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1.
J Public Health Manag Pract ; 26(2): 176-179, 2020.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-31995548

ABSTRACT

CONTEXT: While the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) can use agency-wide emergency activation to respond to a hepatitis A virus-infected food handler, there is a need to identify alternative responses that conserve scarce resources. OBJECTIVE: To compare the costs incurred by DOHMH of responding to a hepatitis A case in restaurant food handlers using an agency-wide emergency activation (2015) versus the cost of collaborating with a private network of urgent care clinics (2017). DESIGN: We partially evaluate the costs incurred by DOHMH of responding to a hepatitis A case in a restaurant food handler using agency-wide emergency activation (2015) with the cost of collaborating with a private network of urgent care clinics (2017) estimated for a scenario in which DOHMH incurred the retail cost of services rendered. RESULTS: Costs incurred by DOHMH for emergency activation were $65 831 ($238 per restaurant employee evaluated) of which DOHMH personnel services accounted for 85% ($55 854). Costs of collaboration would have totaled $50 914 ($253 per restaurant employee evaluated) of which personnel services accounted for 6% ($3146). CONCLUSIONS: Accounting for incident size, collaborating with the clinic network was more expensive than agency-wide emergency activation, though required fewer DOHMH personnel services.


Subject(s)
Costs and Cost Analysis/methods , Hepatitis A/economics , Public Health/economics , Costs and Cost Analysis/statistics & numerical data , Disease Outbreaks/statistics & numerical data , Food Handling , Hepatitis A/epidemiology , Hepatitis A virus/pathogenicity , Humans , New York City/epidemiology , Public Health/methods , Public Health/statistics & numerical data , Restaurants/organization & administration , Restaurants/statistics & numerical data
2.
Health Secur ; 16(4): 274-279, 2018.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-30133374

ABSTRACT

Individuals exposed to spores of B. anthracis must take a course of antibiotics as postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) to prevent inhalation anthrax. During an anthrax event, public health authorities are responsible for conducting dispensing operations to offer PEP to exposed individuals. Jurisdictions have developed antibiotic PEP screening algorithms to determine which antibiotic is appropriate for each individual. Variability exists with regard to screening questions and dispensing decisions based on responses to those questions. It is likely that individuals with similar profiles will receive different antibiotics based solely on the jurisdiction in which they receive their PEP. This lack of consistency among jurisdictions may lead to a loss of confidence in the public health response among the public, the healthcare community, the media, and government leaders, which could compromise the response itself. We present New York City's planning assumptions, screening algorithm, a rationale for our screening questions, and our reasons for excluding screening questions asked by other jurisdictions. We hope that our efforts may assist others in developing and refining their algorithms and associated public messaging and encourage standardization with neighboring jurisdictions where appropriate.


Subject(s)
Anthrax/prevention & control , Antibiotic Prophylaxis/standards , Guidelines as Topic , Post-Exposure Prophylaxis/standards , Respiratory Tract Infections/prevention & control , Anti-Bacterial Agents/therapeutic use , Bacillus anthracis , Humans , New York City
4.
J Public Health Manag Pract ; 23(6): 571-576, 2017.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-28166179

ABSTRACT

During 2013, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) received reports of 6 hepatitis A cases among food handlers. We describe our decision-making process for public notification, type of postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) offered, and lessons learned. For 3 cases, public notification was issued and DOHMH offered only hepatitis A vaccine as PEP. Subsequent outbreaks resulted from 1 case for which no public notification was issued or PEP offered, and 1 for which public notification was issued and PEP was offered too late. DOHMH continues to use environmental assessments to guide public notification decisions and offer only hepatitis A vaccine as PEP after public notification but recognizes the need to evaluate each situation individually. The PEP strategy employed by DOHMH should be considered because hepatitis A vaccine is immunogenic in all age groups, can be obtained by local jurisdictions more quickly, and is logistically easier to administer in mass clinics than immunoglobulin.


Subject(s)
Decision Making , Food Services , Hepatitis A/epidemiology , Public Health/methods , Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control , Food Services/standards , Hepatitis A/drug therapy , Hepatitis A Vaccines/therapeutic use , Humans , Local Government , New York City/epidemiology , Post-Exposure Prophylaxis , Public Health/statistics & numerical data , Workforce
5.
Emerg Infect Dis ; 20(4): 525-31, 2014 Apr.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-24656328

ABSTRACT

In 2009, the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene delivered influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 (pH1N1) vaccine to health care providers, who were required to report all administered doses to the Citywide Immunization Registry. Using data from this registry and a provider survey, we estimated the number of all pH1N1 vaccine doses administered. Of 2.8 million doses distributed during October 1, 2009-March 4, 2010, a total of 988,298 doses were administered and reported; another 172,289 doses were administered but not reported, for a total of 1,160,587 doses administered during this period. Reported doses represented an estimated 80%-85% of actual doses administered. Reporting by a wide range of provider types was feasible during a pandemic. Pediatric-care providers had the highest reporting rate (93%). Other private-care providers who routinely did not report vaccinations indicated that they had few, if any, problems, thereby suggesting that mandatory reporting of all vaccines would be feasible.


Subject(s)
Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype/immunology , Influenza Vaccines/administration & dosage , Influenza, Human/immunology , Influenza, Human/prevention & control , Vaccination/statistics & numerical data , Health Personnel , Humans , New York City , Vaccination/methods
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