Comparing electronic news media reports of potential bioterrorism-related incidents involving unknown white powder to reports received by the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Federal Bureau of Investigation: U.S.A., 2009-2011.

There have been periodic electronic news media reports of potential bioterrorism-related incidents involving unknown substances (often referred to as "white powder") since the 2001 intentional dissemination of Bacillus anthracis through the U.S. Postal System. This study reviewed the number of unknown "white powder" incidents reported online by the electronic news media and compared them with unknown "white powder" incidents reported to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) during a 2-year period from June 1, 2009 and May 31, 2011. Results identified 297 electronic news media reports, 538 CDC reports, and 384 FBI reports of unknown "white powder." This study showed different unknown "white powder" incidents captured by each of the three sources. However, the authors could not determine the public health implications of this discordance.

Public health emergencies and responses: what are they, how long do they last, and how many staff does your agency need?

Responding to outbreaks is one of the most routine yet most important functions of a public health agency. However, some outbreaks are bigger, more visible, or more complex than others, prompting discussion about when an "outbreak" becomes a "public health emergency." When a public health emergency is identified, resources (eg, funding, staff, space) may need to be redirected from core public health programs to contribute to the public health emergency response. The need to sustain critical public health functions while preparing for public health emergency responses raises a series of operational and resource management questions, including when a public health emergency begins and ends, why additional resources are needed, how long an organization should expect staff to be redirected, and how many staff (or what proportion of the agency's staff ) an organization should anticipate will be needed to conduct a public health emergency response. This article addresses these questions from a national perspective by reviewing events for which the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention redirected staff from core public health functions to respond to a series of public health emergencies. We defined "public health emergency" in both operational and public health terms and found that on average each emergency response lasted approximately 4 months and used approximately 9.5% of our workforce. We also provide reasons why public health agencies should consider the impact of redirecting resources when preparing for public health emergencies.

From SARS to 2009 H1N1 influenza: the evolution of a public health incident management system at CDC.

The organization of the response to infectious disease outbreaks by public health agencies at the federal, state, and local levels has historically been based on traditional public health functions (e.g., epidemiology, surveillance, laboratory, infection control, and health communications). Federal guidance has established a framework for the management of domestic incidents, including public health emergencies. Therefore, public health agencies have had to find a way to incorporate traditional public health functions into the common response framework of the National Incident Management System. One solution is the development of a Science Section, containing public health functions, that is equivalent to the traditional incident command system sections. Public health agencies experiencing difficulties in developing incident management systems should consider the feasibility and suitability of creating a Science Section to allow a more seamless and effective coordination of a public health response, while remaining consistent with current federal guidance.

Evaluation of reported malaria chemoprophylactic failure among travelers in a US University Exchange Program, 2002.

BACKGROUND: Travelers to malarious areas are at risk of acquiring malaria; however, with chemoprophylaxis and prompt, effective therapy, serious complications of infection are generally preventable. In June 2002, we investigated a report of a cluster of malaria cases among US university staff and students who visited Ghana and were reportedly adherent to appropriate malaria chemoprophylaxis. METHODS: We administered a questionnaire to all participants and collected blood specimens for malaria serological examinations from those reporting malaria infection diagnosed by blood smear in Ghana. RESULTS: Of the 33 participants, 25 completed the questionnaire. Twenty-four took a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention-recommended chemoprophylactic drug; 14 (56%) of 25 reported complete adherence to therapy. Twenty (80%) of 25 subjects reported symptoms consistent with possible malaria. Six of these persons reported a microscopic diagnosis of malaria and were treated in Ghana. Serological examination for malaria was performed using blood samples obtained from 5 of these participants; the results for all were negative, suggesting that incorrect diagnoses of malaria were made. CONCLUSIONS: Misdiagnosis of malaria made while a person is abroad may not only lead to erroneous reports of drug resistance, but it could also result in unnecessary administration of antimalarial treatment. Health care providers and public health authorities must critically evaluate reports of chemoprophylactic failures and disseminate accurate information to travelers.