compared with the control. The subgroup analysis showed that the observed improvement in performance was most pronounced in the poorest two-fifths of localities. The limitations of the study include the potential for bias from unmeasured time-varying confounding and the fact that the PMAQ score has not been validated as a measure of quality of care. CONCLUSIONS: Performance bonuses to family health team workers compared with traditional input-based budgets were associated with an improvement in the quality of care.

Physicians under Pressure: Evidence from Antibiotics Prescribing in England.

BACKGROUND: Many physicians are experiencing increasing demands from both their patients and society. Evidence is scarce on the consequences of the pressure on physicians' decision making. We present a theoretical framework and predict that increasing pressure may make physicians disregard societal welfare when treating patients. SETTING: We test our prediction on general practitioners' antibiotic-prescribing choices. Because prescribing broad-spectrum antibiotics does not require microbiological testing, it can be performed more quickly than prescribing for narrow-spectrum antibiotics and is therefore often preferred by the patient. In contrast, from a societal perspective, inappropriate prescribing of broad-spectrum antibiotics should be minimized as it may contribute to antimicrobial resistance in the general population. METHODS: We combine longitudinal survey data and administrative data from 2010 to 2017 to create a balanced panel of up to 1072 English general practitioners (GPs). Using a series of linear models with GP fixed effects, we estimate the importance of different sources of pressure for GPs' prescribing. RESULTS: We find that the percentage of broad-spectrum antibiotics prescribed increases by 6.4% as pressure increases on English GPs. The link between pressure and prescribing holds for different sources of pressure. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest that there may be societal costs of physicians working under pressure. Policy makers need to take these costs into account when evaluating existing policies as well as when introducing new policies affecting physicians' work pressure. An important avenue for further research is also to determine the underlying mechanisms related to the different sources of pressure.JEL-code: I11, J28, J45. HIGHLIGHTS: Many physicians are working under increasing pressure.We test the importance of pressure on physicians' prescribing of antibiotics.The prescribed rate of broad-spectrum antibiotics increases with pressure.Policy makers should be aware of the societal costs of pressured physicians.[Formula: see text].

Economic Aspects of Delivering Primary Care Services: An Evidence Synthesis to Inform Policy and Research Priorities.

Policy Points The 2018 Declaration of Astana reemphasized the importance of primary health care and its role in achieving universal health coverage. While there is a large amount of literature on the economic aspects of delivering primary care services, there is a need for more comprehensive overviews of this evidence. In this article, we offer such an overview. Evidence suggests that there are several strategies involving coverage, financing, service delivery, and governance arrangements which can, if implemented, have positive economic impacts on the delivery of primary care services. These include arrangements such as worker task-shifting and telemedicine. The implementation of any such arrangements, based on positive economic evidence, should carefully account for potential impacts on overall health care access and quality. There are many opportunities for further research, with notable gaps in evidence on the impacts of increasing primary care funding or the overall supply of primary care services. CONTEXT: The 2018 Declaration of Astana reemphasized the importance of primary health care and its role in achieving universal health coverage. To strengthen primary health care, policymakers need guidance on how to allocate resources in a manner that maximizes its economic benefits. METHODS: We collated and synthesized published systematic reviews of evidence on the economic aspects of different models of delivering primary care services. Building on previous efforts, we adapted existing taxonomies of primary care components to classify our results according to four categories: coverage, financing, service delivery, and governance. FINDINGS: We identified and classified 109 reviews that met our inclusion criteria according to our taxonomy of primary care components: coverage, financing, service delivery, and governance arrangements. A significant body of evidence suggests that several specific primary care arrangements, such as health workers' task shifting and telemedicine, can have positive economic impacts (such as lower overall health care costs). Notably absent were reviews on the impact of increasing primary care funding or the overall supply of primary care services. CONCLUSIONS: There is a great opportunity for further research to systematically examine the broader economic impacts of investing in primary care services. Despite progress over the last decade, significant evidence gaps on the economic implications of different models of primary care services remain, which could help inform the basis of future research efforts.

Socioeconomic inequalities in the quality of primary care under Brazil's national pay-for-performance programme: a longitudinal study of family health teams.

BACKGROUND: Many governments have introduced pay-for-performance programmes to incentivise health providers to improve quality of care. Evidence on whether these programmes reduce or exacerbate disparities in health care is scarce. In this study, we aimed to assess socioeconomic inequalities in the performance of family health teams under Brazil's National Programme for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ). METHODS: For this longitudinal study, we analysed data on the quality of care delivered by family health teams participating in PMAQ over three rounds of implementation: round 1 (November, 2011, to March, 2013), round 2 (April, 2013, to September, 2015), and round 3 (October, 2015, to December, 2019). The primary outcome was the percentage of the maximum performance score obtainable by family health teams (the PMAQ score), based on several hundred (ranging from 598 to 914) indicators of health-care delivery. Using census data on household income of local areas, we examined the PMAQ score by income ventile. We used ordinary least squares regressions to examine the association between PMAQ scores and the income of each local area across implementation rounds, and we did an analysis of variance to assess geographical variation in PMAQ score. FINDINGS: Of the 40 361 family health teams that were registered as ever participating in PMAQ, we included 13 934 teams that participated in the three rounds of PMAQ in our analysis. These teams were located in 11 472 census areas and served approximately 48 million people. The mean PMAQ score was 61·0% (median 61·8, IQR 55·3-67·9) in round 1, 55·3% (median 56·0, IQR 47·6-63·4) in round 2, and 61·6% (median 62·7, IQR 54·4-69·9) in round 3. In round 1, we observed a positive socioeconomic gradient, with the mean PMAQ score ranging from 56·6% in the poorest group to 64·1% in the richest group. Between rounds 1 and 3, mean PMAQ performance increased by 7·1 percentage points for the poorest group and decreased by 0·8 percentage points for the richest group (p<0·0001), with the gap between richest and poorest narrowing from 7·5 percentage points (95% CI 6·5 to 8·5) to -0·4 percentage points over the same period (-1·6 to 0·8). INTERPRETATION: Existing income inequalities in the delivery of primary health care were eliminated during the three rounds of PMAQ, plausibly due to a design feature of PMAQ that adjusted financial payments for socioeconomic inequalities. However, there remains an important policy agenda in Brazil to address the large inequities in health. FUNDING: UK Medical Research Council, Newton Fund, and CONFAP (Conselho Nacional das Fundações Estaduais de Amparo à Pesquisa).

Does prevention-focused integration lead to the triple aim? An evaluation of two new care models in England.

OBJECTIVES: To examine the effectiveness of two integrated care models ('vanguards') in Salford and South Somerset in England, United Kingdom, in relation to patient experience, health outcomes and costs of care (the 'triple aim'). METHODS: We used difference-in-differences analysis combined with propensity score weighting to compare the two care model sites with control ('usual care') areas in the rest of England. We estimated combined and separate annual effects in the three years following introduction of the new care model, using the national General Practice Patient Survey (GPPS) to measure patient experience (inter-organisational support with chronic condition management) and generic health status (EQ-5D); and hospital episode statistics (HES) data to measure total costs of secondary care. As secondary outcomes we measured proxies for improved prevention: cost per user of secondary care (severity); avoidable emergency admissions; and primary care utilisation. RESULTS: Both intervention sites showed an increase in total costs of secondary care (approximately £74 per registered patient per year in Salford, £45 in South Somerset) and cost per user of secondary care (£130-138 per person per year). There were no statistically significant effects on health status or patient experience of care. There was a more apparent short-term negative effect on measured outcomes in South Somerset, in terms of increased costs and avoidable emergency admissions, but these reduced over time. CONCLUSION: New care models such as those implemented within the Vanguard programme in England might lead to unintended secondary care cost increases in the short to medium term. Cost increases appeared to be driven by average patient severity increases in hospital. Prevention-focused population health management models of integrated care, like previous more targeted models, do not immediately improve the health system's triple aim.

What explains differences in waiting times for health care across socioeconomic status?

In publicly funded health systems, waiting times act as a rationing mechanism that should be based on need rather than socioeconomic status. However, several studies suggest that individuals with higher socioeconomic status wait less. Using individual-level data from administrative registers, we estimate and explain socioeconomic inequalities in access to publicly funded care for seven planned hospital procedures in Denmark. For each procedure, we first estimate the association between patients' waiting time for health care and their socioeconomic status as measured by income and education, controlling for patient severity. Then, we investigate how much of the association remains after controlling for (i) other individual characteristics (patients' family status, labor market status, and country of origin) that may be correlated with income and education, (ii) possible selection due to patients' use of a waiting time guarantee, and (iii) hospital factors which allow us to disentangle whether inequalities in waiting times arise across hospitals or within the hospital. Only for a few procedures, we find inequalities in waiting times related to income and education. These inequalities can be explained mostly by geographical and institutional factors across hospitals. But we also find inequalities for some procedures in relation to non-Western immigrants within hospitals.

Pay for Performance: A Reflection on How a Global Perspective Could Enhance Policy and Research.

Pay-for-performance (P4P) is the provision of financial incentives to healthcare providers based on pre-specified performance targets. P4P has been used as a policy tool to improve healthcare provision globally. However, researchers tend to cluster into those working on high or low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), with still limited knowledge exchange, potentially constraining opportunities for learning from across income settings. We reflect here on some commonalities and differences in the design of P4P schemes, research questions, methods and data across income settings. We highlight how a global perspective on knowledge synthesis could lead to innovations and further knowledge advancement.

Pay for performance for specialised care in England: Strengths and weaknesses.

Pay-for-Performance (P4P) schemes have become increasingly common internationally, yet evidence of their effectiveness remains ambiguous. P4P has been widely used in England for over a decade both in primary and secondary care. A prominent P4P programme in secondary care is the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) framework. The most recent addition to this framework is Prescribed Specialised Services (PSS) CQUIN, introduced into the NHS in England in 2013. This study offers a review and critique of the PSS CQUIN scheme for specialised care. A key feature of PSS CQUIN is that whilst it is centrally developed, performance targets are agreed locally. This means that there is variation across providers in the schemes selected from the national menu, the achievement level needed to earn payment, and the proportion of the overall payment attached to each scheme. Specific schemes vary in terms of what is incentivised - structure, process and/or outcome - and how they are incentivised. Centralised versus decentralised decision making, the nature of the performance measures, the tiered payment structure and the dynamic nature of the schemes have created a sophisticated but complex P4P programme which requires evaluation to understand the effect of such incentives on specialised care.

Do variations in hospital admission rates bias comparisons of standardized hospital mortality rates? A population-based cohort study.

BACKGROUND: Standardized mortality rates are routinely used as measures of hospital performance and quality. Such metrics may, however, be biased if hospital admission thresholds differ and patient severity is not fully measured. AIM: To examine whether comparisons of hospital mortality rates suffer from selection bias due to variations in hospital admission rates, using the example of variations by day of the week. DATA: 12,900,687 emergency department attendances and 3,418,446 unplanned admissions to all acute non-specialist hospitals of the National Health Service in England between 1 April 2013 and 28 February 2014. METHODS: Population-based retrospective cohort study. Mortality within 30 days of attendance is modelled as a function of weekend or weekday attendance and hospital-level predictors of admission rates using patient-level risk-adjusted probit and bivariate Heckman selection models. Robustness is supported by the use of different hospital-level predictors. RESULTS: When examining only the admitted population, patients admitted to hospital at weekends have a 0.206 percentage point higher risk of death within 30 days compared to patients admitted during the week. However, patients attending emergency departments at weekends have a 1.390 percentage point lower probability of being admitted to hospital. Once this selection bias is accounted for, the weekend effect in mortality is reduced by two-thirds to a 0.068 percentage point increase in the risk of death. CONCLUSIONS: Comparisons of standardized hospital mortality rates following unplanned admissions can be biased by variations in emergency department admission rates, leading to incorrect conclusions about quality. The use of mortality as a performance measure could therefore lead to misleading comparisons if admission rates vary and illness severity is not fully controlled for. Accounting for sample selection bias and dependence between admission and mortality rates is vital if accurate comparisons of hospital performance are to be made.