Generalized Gaussian signal detection theory: A unified signal detection framework for confidence data analysis.

Human decision behavior entails a graded awareness of its certainty, known as a feeling of confidence. Until now, considerable interest has been paid to behavioral and computational dissociations of decision and confidence, which has raised an urgent need for measurement frameworks that can quantify the efficiency of confidence rating relative to decision accuracy (metacognitive efficiency). As a unique addition to such frameworks, we have developed a new signal detection theory paradigm utilizing the generalized Gaussian distribution (GGSDT). This framework evaluates the observer's metacognitive efficiency and internal standard deviation ratio through shape and scale parameters, respectively. The shape parameter quantifies the kurtosis of internal distributions and can practically be understood in reference to the proportion of the Gaussian ideal observer's confidence being disrupted with random guessing (metacognitive lapse rate). This interpretation holds largely irrespective of the contaminating effects of decision accuracy or operating characteristic asymmetry. Thus, the GGSDT enables hitherto unexplored research protocols (e.g., direct comparison of yes/no vs. forced-choice metacognitive efficiency), expected to find applications in various fields of behavioral science. This article provides a detailed walkthrough of the GGSDT analysis with an accompanying R package (ggsdt). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

A confidence framing effect: Flexible use of evidence in metacognitive monitoring.

Human behavior is flexibly regulated by specific goals of cognitive tasks. One notable example is goal-directed modulation of metacognitive behavior, where logically equivalent decision-making problems can yield different patterns of introspective confidence depending on the frame in which they are presented. While this observation highlights the important heuristic nature of metacognitive monitoring, computational mechanisms underlying this phenomenon remain elusive. We confirmed the confidence framing effect in two-alternative dot-number discrimination and in previously published preference-choice data, demonstrating distinctive confidence patterns between "choose more" or "choose less" frames. Formal model comparisons revealed a simple confidence heuristic behind this phenomenon, which assigns greater weight to chosen than unchosen stimulus evidence. This computation appears to be based on internal evidence constituted under specific task demands rather than physical stimulus intensity itself, a view justified in terms of ecological rationality. These results shed light on the adaptive nature of human decision-making and metacognitive monitoring.

Natural statistics support a rational account of confidence biases.

Previous work has sought to understand decision confidence as a prediction of the probability that a decision will be correct, leading to debate over whether these predictions are optimal, and whether they rely on the same decision variable as decisions themselves. This work has generally relied on idealized, low-dimensional models, necessitating strong assumptions about the representations over which confidence is computed. To address this, we used deep neural networks to develop a model of decision confidence that operates directly over high-dimensional, naturalistic stimuli. The model accounts for a number of puzzling dissociations between decisions and confidence, reveals a rational explanation of these dissociations in terms of optimization for the statistics of sensory inputs, and makes the surprising prediction that, despite these dissociations, decisions and confidence depend on a common decision variable.

The effect of productive vocabulary knowledge on second language comprehension.

Second language learners tend to focus more on learning the meaning of vocabulary than on how to use it in their speech and writing. Although comprehensive vocabulary knowledge is necessary for understanding sentences, productive vocabulary knowledge may also have a positive impact on sentence comprehension. Most studies examining the relationship between production and comprehension have compared these abilities between participants or evaluated unrelated criteria between tasks, which may be insufficient for examining the direct effects of productive knowledge on sentence comprehension. Our study investigates changes in sentence comprehension speed during listening, and we used a within-subjects comparison to examine the effect of productive vocabulary knowledge or the lack thereof. We applied generalized linear mixed models to investigate productive vocabulary knowledge effects by partialing out other influential factors, such as confidence, frequency of target words, stimulus duration, and individual differences. The results showed that the sentences with a producible phrase were processed faster than the sentences that included phrases with only comprehensive knowledge or no comprehension. The effect of productive vocabulary knowledge on the speed of sentence comprehension was directly examined with a within-subject comparison, and its contribution was clearly found. This study emphasizes the value of productive vocabulary knowledge acquisition in enhancing the speed of sentence comprehension.

Are Pathologists Self-Aware of Their Diagnostic Accuracy? Metacognition and the Diagnostic Process in Pathology.

BACKGROUND: Metacognition is a cognitive process that involves self-awareness of thinking, understanding, and performance. This study assesses pathologists' metacognition by examining the association between their diagnostic accuracy and self-reported confidence levels while interpreting skin and breast biopsies. DESIGN: We studied 187 pathologists from the Melanoma Pathology Study (M-Path) and 115 pathologists from the Breast Pathology Study (B-Path). We measured pathologists' metacognitive ability by examining the area under the curve (AUC), the area under each pathologist's receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve summarizing the association between confidence and diagnostic accuracy. We investigated possible relationships between this AUC measure, referred to as metacognitive sensitivity, and pathologist attributes. We also assessed whether higher metacognitive sensitivity affected the association between diagnostic accuracy and a secondary diagnostic action such as requesting a second opinion. RESULTS: We found no significant associations between pathologist clinical attributes and metacognitive AUC. However, we found that pathologists with higher AUC showed a stronger trend to request secondary diagnostic action for inaccurate diagnoses and not for accurate diagnoses compared with pathologists with lower AUC. LIMITATIONS: Pathologists reported confidence in specific diagnostic terms, rather than the broader classes into which the diagnostic terms were later grouped to determine accuracy. In addition, while there is no gold standard for the correct diagnosis to determine the accuracy of pathologists' interpretations, our studies achieved a high-quality reference diagnosis by using the consensus diagnosis of 3 experienced pathologists. CONCLUSIONS: Metacognition can affect clinical decisions. If pathologists have self-awareness that their diagnosis may be inaccurate, they can request additional tests or second opinions, providing the opportunity to correct inaccurate diagnoses. HIGHLIGHTS: Metacognitive sensitivity varied across pathologists, with most showing higher sensitivity than expected by chance.None of the demographic or clinical characteristics we examined was significantly associated with metacognitive sensitivity.Pathologists with higher metacognitive sensitivity were more likely to request additional tests or second opinions for their inaccurate diagnoses.

On the assumptions behind metacognitive measurements: Implications for theory and practice.

Theories of visual confidence have largely been grounded in the gaussian signal detection framework. This framework is so dominant that idiosyncratic consequences from this distributional assumption have remained unappreciated. This article reports systematic comparisons of the gaussian signal detection framework to its logistic counterpart in the measurement of metacognitive accuracy. Because of the difference in their distribution kurtosis, these frameworks are found to provide different perspectives regarding the efficiency of confidence rating relative to objective decision (the logistic model intrinsically gives greater meta-d'/d' ratio than the gaussian model). These frameworks can also provide opposing conclusions regarding the metacognitive inefficiency along the internal evidence continuum (whether meta-d' is larger or smaller for higher levels of confidence). Previous theories developed on these lines of analysis may need to be revisited as the gaussian and logistic metacognitive models received somewhat equivalent support in our quantitative model comparisons. Despite these discrepancies, however, we found that across-condition or across-participant comparisons of metacognitive measures are relatively robust against the distributional assumptions, which provides much assurance to conventional research practice. We hope this article promotes the awareness for the significance of hidden modeling assumptions, contributing to the cumulative development of the relevant field.

Side- and similarity-biases during confidence conformity.

Memory conformity may develop when people are confronted with distinct memories reported by others in social situations and knowingly/unknowingly adhere to these exogenous memories. Earlier research on memory conformity suggests that (1) subjects were more likely to conform to confederate with high confidence; (2) subjects with low confidence on their memory accuracy were more likely to conform, and; (3) this subjective confidence could be adjusted by social manipulations. Nonetheless, it remains unclear how the confidence levels of ours and others may interact and produce a combined effect on our degree of conformity. More importantly, is memory conformity, defined by a complete adoption of the opposite side, the result of a gradual accumulation of subtler changes at the confidence level, i.e., a buildup of confidence conformity? Here, we followed participant's confidence transformation quantitatively over three confederate sessions in a memory test. After studying a set of human motion videos, participants had to answer simultaneously whether a target or lure video had appeared before by indicating their side (i.e., Yes/No) and their associated confidence rating. Participants were allowed to adjust their responses as they were being shown randomly-generated confederates' answers and confidence values. Results show that participants indeed demonstrated confidence conformity. Interestingly, they tended to become committed to their side early on and gain confidence gradually over subsequent sessions. This polarizing behaviour may be explained by two kinds of preferences: (1) Participant's confidence enhancement towards same-sided confederates was greater in magnitude compared to the decrement towards an opposite-sided confederate; and (2) Participants had the most effective confidence boost when the same-sided confederates shared similar, but not considerably different, confidence level to theirs. In other words, humans exhibit side- and similarity-biases during confidence conformity.

A decision-congruent heuristic gives superior metacognitive sensitivity under realistic variance assumptions.

Psychophysical studies on confidence construction are often grounded in bidimensional signal detection theory (SDT) and its relatives. However, these studies often stand on oversimplified assumptions of (a) bidimensional variance-equality and (b) bidimensional statistical independence. The present study simulated 2-alternative forced-choice and confidence rating performances, incorporating more empirically plausible variance-covariance structures. One prominent observation is that superior metacognitive accuracy can be achieved when one applies a heuristic in which the response-incongruent dimension of information is ignored. This is because such an heuristic takes advantage of the specific unequal-variance structure, which paradoxically cannot be easily exploited if both dimensions are evaluated together. Furthermore, under a variety of internal statistical structures, this simple heuristic predicts dissociations of objective decision and subjective metacognition, which have been empirically observed. Also, it provides a tentative account of some behavioral features of blindsight. Therefore, this surprisingly simple decision heuristic may inspire novel perspectives on metacognition and consciousness. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Systematic spatial patterns of the sense of familiarity: Hierarchical modelling based on eye-tracking experiments.

Using different types of stimuli, such as pictures, horizontally written Japanese words, and vertically written Japanese words, this study investigated the spatial patterns of the sense of familiarity within the visual field. The perceptual asymmetry theory predicted that stimuli in the lower visual field would be processed more fluently and would therefore be perceived as more familiar. The working memory theory, originally proposed in space-number research, envisaged type-specific spatial patterns for different stimuli. Participants made old/new recognition memory judgements for stimuli, presented at random positions, while their eye movements were recorded. The observed spatial patterns changed according to the stimulus type (e.g., "more left = older" for horizontally written words and "upper = older" for vertically written words), and this flexibility is encapsulated by the working memory theory as follows: (a) stimulus-type-specific spatial configurations are encoded in long-term memory on the basis of one's experience (e.g., vertically written words are empirically associated with the "upper = older" spatial configuration), (b) the presentation of a stimulus automatically cues the temporal activation of the associated spatial configuration in working memory, and (c) the referential process between the stimulus and configuration unconsciously affects the viewer's sense of familiarity.

Front-Presented Looming Sound Selectively Alters the Perceived Size of a Visual Looming Object.

In spite of accumulating evidence for the spatial rule governing cross-modal interaction according to the spatial consistency of stimuli, it is still unclear whether 3D spatial consistency (i.e., front/rear of the body) of stimuli also regulates audiovisual interaction. We investigated how sounds with increasing/decreasing intensity (looming/receding sound) presented from the front and rear space of the body impact the size perception of a dynamic visual object. Participants performed a size-matching task (Experiments 1 and 2) and a size adjustment task (Experiment 3) of visual stimuli with increasing/decreasing diameter, while being exposed to a front- or rear-presented sound with increasing/decreasing intensity. Throughout these experiments, we demonstrated that only the front-presented looming sound caused overestimation of the spatially consistent looming visual stimulus in size, but not of the spatially inconsistent and the receding visual stimulus. The receding sound had no significant effect on vision. Our results revealed that looming sound alters dynamic visual size perception depending on the consistency in the approaching quality and the front-rear spatial location of audiovisual stimuli, suggesting that the human brain differently processes audiovisual inputs based on their 3D spatial consistency. This selective interaction between looming signals should contribute to faster detection of approaching threats. Our findings extend the spatial rule governing audiovisual interaction into 3D space.

Attentional cueing induces false memory.

The fluency of stimulus processing significantly contributes to recognition memory judgments. We investigated the effect of processing fluency induced by attentional cueing on recognition judgments. Participants performed a Remember/Know recognition test, while their spatial attention was manipulated in the test session. Stimulus location was either predicted (congruent condition) or unpredicted (incongruent condition) using an arrow cue. The results revealed that familiarity-based false recognition increased in the incongruent condition wherein the participants may have attributed part of the perceived disfluency to the attentional cue, and they may have overestimated the fluency for the stimulus, leading to increased false recognition. However, in the congruent condition, the participants may have attributed some parts of the perceived fluency to the attentional cue and underestimated the fluency for the stimulus, leading to decreased false recognition. In sum, stimulus-irrelevant attentional cueing induces unintentional processing about the source of fluency and biases recognition memory.

Longer prime presentation decreases picture-word cross-domain priming.

A short prime presentation has been shown to provide a greater priming magnitude, whereas a longer prime presentation results in a lower priming magnitude. In Experiment 1, we attempted to replicate the decrease of priming using word stimuli. Words were presented in both prime and test sessions, and participants judged whether each stimulus was natural or manmade. In Experiment 2, we employed a cross-domain priming paradigm to assess the impact of prime duration on non-perceptual processes. Pictures were presented in prime sessions, and their semantically matched words were presented in test sessions. We did not observe a significant decrease in priming in Experiment 1. However, we found that 2000 ms of prime exposure led to weaker cross-domain priming when compared with 250 ms of the exposure in Experiment 2. The results suggest that the longer presentation of pictures causes a non-perceptual adaptation effect. This effect may occur at conceptual, linguistic, and/or response-related levels.

Relationships between priming and subsequent recognition memory.

A discrepancy exists among previous studies regarding whether priming and subsequent recognition memory are positively or negatively correlated. We consider that the difference in recognition memory measures used in these studies accounts for the discrepancy. To examine this, we introduced three different recognition measures and reexamined the relationship between priming and subsequent recognition. Participants learned stimulus words in the first encoding block while performing an abstract/concrete decision task. In the second encoding block, a priming test was conducted, followed by a surprise recognition memory test. Results showed that the hit rate and hit rate (pHit)-false-alarm rate (pFA) positively correlated with priming. However, the difference between hit rates for the twice- and once-encoded stimuli, which can reflect the representations acquired at the second exposure in particular, did not significantly correlate with priming. These results suggest that priming and subsequent recognition relate positively because of the common representations acquired at the initial encoding. Furthermore, the present results are consistent with a previous study that failed to reproduce the negative correlation between priming and subsequent recognition.

Priming and implicit recognition depend on similar temporal changes in perceptual representations.

Previous studies have reported that longer stimulus presentation decreases the magnitude of priming. In the present study, we used meaningless kaleidoscope images, which were reported to minimize conceptual processing, to investigate the mechanism of the phenomenon. We assessed the impact of stimulus duration on perceptual priming (Experiment 1) and implicit recognition memory (Experiment 2). Both the magnitude of priming and the accuracy of implicit recognition were lower with the longer stimulus presentation (350 ms) compared with the shorter presentation (250 ms). This coincidence of temporal dynamics between priming and implicit recognition suggests similar underlying memory mechanisms. In both cases, the decrease of performance with longer presentation can be explained by either changes in perceptual processes or interference from explicit memory retrieval.

Helmholtz illusion makes you look fit only when you are already fit, but not for everyone.

A square filled with horizontal stripes is perceived as thinner than one with vertical stripes (Helmholtz illusion). This is not consistent with a common belief that horizontally striped clothing makes a person look fatter, and studies on this problem have shown inconsistent results. Here, we demonstrate three factors that could have complicated the issue. First, the Helmholtz effect is stronger for a thin figure than for a fat one, with possible reversal for the latter. Second, we found large variability across participants, suggesting dependence on features to attend. Third, there was strong hysteresis as to the order of testing fat and thin figures, suggesting the effect of surrounding people in daily life. There can be yet other factors, but we should note that this apparently simple case of application of a geometrical illusion in daily perception should be taken as a rather complex phenomenon.