Temporal interplay between cognitive conflict and attentional markers in social collaboration.

Cognitive processes deal with contradictory demands in social contexts. On the one hand, social interactions imply a demand for cooperation, which requires processing social signals, and on the other, demands for selective attention require ignoring irrelevant signals, to avoid overload. We created a task with a humanoid robot displaying irrelevant social signals, imposing conflicting demands on selective attention. Participants interacted with the robot as a team (high social demand; n = 23) or a passive co-actor (low social demand; n = 19). We observed that theta oscillations indexed conflict processing of social signals. Subsequently, alpha oscillations were sensitive to the conflicting social signals and the mode of interaction. These findings suggest that brains have distinct mechanisms for dealing with the complexity of social interaction and that these mechanisms are activated differently depending on the mode of the interaction. Thus, how we process environmental stimuli depends on the beliefs held regarding our social context.

Misleading Robot Signals in a Classification Task Induce Cognitive Load as Measured by Theta Synchronization Between Frontal and Temporo-parietal Brain Regions.

As technological advances progress, we find ourselves in situations where we need to collaborate with artificial agents (e.g., robots, autonomous machines and virtual agents). For example, autonomous machines will be part of search and rescue missions, space exploration and decision aids during monitoring tasks (e.g., baggage-screening at the airport). Efficient communication in these scenarios would be crucial to interact fluently. While studies examined the positive and engaging effect of social signals (i.e., gaze communication) on human-robot interaction, little is known about the effects of conflicting robot signals on the human actor's cognitive load. Moreover, it is unclear from a social neuroergonomics perspective how different brain regions synchronize or communicate with one another to deal with the cognitive load induced by conflicting signals in social situations with robots. The present study asked if neural oscillations that correlate with conflict processing are observed between brain regions when participants view conflicting robot signals. Participants classified different objects based on their color after a robot (i.e., iCub), presented on a screen, simulated handing over the object to them. The robot proceeded to cue participants (with a head shift) to the correct or incorrect target location. Since prior work has shown that unexpected cues can interfere with oculomotor planning and induces conflict, we expected that conflicting robot social signals which would interfere with the execution of actions. Indeed, we found that conflicting social signals elicited neural correlates of cognitive conflict as measured by mid-brain theta oscillations. More importantly, we found higher coherence values between mid-frontal electrode locations and posterior occipital electrode locations in the theta-frequency band for incongruent vs. congruent cues, which suggests that theta-band synchronization between these two regions allows for communication between cognitive control systems and gaze-related attentional mechanisms. We also find correlations between coherence values and behavioral performance (Reaction Times), which are moderated by the congruency of the robot signal. In sum, the influence of irrelevant social signals during goal-oriented tasks can be indexed by behavioral, neural oscillation and brain connectivity patterns. These data provide insights about a new measure for cognitive load, which can also be used in predicting human interaction with autonomous machines.

Irrelevant Robot Signals in a Categorization Task Induce Cognitive Conflict in Performance, Eye Trajectories, the N2 Component of the EEG Signal, and Frontal Theta Oscillations.

Understanding others' nonverbal behavior is essential for social interaction, as it allows, among others, to infer mental states. Although gaze communication, a well-established nonverbal social behavior, has shown its importance in inferring others' mental states, not much is known about the effects of irrelevant gaze signals on cognitive conflict markers during collaborative settings. In the present study, participants completed a categorization task where they categorized objects based on their color while observing images of a robot. On each trial, participants observed the robot iCub grasping an object from a table and offering it to them to simulate a handover. Once the robot "moved" the object forward, participants were asked to categorize the object according to its color. Before participants were allowed to respond, the robot made a lateral head/gaze shift. The gaze shifts were either congruent or incongruent with the object's color. We expected that incongruent head cues would induce more errors (Study 1), would be associated with more curvature in eye-tracking trajectories (Study 2), and induce larger amplitude in electrophysiological markers of cognitive conflict (Study 3). Results of the three studies show more oculomotor interference as measured in error rates (Study 1), larger curvatures eye-tracking trajectories (Study 2), and higher amplitudes of the N2 ERP component of the EEG signals as well as higher event-related spectral perturbation amplitudes (Study 3) for incongruent trials compared with congruent trials. Our findings reveal that behavioral, ocular, and electrophysiological markers can index the influence of irrelevant signals during goal-oriented tasks.

Do We Adopt the Intentional Stance Toward Humanoid Robots?

In daily social interactions, we need to be able to navigate efficiently through our social environment. According to Dennett (1971), explaining and predicting others' behavior with reference to mental states (adopting the intentional stance) allows efficient social interaction. Today we also routinely interact with artificial agents: from Apple's Siri to GPS navigation systems. In the near future, we might start casually interacting with robots. This paper addresses the question of whether adopting the intentional stance can also occur with respect to artificial agents. We propose a new tool to explore if people adopt the intentional stance toward an artificial agent (humanoid robot). The tool consists in a questionnaire that probes participants' stance by requiring them to choose the likelihood of an explanation (mentalistic vs. mechanistic) of a behavior of a robot iCub depicted in a naturalistic scenario (a sequence of photographs). The results of the first study conducted with this questionnaire showed that although the explanations were somewhat biased toward the mechanistic stance, a substantial number of mentalistic explanations were also given. This suggests that it is possible to induce adoption of the intentional stance toward artificial agents, at least in some contexts.

Expectations regarding action sequences modulate electrophysiological correlates of the gaze-cueing effect.

Predictive mechanisms of the brain are important for social cognition, as they enable inferences about others' goals and intentions, thereby allowing for generation of expectations regarding what will happen next in the social environment. Therefore, attentional selection is modulated by expectations regarding behavior of others (Perez-Osorio, Müller, Wiese, & Wykowska, 2015). In this article, we examined-using the ERPs of the EEG signal-which stages of processing are influenced by expectations about others' action steps. We used a paradigm in which a gaze-cueing procedure was embedded in successively presented naturalistic photographs composing an action sequence. Our results showed (a) behavioral gaze-cueing effects modulated by whether the observed agent gazed at an object that was expected to be gazed at, according to the action sequence; (b) the N1 component locked to the onset of a target was modulated both by spatial gaze validity and participants' expectations about where the agent would gaze to perform an action; (c) a more positive amplitude, locked to the shift of gaze direction for action-congruent gaze, relative to incongruent and neutral conditions-over parieto-occipital areas in the time window between 280 and 380 ms. Taken together, these findings revealed that confirmation or violation of expectations concerning others' goal-oriented actions modulate attentional selection processes, as indexed by early ERP components.

Correction: Gaze Following Is Modulated by Expectations Regarding Others' Action Goals.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0143614.].

Gaze Following Is Modulated by Expectations Regarding Others' Action Goals.

Humans attend to social cues in order to understand and predict others' behavior. Facial expressions and gaze direction provide valuable information to infer others' mental states and intentions. The present study examined the mechanism of gaze following in the context of participants' expectations about successive action steps of an observed actor. We embedded a gaze-cueing manipulation within an action scenario consisting of a sequence of naturalistic photographs. Gaze-induced orienting of attention (gaze following) was analyzed with respect to whether the gaze behavior of the observed actor was in line or not with the action-related expectations of participants (i.e., whether the actor gazed at an object that was congruent or incongruent with an overarching action goal). In Experiment 1, participants followed the gaze of the observed agent, though the gaze-cueing effect was larger when the actor looked at an action-congruent object relative to an incongruent object. Experiment 2 examined whether the pattern of effects observed in Experiment 1 was due to covert, rather than overt, attentional orienting, by requiring participants to maintain eye fixation throughout the sequence of critical photographs (corroborated by monitoring eye movements). The essential pattern of results of Experiment 1 was replicated, with the gaze-cueing effect being completely eliminated when the observed agent gazed at an action-incongruent object. Thus, our findings show that covert gaze following can be modulated by expectations that humans hold regarding successive steps of the action performed by an observed agent.

Deployment of spatial attention towards locations in memory representations. An EEG study.

Recalling information from visual short-term memory (VSTM) involves the same neural mechanisms as attending to an actually perceived scene. In particular, retrieval from VSTM has been associated with orienting of visual attention towards a location within a spatially-organized memory representation. However, an open question concerns whether spatial attention is also recruited during VSTM retrieval even when performing the task does not require access to spatial coordinates of items in the memorized scene. The present study combined a visual search task with a modified, delayed central probe protocol, together with EEG analysis, to answer this question. We found a temporal contralateral negativity (TCN) elicited by a centrally presented go-signal which was spatially uninformative and featurally unrelated to the search target and informed participants only about a response key that they had to press to indicate a prepared target-present vs. -absent decision. This lateralization during VSTM retrieval (TCN) provides strong evidence of a shift of attention towards the target location in the memory representation, which occurred despite the fact that the present task required no spatial (or featural) information from the search to be encoded, maintained, and retrieved to produce the correct response and that the go-signal did not itself specify any information relating to the location and defining feature of the target.