Temporal dynamics of the semantic versus affective representations of valence during reversal learning.

Valence, the representation of a stimulus in terms of good or bad, plays a central role in models of affect, value-based learning theories, and value-based decision-making models. Previous work used Unconditioned Stimulus (US) to support a theoretical division between two different types of valence representations for a stimulus: the semantic representation of valence, i.e., stored accumulated knowledge about the value of the stimulus, and the affective representation of valence, i.e., the valence of the affective response to this stimulus. The current work extended past research by using a neutral Conditioned Stimulus (CS) in the context of reversal learning, a type of associative learning. The impact of expected uncertainty (the variability of rewards) and unexpected uncertainty (reversal) on the evolving temporal dynamics of the two types of valence representations of the CS was tested in two experiments. Results show that in an environment presenting the two types of uncertainty, the adaptation process (learning rate) of the choices and of the semantic valence representation is slower than the adaptation of the affective valence representation. In contrast, in environments with only unexpected uncertainty (i.e., fixed rewards), there is no difference in the temporal dynamics of the two types of valence representations. Implications for models of affect, value-based learning theories, and value-based decision-making models are discussed.

A divergent effect of stimulus perceptual details on affective and semantic representations of valence.

The current work investigated the potential dissociation between two modes of valence: affective valence (valence of the emotional response) and semantic valence (stored knowledge about the valence of an object/event). A series of six experiments systematically examined the divergent effect of manipulating the amount of perceptual details on affective valence and semantic knowledge about valence. We predicted that affective valence, more than semantic valence, will be affected by manipulating the amount of stimulus perceptual details. Experiment 1a manipulated the amount of perceptual details by presenting the same stimulus content with different quantity of perceptual details. We compared three conditions: a very short movie clip, a still picture that was taken from the movie clip, and a blurred version of the picture from the movie clip. Experiment 1b replicated Experiment 1a using a stronger filter for blurring the picture. Experiment 2 used different manipulation of filtering out visual perceptual details by comparing still pictures to outlined images. Experiment 3 generalized the results of Experiments 1 and 2 by comparing pictures and written words. Experiments 4a and 4b examined the hypothesis regarding the divergent effect of the amount of perceptual details on semantic and affective valence, using physiological signals and a reaction time task, measures that do not rely on self-reports. Results suggest that affective valence is more sensitive to the change in the amount of perceptual details of the stimulus than semantic valence. The psychological mechanism that might underlie this effect and the theoretical implications of the findings are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Comparing three models of arousal in the human brain.

The bipolar valence-arousal model is assumed by many to be an underlying structure of conscious experience of core affect and emotion. In this work, we compare three versions of the bipolar valence-arousal model at the neural domain, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Specifically, we systematically contrast three models of arousal: model 1-'arousal as a separate quale from valence', model 2-'arousal as intensity of bipolar valence' and model 3-'arousal as a linear combination of unipolar pleasant and unpleasant'. Using parametric modulation analysis, we estimated the ability of each model to predict activation in arousal-related brain regions, in response to affective stimuli. The results suggest that arousal is not separable from valence in its ability to predict arousal-related neural activity. The relevance of the results to the theory of conscious affect is discussed.

Semantic and affective representations of valence: Prediction of autonomic and facial responses from feelings-focused and knowledge-focused self-reports.

The term valence can refer to either the affective response (e.g., "I feel bad") or the semantic knowledge about a stimulus (e.g., "car accidents are bad"). Accordingly, the content of self-reports can be more "experience-near" and proxy to the mental state of affective feelings, or, alternatively, involve nonexperiential semantic knowledge. In this work we compared three experimental protocol instructions: feelings-focused self-reports that encourage participants to report their feelings (but not knowledge); knowledge-focused self-reports that encourage participants to report about semantic knowledge (and not feelings); and "feelings-naïve", in which participants were asked to report their feelings but are not explicitly presented with the distinction between feelings and knowledge. We compared the ability of the three types of self-report data to predict facial electromyography, heart rate, and electrodermal changes in response to affective stimuli. The relationship between self-reports and both physiological signal intensity and signal discriminability were examined. The results showed a consistent advantage for feelings-focused over knowledge-focused instructions in prediction of physiological response with feelings-naïve instructions falling in between. The results support the theoretical distinction between affective and semantic representations of valence and the validity of feelings-focused and knowledge-focused self-report instructions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Semantic and affective manifestations of ambi (valence).

People sometimes report both pleasant and unpleasant feelings when presented with affective stimuli. However, what is reported as "mixed emotions" might reflect semantic knowledge about the stimulus (Russell, J. A. (2017). Mixed emotions viewed from the psychological constructionist perspective. Emotion Review, 9(2), 111-117). The following research examines to what degree self-reported mixed emotions represent actual feelings compared to knowledge about the stimulus. In a series of three experiments, participants reported either their feelings or their knowledge in response to affective stimuli. In Experiment 1, we sampled the entire IAPS pictorial space and examined the proportion of mixed emotion ratings using feelings-focused and knowledge-focused self-reports. We found a higher degree of mixed emotions under knowledge-focused than feelings-focused self-reports. In Experiment 2, we used a priori selected pictures to elicit mixed emotions. The proportion of mixed emotions was again higher under knowledge-focused instructions. In Experiment 3, we used movie clips that were previously used to elicit mixed emotions. In contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, there was no difference between feelings-focused and knowledge-focused self-reports. The results suggest a strong semantic component and a weak experiential component of self-reports in the case of pictorial stimuli. However, ambivalent movie clips elicited a stronger experiential component, thus supporting the existence of mixed emotions at the level of feelings.

The effect of relevance appraisal on the emotional response.

Many models of emotion assume that the emotional response is preceded by an assessment of a stimulus' relevance to the perceiver's goals. Although widely assumed, experimentally controlling and, hence, empirically testing the effect of a stimulus' relevance on the emotional response has proven challenging. In this study, we used stimuli with high ecological validity and manipulated their relevance while holding constant the perceptual features of the stimuli. In the experiment, participants were given the result of their Israeli Psychometric Entrance Test (PET). The PET score is highly relevant to most participants, as, at the time of the experiment, it is the only unknown about whether they shall be admitted to their major of choice at the university. Relevance of the information was experimentally controlled both binarily by manipulating whether the presented score is the participant's or belongs to another unfamiliar participant and parametrically by manipulating the probability that a presented score is their actual PET score. We found a substantial effect for manipulated relevance on self-report, electrodermal activity, and heart rate. The results provide evidence that information about a stimulus' relevance modulates the emotional response to it. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Dissociating affective and semantic valence.

We examined the possible dissociation between two modes of valence: affective valence (valence of e emotional response) and semantic valence (stored knowledge about valence of an object or event). In Experiment 1, 50 participants viewed affective pictures that were repeatedly presented while their facial electromyography (EMG) activation and heart rate response were continuously recorded. Half of the participants provided self-report ratings about the valence of their feelings and half about the valence of the stimulus. Next, all participants performed an affective Simon task. In Experiment 2, 30 new participants performed the affective Simon task with the repeated exposure embedded within the task. The results showed that measures related to affective valence (feelings-focused self-reports, heart rate, and facial EMG activations) attenuated with repeated exposure to pleasant and unpleasant pictures, whereas measures related to semantic valence (knowledge-focused self-reports and congruency effect of affective Simon task) did not. These findings strongly suggest that affective and semantic valence represent two distinct psychological constructs. (PsycINFO Database Record

Are valence and arousal separable in emotional experience?

The bipolar valence-arousal model of conscious experience of emotions is prominent in emotion research. In this work, we examine the validity of this model in the context of feelings elicited by visual stimuli. In particular, we examine whether arousal has a unique contribution over bivariate valence (separate measures for pleasure and displeasure) in explaining physiological arousal (electrodermal activity, EDA) and self-reported feelings at the level of item-specific responses across and within individuals. Our results suggest that self-reports of arousal have neither an advantage in predicting EDA nor make a unique contribution when valence is present in the model. Acceptance of the null hypothesis was confirmed with the use of the Bayesian information criterion. Arousal also showed no advantage over valence in predicting global feelings, but demonstrated a small unique component (1.5% to 4% of variance explained). These results have practical implications for both experimental design in the study of emotions and the underlying bases of their conscious experience.

Spending one's time: the hedonic principle in ad libitum viewing of pictures.

The hedonic principle maintains that humans strive to maximize pleasant feelings and avoid unpleasant feelings. Surprisingly, and contrary to hedonic logic, previous experiments have demonstrated a relationship between picture viewing time and arousal (activation) but not with valence (pleasure vs. displeasure), suggesting that arousal rather than the hedonic principle accounts for how individuals choose to spend their time. In 2 experiments we investigated the arousal and hedonic principles underlying viewing time behavior while controlling for familiarity with stimuli, picture complexity, and demand characteristics. Under ad libitum conditions of picture viewing, we found strong relationships between viewing time, valence, and facial corrugator electomyographic (EMG) activity with familiar but not novel pictures. Viewing time of novel stimuli was largely associated with arousal and visual complexity. We conclude that only after initial information about the stimulus is gathered, where we choose to spend our time is guided by the hedonic principle.

How are you feeling? Revisiting the quantification of emotional qualia.

Numerous emotion researchers have asked their study participants to attend to the distinct feelings of arousal and valence, and self-report and physiological data have supported the independence of the two. We examined whether this dissociation reflects introspection about distinct emotional qualia or the way in which valence is measured. With either valence (Experiment 1) or arousal (Experiment 2) as the primary focus, when valence was measured using a bipolar scale (ranging from negative to positive), it was largely dissociable from arousal. By contrast, when two separate unipolar scales of pleasant and unpleasant valence were used, their sum was equivalent to feelings of arousal and its autonomic correlates. The association (or dissociation) of valence and arousal was related to the estimation (or nonestimation) of mixed-valence experiences, which suggests that the distinction between valence and arousal may reflect less the nature of emotional experience and more how it is measured. These findings further encourage use of unipolar valence scales in psychological measurement.

Feelings don't come easy: studies on the effortful nature of feelings.

We propose that experience of emotion is a mental phenomenon, which requires resources. This hypothesis implies that a concurrent cognitive load diminishes the intensity of feeling since the 2 activities are competing for the same resources. Two sets of experiments tested this hypothesis. The first line of experiments (Experiments 1-4) examined the intensity of participants' feelings as they performed a secondary (backward counting) task. The results showed that the intensity of both negative and positive feelings diminished under a cognitive load and that this attenuation of feeling was not mediated by either distraction from external stimuli or demand characteristics. In the second set of experiments (Experiments 5-6), load was created by asking the participants to focus on the feelings. Even in these circumstances, the participants who were under load reported a lower intensity of feeling than those who were not under load. We explain these findings in terms of a resource-dependent model of emotional experience. Possible implications of our findings for a broader class of phenomenological experiences are succinctly discussed.

What is it that color determinants determine? The relation between the rorschach inkblot method and cognitive object-recognition processes.

We sought to demonstrate a relation between the Determinants in the Rorschach Inkblot Method (Rorschach, 1921) and fundamental properties of the participant's cognitive (visual) system by examining whether the report about Color Determinants is related to basic cognitive processes concerned with color of visual objects. In Experiment 1, we established an object-naming task that is sensitive to the objects' color. Participants were strongly influenced by the object's color, responding fastest when objects appeared in their typical color and slowest when the object's color was atypical. In Experiment 2, we examined the relationship between the Color Determinants in the Rorschach Inkblot Method and the magnitude of the color effect in the object-naming task of Experiment 1. It was found that the effect of color in the object-naming task was correlated with the type of color responses in the Rorschach Inkblot Method. The results support an "early" cognitive account of the Determinants. We discuss implications concerning the theory of the Rorschach and the relation between emotion, personality, and cognition.