Beyond collective intelligence: Collective adaptation.

We develop a conceptual framework for studying collective adaptation in complex socio-cognitive systems, driven by dynamic interactions of social integration strategies, social environments and problem structures. Going beyond searching for 'intelligent' collectives, we integrate research from different disciplines and outline modelling approaches that can be used to begin answering questions such as why collectives sometimes fail to reach seemingly obvious solutions, how they change their strategies and network structures in response to different problems and how we can anticipate and perhaps change future harmful societal trajectories. We discuss the importance of considering path dependence, lack of optimization and collective myopia to understand the sometimes counterintuitive outcomes of collective adaptation. We call for a transdisciplinary, quantitative and societally useful social science that can help us to understand our rapidly changing and ever more complex societies, avoid collective disasters and reach the full potential of our ability to organize in adaptive collectives.

Sentiment analysis of the Twitter response to Netflix's Our Planet documentary.

The role of nature documentaries in shaping public attitudes and behavior toward conservation and wildlife issues is unclear. We analyzed the emotional content of over 2 million tweets related to Our Planet, a major nature documentary released on Netflix, with dictionary and rule-based automatic sentiment analysis. We also compared the sentiment associated with species mentioned in Our Planet and a set of control species with similar features but not mentioned in the documentary. Tweets were largely negative in sentiment at the time of release of the series. This effect was primarily linked to the highly skewed distributions of retweets and, in particular, to a single negatively valenced and massively retweeted tweet (>150,000 retweets). Species mentioned in Our Planet were associated with more negative sentiment than the control species, and this effect coincided with a short period following the airing of the series. Our results are consistent with a general negativity bias in cultural transmission and document the difficulty of evoking positive sentiment, on social media and elsewhere, in response to environmental problems.

Análisis de sentimientos de la respuesta en Twitter al documental Nuestro Planeta de Netflix Resumen No está claro el papel que tienen los documentales sobre naturaleza en la formación de actitudes públicas y respuestas a los temas de conservación y vida silvestre. Aplicamos un análisis automático de sentimientos basado en reglas y el diccionario al contenido emocional de más de dos millones de tuits relacionados a Nuestro Planeta, un importante documental estrenado en Netflix. También comparamos entre los sentimientos asociados a las especies mencionadas en el documental y un conjunto de especies control con características similares pero que no mencionan en el documental. En general, los tuits contenían sentimientos negativos cuando se estrenó la serie. Relacionamos este efecto a la distribución sesgada de retuits particularmente de un solo tuit negativo con retuits masivos (>150,000). Las especies mencionadas estuvieron asociadas con más sentimientos negativos que las especies control. Este efecto coincidió con un periodo corto después de la emisión de la serie. Nuestros resultados son coherentes con un sesgo generalizado de negatividad en la transmisión cultural y documentan lo difícil que es provocar sentimientos positivos, en redes sociales o en demás sitios, como respuesta a los problemas ambientales.

Trusting the experts: The domain-specificity of prestige-biased social learning.

Prestige-biased social learning (henceforth "prestige-bias") occurs when individuals predominantly choose to learn from a prestigious member of their group, i.e. someone who has gained attention, respect and admiration for their success in some domain. Prestige-bias is proposed as an adaptive social-learning strategy as it provides a short-cut to identifying successful group members, without having to assess each person's success individually. Previous work has documented prestige-bias and verified that it is used adaptively. However, the domain-specificity and generality of prestige-bias has not yet been explicitly addressed experimentally. By domain-specific prestige-bias we mean that individuals choose to learn from a prestigious model only within the domain of expertise in which the model acquired their prestige. By domain-general prestige-bias we mean that individuals choose to learn from prestigious models in general, regardless of the domain in which their prestige was earned. To distinguish between domain specific and domain general prestige we ran an online experiment (n = 397) in which participants could copy each other to score points on a general-knowledge quiz with varying topics (domains). Prestige in our task was an emergent property of participants' copying behaviour. We found participants overwhelmingly preferred domain-specific (same topic) prestige cues to domain-general (across topic) prestige cues. However, when only domain-general or cross-domain (different topic) cues were available, participants overwhelmingly favoured domain-general cues. Finally, when given the choice between cross-domain prestige cues and randomly generated Player IDs, participants favoured cross-domain prestige cues. These results suggest participants were sensitive to the source of prestige, and that they preferred domain-specific cues even though these cues were based on fewer samples (being calculated from one topic) than the domain-general cues (being calculated from all topics). We suggest that the extent to which people employ a domain-specific or domain-general prestige-bias may depend on their experience and understanding of the relationships between domains.

Cultural selection and biased transformation: two dynamics of cultural evolution.

Here, I discuss two broad versions of human cultural evolution which currently exist in the literature and which emphasize different underlying dynamics. One, which originates in population-genetic-style modelling, emphasizes how cultural selection causes some cultural variants to be favoured and gradually increase in frequency over others. The other, which draws more from cognitive science, holds that cultural change is driven by the biased transformation of cultural variants by individuals in non-random and consistent directions. Despite claims that cultural evolution is characterized by one or the other of these dynamics, these are neither mutually exclusive nor a dichotomy. Different domains of human culture are likely to be more or less strongly weighted towards cultural selection or biased transformation. Identifying cultural dynamics in real-world cultural data is challenging given that they can generate the same population-level patterns, such as directional change or cross-cultural stability, and the same cognitive and emotional mechanisms may underlie both cultural selection and biased transformation. Nevertheless, fine-grained historical analysis and laboratory experiments, combined with formal models to generate quantitative predictions, offer the best way of distinguishing them. This article is part of the theme issue 'Foundations of cultural evolution'.

When do people prefer dominant over prestigious political leaders?

Previous research has sought to explain the rise of right-wing populist leaders in terms of the evolutionary framework of dominance and prestige. In this framework, dominance is defined as high social rank acquired via coercion and fear, and prestige is defined as high social rank acquired via competence and admiration. Previous studies have shown that right-wing populist leaders are rated as more dominant than non-populist leaders, and right-wing populist/dominant leaders are favoured in times of economic uncertainty and intergroup conflict. In this paper, we explore and critique this application of dominance-prestige to politics. First, we argue that the dominance-prestige framework, originally developed to explain inter-personal relationships within small-scale societies characterised by face-to-face interaction, does not straightforwardly extend to large-scale democratic societies which have frequent anonymous interaction and complex ingroup-outgroup dynamics. Second, we show that economic uncertainty and intergroup conflict predict a preference not only for dominant leaders, but also for prestigious leaders. Third, we show that perceptions of leaders as dominant or prestigious are not fixed, and depend on the political ideology of the perceiver: people view leaders who share their ideology as prestigious, and those who oppose their ideology as dominant, whether that ideology is liberal or conservative. Fourth, we show that political ideology is a stronger predictor than economic uncertainty of preference for Donald Trump vs Hillary Clinton in the 2016 US Presidential Election, contradicting previous findings that link Trump's success to economic uncertainty. We conclude by suggesting that, if economic uncertainty does not directly affect preferences for right-wing populist leaders, other features of their discourse such as higher emotionality might explain their success.

Banking on cooperation: an evolutionary analysis of microfinance loan repayment behaviour.

Microfinance is an economic development tool that provides loans to low-income borrowers to stimulate economic growth and reduce financial hardship. Lenders typically require joint liability, where multiple borrowers share the responsibility of repaying a group loan. We propose that this lending practice creates a cooperation dilemma similar to that faced by humans and other organisms in nature across many domains. This could offer a real-world test case for evolutionary theories of cooperation from the biological sciences. In turn, such theories could provide new insights into loan repayment behaviour. We first hypothesise how group loan repayment efficacy should be affected by mechanisms of assortment from the evolutionary literature on cooperation, i.e. common ancestry (kin selection), prior interaction (reciprocity), partner choice, similarity of tags, social learning, and ecology and demography. We then assess selected hypotheses by reviewing 41 studies from 32 countries on micro-borrowers' loan repayment, evaluating which characteristics of borrowers are associated with credit repayment behaviour. Surprisingly, we find that kinship is mostly negatively associated with repayment efficacy, but prior interaction and partner choice are both more positively associated. Our work highlights the scope of evolutionary theory to provide systematic insight into how humans respond to novel economic institutions and interventions.

Erratum: When do people prefer dominant over prestigious political leaders? - ERRATUM.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1017/ehs.2021.12.].

Cumulative Cultural Evolution within Evolving Population Structures.

Our species has the peculiar ability to accumulate cultural innovations over multiple generations, a phenomenon termed 'cumulative cultural evolution' (CCE). Recent years have seen a proliferation of empirical and theoretical work exploring the interplay between demography and CCE. This has generated intense discussion about whether demographic models can help explain historical patterns of cultural changes. Here, we synthesize empirical and theoretical studies from multiple fields to highlight how both population size and structure can shape the pool of cultural information that individuals can build upon to innovate, present the potential pathways through which humans' unique social structure might promote CCE, and discuss whether humans' social networks might partly result from selection pressures linked to our extensive reliance on culturally accumulated knowledge.

No evidence that omission and confirmation biases affect the perception and recall of vaccine-related information.

Despite the spectacular success of vaccines in preventing infectious diseases, fears about their safety and other anti-vaccination claims are widespread. To better understand how such fears and claims persist and spread, we must understand how they are perceived and recalled. One influence on the perception and recall of vaccination-related information might be universal cognitive biases acting against vaccination. An omission bias describes the tendency to perceive as worse, and recall better, bad outcomes resulting from commissions (e.g. vaccine side effects) compared to the same bad outcomes resulting from omissions (e.g. symptoms of vaccine preventable diseases). Another factor influencing the perception and recall of vaccination-related information might be people's attitudes towards vaccines. A confirmation bias would mean that pre-existing pro-vaccination attitudes positively predict perceptions of severity and recall of symptoms of vaccine preventable diseases and negatively predict perceptions of severity and recall of vaccine side effects. To test for these hypothesized biases, 202 female participants aged 18-60 (M = 38.15, SD = 10.37) completed an online experiment with a between-subjects experimental design. Participants imagined that they had a 1-year old child who suffered from either vaccine side effects (Commission Condition) or symptoms of a vaccine-preventable disease (Omission Condition). They then rated a list of symptoms/side effects for their perceived severity on a 7-point Likert scale. Finally, they completed a surprise recall test in which they recalled the symptoms/side effects previously rated. An additional scale was used to measure their attitudes towards vaccines. Contrary to the hypotheses, perceptions of severity and the recall of symptoms/side effects were not associated with experimental condition, failing to support the omission bias, nor did they interact with attitudes towards vaccines, failing to support the confirmation bias. This cast doubt on the possibility that the spread of anti-vaccination claims can be explained by these particular universal cognitive biases.

Cultural evolution of football tactics: strategic social learning in managers' choice of formation.

In order to adaptively solve complex problems or make difficult decisions, people must strategically combine personal information acquired directly from experience (individual learning) and social information acquired from others (social learning). The game of football (soccer) provides extensive real world data with which to quantify this strategic information use. I analyse a 5-year dataset of all games (n = 9127, 2012-2017) in five top European leagues to quantify the extent to which a manager's initial formation is guided by their personal past use or success with that formation, or other managers' use or success with that formation. I focus on the 4231 formation, the dominant formation during this period. As predicted, a manager's choice of whether to use 4231 is influenced by both their recent use of 4231 (personal information) and the use of 4231 in the entire population of managers in that division (social information). Against expectations, managers relied more on personal than social information, although this estimate was highly variable across managers and divisions. Finally, there did not appear to be an adaptive tradeoff between social and personal information use, with the relative reliance on each failing to predict managerial success.

Correction: Migration, acculturation, and the maintenance of between-group cultural variation.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0205573.].

Causal understanding is not necessary for the improvement of culturally evolving technology.

Bows and arrows, houses and kayaks are just a few examples of the highly optimized tools that humans have produced and used to colonize new environments1,2. Because there is much evidence that humans' cognitive abilities are unparalleled3,4, many believe that such technologies resulted from our superior causal reasoning abilities5-7. However, others have stressed that the high dimensionality of human technologies makes them very difficult to understand causally8. Instead, they argue that optimized technologies emerge through the retention of small improvements across generations without requiring understanding of how these technologies work1,9. Here we show that a physical artefact becomes progressively optimized across generations of social learners in the absence of explicit causal understanding. Moreover, we find that the transmission of causal models across generations has no noticeable effect on the pace of cultural evolution. The reason is that participants do not spontaneously create multidimensional causal theories but, instead, mainly produce simplistic models related to a salient dimension. Finally, we show that the transmission of these inaccurate theories constrains learners' exploration and has downstream effects on their understanding. These results indicate that complex technologies need not result from enhanced causal reasoning but, instead, can emerge from the accumulation of improvements made across generations.

Cultural evolution of emotional expression in 50 years of song lyrics.

Popular music offers a rich source of data that provides insights into long-term cultural evolutionary dynamics. One major trend in popular music, as well as other cultural products such as literary fiction, is an increase over time in negatively valenced emotional content, and a decrease in positively valenced emotional content. Here we use two large datasets containing lyrics from n = 4913 and n = 159,015 pop songs respectively and spanning 1965-2015, to test whether cultural transmission biases derived from the cultural evolution literature can explain this trend towards emotional negativity. We find some evidence of content bias (negative lyrics do better in the charts), prestige bias (best-selling artists are copied) and success bias (best-selling songs are copied) in the proliferation of negative lyrics. However, the effects of prestige and success bias largely disappear when unbiased transmission is included in the models, which assumes that the occurrence of negative lyrics is predicted by their past frequency. We conclude that the proliferation of negative song lyrics may be explained partly by content bias, and partly by undirected, unbiased cultural transmission.

Migration, acculturation, and the maintenance of between-group cultural variation.

How do migration and acculturation (i.e. psychological or behavioral change resulting from migration) affect within- and between-group cultural variation? Here I address this question by drawing analogies between genetic and cultural evolution. Population genetic models show that migration rapidly breaks down between-group genetic structure. In cultural evolution, however, migrants or their descendants can acculturate to local behaviors via social learning processes such as conformity, potentially preventing migration from eliminating between-group cultural variation. An analysis of the empirical literature on migration suggests that acculturation is common, with second and subsequent migrant generations shifting, sometimes substantially, towards the cultural values of the adopted society. Yet there is little understanding of the individual-level dynamics that underlie these population-level shifts. To explore this formally, I present models quantifying the effect of migration and acculturation on between-group cultural variation, for both neutral and costly cooperative traits. In the models, between-group cultural variation, measured using F statistics, is eliminated by migration and maintained by conformist acculturation. The extent of acculturation is determined by the strength of conformist bias and the number of demonstrators from whom individuals learn. Acculturation is countered by assortation, the tendency for individuals to preferentially interact with culturally-similar others. Unlike neutral traits, cooperative traits can additionally be maintained by payoff-biased social learning, but only in the presence of strong sanctioning mechanisms (e.g. institutions). Overall, the models show that surprisingly little conformist acculturation is required to maintain realistic amounts of between-group cultural diversity. While these models provide insight into the potential dynamics of acculturation and migration in cultural evolution, they also highlight the need for more empirical research into the individual-level learning biases that underlie migrant acculturation.

Correction: How Do People Become W.E.I.R.D.? Migration Reveals the Cultural Transmission Mechanisms Underlying Variation in Psychological Processes.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0147162.].

What is cumulative cultural evolution?

In recent years, the phenomenon of cumulative cultural evolution (CCE) has become the focus of major research interest in biology, psychology and anthropology. Some researchers argue that CCE is unique to humans and underlies our extraordinary evolutionary success as a species. Others claim to have found CCE in non-human species. Yet others remain sceptical that CCE is even important for explaining human behavioural diversity and complexity. These debates are hampered by multiple and often ambiguous definitions of CCE. Here, we review how researchers define, use and test CCE. We identify a core set of criteria for CCE which are both necessary and sufficient, and may be found in non-human species. We also identify a set of extended criteria that are observed in human CCE but not, to date, in other species. Different socio-cognitive mechanisms may underlie these different criteria. We reinterpret previous theoretical models and observational and experimental studies of both human and non-human species in light of these more fine-grained criteria. Finally, we discuss key issues surrounding information, fitness and cognition. We recommend that researchers are more explicit about what components of CCE they are testing and claiming to demonstrate.

Pursuing Darwin's curious parallel: Prospects for a science of cultural evolution.

In the past few decades, scholars from several disciplines have pursued the curious parallel noted by Darwin between the genetic evolution of species and the cultural evolution of beliefs, skills, knowledge, languages, institutions, and other forms of socially transmitted information. Here, I review current progress in the pursuit of an evolutionary science of culture that is grounded in both biological and evolutionary theory, but also treats culture as more than a proximate mechanism that is directly controlled by genes. Both genetic and cultural evolution can be described as systems of inherited variation that change over time in response to processes such as selection, migration, and drift. Appropriate differences between genetic and cultural change are taken seriously, such as the possibility in the latter of nonrandomly guided variation or transformation, blending inheritance, and one-to-many transmission. The foundation of cultural evolution was laid in the late 20th century with population-genetic style models of cultural microevolution, and the use of phylogenetic methods to reconstruct cultural macroevolution. Since then, there have been major efforts to understand the sociocognitive mechanisms underlying cumulative cultural evolution, the consequences of demography on cultural evolution, the empirical validity of assumed social learning biases, the relative role of transformative and selective processes, and the use of quantitative phylogenetic and multilevel selection models to understand past and present dynamics of society-level change. I conclude by highlighting the interdisciplinary challenges of studying cultural evolution, including its relation to the traditional social sciences and humanities.

Experimental priming of independent and interdependent activity does not affect culturally variable psychological processes.

Cultural psychologists have shown that people from Western countries exhibit more independent self-construal and analytic (rule-based) cognition than people from East Asia, who exhibit more interdependent self-construal and holistic (relationship-based) cognition. One explanation for this cross-cultural variation is the ecocultural hypothesis, which links contemporary psychological differences to ancestral differences in subsistence and societal cohesion: Western thinking formed in response to solitary herding, which fostered independence, while East Asian thinking emerged in response to communal rice farming, which fostered interdependence. Here, we report two experiments that tested the ecocultural hypothesis in the laboratory. In both, participants played one of two tasks designed to recreate the key factors of working alone and working together. Before and after each task, participants completed psychological measures of independent-interdependent self-construal and analytic-holistic cognition. We found no convincing evidence that either solitary or collective tasks affected any of the measures in the predicted directions. This fails to support the ecocultural hypothesis. However, it may also be that our priming tasks are inappropriate or inadequate for simulating subsistence-related behavioural practices, or that these measures are fixed early in development and therefore not experimentally primable, despite many previous studies that have purported to find such priming effects.