Pre-acquired Functional Connectivity Predicts Choice Inconsistency.

Economic choice theories usually assume that humans maximize utility in their choices. However, studies have shown that humans make inconsistent choices, leading to suboptimal behavior, even without context-dependent manipulations. Previous studies showed that activation in value and motor networks are associated with inconsistent choices at the moment of choice. Here, we investigated if the neural predispositions, measured before a choice task, can predict choice inconsistency in a later risky choice task. Using functional connectivity (FC) measures from resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rsfMRI), derived before any choice was made, we aimed to predict subjects' inconsistency levels in a later-performed choice task. We hypothesized that rsfMRI FC measures extracted from value and motor brain areas would predict inconsistency. Forty subjects (21 females) completed a rsfMRI scan before performing a risky choice task. We compared models that were trained on FC that included only hypothesized value and motor regions with models trained on whole-brain FC. We found that both model types significantly predicted inconsistency levels. Moreover, even the whole-brain models relied mostly on FC between value and motor areas. For external validation, we used a neural network pretrained on FC matrices of 37,000 subjects and fine-tuned it on our data and again showed significant predictions. Together, this shows that the tendency for choice inconsistency is predicted by predispositions of the nervous system and that synchrony between the motor and value networks plays a crucial role in this tendency.

Generalizing prediction of task-evoked brain activity across datasets and populations.

Predictions of task-based functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) from task-free resting-state (rs) fMRI have gained popularity over the past decade. This method holds a great promise for studying individual variability in brain function without the need to perform highly demanding tasks. However, in order to be broadly used, prediction models must prove to generalize beyond the dataset they were trained on. In this work, we test the generalizability of prediction of task-fMRI from rs-fMRI across sites, MRI vendors and age-groups. Moreover, we investigate the data requirements for successful prediction. We use the Human Connectome Project (HCP) dataset to explore how different combinations of training sample sizes and number of fMRI datapoints affect prediction success in various cognitive tasks. We then apply models trained on HCP data to predict brain activations in data from a different site, a different MRI vendor (Phillips vs. Siemens scanners) and a different age group (children from the HCP-development project). We demonstrate that, depending on the task, a training set of approximately 20 participants with 100 fMRI timepoints each yields the largest gain in model performance. Nevertheless, further increasing sample size and number of timepoints results in significantly improved predictions, until reaching approximately 450-600 training participants and 800-1000 timepoints. Overall, the number of fMRI timepoints influences prediction success more than the sample size. We further show that models trained on adequate amounts of data successfully generalize across sites, vendors and age groups and provide predictions that are both accurate and individual-specific. These findings suggest that large-scale publicly available datasets may be utilized to study brain function in smaller, unique samples.

Bounded rationality in C. elegans is explained by circuit-specific normalization in chemosensory pathways.

Rational choice theory assumes optimality in decision-making. Violations of a basic axiom of economic rationality known as "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives" (IIA) have been demonstrated in both humans and animals and could stem from common neuronal constraints. Here we develop tests for IIA in the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans, an animal with only 302 neurons, using olfactory chemotaxis assays. We find that in most cases C. elegans make rational decisions. However, by probing multiple neuronal architectures using various choice sets, we show that violations of rationality arise when the circuit of olfactory sensory neurons is asymmetric. We further show that genetic manipulations of the asymmetry between the AWC neurons can make the worm irrational. Last, a context-dependent normalization-based model of value coding and gain control explains how particular neuronal constraints on information coding give rise to irrationality. Thus, we demonstrate that bounded rationality could arise due to basic neuronal constraints.