The evolutionary safety of mutagenic drugs should be assessed before drug approval.

Some drugs increase the mutation rate of their target pathogen, a potentially concerning mechanism as the pathogen might evolve faster toward an undesired phenotype. We suggest a four-step assessment of evolutionary safety for the approval of such treatments.

Gene drives for the extinction of wild metapopulations.

Population-suppressing gene drives may be capable of extinguishing wild populations, with proposed applications in conservation, agriculture, and public health. However, unintended and potentially disastrous consequences of release of drive-engineered individuals are extremely difficult to predict. We propose a model for the dynamics of a sex ratio-biasing drive, and using simulations, we show that failure of the suppression drive is often a natural outcome due to stochastic and spatial effects. We further demonstrate rock-paper-scissors dynamics among wild-type, drive-infected, and extinct populations that can persist for arbitrarily long times. Gene drive-mediated extinction of wild populations entails critical complications that lurk far beyond the reach of laboratory-based studies. Our findings help in addressing these challenges.

Evolutionary dynamics of mutants that modify population structure.

Natural selection is usually studied between mutants that differ in reproductive rate, but are subject to the same population structure. Here we explore how natural selection acts on mutants that have the same reproductive rate, but different population structures. In our framework, population structure is given by a graph that specifies where offspring can disperse. The invading mutant disperses offspring on a different graph than the resident wild-type. We find that more densely connected dispersal graphs tend to increase the invader's fixation probability, but the exact relationship between structure and fixation probability is subtle. We present three main results. First, we prove that if both invader and resident are on complete dispersal graphs, then removing a single edge in the invader's dispersal graph reduces its fixation probability. Second, we show that for certain island models higher invader's connectivity increases its fixation probability, but the magnitude of the effect depends on the exact layout of the connections. Third, we show that for lattices the effect of different connectivity is comparable to that of different fitness: for large population size, the invader's fixation probability is either constant or exponentially small, depending on whether it is more or less connected than the resident.

A geometric process of evolutionary game dynamics.

Many evolutionary processes occur in phenotype spaces which are continuous. It is therefore of interest to explore how selection operates in continuous spaces. One approach is adaptive dynamics, which assumes that mutants are local. Here we study a different process which also allows non-local mutants. We assume that a resident population is challenged by an invader who uses a strategy chosen from a random distribution on the space of all strategies. We study the repeated donation game of direct reciprocity. We consider reactive strategies given by two probabilities, denoting respectively the probability to cooperate after the co-player has cooperated or defected. The strategy space is the unit square. We derive analytic formulae for the stationary distribution of evolutionary dynamics and for the average cooperation rate as function of the cost-to-benefit ratio. For positive reactive strategies, we prove that cooperation is more abundant than defection if the area of the cooperative region is greater than 1/2 which is equivalent to benefit, b, divided by cost, c, exceeding [Formula: see text]. We introduce the concept of strategies that are stable with probability one. We also study an extended process and discuss other games.

Correction: A spatial vaccination strategy to reduce the risk of vaccine-resistant variants.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010391.].

Vacancies in growing habitats promote the evolution of cooperation.

We study evolutionary game dynamics in a growing habitat with vacancies. Fitness is determined by the global effect of the environment and a local prisoner's dilemma among neighbors. We study population growth on a one-dimensional lattice and analyze how the environment affects evolutionary competition. As the environment becomes harsh, an absorbing phase transition from growing populations to extinction occurs. The transition point depends on which strategies are present in the population. In particular, we find a 'cooperative window' in parameter space, where only cooperators can survive. A mutant defector in a cooperative community might briefly proliferate, but over time naturally occurring vacancies separate cooperators from defectors, thereby driving defectors to extinction. Our model reveals that vacancies provide a strong boost for cooperation by spatial selection.

Evolutionary safety of lethal mutagenesis driven by antiviral treatment.

Nucleoside analogs are a major class of antiviral drugs. Some act by increasing the viral mutation rate causing lethal mutagenesis of the virus. Their mutagenic capacity, however, may lead to an evolutionary safety concern. We define evolutionary safety as a probabilistic assurance that the treatment will not generate an increased number of mutants. We develop a mathematical framework to estimate the total mutant load produced with and without mutagenic treatment. We predict rates of appearance of such virus mutants as a function of the timing of treatment and the immune competence of patients, employing realistic assumptions about the vulnerability of the viral genome and its potential to generate viable mutants. We focus on the case study of Molnupiravir, which is an FDA-approved treatment against Coronavirus Disease-2019 (COVID-19). We estimate that Molnupiravir is narrowly evolutionarily safe, subject to the current estimate of parameters. Evolutionary safety can be improved by restricting treatment with this drug to individuals with a low immunological clearance rate and, in future, by designing treatments that lead to a greater increase in mutation rate. We report a simple mathematical rule to determine the fold increase in mutation rate required to obtain evolutionary safety that is also applicable to other pathogen-treatment combinations.

The effect of environmental information on evolution of cooperation in stochastic games.

Many human interactions feature the characteristics of social dilemmas where individual actions have consequences for the group and the environment. The feedback between behavior and environment can be studied with the framework of stochastic games. In stochastic games, the state of the environment can change, depending on the choices made by group members. Past work suggests that such feedback can reinforce cooperative behaviors. In particular, cooperation can evolve in stochastic games even if it is infeasible in each separate repeated game. In stochastic games, participants have an interest in conditioning their strategies on the state of the environment. Yet in many applications, precise information about the state could be scarce. Here, we study how the availability of information (or lack thereof) shapes evolution of cooperation. Already for simple examples of two state games we find surprising effects. In some cases, cooperation is only possible if there is precise information about the state of the environment. In other cases, cooperation is most abundant when there is no information about the state of the environment. We systematically analyze all stochastic games of a given complexity class, to determine when receiving information about the environment is better, neutral, or worse for evolution of cooperation.

Adaptive dynamics of memory-one strategies in the repeated donation game.

Human interactions can take the form of social dilemmas: collectively, people fare best if all cooperate but each individual is tempted to free ride. Social dilemmas can be resolved when individuals interact repeatedly. Repetition allows them to adopt reciprocal strategies which incentivize cooperation. The most basic model for direct reciprocity is the repeated donation game, a variant of the prisoner's dilemma. Two players interact over many rounds; in each round they decide whether to cooperate or to defect. Strategies take into account the history of the play. Memory-one strategies depend only on the previous round. Even though they are among the most elementary strategies of direct reciprocity, their evolutionary dynamics has been difficult to study analytically. As a result, much previous work has relied on simulations. Here, we derive and analyze their adaptive dynamics. We show that the four-dimensional space of memory-one strategies has an invariant three-dimensional subspace, generated by the memory-one counting strategies. Counting strategies record how many players cooperated in the previous round, without considering who cooperated. We give a partial characterization of adaptive dynamics for memory-one strategies and a full characterization for memory-one counting strategies.

Mutation enhances cooperation in direct reciprocity.

Direct reciprocity is a powerful mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on repeated interactions between the same individuals. But high levels of cooperation evolve only if the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds a certain threshold that depends on memory length. For the best-explored case of one-round memory, that threshold is two. Here, we report that intermediate mutation rates lead to high levels of cooperation, even if the benefit-to-cost ratio is only marginally above one, and even if individuals only use a minimum of past information. This surprising observation is caused by two effects. First, mutation generates diversity which undermines the evolutionary stability of defectors. Second, mutation leads to diverse communities of cooperators that are more resilient than homogeneous ones. This finding is relevant because many real-world opportunities for cooperation have small benefit-to-cost ratios, which are between one and two, and we describe how direct reciprocity can attain cooperation in such settings. Our result can be interpreted as showing that diversity, rather than uniformity, promotes evolution of cooperation.

Recombination and selection against introgressed DNA.

Introgressed DNA is often deleterious at many loci in the recipient species' genome, and is therefore purged by selection. Here, we use mathematical modeling and whole-genome simulations to study the influence of recombination on this process. We find that aggregate recombination controls the genome-wide rate of purging in the early generations after admixture, when purging is most rapid. Aggregate recombination is influenced by the number of chromosomes and heterogeneity in their size, and by the number of crossovers and their locations along chromosomes. A comparative prediction is that species with fewer chromosomes should purge introgressed ancestry more profoundly, and should therefore exhibit weaker genomic signals of historical introgression. Turning to within-genome patterns, we show that, in species with autosomal recombination in both sexes, more purging is expected on sex chromosomes than autosomes, all else equal. The opposite prediction holds for species without autosomal recombination in the heterogametic sex. Finally, positive correlations between recombination rate and introgressed ancestry have recently been observed within the genomes of several species. We show that these correlations are likely driven not by recombination's effect in unlinking neutral from deleterious introgressed alleles, but by recombination's effect on the rate of purging of deleterious introgressed alleles themselves.

A spatial vaccination strategy to reduce the risk of vaccine-resistant variants.

The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated that the process of global vaccination against a novel virus can be a prolonged one. Social distancing measures, that are initially adopted to control the pandemic, are gradually relaxed as vaccination progresses and population immunity increases. The result is a prolonged period of high disease prevalence combined with a fitness advantage for vaccine-resistant variants, which together lead to a considerably increased probability for vaccine escape. A spatial vaccination strategy is proposed that has the potential to dramatically reduce this risk. Rather than dispersing the vaccination effort evenly throughout a country, distinct geographic regions of the country are sequentially vaccinated, quickly bringing each to effective herd immunity. Regions with high vaccination rates will then have low infection rates and vice versa. Since people primarily interact within their own region, spatial vaccination reduces the number of encounters between infected individuals (the source of mutations) and vaccinated individuals (who facilitate the spread of vaccine-resistant strains). Thus, spatial vaccination may help mitigate the global risk of vaccine-resistant variants.

Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces.

In repeated interactions, players can use strategies that respond to the outcome of previous rounds. Much of the existing literature on direct reciprocity assumes that all competing individuals use the same strategy space. Here, we study both learning and evolutionary dynamics of players that differ in the strategy space they explore. We focus on the infinitely repeated donation game and compare three natural strategy spaces: memory-1 strategies, which consider the last moves of both players, reactive strategies, which respond to the last move of the co-player, and unconditional strategies. These three strategy spaces differ in the memory capacity that is needed. We compute the long term average payoff that is achieved in a pairwise learning process. We find that smaller strategy spaces can dominate larger ones. For weak selection, unconditional players dominate both reactive and memory-1 players. For intermediate selection, reactive players dominate memory-1 players. Only for strong selection and low cost-to-benefit ratio, memory-1 players dominate the others. We observe that the supergame between strategy spaces can be a social dilemma: maximum payoff is achieved if both players explore a larger strategy space, but smaller strategy spaces dominate.

Evolution of resistance to COVID-19 vaccination with dynamic social distancing.

The greatest hope for a return to normalcy following the COVID-19 pandemic is worldwide vaccination. Yet, a relaxation of social distancing that allows increased transmissibility, coupled with selection pressure due to vaccination, will probably lead to the emergence of vaccine resistance. We analyse the evolutionary dynamics of COVID-19 in the presence of dynamic contact reduction and in response to vaccination. We use infection and vaccination data from six different countries. We show that under slow vaccination, resistance is very likely to appear even if social distancing is maintained. Under fast vaccination, the emergence of mutants can be prevented if social distancing is maintained during vaccination. We analyse multiple human factors that affect the evolutionary potential of the virus, including the extent of dynamic social distancing, vaccination campaigns, vaccine design, boosters and vaccine hesitancy. We provide guidelines for policies that aim to minimize the probability of emergence of vaccine-resistant variants.

Cooperation in alternating interactions with memory constraints.

In repeated social interactions, individuals often employ reciprocal strategies to maintain cooperation. To explore the emergence of reciprocity, many theoretical models assume synchronized decision making. In each round, individuals decide simultaneously whether to cooperate or not. Yet many manifestations of reciprocity in nature are asynchronous. Individuals provide help at one time and receive help at another. Here, we explore such alternating games in which players take turns. We mathematically characterize all Nash equilibria among memory-one strategies. Moreover, we use evolutionary simulations to explore various model extensions, exploring the effect of discounted games, irregular alternation patterns, and higher memory. In all cases, we observe that mutual cooperation still evolves for a wide range of parameter values. However, compared to simultaneous games, alternating games require different strategies to maintain cooperation in noisy environments. Moreover, none of the respective strategies are evolutionarily stable.

Infection dynamics of COVID-19 virus under lockdown and reopening.

Motivated by COVID-19, we develop and analyze a simple stochastic model for the spread of disease in human population. We track how the number of infected and critically ill people develops over time in order to estimate the demand that is imposed on the hospital system. To keep this demand under control, we consider a class of simple policies for slowing down and reopening society and we compare their efficiency in mitigating the spread of the virus from several different points of view. We find that in order to avoid overwhelming of the hospital system, a policy must impose a harsh lockdown or it must react swiftly (or both). While reacting swiftly is universally beneficial, being harsh pays off only when the country is patient about reopening and when the neighboring countries coordinate their mitigation efforts. Our work highlights the importance of acting decisively when closing down and the importance of patience and coordination between neighboring countries when reopening.

Fast and strong amplifiers of natural selection.

Selection and random drift determine the probability that novel mutations fixate in a population. Population structure is known to affect the dynamics of the evolutionary process. Amplifiers of selection are population structures that increase the fixation probability of beneficial mutants compared to well-mixed populations. Over the past 15 years, extensive research has produced remarkable structures called strong amplifiers which guarantee that every beneficial mutation fixates with high probability. But strong amplification has come at the cost of considerably delaying the fixation event, which can slow down the overall rate of evolution. However, the precise relationship between fixation probability and time has remained elusive. Here we characterize the slowdown effect of strong amplification. First, we prove that all strong amplifiers must delay the fixation event at least to some extent. Second, we construct strong amplifiers that delay the fixation event only marginally as compared to the well-mixed populations. Our results thus establish a tight relationship between fixation probability and time: Strong amplification always comes at a cost of a slowdown, but more than a marginal slowdown is not needed.

The Great Oxygenation Event as a consequence of ecological dynamics modulated by planetary change.

The Great Oxygenation Event (GOE), ca. 2.4 billion years ago, transformed life and environments on Earth. Its causes, however, are debated. We mathematically analyze the GOE in terms of ecological dynamics coupled with a changing Earth. Anoxygenic photosynthetic bacteria initially dominate over cyanobacteria, but their success depends on the availability of suitable electron donors that are vulnerable to oxidation. The GOE is triggered when the difference between the influxes of relevant reductants and phosphate falls below a critical value that is an increasing function of the reproductive rate of cyanobacteria. The transition can be either gradual and reversible or sudden and irreversible, depending on sources and sinks of oxygen. Increasing sources and decreasing sinks of oxygen can also trigger the GOE, but this possibility depends strongly on migration of cyanobacteria from privileged sites. Our model links ecological dynamics to planetary change, with geophysical evolution determining the relevant time scales.

A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity.

Direct and indirect reciprocity are key mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. Direct reciprocity means that individuals use their own experience to decide whether to cooperate with another person. Indirect reciprocity means that they also consider the experiences of others. Although these two mechanisms are intertwined, they are typically studied in isolation. Here, we introduce a mathematical framework that allows us to explore both kinds of reciprocity simultaneously. We show that the well-known 'generous tit-for-tat' strategy of direct reciprocity has a natural analogue in indirect reciprocity, which we call 'generous scoring'. Using an equilibrium analysis, we characterize under which conditions either of the two strategies can maintain cooperation. With simulations, we additionally explore which kind of reciprocity evolves when members of a population engage in social learning to adapt to their environment. Our results draw unexpected connections between direct and indirect reciprocity while highlighting important differences regarding their evolvability.

Evolution of delayed resistance to immunotherapy in a melanoma responder.

Despite initial responses1-3, most melanoma patients develop resistance4 to immune checkpoint blockade (ICB). To understand the evolution of resistance, we studied 37 tumor samples over 9 years from a patient with metastatic melanoma with complete clinical response to ICB followed by delayed recurrence and death. Phylogenetic analysis revealed co-evolution of seven lineages with multiple convergent, but independent resistance-associated alterations. All recurrent tumors emerged from a lineage characterized by loss of chromosome 15q, with post-treatment clones acquiring additional genomic driver events. Deconvolution of bulk RNA sequencing and highly multiplexed immunofluorescence (t-CyCIF) revealed differences in immune composition among different lineages. Imaging revealed a vasculogenic mimicry phenotype in NGFRhi tumor cells with high PD-L1 expression in close proximity to immune cells. Rapid autopsy demonstrated two distinct NGFR spatial patterns with high polarity and proximity to immune cells in subcutaneous tumors versus a diffuse spatial pattern in lung tumors, suggesting different roles of this neural-crest-like program in different tumor microenvironments. Broadly, this study establishes a high-resolution map of the evolutionary dynamics of resistance to ICB, characterizes a de-differentiated neural-crest tumor population in melanoma immunotherapy resistance and describes site-specific differences in tumor-immune interactions via longitudinal analysis of a patient with melanoma with an unusual clinical course.