Radionuclide measurements of the international monitoring system.

The International Monitoring System (IMS) is a unique global network of sensors, tuned to measure various phenomenology, with the common goal of detecting a nuclear explosion anywhere in the world. One component of this network collects measurements of radioactive particulates and gases (collectively known as radionuclides) present in the atmosphere; through this, compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) can be verified. The radionuclide sub-network consists of 120 sensors across 80 locations, supported by 16 measurement laboratories. All radionuclide stations make use of a form of γ-ray spectroscopy to measure radionuclides from samples; this remains largely unchanged since the network was first established 25 years ago. Advances in sampling and spectroscopy systems can yield improvements to the sensitivity of the network to detect a nuclear explosion. This paper summarises the status of the IMS radionuclide network, the current suite of technology used and reviews new technology that could enhance future iterations, potentially improving the verification power of the IMS.

Nuclear explosion monitoring network design considerations.

Design of an efficient monitoring network requires information on the type and size of releases to be detected, the accuracy and reliability of the measuring equipment, and the desired network performance. This work provides a scientific basis for optimizing or minimizing networks of 133Xe samplers to achieve a desired performance level for different levels of release. The approach of this work varies the density of sampling locations to find optimal location subsets, and to explore the properties of variations of those subsets - how crucial is a specific subset; are substitutions problematic? The choice of possible station locations is arbitrary but constrained to some extent by the location of islands, land masses, difficult topography (mountains, etc.) and the places where infrastructure exists to run and support a sampler. Performance is evaluated using hypothetical releases and atmospheric transport models that cover an entire year. Three network performance metrics are calculated: the probability of detecting the releases, the expected number of stations to detect the releases, and the expected number of samples that detect the releases. The quantitative measures support picking optimal or near-optimal network of a specific station density. If a detection probability of 90% (high) was desired for a design basis release of 1014 Bq (1% of 133Xe production from a 1 kt explosion), then a very high density would be required using today's sampling and measurement technology. If the design basis release were raised to 1015 Bq, then the station density could be lowered by a factor of 3. To achieve a location goal of three station detections on average, posited here for the first time, would also require very high station density for a release of 1014 Bq.

Projected network performance for next generation aerosol monitoring systems.

Aerosol monitoring for radioactivity is a mature and proven technology. However, by improving key specifications of aerosol monitoring equipment, more samples per day can be collected and analyzed with the same minimum detectable concentrations as current systems. This work models hypothetical releases of 140Ba and 131I over a range of magnitudes corresponding to the inventory produced from the fission of about 100 g to 1 kiloton TNT-equivalent of 235U. The releases occur over an entire year to incorporate the natural variability in atmospheric transport. Sampling equipment located at the 79 locations for radionuclide stations identified in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) for the International Monitoring System are used to determine the detections of the individual releases. Alternative collection schemes in next generation equipment that collect 2, 3, or 4 samples per day, rather than the current 1 sample per day, would result in detections in many more samples at more stations with detections for a given release level. The authors posit that next generation equipment will result in increased network resilience to outages and improved source-location capability for lower yield source releases. The application of dual-detector and coincidence measurements to these systems would significantly boost sensitivity for some isotopes and would further enhance the monitoring capability.

Impact of industrial nuclear emissions on nuclear explosion monitoring.

In 1995, the development of a global radioactive xenon monitoring network was discussed in the Conference on Disarmament as part of a nuclear explosion verification regime. Discussions considered different network densities and different possible source magnitudes. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was subsequently written to initially include 40 locations for noble gas (radioxenon) samplers, and to consider using a total of 80 locations for noble gas samplers in its International Monitoring System (IMS) after the treaty enters into force. Since 2000, a global network of noble gas monitoring locations has been built as part of the IMS. This network, currently with 31 locations, is of sufficient sensitivity to discover that the Earth's atmosphere contains a complex anthropogenic radioactive xenon background. In this work, the impact of calculated xenon backgrounds on IMS radionuclide stations is determined by atmospheric transport modeling over a period of two years using global average values. The network coverage for potential nuclear explosions is based on a proposed method for finding anomalies among frequent background signals. Even with the addition of background radioxenon sources and using a conservative anomaly-based approach, this work shows that various network configurations have higher xenon coverage than the estimates developed when the IMS network was designed in 1995. While these global xenon coverage figures are better than expected when the network was designed in 1995, the regional impact of background radioxenon sources is large, especially for smaller source magnitudes from potential nuclear explosions, and in some cases the xenon background vastly reduces the coverage value of individual sampling locations. The results show the detection capability and presents an optimal installation order of noble gas sampling locations, e.g. from 40 to 80, after the treaty enters into force.

Projected network performance for next-generation xenon monitoring systems.

Next-generation radioxenon monitoring systems are reaching maturity and are expected to improve certain aspects of performance in verifying the absence of nuclear tests. To predict the improvement in detecting and locating nuclear test releases, thousands of releases all over the globe were simulated and the global detection probability was calculated for the single xenon isotope 133Xe. This was done for the International Monitoring System network of noble gas samplers as it currently exists (25 certified stations), and how it would be for potential future network sizes of 39 and 79 stations. The probability of detection was calculated for releases ranging from 1010 Bq to 1016 Bq of 133Xe using 10 d of atmospheric transport and presented as coverage maps and global integrals for both current and next-generation monitoring systems. Similarly, the number of detecting stations and the number of detecting samples were tabulated to elucidate the possibilities for enhanced location capability. Improvements in global detection coverage are maximized at different release sizes in a way that depends on the station density. For example, for releases of 3 × 1014 Bq and 39 stations, the detection probability would rise from 60% to 70% with next-generation systems, while for releases of 1013 Bq and 79 stations, it would rise from 37% to 52%. Achieving an average of two detecting stations would require a 1015 Bq release for a 39-station network and a 1014 Bq release for a 79-station network. The largest impact of using next-generation systems may be the confidence, detection redundancy, and location capability that arise from obtaining multiple samples associated with a single release event.

Projected network performance for multiple isotopes using next-generation xenon monitoring systems.

Since about 2000 (Bowyer et al., 1998), radioxenon monitoring systems have been under development and testing for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Operation of the systems since then has resulted in development of a next-generation of systems that are nearly ready for operational deployment. By 2010, the need to screen out civilian sources was well known (Auer et al., 2010; Saey, 2009), and isotopic ratio approaches were soon considered (Kalinowski and Pistner, 2006) to identify specific sources. New generation systems are expected to improve the ability to verify the absence of nuclear tests by using isotopic ratios when multiple isotopes are detected. In this work, thousands of releases were simulated to compute the global detection probability of 131mXe, 133mXe, 133Xe, and 135Xe at 39 noble gas systems in the International Monitoring System (IMS) for both current and next-generation systems. Three release scenarios are defined at 1 h, 1 d, and 10 d past a 1 kt TNT equivalent 235U explosion event. Multiple cases using from one part in a million to the complete release of the xenon isotopic activity are evaluated for each scenario. Coverage maps and global integrals comparing current and next-generation monitoring systems are presented showing that next-generation noble gas systems will create measurable improvements in the IMS. The global detection probability for 133Xe is shown to be strong in all scenarios, but only modestly improved by next-generation equipment. However, the detection probability for 131mXe and 133mXe increased to about 50% in different scenarios, providing a second detectable isotope for many events. As anticipated from shorter sampling intervals, the expected number of detecting samples roughly doubled and the expected number of detecting stations rose by approximately 50% for all release scenarios. Thus, it might be anticipated that future events would consist of multiple 133Xe detections and one or more second isotope detections. Signals of this nature should increase detection confidence, tighten release location estimates, improve rejection of civilian signals, and lessen the impacts from individual systems being offline for maintenance or repair reasons.

Enabling probabilistic retrospective transport modeling for accurate source detection.

Predicting source or background radionuclide emissions is limited by the effort needed to run gas/aerosol atmospheric transport models (ATMs). A high-performance surrogate model is developed for the HYSPLIT4 (NOAA) ATM to accelerate transport simulation through model reduction, code optimization, and improved scaling on high performance computing systems. The surrogate model parameters are a grid of short-duration transport simulations stored offline. The surrogate model then predicts the path of a plume of radionuclide particles emitted from a source, or the field of sources which may have contributed to a detected signal, more efficiently than direct simulation by HYSPLIT4. Termed the Atmospheric Transport Model Surrogate (ATaMS), this suite of capabilities forms a basis to accelerate workflows for probabilistic source prediction and estimation of the radionuclide atmospheric background.

Investigations of association among atmospheric radionuclide measurements.

Large networks producing frequent atmospheric radionuclide measurements have additional power in characterizing and localizing radionuclide release events over the analysis performed with four or fewer radionuclide measurements. However, adding unrelated measurements to an analysis dilutes that advantage, unless source-term models are extended to account for this complexity. A key steppingstone to obtaining network power is to select a group of related sample measurements that are associated with a release event. Such collections of measurements can be assembled by an analyst, or perhaps they can be selected by algorithm. The authors explore, using a year of atmospheric transport calculations and realistic sensor sensitivities, the potential for a computed radionuclide association tool.

Source type estimation using noble gas samples.

A Bayesian source-term algorithm recently published by Eslinger et al. (2019) extended previous models by including the ability to discriminate between classes of releases such as nuclear explosions, nuclear power plants, or medical isotope production facilities when multiple isotopes are measured. Using 20 release cases from a synthetic data set previously published by Haas et al. (2017), algorithm performance was demonstrated on the transport scale (400-1000 km) associated with the radionuclide samplers in the International Monitoring System. Inclusion of multiple isotopes improves release location and release time estimates over analyses using only a single isotope. The ability to discriminate between classes of releases does not depend on the accuracy of the location or time of release estimates. For some combinations of isotopes, the ability to confidently discriminate between classes of releases requires only a few samples.

Design considerations for future radionuclide aerosol monitoring systems.

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) staff developed the Radionuclide Aerosol Sampler Analyzer (RASA) for worldwide aerosol monitoring in the 1990s. Recently, researchers at PNNL and Creare, LLC, have investigated possibilities for how RASA could be improved, based on lessons learned from more than 15 years of continuous operation, including during the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant disaster. Key themes addressed in upgrade possibilities include having a modular approach to additional radionuclide measurements, optimizing the sampling/analyzing times to improve detection location capabilities, and reducing power consumption by using electrostatic collection versus classic filtration collection. These individual efforts have been made in a modular context that might constitute retrofits to the existing RASA, modular components that could improve a manual monitoring approach, or a completely new RASA. Substantial optimization of the detection and location capabilities of an aerosol network is possible and new missions could be addressed by including additional measurements.

Source term estimation using multiple xenon isotopes in atmospheric samples.

Algorithms that estimate the location and magnitude of an atmospheric release using remotely sampled air concentrations typically involve a single chemical or radioactive isotope. A new Bayesian algorithm is presented that makes discrimination between possible types of releases (e.g., nuclear explosion, nuclear power plant, or medical isotope production facility) an integral part of the analysis for samples that contain multiple isotopes. Algorithm performance is demonstrated using synthetic data and correctly discriminated between most release-type hypotheses, with higher accuracy when data are available on three or more isotopes.

The 2014 Integrated Field Exercise of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty revisited: The case for data fusion.

The International Monitoring System of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) uses a global network of radionuclide monitoring stations to detect evidence of a nuclear explosion. The two radionuclide technologies employed-particulate and noble gas (radioxenon) detection-have applications for data fusion to improve detection of a nuclear explosion. Using the hypothetical 0.5 kT nuclear explosive test scenario of the CTBTO 2014 Integrated Field Exercise, the intrinsic relationship between particulate and noble gas signatures has been examined. This study shows that, depending upon the time of the radioxenon release, the particulate progeny can produce the more detectable signature. Thus, as both particulate and noble gas signatures are inherently coupled, the authors recommend that the sample categorization schemes should be linked.

Improved performance comparisons of radioxenon systems for low level releases in nuclear explosion monitoring.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty bans all nuclear tests and mandates development of verification measures to detect treaty violations. One verification measure is detection of radioactive xenon isotopes produced in the fission of actinides. The International Monitoring System (IMS) currently deploys automated radioxenon systems that can detect four radioxenon isotopes. Radioxenon systems with lower detection limits are currently in development. Historically, the sensitivity of radioxenon systems was measured by the minimum detectable concentration for each isotope. In this paper we analyze the response of radioxenon systems using rigorous metrics in conjunction with hypothetical representative releases indicative of an underground nuclear explosion instead of using only minimum detectable concentrations. Our analyses incorporate the impact of potential spectral interferences on detection limits and the importance of measuring isotopic ratios of the relevant radioxenon isotopes in order to improve discrimination from background sources particularly for low-level releases. To provide a sufficient data set for analysis, hypothetical representative releases are simulated every day from the same location for an entire year. The performance of three types of samplers are evaluated assuming they are located at 15 IMS radionuclide stations in the region of the release point. The performance of two IMS-deployed samplers and a next-generation system is compared with proposed metrics for detection and discrimination using representative releases from the nuclear test site used by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Radionuclide observables during the Integrated Field Exercise of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

In 2014 the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) undertook an Integrated Field Exercise (IFE14) in Jordan. The exercise consisted of a simulated 0.5-2 kT underground nuclear explosion triggering an On-site Inspection (OSI) to search for evidence of a Treaty violation. This research paper evaluates two of the OSI techniques used during the IFE14, laboratory-based gamma-spectrometry of soil samples and in-situ gamma-spectrometry, both of which were implemented to search for 17 OSI relevant particulate radionuclides indicative of nuclear explosions. The detection sensitivity is evaluated using real IFE and model data. It indicates that higher sensitivity laboratory measurements are the optimum technique during the IFE and within the Treaty/Protocol-specified OSI timeframes.

Atmospheric plume progression as a function of time and distance from the release point for radioactive isotopes.

The radionuclide network of the International Monitoring System comprises up to 80 stations around the world that have aerosol and xenon monitoring systems designed to detect releases of radioactive materials to the atmosphere from nuclear explosions. A rule of thumb description of plume concentration and duration versus time and distance from the release point is useful when designing and deploying new sample collection systems. This paper uses plume development from atmospheric transport modeling to provide a power-law rule describing atmospheric dilution factors as a function of distance from the release point. Consider the plume center-line concentration seen by a ground-level sampler as a function of time based on a short-duration ground-level release of a nondepositing radioactive tracer. The concentration C (Bq m(-3)) near the ground varies with distance from the source with the relationship C=R×A(D,C) ×e (-λ(-1.552+0.0405×D)) × 5.37×10(-8) × D(-2.35) where R is the release magnitude (Bq), D is the separation distance (km) from the ground level release to the measurement location, λ is the decay constant (h(-1)) for the radionuclide of interest and AD,C is an attenuation factor that depends on the length of the sample collection period. This relationship is based on the median concentration for 10 release locations with different geographic characteristics and 365 days of releases at each location, and it has an R(2) of 0.99 for 32 distances from 100 to 3000 km. In addition, 90 percent of the modeled plumes fall within approximately one order of magnitude of this curve for all distances.

Source term estimates of radioxenon released from the BaTek medical isotope production facility using external measured air concentrations.

BATAN Teknologi (BaTek) operates an isotope production facility in Serpong, Indonesia that supplies (99m)Tc for use in medical procedures. Atmospheric releases of (133)Xe in the production process at BaTek are known to influence the measurements taken at the closest stations of the radionuclide network of the International Monitoring System (IMS). The purpose of the IMS is to detect evidence of nuclear explosions, including atmospheric releases of radionuclides. The major xenon isotopes released from BaTek are also produced in a nuclear explosion, but the isotopic ratios are different. Knowledge of the magnitude of releases from the isotope production facility helps inform analysts trying to decide if a specific measurement result could have originated from a nuclear explosion. A stack monitor deployed at BaTek in 2013 measured releases to the atmosphere for several isotopes. The facility operates on a weekly cycle, and the stack data for June 15-21, 2013 show a release of 1.84 × 10(13) Bq of (133)Xe. Concentrations of (133)Xe in the air are available at the same time from a xenon sampler located 14 km from BaTek. An optimization process using atmospheric transport modeling and the sampler air concentrations produced a release estimate of 1.88 × 10(13) Bq. The same optimization process yielded a release estimate of 1.70 × 10(13) Bq for a different week in 2012. The stack release value and the two optimized estimates are all within 10% of each other. Unpublished production data and the release estimate from June 2013 yield a rough annual release estimate of 8 × 10(14) Bq of (133)Xe in 2014. These multiple lines of evidence cross-validate the stack release estimates and the release estimates based on atmospheric samplers.

Estimates of radioxenon released from Southern Hemisphere medical isotope production facilities using measured air concentrations and atmospheric transport modeling.

The International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty monitors the atmosphere for radioactive xenon leaking from underground nuclear explosions. Emissions from medical isotope production represent a challenging background signal when determining whether measured radioxenon in the atmosphere is associated with a nuclear explosion prohibited by the treaty. The Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) operates a reactor and medical isotope production facility in Lucas Heights, Australia. This study uses two years of release data from the ANSTO medical isotope production facility and (133)Xe data from three IMS sampling locations to estimate the annual releases of (133)Xe from medical isotope production facilities in Argentina, South Africa, and Indonesia. Atmospheric dilution factors derived from a global atmospheric transport model were used in an optimization scheme to estimate annual release values by facility. The annual releases of about 6.8 × 10(14) Bq from the ANSTO medical isotope production facility are in good agreement with the sampled concentrations at these three IMS sampling locations. Annual release estimates for the facility in South Africa vary from 2.2 × 10(16) to 2.4 × 10(16) Bq, estimates for the facility in Indonesia vary from 9.2 × 10(13) to 3.7 × 10(14) Bq and estimates for the facility in Argentina range from 4.5 × 10(12) to 9.5 × 10(12) Bq.

Maximum reasonable radioxenon releases from medical isotope production facilities and their effect on monitoring nuclear explosions.

Fission gases such as (133)Xe are used extensively for monitoring the world for signs of nuclear testing in systems such as the International Monitoring System (IMS). These gases are also produced by nuclear reactors and by fission production of (99)Mo for medical use. Recently, medical isotope production facilities have been identified as the major contributor to the background of radioactive xenon isotopes (radioxenon) in the atmosphere (Stocki et al., 2005; Saey, 2009). These releases pose a potential future problem for monitoring nuclear explosions if not addressed. As a starting point, a maximum acceptable daily xenon emission rate was calculated, that is both scientifically defendable as not adversely affecting the IMS, but also consistent with what is possible to achieve in an operational environment. This study concludes that an emission of 5 × 10(9) Bq/day from a medical isotope production facility would be both an acceptable upper limit from the perspective of minimal impact to monitoring stations, but also appears to be an achievable limit for large isotope producers.