Communicating beyond the information given can make the communicator's attitudes toward a social group more extreme.

Three experiments tested how communicating attributes of initially liked or disliked groups might create more extreme attitudes. We gave non-neutral participants information about previously unknown groups and asked them to write social media posts describing the group to others. Participants who wrote social media posts to friends (Experiment 1, n = 332) or undecided strangers (Experiments 2 and 3, ns = 113 and 816) exaggerated and elaborated on initial information, subsequently reporting more extreme attitudes. These effects, mediated by extremity of associations to the target group, were interpreted as consistent with theory and research on going beyond the information given. (100 words).

Behind the stage of deliberate self-persuasion: When changes in valence of associations to an attitude object predict attitude change.

Modern theory and research on evaluative processes, combined with a comprehensive review of deliberate self-persuasion (Maio & Thomas, 2007, Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull., 11, 46), suggest two types of strategies people can use to construct new, more desired attitudes. Epistemic strategies change the perceived valence of associations activated by the attitude object. Teleologic strategies, in contrast, keep undesired associations from being activated in the first place, thus obviating the need to change their perceived valence. Change in perceived valence of associations therefore might predict attitude change better when people pursue epistemic than teleologic strategies for deliberate self-persuasion. This hypothesis gained convergent support from three studies in which use of epistemic versus teleologic strategies was measured as an individual difference (Study 1) and manipulated (studies 2 and 3). The results of these studies supported the theoretical distinction between the two strategies and suggested further research directions.

Individual differences in preference for epistemic versus teleologic strategies of deliberate self-persuasion.

People are often dissatisfied with their attitudes (e.g., liking their jobs too little or junk food too much) and would like to evaluate differently. On the basis of theory and research, a scale was developed to measure individual differences in preference for 2 types of cognitive tactics (epistemic or teleologic [E or T]) that people use when they try to change their own attitudes (Maio & Thomas, 2007). For each of 3 attitude objects (my life, a romantic partner, Arabs), the scale items loaded on the 2 intended factors, and E - T scale scores were significantly correlated across the 3 attitude objects (Study 1). Scale scores also displayed satisfactory internal and test-retest reliability and discriminant validity (Study 2). In addition, E - T scores (i.e., mean preference for epistemic vs. teleologic tactics) displayed satisfactory predictive and construct validity by predicting the extent to which individuals would recall negative attributes of their lives (Study 3) and of going to a counseling center (Study 4) after a session of deliberate self-persuasion. The discussion centers on theoretical and practical applications of the new scale.

Embodiment, agency, and attitude change.

Attitude embodiment effects occur when the position or movement of a person's physical body changes the way the person evaluates an object. The present research investigated whether attitude embodiment effects depend more on biomechanical factors or on inferential cues to causal agency. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that actual movements of the physical body are not necessary to create attitude embodiment effects when inferential cues imply agency for another person's physical movements. Experiment 3 showed that actual movements of the physical body are not sufficient to create attitude embodiment effects when inferential cues imply nonagency for those movements. In all 3 experiments, inferential cues to agency played a more important role in attitude embodiment effects than did actual agency, suggesting that theories of embodiment and attitude embodiment need to consider inferential cues to agency alongside biomechanical mechanisms.

Beyond pleasure: emotion activity affects the relationship between attitudes and behavior.

The research examined an additional proposed moderator of the attitude-behavior relationship: the activity level of emotions associated with an attitude object. In Experiment 1, participants who self-generated active rather than passive emotions as being associated with gay men displayed greater attitude-behavior consistency in hiring recommendations for a gay job applicant, as did participants who rated active rather than passive experimenter-provided emotions as being associated with gay men. In Experiment 2, participants who were instructed to associate active rather than passive emotions with gay men subsequently displayed greater attitude-behavior consistency in similar hiring recommendations. It is suggested that future research on the affective component of attitudes might benefit from going beyond consideration of whether the associated emotions entail displeasure or pleasure.

Houses built on sand: effects of exemplar stability on susceptibility to attitude change.

Attitude representation theory (C. G. Lord & M. R. Lepper, 1999) explains both attitude-behavior consistency and attitude change with the same principles. When individuals respond evaluatively to an attitude object, they activate and combine assumptions about the attitude object with perceptions of the immediate situation. The assumptions activated can vary across time, even without additional information. Previous research has shown that individuals activate exemplars when answering attitude questions, attitude reports vary with the valence of the assumptions activated, and activating differently liked exemplars reduces attitude-behavior consistency. The present research completed study of the theoretical implications of exemplar stability by showing that individuals with temporally unstable exemplars, whether spontaneous (Experiment 1) or manipulated (Experiments 2 and 3), are more susceptible to subsequent attitude change than are individuals with stable exemplars.

Effects of attitude action identification on congruence between attitudes and behavioral intentions toward social groups.

Attitude Representation Theory (ART) holds that attitude-relevant responses are informed by mental representations of the attitude object, which include the individual's actions toward that object. Action Identification Theory (AIT) holds that the same action can be identified at multiple levels. Individuals who identify their actions at lower levels have less flexibility in how they perform the action, and thus enact the action less consistently. An integration of ART and AIT suggested that individuals who spontaneously (Experiment 1) or through manipulation (Experiments 2 and 3) identify their attitude-relevant actions toward a social group at lower levels might display less attitude-intention congruence than would individuals who identify their attitude-relevant actions at higher levels. ART and AIT are discussed as having links with each other and with other theories of attitude and judgment processes.