ABSTRACT
People tend to overestimate the efficacy of an ineffective treatment when they experience the treatment and its supposed outcome co-occurring frequently. This is referred to as the outcome density effect. Here, we attempted to improve the accuracy of participants' assessments of an ineffective treatment by instructing them about the scientific practice of comparing treatment effects against a relevant base-rate, i.e., when no treatment is delivered. The effect of these instructions was assessed in both a trial-by-trial contingency learning task, where cue administration was either decided by the participant (Experiments 1 & 2) or pre-determined by the experimenter (Experiment 3), as well as in summary format where all information was presented on a single screen (Experiment 4). Overall, we found two means by which base-rate instructions influence efficacy ratings for the ineffective treatment: 1) When information was presented sequentially, the benefit of base-rate instructions on illusory belief was mediated by reduced sampling of cue-present trials, and 2) When information was presented in summary format, we found a direct effect of base-rate instruction on reducing causal illusion. Together, these findings suggest that simple instructions on the scientific method were able to decrease participants' (over-)weighting of cue-outcome coincidences when making causal judgements, as well as decrease their tendency to over-sample cue-present events. However, the effect of base-rate instructions on correcting illusory beliefs was incomplete, and participants still showed illusory causal judgements when the probability of the outcome occurring was high. Thus, simple textual information about assessing causal relationships is partially effective in influencing people's judgements of treatment efficacy, suggesting an important role of scientific instruction in debiasing cognitive errors.
ABSTRACT
The learned predictiveness effect refers to the tendency for predictive cues to attract greater attention and show faster learning in subsequent tasks. However, in typical designs, the predictiveness of each cue (its objective cue-outcome correlation) is confounded with the degree to which it is informative for making the correct response on each trial (a feature we term choice relevance). In four experiments, we tested the unique contributions of cue-outcome correlation and choice relevance to the learned predictiveness effect by manipulating the outcome choices available on each trial. Experiments 1A and 1B compared two sets of partially predictive cues and found that participants learned more in a transfer phase about the set of cues that were previously choice-relevant. Experiments 2A and 2B used a design in which the cue-outcome correlation was stronger for one set of cues (perfect predictors) than the other set (imperfect predictors). Manipulating the choice relevance of the imperfect predictors in this design did not influence the magnitude of the learning bias toward the perfect predictor. Unlike cue-outcome correlation, choice relevance did not seem to correspond to biases in eye-gaze, suggesting that it operates via a distinct mechanism. Simulations with a modified EXIT model successfully predicted cue-outcome correlation and choice relevance effects by assuming that participants update learning for present outcomes only, but incorrectly predicted additive effects. We conclude that cue-outcome correlation and choice relevance are important factors that can lead to biases in future learning; both were individually sufficient but neither was necessary. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
ABSTRACT
The stop-signal task is widely used in experimental psychology and cognitive neuroscience research, as well as neuropsychological and clinical practice for assessing response inhibition. The task requires participants to make speeded responses on a majority of trials, but to inhibit responses when a stop signal appears after the imperative cue. The stop-signal delay after the onset of the imperative cue determines how difficult it is to cancel an initiated action. The delay is typically staircased to maintain a 50% stopping accuracy for an estimation of stopping speed to be calculated. However, the validity of this estimation is compromised when participants engage in strategic slowing, motivated by a desire to avoid stopping failures. We hypothesized that maintaining stopping accuracy at 66.67% reduces this bias, and that slowing may also be impacted by the level of experimenter supervision. We found that compared with 50%, using a 66.67% stopping accuracy staircase produced slower stop-signal reaction time estimations (≈7 ms), but resulted in fewer strategic slowing exclusions. Additionally, both staircase procedures had similar within-experiment test-retest reliability. We also found that while individual and group testing in a laboratory setting produced similar estimations of stopping speed, participants tested online produced slower estimates. Our findings indicate that maintaining stopping accuracy at 66.67% is a reliable method for estimating stopping speed and can have benefits over the standard 50% staircase procedure. Further, our results show that care should be taken when comparing between experiments using different staircases or conducted in different testing environments.
Subject(s)
Inhibition, Psychological , Psychomotor Performance , Humans , Reaction Time/physiology , Psychomotor Performance/physiology , Reproducibility of ResultsABSTRACT
Recent research using paired-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) has shown that the speed with which people can stop an action is linked to GABAergic inhibitory activity in the motor system. Specifically, a significant proportion of the variance in stop signal reaction time (SSRT; a widely used measure of inhibitory control) is accounted for by short-interval cortical inhibition (SICI). It is still unclear whether this relationship reflects a broader link between GABAergic processes and executive functions, or a specific link between GABAergic processes and motor stopping ability. The current study sought to replicate the correlation between SSRT and SICI while investigating whether this association generalises to other measures of inhibitory control and working memory, and to long-interval cortical inhibition (LICI). Participants completed a battery of inhibition (Stop-Signal, Stroop, Flanker) and working memory (n-back, Digit Span, and Operation Span) tasks. We replicated the correlation between SICI and SSRT but found no other correlations between behavioural measures of executive control and the two cortical measures of inhibition. These findings indicate that the relationship between SSRT and SICI is specific to a particular property of response inhibition and likely reflects the function of local inhibitory networks mediated by GABAA.
Subject(s)
Executive Function , Motor Cortex , Humans , Motor Cortex/physiology , Neural Inhibition/physiology , Evoked Potentials, Motor/physiology , Reaction Time , Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation , ElectromyographyABSTRACT
This opinion piece considers the construct of tolerance of uncertainty and suggests that it should be viewed in the context of three psychological factors: uncertainty aversion, uncertainty interpretation, and uncertainty determinability. Uncertainty aversion refers to a dislike of situations in which the outcomes are not deterministic and is similar to conventional conceptions of (in)tolerance of uncertainty. Uncertainty interpretation refers to the extent to which variability in an observed outcome is interpreted as random fluctuation around a relatively stable base-rate versus frequent and rapid changes in the base-rate. Uncertainty determinability refers to the (actual or perceived) capacity of the individual to generate any meaningful expectancy of the uncertain outcome, which may be undeterminable if predictions are updated too quickly. We argue that uncertainty interpretation and determinability are psychological responses to the experience of probabilistic events that vary among individuals and can moderate negative affect experienced in response to uncertainty. We describe how individual differences in basic parameters of associative learning (modelled by a simple learning window) could lead to this variation. To explain these hypotheses, we utilise the distinction between aleatory uncertainty (the inherent unpredictability of individual stochastic events) and epistemic uncertainty (obtainable knowledge that the individual lacks or perceives to be lacking). We argue that when expectancies are updated quickly, epistemic uncertainty will dominate the individual's representation of the events around them, leading to a subjective experience of the world as one that is volatile and unpredictable.
Subject(s)
Affect , Mental Disorders , Humans , Uncertainty , Affect/physiology , LearningABSTRACT
Proactive cognitive control is thought to rely on the active maintenance of goals or contextual information in working memory. It is often measured using the AX-CPT, in which antecedent cues (A/B) are used to proactively prepare a response to a subsequently-presented probe (X/Y). Although control in this task purportedly requires active maintenance of information in working memory, it also provides conditions in which learning the contingencies between relevant events could influence performance via associative learning. We tested this hypothesis using a dot-pattern expectancy version of the AX-CPT whereby a set of new rules (test phase) for responding changed the control operations required for some previously trained cues, while keeping the operations the same for others, allowing us to measure associative interference. We also tested the relationship between associative interference and working memory capacity (operation span; Experiments 1-3) and tested the effect of applying working memory load during the initial acquisition period (Experiment 2) and during the test phase (Experiment 3). We found robust evidence of interference after the rule change based on previously learnt contingencies, suggesting that learnt contingencies come to influence proactive planning, even when they are task-irrelevant. This associative effect had no relationship with working memory capacity or load, based on a load manipulation commonly used in executive control tasks. The findings suggest that proactive control does not always require active maintenance of current goals and environmental cues in working memory. Instead, proactive control may run on autopilot if the individual can rely upon stable relationships in the environment to trigger planning and preparation. SIGNIFICANCE: Navigating daily life requires us to anticipate future events and plan our thoughts and actions accordingly to achieve our goals. This forward planning, or proactive control, is thought to be a resource-intensive and metabolically costly process that recruits higher-order cognitive functions, such as working memory, where relevant thoughts and actions have to be maintained online. The current study challenged this notion by finding that proactive control can be incrementally relegated to simpler processes based on one's learning of stable relationships in the environment, thereby reducing the need to actively maintain information online. Individuals can come to rely on underlying contingencies in stimuli associated with proactive control, even when it is detrimental to their goals.
Subject(s)
Cognition , Executive Function , Humans , Cognition/physiology , Executive Function/physiology , Memory, Short-Term/physiology , Cues , LearningABSTRACT
Response inhibition is our ability to suppress or cancel actions when required. Deficits in response inhibition are linked with a range of psychopathological disorders including addiction and OCD. Studies on response inhibition have largely focused on reactive inhibition-stopping an action when explicitly cued. Less work has examined proactive inhibition-preparation to stop ahead of time. In the current experiment, we studied both reactive and proactive inhibition by adopting a two-step continuous performance task (e.g., "AX"-CPT) often used to study cognitive control. By combining a dot pattern expectancy (DPX) version of this task with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), we mapped changes in reactive and proactive inhibition within the motor system. Measured using motor-evoked potentials, we found modulation of corticospinal excitability at critical timepoints during the DPX when participants were preparing in advance to inhibit a response (at step 1: during the cue) and while inhibiting a response (at step 2: during the probe). Notably, motor system activity during early timepoints was predicted by a behavioural index of proactive capacity and could predict whether participants would later successfully inhibit their response. Our findings demonstrate that combining TMS with a two-step CPT such as the DPX can be useful for studying reactive and proactive inhibition, and reveal that successful inhibition is determined earlier than previously thought.
Subject(s)
Reactive Inhibition , Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation , Evoked Potentials, Motor/physiology , Humans , Inhibition, Psychological , Proactive Inhibition , Reaction Time/physiologyABSTRACT
Beliefs about cause and effect, including health beliefs, are thought to be related to the frequency of the target outcome (e.g., health recovery) occurring when the putative cause is present and when it is absent (treatment administered vs. no treatment); this is known as contingency learning. However, it is unclear whether unvalidated health beliefs, where there is no evidence of cause-effect contingency, are also influenced by the subjective perception of a meaningful contingency between events. In a survey, respondents were asked to judge a range of health beliefs and estimate the probability of the target outcome occurring with and without the putative cause present. Overall, we found evidence that causal beliefs are related to perceived cause-effect contingency. Interestingly, beliefs that were not predicted by perceived contingency were meaningfully related to scores on the paranormal belief scale. These findings suggest heterogeneity in pseudoscientific health beliefs and the need to tailor intervention strategies according to underlying causes.
Subject(s)
Surveys and Questionnaires , Causality , ProbabilityABSTRACT
Environmental cues associated with an action can prime the motor system, decreasing response times and activating motor regions of the brain. However, when task goals change, the same responses to former go-associated cues are no longer required and motor priming needs to be inhibited to avoid unwanted behavioural errors. The present study tested whether the inhibition of motor system activity to presentations of former go cues is reliant on top-down, goal-directed cognitive control processes using a working memory (WM) load manipulation. Applying transcranial magnetic stimulation over the primary motor cortex to measure motor system activity during a Go/No-go task, we found that under low WM, corticospinal excitability was suppressed to former go and trained no-go cues relative to control cues. Under high WM, the cortical suppression to former go cues was reduced, suggesting that the underlying mechanism required executive control. Unexpectedly, we found a similar result for trained no-go cues and showed in a second experiment that the corticospinal suppression and WM effects were unrelated to local inhibitory function as indexed by short-interval intracortical inhibition. Our findings reveal that the interaction between former response cues and WM is complex and we discuss possible explanations of our findings in relation to models of response inhibition.
Subject(s)
Cues , Memory, Short-Term , Motor Cortex/physiology , Spinal Cord/physiology , Electroencephalography , Evoked Potentials, Motor/physiology , Female , Humans , Male , Photic Stimulation , Task Performance and Analysis , Young AdultABSTRACT
One of the mechanisms proposed to underpin perceptual learning is the reduction in salience of predicted stimuli. This reduction is held to affect the representation of (conditioned) stimuli before they have been associated with motivationally meaningful consequences but may also affect (unconditioned) stimuli that automatically elicit responding. The purpose of this article is to review past findings and present new evidence of phenomena across a range of domains that are consistent with the idea that responses automatically triggered by stimulating events will be reduced by prediction. We argue that prediction-based attenuation may serve several adaptive functions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
Subject(s)
Conditioning, Classical , Learning , AnimalsABSTRACT
People often fail to use base-rate information appropriately in decision-making. This is evident in the inverse base-rate effect, a phenomenon in which people tend to predict a rare outcome for a new and ambiguous combination of cues. While the effect was first reported in 1988, it has recently seen a renewed interest from researchers concerned with learning, attention and decision-making. However, some researchers have raised concerns that the effect arises in specific circumstances and is unlikely to provide insight into general learning and decision-making processes. In this review, we critically evaluate the evidence for and against the main explanations that have been proposed to explain the effect, and identify where this evidence is currently weak. We argue that concerns about the effect are not well supported by the data. Instead, the evidence supports the conclusion that the effect is a result of general mechanisms that provides a useful opportunity to understand the processes involved in learning and decision making. We discuss gaps in our knowledge and some promising avenues for future research, including the relevance of the effect to models of attentional change in learning, an area where the phenomenon promises to contribute new insights.
Subject(s)
Equidae , Hoof and Claw , Animals , Cues , Decision Making , Hearing , Humans , LearningABSTRACT
Studying generalisation of associative learning requires analysis of response gradients measured over a continuous stimulus dimension. In human studies, there is often a high degree of individual variation in the gradients, making it difficult to draw conclusions about group-level trends with traditional statistical methods. Here, we demonstrate a novel method of analysing generalisation gradients based on hierarchical Bayesian curve-fitting. This method involves fitting an augmented (asymmetrical) Gaussian function to individual gradients and estimating its parameters in a hierarchical Bayesian framework. We show how the posteriors can be used to characterise group differences in generalisation and how classic generalisation phenomena such as peak shift and area shift can be measured and inferred. Estimation of descriptive parameters can provide a detailed and informative way of analysing human generalisation gradients.
Subject(s)
Generalization, Psychological , Bayes Theorem , Conditioning, Classical , Humans , Normal Distribution , Research DesignABSTRACT
Impairments in response inhibition have been implicated in gambling psychopathology. This behavioral impairment may suggest that the neural mechanisms involved in response inhibition, such as GABAA -mediated neurotransmission in the primary motor cortex (M1), are also impaired. The present study obtained paired-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation markers of GABAA and glutamate receptor activity from the left M1 of three groups-problem gamblers (n = 17, 12 males), at-risk gamblers (n = 29, 19 males), and controls (n = 23, six males)-with each group matched for alcohol use, substance use, and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptomology. Response inhibition was measured using the stop signal task. Results showed that problem gamblers had weaker M1 GABAA receptor activity relative to controls and elevated M1 glutamate receptor activity relative to at-risk gamblers and controls. Although there were no differences in response inhibition between the groups, poorer response inhibition was correlated with weaker M1 GABAA receptor activity. These findings are the first to show that problem gambling is associated with alterations in M1 GABAA and glutamate-mediated neurotransmission.
Subject(s)
Gambling/physiopathology , Motor Cortex/physiopathology , Adult , Attention Deficit Disorder with Hyperactivity/physiopathology , Case-Control Studies , Female , Humans , Impulsive Behavior , Male , Substance-Related Disorders/physiopathology , Transcranial Magnetic StimulationABSTRACT
The inverse base-rate effect is a tendency to predict the rarer of two outcomes when presented with cues that make conflicting predictions. Attention-based accounts of the effect appeal to prioritised attention to predictors of rare outcomes. Changes in the processing of these cues are predicted to increase the rate at which they are learned about in the future (i.e., their associability). Our previous work has shown that the development of the inverse base-rate effect is accompanied by greater overt attention to the rare predictor while participants made predictions, and during feedback, and these biases change in different ways depending on the stage of training and global base-rate differences. It is unknown whether these gaze patterns reflect the manner in which cues are prioritised for learning or are merely a consequence of learning what the cues predict. This study tested whether the associability of common and rare predictors differed, and if so, how this difference changed as a function of training length and the presence of base-rate differences in the outcomes. Experiment 1 tested cue associability using a second learning task presented after either short or long training. The results suggest an associability advantage for rare predictors that weakens with extended training and is not strongly affected by the presence of global base-rate differences. However, Experiment 2 showed a clear effect of base-rate differences on choice after very brief training, indicating that attention biases as measured by associability change are not sufficient to produce the inverse base-rate effect.
Subject(s)
Association Learning , Attentional Bias , Bias , Cues , HumansABSTRACT
The brain's response to sensory input is modulated by prediction. For example, sounds that are produced by one's own actions, or those that are strongly predicted by environmental cues, elicit an attenuated N1 component in the auditory evoked potential. It has been suggested that this form of sensory attenuation to stimulation produced by one's own actions is the reason we are unable to tickle ourselves. Here we examined whether the neural response to direct stimulation of the brain is attenuated by prediction in a similar manner. Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) applied over primary motor cortex can be used to gauge the excitability of the motor system. Motor-evoked potentials (MEPs), elicited by TMS and measured in peripheral muscles, are larger when actions are being prepared and smaller when actions are voluntarily suppressed. We tested whether the amplitude of MEPs was attenuated under circumstances where the TMS pulse can be reliably predicted, even though control of the relevant motor effector was never required. Self-initiation of the TMS pulse and reliable cuing of the TMS pulse both produced attenuated MEP amplitudes, compared to those generated programmatically in an unpredictable manner. These results suggest that predictive coding may be governed by domain-general mechanisms responsible for all forms predictive learning. The findings also have important methodological implications for designing TMS experiments that control for the predictability of TMS pulses.
Subject(s)
Evoked Potentials, Motor/physiology , Motivation/physiology , Motor Cortex/physiology , Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation/methods , Adult , Female , Humans , MaleABSTRACT
Psychopathic traits and the childhood analogue, callous-unemotional traits, have been severely neglected by the research field in terms of mechanistic, falsifiable accounts. This is surprising given that some of the core symptoms of the disorder point towards problems with basic components of associative learning. In this manuscript we describe a new mechanistic account that is concordant with current cognitive theories of psychopathic traits and is also able to replicate previous empirical data. The mechanism we describe is one of individual differences in an index we have called, "learning window width". Here we show how variation in this index would result in different outcome expectations which, in turn, would lead to differences in behaviour. The proposed mechanism is intuitive and simple with easily calculated behavioural implications. Our hope is that this model will stimulate discussion and the use of mechanistic and computational accounts to improve our understanding in this area of research.
ABSTRACT
Causal and predictive learning research often employs intuitive and familiar hypothetical scenarios to facilitate learning novel relationships. The allergist task, in which participants are asked to diagnose the allergies of a fictitious patient, is one example of this. In such studies, it is common practice to ask participants to ignore their existing knowledge of the scenario and make judgments based only on the relationships presented within the experiment. Causal judgments appear to be sensitive to instructions that modify assumptions about the scenario. However, the extent to which prior knowledge continues to affect competition for associative learning, even after participants are instructed to disregard it, is unknown. To answer this, we created a cue competition design that capitalized on prevailing beliefs about the allergenic properties of various foods. High and low allergenic foods were paired with foods moderately associated with allergy to create two compounds; high + moderate and low + moderate. We expected high allergenic foods to produce greater competition for associative memory than low allergenic foods. High allergenic foods may affect learning either because they generate a strong memory of allergy or because they are more salient in the context of the task. We therefore also manipulated the consistency of the high allergenic cue-outcome relationship with prior beliefs about the nature of the allergies. A high allergenic food that is paired with an inconsistent allergenic outcome should generate more prediction error and thus more competition for learning, than one that is consistent with prior beliefs. Participants were instructed to either use or ignore their knowledge of food allergies to complete the task. We found that while participants were able to set aside their prior knowledge when making causal judgments about the foods in question, associative memory was weaker for the cues paired with highly allergenic foods than cues paired with low allergenic foods regardless of instructions. The consistency manipulation had little effect on this result, suggesting that the effects in associative memory are most likely driven by selective attention to highly allergenic cues. This has implications for theories of causal learning as well as the way causal learning tasks are designed.
ABSTRACT
In recent years, several studies of human predictive learning demonstrated better learning about outcomes that have previously been experienced as consistently predictable compared to outcomes previously experienced as less predictable, namely the outcome predictability effect. As this effect may have wide-reaching implications for current theories of associative learning, the present study aimed to examine the generality of the effect with a human goal-tracking paradigm, employing three different designs to manipulate the predictability of outcomes in an initial training phase. In contrast to the previous studies, learning in a subsequent phase, when every outcome was equally predictable by novel cues, was not reliably affected by the outcomes' predictability in the first phase. This lack of an outcome predictability effect provides insights into the parameters of the effect and its underlying mechanisms.
Subject(s)
Association Learning/physiology , Attention/physiology , Conditioning, Classical , Adult , Female , Germany , Humans , Male , Middle Aged , Photic Stimulation , StudentsABSTRACT
Teachers sometimes believe in the efficacy of instructional practices that have little empirical support. These beliefs have proven difficult to efface despite strong challenges to their evidentiary basis. Teachers typically develop causal beliefs about the efficacy of instructional practices by inferring their effect on students' academic performance. Here, we evaluate whether causal inferences about instructional practices are susceptible to an outcome density effect using a contingency learning task. In a series of six experiments, participants were ostensibly presented with students' assessment outcomes, some of whom had supposedly received teaching via a novel technique and some of whom supposedly received ordinary instruction. The distributions of the assessment outcomes was manipulated to either have frequent positive outcomes (high outcome density condition) or infrequent positive outcomes (low outcome density condition). For both continuous and categorical assessment outcomes, participants in the high outcome density condition rated the novel instructional technique as effective, despite the fact that it either had no effect or had a negative effect on outcomes, while the participants in the low outcome density condition did not. These results suggest that when base rates of performance are high, participants may be particularly susceptible to drawing inaccurate inferences about the efficacy of instructional practices.