Development and implementation of evidence-based laboratory safety management tools for a public health laboratory.

We developed an evidence-based continuous quality improvement (CQI) cycle for laboratory safety as a method of utilizing survey data to improve safety in a public health laboratory setting. • Expert Opinion: The CQI cycle begins with the solicitation of laboratory staff input via an annual survey addressing potential chemical, physical and radiological hazards associated with multiple laboratory activities. The survey collects frequency, severity and exposure data related to these activities in the context of the most pathogenic organisms handled at least weekly. • Gap Analysis: Step 2 of the CQI cycle used survey data to identify areas needing improvement. Typically, the traditional two-dimensional risk assessment matrix is used to prioritize mitigations. However, we added an additional dimension - frequency of exposure - to create three-dimensional risk maps to better inform and communicate risk priorities. • Mitigation Measures: Step 3 of the CQI cycle was to use these results to develop mitigations. This included evaluating the identified risks to determine what risk control measures (elimination, substitution, engineering, administrative or PPE) were needed. In the 2016 iteration of the CQI cycle described here, all mitigations were based on administrative controls. • Evaluation and Feedback: The last step of the CQI cycle was to evaluate the inferred effects of interventions through subsequent surveys, allowing for qualitative assessment of intervention effectiveness while simultaneously restarting the cycle by identifying new hazards. Here we describe the tools used to drive this CQI cycle, including the survey tool, risk analysis method, design of interventions and inference of mitigation effectiveness.

Direct Detection of Carbapenem-Resistant Organisms from Environmental Samples Using the GeneXpert Molecular Diagnostic System.

In this pilot study, traditional culture and PCR methods were compared to the Cepheid GeneXpert IV molecular diagnostic system with the Xpert Carba-R assay (Carba-R assay) for detection of carbapenem resistance genes in primary environmental samples collected during a health care-related outbreak. Overall, traditional culture-dependent PCR and the Carba-R assay demonstrated 75% agreement. The Carba-R assay detected carbapenemase genes in five additional samples and in two samples that had additional genes when compared to culture-dependent PCR. The Carba-R assay could be useful for prioritizing further testing of environmental samples during health care-related outbreaks.IMPORTANCE Use of the Carba-R assay for detection of carbapenem-resistant Gram-negative organisms (CROs) can provide data for implementation of a rapid infection control response to minimize the spread of CROs in the health care setting.

Investigation of the First Seven Reported Cases of Candida auris, a Globally Emerging Invasive, Multidrug-Resistant Fungus-United States, May 2013-August 2016.

November 11, 2016/65(44);1234-1237. What is already known about this topic? Candida auris is an emerging pathogenic fungus that has been reported from at least a dozen countries on four continents during 2009-2015. The organism is difficult to identify using traditional biochemical methods, some isolates have been found to be resistant to all three major classes of antifungal medications, and C. auris has caused health care-associated outbreaks. What is added by this report? This is the first description of C. auris cases in the United States. C. auris appears to have emerged in the United States only in the last few years, and U.S. isolates are related to isolates from South America and South Asia. Evidence from U.S. case investigations suggests likely transmission of the organism occurred in health care settings. What are the implications for public health practice? It is important that U.S. laboratories accurately identify C. auris and for health care facilities to implement recommended infection control practices to prevent the spread of C. auris. Local and state health departments and CDC should be notified of possible cases of C. auris and of isolates of C. haemulonii and Candida spp. that cannot be identified after routine testing.

Persistence of Influenza A (H1N1) Virus on Stainless Steel Surfaces.

UNLABELLED: As annual influenza epidemics continue to cause significant morbidity and economic burden, an understanding of viral persistence and transmission is critical for public health officials and health care workers to better protect patients and their family members from infection. The infectivity and persistence of two influenza A (H1N1) virus strains (A/New Caledonia/20/1999 and A/Brisbane/59/2007) on stainless steel (SS) surfaces were evaluated using three different surface matrices (2% fetal bovine serum, 5 mg/ml mucin, and viral medium) under various absolute humidity conditions (4.1 × 10(5) mPa, 6.5 × 10(5) mPa, 7.1 × 10(5) mPa, 11.4 × 10(5) mPa, 11.2 × 10(5) mPa, and 17.9 × 10(5) mPa) for up to 7 days. Influenza A virus was deposited onto SS coupons (7.07 cm(2)) and recovered by agitation and sonication in viral medium. Viral persistence was quantified using a tissue culture-based enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) to determine the median (50%) tissue culture infective dose (TCID50) of infectious virus per coupon. Overall, both strains of influenza A virus remained infectious on SS coupons, with an approximate 2 log10 loss over 7 days. Factors that influenced viral persistence included absolute humidity, strain-absolute humidity interaction, and time (P ≤ 0.01). Further studies on the transfer of influenza A virus from fomites by hand and the impact of inanimate surface contamination on transmission should be performed, as this study demonstrates prolonged persistence on nonporous surfaces. IMPORTANCE: This study tested the ability of two influenza A (H1N1) virus strains to persist and remain infectious on stainless steel surfaces under various environmental conditions. It demonstrated that influenza A (H1N1) viruses can persist and remain infectious on stainless steel surfaces for 7 days. Additional studies should be conducted to assess the role played by contaminated surfaces in the transmission of influenza A virus.

MS2 Coliphage as a Surrogate for 2009 Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) Virus (pH1N1) in Surface Survival Studies on N95 Filtering Facepiece Respirators.

Research on influenza viruses regarding transmission and survival has surged in the recent years due to infectious emerging strains and outbreaks such as the 2009 Influenza A (H1N1) pandemic. MS2 coliphage has been applied as a surrogate for pathogenic respiratory viruses, such as influenza, as it's safe for personnel to handle and requires less time and labor to measure virus infectivity. However, direct comparisons to determine the effectiveness of coliphage as a surrogate for influenza virus regarding droplet persistence on personal protective equipment such as N95 filtering facepiece respirators (FFRs) are lacking. Persistence of viral droplets deposited on FFRs in healthcare settings is important to discern due to the potential risk of infection via indirect fomite transmission. The objective of this study was to determine if MS2 coliphage could be applied as a surrogate for influenza A viruses for studying persistence when applied to the FFRs as a droplet. The persistence of MS2 coliphage and 2009 Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) Virus on FFR coupons in different matrices (viral media, 2% fetal bovine serum, and 5 mg ml-1 mucin) were compared over time (4, 12, 24, 48, 72, and 144 hours) in typical absolute humidity conditions (4.1 × 105 mPa [18°C/20% relative humidity (RH)]). Data revealed significant differences in viral infectivity over the 6-day period (H1N1- P <0.0001; MS2 - P <0.005), although a significant correlation of viral log10 reduction in 2% FBS (P <0.01) was illustrated. Overall, MS2 coliphage was not determined to be a sufficient surrogate for influenza A virus with respect to droplet persistence when applied to the N95 FFR as a droplet.

Persistence of the 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus on N95 respirators.

In the United States, the 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus (pH1N1) infected almost 20% of the population and caused >200,000 hospitalizations and >10,000 deaths from April 2009 to April 2010. On 24 April 2009, the CDC posted interim guidance on infection control measures in health care settings explicitly for pH1N1 and recommended using filtering face respirators (FFRs) when in close contact with a suspected- or confirmed-to-be-infected individual, particularly when performing aerosol-generating procedures. The persistence and infectivity of pH1N1 were evaluated on FFRs, specifically N95 respirators, under various conditions of absolute humidity (AH) (4.1 × 10(5) mPa, 6.5 × 10(5) mPa, and 14.6 × 10(5) mPa), sample matrices (2% fetal bovine serum [FBS], 5 mg/ml mucin, and viral medium), and times (4, 12, 24, 48, 72, and 144 h). pH1N1 was distributed onto N95 coupons (3.8 to 4.2 cm(2)) and extracted by a vortex-centrifugation-filtration process, and the ability of the remaining virus to replicate was quantified using an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) to determine the log10 concentration of the infectious virus per coupon. Overall, pH1N1 remained infectious for 6 days, with an approximately 1-log10 loss of virus concentrations over this time period. Time and AH both affected virus survival. We found significantly higher (P ≤ 0.01) reductions in virus concentrations at time points beyond 24 to 72 h (-0.52-log10 reduction) and 144 h (-0.74) at AHs of 6.5 × 10(5) mPa (-0.53) and 14.6 × 10(5) mPa (-0.47). This research supports discarding respirators after close contact with a person with suspected or confirmed influenza infection due to the virus's demonstrated ability to persist and remain infectious.

Fatal Apophysomyces elegans infection transmitted by deceased donor renal allografts.

Two patients developed renal mucormycosis following transplantation of kidneys from the same donor, a near-drowning victim in a motor vehicle crash. Genotypically, indistinguishable strains of Apophysomyces elegans were recovered from both recipients. We investigated the source of the infection including review of medical records, environmental sampling at possible locations of contamination and query for additional cases at other centers. Histopathology of the explanted kidneys revealed extensive vascular invasion by aseptate, fungal hyphae with relative sparing of the renal capsules suggesting a vascular route of contamination. Disseminated infection in the donor could not be definitively established. A. elegans was not recovered from the same lots of reagents used for organ recovery or environmental samples and no other organ transplant-related cases were identified. This investigation suggests either isolated contamination of the organs during recovery or undiagnosed disseminated donor infection following a near-drowning event. Although no changes to current organ recovery or transplant procedures are recommended, public health officials and transplant physicians should consider the possibility of mucormycosis transmitted via organs in the future, particularly for near-drowning events. Attention to aseptic technique during organ recovery and processing is re-emphasized.

Pseudo-outbreak of Mycobacterium abscessus Infection Caused by laboratory contamination .

OBJECTIVE: To investigate the cause(s) of an increased incidence of clinical cultures growing Mycobacterium abscessus at a hospital in Florida. DESIGN: Outbreak investigation. SETTING: University-affiliated, tertiary-care hospital. METHODS: A site visit was done during the first week of September 2006. We reviewed the medical records of patients from whom M. abscessus was recovered during the period from January 1, 2003, through June 30, 2006. We collected environmental samples from various sites and evaluated specimen processing procedures in the microbiology laboratory. Isolates of M. abscessus recovered from the environment and from 12 randomly selected patients who sought medical care in 2006 were compared by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE). Follow-up case surveillance was continued through March 31, 2007. RESULTS: Specimens from 143 patients obtained from various anatomical sites grew M. abscessus on culture in 2005-2006, compared with specimens from 21 patients in 2003-2004. The 12 isolates from patients that were selected for molecular typing had indistinguishable PFGE patterns. Observations revealed no major breaches in the processing of mycobacterial specimens in the laboratory. Isolates grew only after prolonged incubation (mean +/- SD, 45 +/- 15 days) in test tubes containing diagonally oriented Middlebrook and Cohn 7H10 agar or Lowenstein-Jensen medium. Environmental samples obtained from the inside of the specimen incubator grew M. abscessus on culture. A test tube containing diagonally oriented, uninoculated Middlebrook and Cohn 7H10 agar that was incubated in the same incubator as clinical specimens grew M. abscessus with a PFGE pattern that matched the pattern of the patient isolates. Cases of M. abscessus infection decreased to baseline after the hospital changed suppliers of mycobacterial media and cleaned the incubator. CONCLUSIONS: Although the source was never confirmed, our investigation suggests that this was a pseudo-outbreak of M. abscessus infection that resulted from contamination of mycobacterial cultures during incubation. Our findings emphasize the need for guidance on the disinfection of specimen incubators.

Evaluation of a macrofoam swab protocol for the recovery of Bacillus anthracis spores from a steel surface.

A protocol to recover Bacillus anthracis spores from a steel surface using macrofoam swabs was evaluated for its accuracy, precision, reproducibility, and limit of detection. Macrofoam swabs recovered 31.7 to 49.1% of spores from 10-cm2 steel surfaces with a < or =32.7% coefficient of variation in sampling precision and reproducibility for inocula of > or =38 spores.