Repressed Memories (of Sexual Abuse Against Minors) and Statutes of Limitations in Europe: Status Quo and Possible Alternatives.

One of the most heated debates in psychological science concerns the concept of repressed memory. We discuss how the debate on repressed memories continues to surface in legal settings, sometimes even to suggest avenues of legal reform. In the past years, several European countries have extended or abolished the statute of limitations for the prosecution of sexual crimes. Such statutes force legal actions (e.g., prosecution of sexual abuse) to be applied within a certain period of time. One of the reasons for the changes in statutes of limitations concerns the idea of repressed memory. We argue that from a psychological standpoint, these law reforms can be detrimental, particularly when they are done to endorse unfounded psychological theories. The validity of testimonies is compromised many years after the alleged facts, and abolishing the statute of limitations increases the chance that even more (false) recovered memories of abuse might enter the courtroom. We propose solutions to these changes such as establishing an independent expert committee evaluating claims of sexual abuse.

Prosocial motives underlie scientific censorship by scientists: A perspective and research agenda.

Science is among humanity's greatest achievements, yet scientific censorship is rarely studied empirically. We explore the social, psychological, and institutional causes and consequences of scientific censorship (defined as actions aimed at obstructing particular scientific ideas from reaching an audience for reasons other than low scientific quality). Popular narratives suggest that scientific censorship is driven by authoritarian officials with dark motives, such as dogmatism and intolerance. Our analysis suggests that scientific censorship is often driven by scientists, who are primarily motivated by self-protection, benevolence toward peer scholars, and prosocial concerns for the well-being of human social groups. This perspective helps explain both recent findings on scientific censorship and recent changes to scientific institutions, such as the use of harm-based criteria to evaluate research. We discuss unknowns surrounding the consequences of censorship and provide recommendations for improving transparency and accountability in scientific decision-making to enable the exploration of these unknowns. The benefits of censorship may sometimes outweigh costs. However, until costs and benefits are examined empirically, scholars on opposing sides of ongoing debates are left to quarrel based on competing values, assumptions, and intuitions.

The Multiple Roles of Emotion in Interpretation and Memory of Sexual Consent.

In this paper, we explore the role of emotion in the interpretation and memory of sexual encounters. We consider situations likely to generate negative emotions during sex, and the mechanisms through which the experience of negative emotions can lead to false memories of coercion and mislabeling of an encounter as sexual assault. Specifically, we consider the role of emotion in directing attention during a sexual encounter and the effects of emotion as context for interpretation at the time of the encounter, and for retrieval and interpretation when the encounter is later recalled and reported. Our intent is to provide a greater understanding of the processes of interpretation and memory through which false claims of sexual assault might arise, if and when they do arise.

Cross-stage neural pattern similarity in the hippocampus predicts false memory derived from post-event inaccurate information.

The misinformation effect occurs when people's memory of an event is altered by subsequent inaccurate information. No study has systematically tested theories about the dynamics of human hippocampal representations during the three stages of misinformation-induced false memory. This study replicates behavioral results of the misinformation effect, and investigates the cross-stage pattern similarity in the hippocampus and cortex using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Results show item-specific hippocampal pattern similarity between original-event and post-event stages. During the memory-test stage, hippocampal representations of original information are weakened for true memory, whereas hippocampal representations of misinformation compete with original information to create false memory. When false memory occurs, this conflict is resolved by the lateral prefrontal cortex. Individuals' memory traces of post-event information in the hippocampus predict false memory, whereas original information in the lateral parietal cortex predicts true memory. These findings support the multiple-trace model, and emphasize the reconstructive nature of human memory.

Oversimplifications and Misrepresentations in the Repressed Memory Debate: A Reply to Ross.

Ross argued that false memory researchers misunderstand the concepts of repression and dissociation, as well as the writings of Freud. In this commentary, we show that Ross is wrong. He oversimplifies and misrepresents the literature on repressed and false memory. We rebut Ross by showing the fallacies underlying his arguments. For example, we adduce evidence showing that the notions of dissociation or repression are unnecessary to explain how people may forget and then remember childhood sexual abuse, stressing that abuse survivors may reinterpret childhood events later in life. Also, Ross overlooks previous critiques concerning dissociation. Finally, we will demonstrate that Ross misrepresents work by Freud and Loftus in the area of repressed and false memory. His article confuses, not clarifies, an already heated debate on the existence of repressed memory.

Dynamic changes in neural representations underlie the repetition effect on false memory.

Restudying word lists (e.g., dream, awake, and bed) strengthens true memory of the studied words and reduces false memory for unstudied but semantically related lures (e.g., sleep). Yet, the neural mechanisms involved in this repetition effect on false memory remain unclear. Possible mechanisms involve item-specific and semantic neural representations at encoding, and the memory strength between encoding and retrieval. This study first replicated the behavioral results (Exp. 1) and then investigated various neural mechanisms by using slow event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and representational similarity analysis (Exp. 2). Behavioral results confirmed that restudy improved true memory and reduced false memory. The fMRI results showed that restudy induced item-specific neural representations at encoding in the left occipital pole, but reduced neural overlap between semantic representations at encoding in the left temporal pole. Individual differences in these two encoding neural mechanisms were correlated with the behavioral measure of false memory, with greater restudy-induced representational changes at encoding (item-specific neural representations and reduced neural overlap between semantic representations) being associated with lower false memory. Moreover, restudy enhanced the memory strength between encoding and retrieval in the visuoparietal cortex but reduced it in the frontal cortex. These findings suggest that dynamic changes in neural representations underlie the repetition effect on false memory, supporting a dual-coding neural framework.

What happens after debriefing? The effectiveness and benefits of postexperimental debriefing.

After participating in an experiment, people are routinely debriefed. How effective is debriefing when the experiments involve deception, as occurs in studies of misinformation and memory? We conducted two studies addressing this question. In Study 1, participants (N = 373) watched a video, were exposed to misinformation or not, and completed a memory test. Participants were either debriefed or not and then were interviewed approximately one week later. Results revealed that, after debriefing, some participants continued to endorse misinformation. Notably, however, debriefing had positive effects; participants exposed to misinformation reported learning significantly more from their study participation than control participants. In Study 2 (N = 439), we developed and tested a novel, enhanced debriefing. The enhanced debriefing included more information about the presence of misinformation in the study and how memory errors occur. This enhanced debriefing outperformed typical debriefing. Specifically, when the enhanced debriefing explicitly named and described the misinformation, the misinformation effect postdebriefing was eliminated. Enhanced debriefing also resulted in a more positive participant experience than typical debriefing. These results have implications for the design and use of debriefing in deception studies.

Eyewitness confidence may not be ready for the courts: a reply to Wixted et al.

Wixted et al. (in press. Doing right by the eyewitness evidence: A response to Berkowitz et al. Memory) remind us that they are aware of some conditions in which confidence does not trump all but suggest that initial high-confidence errors should be rare. In this reply, we draw attention to new lab research that continues to cast doubt on the value of an initial eyewitness identification made with high confidence. Additional data from field studies of police lineups lead us to conclude that it is far too risky in real-world cases to assume that eyewitnesses who have high initial confidence are also highly accurate. As a final point, we dispute Wixted et al.'s interpretation of "initial low confidence" in the DNA exoneration cases.

The messy landscape of eye movements and false memories.

Eye-Movement Desensitisation and Reprocessing (EMDR) therapy is a common treatment for PTSD. However, skeptics like James Ost question the theoretical underpinnings, highlight inconsistency of empirical findings surrounding the efficacy of such therapy, and warn against unknown drawbacks. Little is known about the impact of the eye movements, a critical component in EMDR, on susceptibility to false memories, and the existing literature is contradictory. We review the literature and present new findings to help tell the story of the effects of eye movements on memory. Taken as a whole, this small body of work suggests that eye movements do not reliably affect susceptibility to misinformation, nor do they appear to enhance memory, but they do seem to increase spontaneous false memories.

Convicting with confidence? Why we should not over-rely on eyewitness confidence.

Eyewitness memory researchers have recently devoted considerable attention to eyewitness confidence. While there is strong consensus that courtroom confidence is problematic, we now recognise that an eyewitness's initial confidence in their first identification - in certain contexts - can be of value. A few psychological scientists, however, have confidently, but erroneously claimed that in real-world cases, eyewitness initial confidence is the most important indicator of eyewitness accuracy, trumping all other factors that might exist in a case. This claim accompanies an exaggeration of the role of eyewitnesses' "initial confidence" in the DNA exoneration cases. Still worse, overstated claims about the confidence-accuracy relationship, and eyewitness memory, have reached our top scientific journals, news articles, and criminal cases. To set the record straight, we review what we actually know and do not know about the "initial confidence" of eyewitnesses in the DNA exoneration cases. Further reasons for skepticism about the value of the confidence-accuracy relationship in real-world cases come from new analyses of a separate database, the National Registry of Exonerations. Finally, we review new research that reveals numerous conditions wherein eyewitnesses with high initial confidence end up being wrong.

Test a Witness's Memory of a Suspect Only Once.

Eyewitness misidentifications are almost always made with high confidence in the courtroom. The courtroom is where eyewitnesses make their last identification of defendants suspected of (and charged with) committing a crime. But what did those same eyewitnesses do on the first identification test, conducted early in a police investigation? Despite testifying with high confidence in court, many eyewitnesses also testified that they had initially identified the suspect with low confidence or failed to identify the suspect at all. Presenting a lineup leaves the eyewitness with a memory trace of the faces in the lineup, including that of the suspect. As a result, the memory signal generated by the face of that suspect will be stronger on a later test involving the same witness, even if the suspect is innocent. In that sense, testing memory contaminates memory. These considerations underscore the importance of a newly proposed recommendation for conducting eyewitness identifications: Avoid repeated identification procedures with the same witness and suspect. This recommendation applies not only to additional tests conducted by police investigators but also to the final test conducted in the courtroom, in front of the judge and jury.

Nevertheless, partisanship persisted: fake news warnings help briefly, but bias returns with time.

Politically oriented "fake news"-false stories or headlines created to support or attack a political position or person-is increasingly being shared and believed on social media. Many online platforms have taken steps to address this by adding a warning label to articles identified as false, but past research has shown mixed evidence for the effectiveness of such labels, and many prior studies have looked only at either short-term impacts or non-political information. This study tested three versions of fake news labels with 541 online participants in a two-wave study. A warning that came before a false headline was initially very effective in both discouraging belief in false headlines generally and eliminating a partisan congruency effect (the tendency to believe politically congenial information more readily than politically uncongenial information). In the follow-up survey two weeks later, however, we found both high levels of belief in the articles and the re-emergence of a partisan congruency effect in all warning conditions, even though participants had known just two weeks ago the items were false. The new pre-warning before the headline showed some small improvements over other types, but did not stop people from believing the article once seen again without a warning. This finding suggests that warnings do have an important immediate impact and may work well in the short term, though the durability of that protection is limited.

Push polls increase false memories for fake news stories.

Push polls are an insidious means of disseminating information under the guise of a legitimate information-gathering poll (e.g., "Would you be more or less likely to vote for X if you heard they were being investigated for tax fraud?"). While previous research has shown that push polls can affect attitudes, the current study assessed whether exposure to push polls can increase false memories for corresponding fake news stories. Across four studies, we found that participants (N = 1,290) were significantly more likely to report a false memory for a corresponding fabricated news story after push poll exposure. This was true for positive and negative stories, concerning both fictitious characters and well-known public figures. Furthermore, this effect was stronger after a delay of one week between the push poll and the news story. Our findings suggest that push polls are a potent applied example of the misinformation effect and can significantly increase susceptibility to fake news stories.

Remembering facts versus feelings in the wake of political events.

Amid rising political polarisation, inaccurate memory for facts and exaggerated memories of grievances can drive individuals and groups further apart. We assessed whether people with more accurate memories of the facts concerning political events were less susceptible to bias when remembering how events made them feel. Study 1 assessed participants' memories concerning the 2016 U.S. presidential election (N = 571), and included 33 individuals with Highly Superior Autobiographical Memory (HSAM). Study 2 assessed participants' memories concerning the 2018 referendum on abortion in Ireland (N = 733). Participants rated how happy, angry, and scared they felt days after these events. Six months later, they recalled their feelings and factual information. In both studies, participants overestimated how angry they had felt but underestimated happiness and fear. Adjusting for importance, no association was found between the accuracy of memory for facts and feelings. Accuracy in remembering facts was predicted by media exposure. Accuracy in remembering feelings was predicted by consistency over time in feelings and appraisals about past events. HSAM participants in Study 1 remembered election-related facts better than others, but not their feelings. Thus, having a good grasp of the facts did not protect against bias in remembering feelings about political events.

Belief in Unconscious Repressed Memory Persists.

On the basis of converging research, we concluded that the controversial topic of unconscious blockage of psychological trauma (i.e., repressed memory) remains very much alive in clinical, legal, and academic contexts. In his commentary, Brewin (this issue, p. 443) conducted a cocitation analysis and concluded that scholars do not adhere to the concept of unconscious repression. Furthermore, he argued that previous survey research did not specifically assess unconscious repression. Here, we present critical evidence that runs counter to his claims. First, we inspected his cocitation analysis and found that some scholars support notions that are closely related to unconscious repression. Furthermore, we conducted another analysis on the basis of articles' similarity. Again, we found examples of scholars specifically endorsing unconscious repressed memories. Second, as opposed to what Brewin reports, recent survey research now exists that bears directly on people's beliefs regarding unconscious repression. This work reveals that large percentages of people (e.g., students and eye-movement desensitization and reprocessing [EMDR] clinicians) endorse the concept of unconscious repressed memories. The belief in unconscious repressed memory can continue to contribute to harmful consequences in clinical, legal, and academic domains (e.g., false accusations of abuse).

Memory experts' beliefs about repressed memory.

ABSTRACTWhat we believe about how memory works affects the decisions we make in many aspects of life. In Patihis, Ho et al. [Patihis, L., Ho, L. Y., Tingen, I. W., Lilienfeld, S. O., & Loftus, E. F. (2014). Are the "memory wars" over? A scientist-practitioner gap in beliefs about repressed memory. Psychological Science, 25, 519-530.], we documented several group's beliefs on repressed memories and other aspects of how memory works. Here, we present previously unreported data on the beliefs of perhaps the most credible minority in our dataset: memory experts. We provide the statistics and written responses of the beliefs for 17 memory experts. Although memory experts held similarly sceptical beliefs about repressed memory as other research-focused groups, they were significantly more sceptical about repressed memory compared to practitioners, students and the public. Although a minority of memory experts wrote that they maintained an open mind about repressed memories - citing research such as retrieval inhibition - all of the memory experts emphasised the dangers of memory distortion.

Resting state heart rate variability and false memories.

Recent studies have shown higher resting-state vagally-mediated heart rate variability (vmHRV) to be related to greater memory retrieval. Research has not yet linked resting vmHRV with memory encoding and retrieval, as both are thought to play an important role in correctly distinguishing between true and false memories. The current study investigated this possible link in n = 71 undergraduate students. VmHRV was assessed during a 5-minute resting baseline period. Participants then completed the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) task, where they first viewed 6 word lists (12 words per list), and were later asked to identify previously shown words (true memories) and reject non-presented words. Results showed that participants with lower resting vmHRV were less able to discriminate true from false items. These data extend previous work on resting vmHRV and memory suggesting that resting vmHRV represents a psychophysiological pathway involved in both the proper encoding and retrieval of memories.

Food insecurity and mental health outcomes among homeless adults: a scoping review.

OBJECTIVE: This review summarises and synthesises the existing literature on the relationship between food insecurity (FS) and mental health conditions among adult individuals experiencing homelessness. DESIGN: Scoping review. Papers published between 1 January 2008 and 2 November 2018, searched in PubMed, Web of Science, Scopus, PsycINFO, Cochrane Library and CINAHL, using homelessness, food security and mental health keywords. SETTING: Global evidence. PARTICIPANTS: Homeless adults aged 18 years or more. RESULTS: Nine articles (eight cross-sectional and one longitudinal) were included in the present review. FS was measured using the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale, the United States Department of Agriculture Household Food Security Survey Module, as well as single-item or constructed measures. Depression and depressive symptoms were the most common mental health conditions studied. Other mental health conditions assessed included alcohol and substance use, emotional disorders, mental health problems symptoms severity and psychiatric hospitalisations. Composite measures such as axis I and II categories and a cluster of severe mental conditions and mental health-related functioning status were also analysed. FS and mental health-related problems were considered as both exposure and outcome variables. The existing evidence suggests a potential association between FS and several mental health conditions, particularly depression, mental health symptoms severity and poor mental health status scores. CONCLUSIONS: This review suggests the potential association between some mental health conditions and FS among homeless adults. However, there is a need for more longitudinal- and interventional-based studies, in order to understand the nature and directionality of the links between FS and mental health in this population group.

Pandemics and infodemics: Research on the effects of misinformation on memory.

On social media and in everyday life, people are often exposed to misinformation. Decades of research have shown that exposure to misinformation can have significant impacts on people's thoughts, actions, and memories. During global pandemics like COVID-19, people are likely exposed to heightened quantities of misinformation as they search for and are exposed to copious amounts of information about the disease and its effects. This media environment, with an abundance of both accurate and inaccurate information, is often called an "infodemic." In the current essay, we discuss the consequences of exposure to misinformation during this infodemic, particularly in the domain of memory. We review existing research demonstrating how inaccurate, postevent information impacts a person's memory for a previously witnessed event. We discuss various factors that strengthen the impact of misinformation, including repetition and whether the misinformation is consistent with people's pre-existing attitudes or beliefs. We conclude by describing how social media companies and individual users can help prevent the spread of misinformation and the ways in which cognitive science research can inform these approaches.

Belief in unconscious repressed memory is widespread: A comment on Brewin, Li, Ntarantana, Unsworth, and McNeilis (2019).

What does believing in repressed memory mean? In a recent article in this journal, Brewin, Li, Ntarantana, Unsworth, and McNeilis (2019, Study 3) argued that when people are asked to indicate their belief in repressed memory, they might actually think of deliberate memory suppression rather than unconscious repressed memory. They further argued that in contrast to belief in unconscious repressed memory, belief in deliberate memory suppression is not scientifically controversial. In this commentary, we show that they are incorrect on both counts. Although Brewin and colleagues surveyed people to indicate their belief in deliberate memory suppression, they neglected to ask their participants whether they (also) believed in unconscious repressed memory. We asked people from the general population whether they believed that traumatic experiences can be unconsciously repressed for many years and then recovered. In 2 studies of the general population, we found high endorsement rates (Study 1 [N = 230]: 59.2% [n = 45]; Study 2 [N = 79]: 67.1% [n = 53]) of the belief in unconscious repressed memory. These endorsement rates did not statistically differ from endorsement rates to statements on repressed memory and deliberate memory suppression. In contrast to what Brewin et al. argued, belief in unconscious repressed memory among lay people is alive and well. Finally, we contend that Brewin et al. overstated the scientific evidence bearing on deliberate repression (suppression). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).