Scientific and religious beliefs are primarily shaped by testimony.

Understanding why individuals are more confident of the existence of invisible scientific phenomena (e.g., oxygen) than invisible religious phenomena (e.g., God) remains a puzzle. Departing from conventional explanations linking ontological beliefs to direct experience, we introduce a model positing that testimony predominantly shapes beliefs in both scientific and religious domains. Distinguishing direct experience (personal observation) from cultural input (testimony-based evidence), we argue that even apparently direct experiences often stem from others' testimony. Our analysis indicates that variability in direct experience cannot explain belief disparities between science and religion, within each domain, or across cultures. Instead, variability in testimony is the primary driver of ontological beliefs. We present developmental evidence for testimony-based beliefs and elucidate the mechanisms underlying their impact.

Religious polarization and justification of belief in invisible scientific versus religious entities.

Children and adults express greater confidence in the existence of invisible scientific as compared to invisible religious entities. To further examine this differential confidence, 5- to 11-year-old Turkish children and their parents (N = 174, 122 females) from various regions in Türkiye, a country with an ongoing tension between secularism and religion, were tested in 2021 for their belief in invisible entities. Participants expressed more confidence in the existence of scientific than religious entities. For scientific entities, children justified their belief primarily by elaborating on the properties of the entity, rather than referring to the testimonial source of their judgment. This pattern was reversed for religious entities, arguably, highlighting the role of polarization in shaping the testimony children typically hear.

The development and diversity of religious cognition and behavior: Protocol for Wave 1 data collection with children and parents by the Developing Belief Network.

The Developing Belief Network is a consortium of researchers studying human development in diverse social-cultural settings, with a focus on the interplay between general cognitive development and culturally specific processes of socialization and cultural transmission in early and middle childhood. The current manuscript describes the study protocol for the network's first wave of data collection, which aims to explore the development and diversity of religious cognition and behavior. This work is guided by three key research questions: (1) How do children represent and reason about religious and supernatural agents? (2) How do children represent and reason about religion as an aspect of social identity? (3) How are religious and supernatural beliefs transmitted within and between generations? The protocol is designed to address these questions via a set of nine tasks for children between the ages of 4 and 10 years, a comprehensive survey completed by their parents/caregivers, and a task designed to elicit conversations between children and caregivers. This study is being conducted in 39 distinct cultural-religious groups (to date), spanning 17 countries and 13 languages. In this manuscript, we provide detailed descriptions of all elements of this study protocol, give a brief overview of the ways in which this protocol has been adapted for use in diverse religious communities, and present the final, English-language study materials for 6 of the 39 cultural-religious groups who are currently being recruited for this study: Protestant Americans, Catholic Americans, American members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Jewish Americans, Muslim Americans, and religiously unaffiliated Americans.

Children's beliefs in invisible causal agents-Both religious and scientific.

Against the proposal that children have a natural disposition for supernatural or religious beliefs, we review the decades-old evidence showing that children typically invoke naturalistic causes-even in the face of unusual outcomes. Instead, we propose that children's tendency to endorse supernatural agents reflects their capacity for cultural learning rather than an inherent inclination to believe in divine powers. We support this argument by reviewing the findings that religious exposure in childhood, not individual cognitive or personality factors, is the major determinant of religiosity in adulthood. We highlight the role of cultural learning in children's endorsement of invisible divine agents by drawing on cross-cultural evidence that children are equally receptive to claims regarding the existence of invisible natural agents. We end by introducing a hypothesis to explain how children come to endorse religious beliefs despite their bias toward naturalistic explanation.

Expressions of uncertainty in invisible scientific and religious phenomena during naturalistic conversation.

Across cultures, studies report more confidence in the existence of unobservable scientific phenomena, such as germs, as compared to unobservable religious phenomena, such as angels. We investigated a potential cultural mechanism for the transmission of confidence in the existence of invisible entities. Specifically, we asked whether parents in societies with markedly different religious profiles-Iran and China-signal differential confidence across the domains of science and religion during unmoderated conversations with their children (N = 120 parent-child dyads in total; 5- to 11-year-olds). The results revealed that parents used fewer lexical cues to uncertainty when discussing scientific phenomena, as compared to religious phenomena. Unsurprisingly, this cross-domain distinction was observed among majority belief, secular parents in China (Study 2). More importantly, however, the same pattern was observed among parents in Iran, a highly religious society (Study 1), as well as among minority belief, religious parents in China (Study 2). Thus, adults in markedly different belief communities spontaneously express less confidence in religious, as compared to scientific, invisible entities in naturalistic conversation. These findings contribute to theories on the role of culture and testimony in the development of beliefs about unobservable phenomena.

Miraculous, magical, or mundane? The development of beliefs about stories with divine, magical, or realistic causation.

Children's naïve theories about causal regularities enable them to differentiate factual narratives describing real events and characters from fictional narratives describing made-up events and characters (Corriveau, Kim, Schwalen, & Harris, Cognition 113 (2): 213-225, 2009). But what happens when children are consistently presented with accounts of miraculous and causally impossible events as real occurrences? Previous research has shown that preschoolers with consistent exposure to religious teaching tend to systematically judge characters involved in fantastical or religious events as real (Corriveau et al., Cognitive Science, 39 (2), 353-382, 2015; Davoodi et al., Developmental Psychology, 52 (2), 221, 2016). In the current study, we extended this line of work by asking about the scope of the impact of religious exposure on children's reality judgments. Specifically, we asked whether this effect is  domain-general or domain-specific. We tested children in Iran, where regular exposure to uniform religious beliefs might influence children's reasoning about possibility in non-religious domains, in addition to the domain of religion. Children with no or minimal schooling (5- to 6-year-olds) and older elementary school students (9- to 10-year-olds) judged the reality status of different kinds of stories, notably realistic, unusual (but nonetheless realistic), religious, and magical stories. We found that while younger children were not systematic in their judgments, older children often judged religious stories as real but rarely judged magical stories as real. This developmental pattern suggests that the impact of religious exposure on children's reality judgments does not extend beyond their reasoning about divine intervention. Children's justifications for their reality judgments provided further support for this domain-specific influence of religious teaching.

How weird is the development of children's gratitude in the United States? Cross-cultural comparisons.

Our interest is in the development of gratitude as a moral virtue, and its variability across different cultural contexts. Given psychology's overreliance on samples collected from the United Sates, Western Europe, and Australasia, we contrasted patterns of age-related expressions of gratitude among a sample of U.S. 7- to 14-year-old children with those from same-age samples from Brazil, China, Russia, South Korea, and Turkey (N = 2,540, 54.7% female, Mage = 10.61 years). The U.S. sample was diverse (n = 730: Black 26.4%, White 40.4%, Latinx 19.9%, Asian 3.8%, Other 1.6%, Missing 7.0%; 55.7% female, Mage = 10.52 years). The remaining samples were largely homogeneous by ethnicity. Our data were gathered using one quantitative scale to measure variations in the extent of gratitude that children expressed, and one qualitative measure to assess variability in the types of gratitude expressed by children of different ages. Both measures were chosen for their fit with the definition of virtuous gratitude. Hypotheses that the U.S. sample would differ from the others in extent and type of gratitude were largely supported. However, age-related differences in the type of gratitude expressed were similar across societies (e.g., in most samples older children were less likely to express concrete gratitude and more likely to express connective gratitude). Our results reveal the importance of treating gratitude as a virtue that develops during childhood and that is influenced by one's cultural group. Reliance on samples from a limited set of cultures is thus to be avoided. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

What could have been done? Counterfactual alternatives to negative outcomes generated by religious and secular children.

Recent research has shown that a religious upbringing renders children receptive to ordinarily impossible outcomes, but the underlying mechanism for this effect remains unclear. Exposure to religious teachings might alter children's basic understanding of causality. Alternatively, religious exposure might only affect children's religious cognition, not their causal judgments more generally. To test between these possibilities, 6- to 11-year-old children attending either secular (n = 49, 51% female, primarily White and middle-class) or parochial schools (n = 42, 48% female, primarily White and middle-class) heard stories in which characters experienced negative outcomes and indicated how those characters could have prevented them. Both groups of children spontaneously invoked interventions consistent with natural causal laws. Similarly, when judging the plausibility of several counterfactual interventions, participants endorsed the intervention consistent with natural laws at high levels, irrespective of schooling. However, children's endorsement of supernatural interventions inconsistent with these laws revealed both group similarities and differences. Although both groups of children judged divine intervention (i.e., via prayer) as more plausible than mental (i.e., via wishing) and magical (i.e., via magical powers) interventions, children receiving religious (vs. secular) schooling were more likely to do so. Moreover, although children with a secular upbringing overwhelmingly chose naturalistic interventions as the most effective, children with a religious upbringing chose divine as well as naturalistic intervention. These results indicate that religious teaching does not alter children's basic understanding of causality but rather adds divine intervention to their repertoire of possible causal factors. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Children's Ideas About What Can Really Happen: The Impact of Age and Religious Background.

Five- to 11-year-old U.S. children, from either a religious or secular background, judged whether story events could really happen. There were four different types of stories: magical stories violating ordinary causal regularities; religious stories also violating ordinary causal regularities but via a divine agent; unusual stories not violating ordinary causal regularities but with an improbable event; and realistic stories not violating ordinary causal regularities and with no improbable event. Overall, children were less likely to judge that religious and magical stories could really happen than unusual and realistic stories although religious children were more likely than secular children to judge that religious stories could really happen. Irrespective of background, children frequently invoked causal regularities in justifying their judgments. Thus, in justifying their conclusion that a story could really happen, children often invoked a causal regularity, whereas in justifying their conclusion that a story could not really happen, they often pointed to the violation of causal regularity. Overall, the findings show that children appraise the likelihood of story events actually happening in light of their beliefs about causal regularities. A religious upbringing does not impact the frequency with which children invoke causal regularities in judging what can happen, even if it does impact the type of causal factors that children endorse.

Are high levels of religiosity inconsistent with a high valuation of science? Evidence from the United States, China and Iran.

We asked whether high levels of religiosity are inconsistent with a high valuation of science. We explored this possibility in three countries that diverge markedly in the relation between the state and religion. Parents in the United States (n = 126), China (n = 234) and Iran (n = 77) completed a survey about their personal and parental stance towards science. The relation between religiosity and the valuation of science varied sharply by country. In the U.S. sample, greater religiosity was associated with a lower valuation of science. A similar but weaker negative relation was found in the Chinese sample. Parents in the Iranian sample, by contrast, valued science highly, despite high levels of religiosity. Given the small size of our United States and Iranian samples, and the non-probabilistic nature of our samples in general, we caution readers not to generalise our findings beyond the current samples. Despite this caveat, these findings qualify the assumption that religiosity is inconsistent with the valuation of science and highlight the role of sociocultural context in shaping adults' perception of the relation between religion and science.

Epistemic justifications for belief in the unobservable: The impact of minority status.

Children hold beliefs about religious and scientific entities, such as angels or germs, that they cannot directly observe or interact with. Given their limited opportunities for first-hand observation, children's beliefs in these entities are a clear example of cultural learning and are likely to vary based on cultural factors. In the present study, we investigated variation in the epistemic stance of 4-11-year-old children growing up in a religious minority in China (N = 47), a religious majority in Iran (N = 85), and a religious majority in the U.S. (N = 74). To assess the role of community status as a domain-specific, as opposed to a domain-general, factor contributing to children's beliefs about unobservable entities, we compared children's beliefs about religious unobservable entities with their beliefs about scientific unobservable entities in these three communities. In all three communities, younger and older children were confident that unobservable religious and scientific entities exist. However, compared to children in Iran and the U.S., children from the religious minority group in China were more likely to justify their ontological beliefs about religious entities by appealing to the source of their beliefs. These results highlight the impact of community status on learning from testimony about unobservable entities. Additionally, the results show that under certain circumstances - notably when holding minority beliefs - tracking the source of beliefs serves as a central epistemic justification.

Counterfactual thinking and age differences in judgments of regret and blame.

In the current study, we examined whether two different counterfactual thinking biases (i.e., action  bias and temporal order bias) influence children's and adults' judgments of regret and blame and whether the perspective that participants take (i.e., self vs. other) affects blame attributions. Little evidence was found for either bias in young children's judgments, and at older ages the temporal order bias had a stronger influence on judgments compared with the action bias. In addition, the results provide new evidence suggesting that there are developmental changes in the effects of self versus other perspectives on children's social judgments. The findings are discussed in the context of developmental change in counterfactual thinking.

"It could have been worse": Developmental change in the use of a counterfactual consoling strategy.

In two experiments, we investigated developmental change in the use of a counterfactual consoling strategy: "it could have been worse." In Experiment 1, 8-year-olds, 10-year-olds, 12-year-olds, and adults were presented with two stories in which a character feels bad as the result of an event that could have turned out better or could have turned out worse. Participants were asked what they would say or do to make the characters feel better. The results revealed that the frequency with which participants mentioned a counterfactual consoling strategy increased dramatically with age. In Experiment 2, using the same stories with similar-aged participants, we tested whether providing children with several consoling strategies (rather than asking them to create one) would prompt greater use of a counterfactual consoling strategy. Under these conditions, the 10- and 12-year-olds responded in a manner very similar to that of adults, whereas the 8-year-olds selected a counterfactual consoling strategy less often than participants at any other age. The findings from the two experiments suggest that, up through at least age 12years, children are less likely than adults to spontaneously apply counterfactual thinking when generating a consoling strategy.