Dissecting shared pain representations to understand their behavioral and clinical relevance.

Accounts of shared representations posit that the experience of pain and pain empathy rely on similar neural mechanisms. Experimental research employing novel analytical and methodological approaches has made significant advances in both the identification and targeted manipulation of such shared experiences and their neural underpinnings. This revealed that painful experiences can be shared on different representational levels, from pain-specific to domain-general features, such as negative affect and its regulation. In view of direct links between such representations and social behaviors such as prosocial behavior, conditions characterized by aberrant pain processing may come along with heavy impairments in the social domain, depending on the affected representational level. This has wide potential implications in light of the high prevalence of pain-related clinical conditions, their management, and the overuse of pain medication. In this review and opinion paper, we aim to chart the path toward a better understanding of the link between shared affect and prosocial behavior.

A pill as a quick solution: association between painkiller intake, empathy, and prosocial behavior.

Previous research has demonstrated a link between the administration of analgesic drugs and the reduction of empathy levels in humans. This apparent blunting effect of pain medication has been explained through shared neural mechanisms for the first-hand and the empathic experience of pain (simulation theory). Considering that analgesics are among the most consumed drugs in the world and the ability to empathize with others is fundamental to human social interactions, the aim of the present study was to investigate whether the typical day-to-day analgesic consumption rate in Austria and Germany is associated with a reduction in empathy and prosocial behavior. We therefore collected self-reports of analgesic consumption behavior as well as empathy for pain and prosocial behavior measures in an online survey (n = 940). Analyses revealed no significant association between the analgesic intake frequency and measures of empathy or prosocial behavior. However, liberal intake of analgesics (i.e. mind-set of "a pill is a quick solution") was linked to lower empathic concern and helping behavior, which may hint towards a negative effect in people who take pain medication for non-pain related issues or episodes of low pain. Nevertheless, further research is needed to investigate the effects of analgesic drugs in high frequency users.

Placebo Analgesia Reduces Costly Prosocial Helping to Lower Another Person's Pain.

Painkiller administration lowers pain empathy, but whether this also reduces prosocial behavior is unknown. In this preregistered study, we investigated whether inducing analgesia through a placebo painkiller reduced effortful helping. When given the opportunity to reduce the pain of another person, individuals experiencing placebo analgesia (n = 45 adults from Austria; 21 male, 24 female) made fewer prosocial choices at the lowest helping level and exerted less physical effort when helping, compared with controls whose pain sensitivity was unaltered (n = 45; 21 male, 24 female). Self-reported empathic unpleasantness positively correlated with prosocial choices across the whole sample. While not replicating group differences in empathy, a mediation analysis revealed that the level of unpleasantness to other people's pain fully mediated the effect of placebo analgesia on prosocial choices. Given the importance of prosociality for social cohesion, these findings have broad potential implications both for individuals under the influence of painkillers and for society at large.

Effective connectivity reveals distinctive patterns in response to others' genuine affective experience of disgust.

Empathy is significantly influenced by the identification of others' emotions. In a recent study, we have found increased activation in the anterior insular cortex (aIns) that could be attributed to affect sharing rather than perceptual saliency, when seeing another person genuinely experiencing pain as opposed to merely acting to be in pain. In that prior study, effective connectivity between aIns and the right supramarginal gyrus (rSMG) was revealed to represent what another person really feels. In the present study, we used a similar paradigm to investigate the corresponding neural signatures in the domain of empathy for disgust - with participants seeing others genuinely sniffing unpleasant odors as compared to pretending to smell something disgusting (in fact the disgust expressions in both conditions were acted for reasons of experimental control). Consistent with the previous findings on pain, we found stronger activations in aIns associated with affect sharing for genuine disgust (inferred) compared with pretended disgust. However, instead of rSMG we found engagement of the olfactory cortex. Using dynamic causal modeling (DCM), we estimated the neural dynamics of aIns and the olfactory cortex between the genuine and pretended conditions. This revealed an increased excitatory modulatory effect for genuine disgust compared to pretended disgust. For genuine disgust only, brain-to-behavior regression analyses highlighted a link between the observed modulatory effect and a few empathic traits. Altogether, the current findings complement and expand our previous work, by showing that perceptual saliency alone does not explain responses in the insular cortex. Moreover, it reveals that different brain networks are implicated in a modality-specific way when sharing the affective experiences associated with pain vs. disgust.

Neural dynamics between anterior insular cortex and right supramarginal gyrus dissociate genuine affect sharing from perceptual saliency of pretended pain.

Empathy for pain engages both shared affective responses and self-other distinction. In this study, we addressed the highly debated question of whether neural responses previously linked to affect sharing could result from the perception of salient affective displays. Moreover, we investigated how the brain network involved in affect sharing and self-other distinction underpinned our response to a pain that is either perceived as genuine or pretended (while in fact both were acted for reasons of experimental control). We found stronger activations in regions associated with affect sharing (anterior insula [aIns] and anterior mid-cingulate cortex) as well as with affective self-other distinction (right supramarginal gyrus [rSMG]), in participants watching video clips of genuine vs. pretended facial expressions of pain. Using dynamic causal modeling, we then assessed the neural dynamics between the right aIns and rSMG in these two conditions. This revealed a reduced inhibitory effect on the aIns to rSMG connection for genuine pain compared to pretended pain. For genuine pain only, brain-to-behavior regression analyses highlighted a linkage between this inhibitory effect on the one hand, and pain ratings as well as empathic traits on the other. These findings imply that if the pain of others is genuine and thus calls for an appropriate empathic response, neural responses in the aIns indeed seem related to affect sharing and self-other distinction is engaged to avoid empathic over-arousal. In contrast, if others merely pretend to be in pain, the perceptual salience of their painful expression results in neural responses that are down-regulated to avoid inappropriate affect sharing and social support.

Empathy enables us to share and understand the emotional states of other people, often based on their facial expressions. This empathic response involves being able to distinguish our own emotional state from someone else's, and it is influenced by how we recognize that person's emotion. In real life, knowing and identifying whether the facial expression we are witnessing reflects genuine or pretended pain is particularly important so that we can appropriately react to someone's emotions and avoid unnecessary personal distress. How our brains manage to do this is still heavily debated. Two areas, the anterior insular (aIns for short) and the mid-cingulate cortex, appear to be activated when someone 'feels' someone else's pain. However, these regions might just automatically be triggered by vivid emotional facial expressions, regardless of whether we really respond to that pain. To examine this question, Zhao et al. measured brain activity as healthy adults watched video clips of people either feeling or pretending to feel pain. The activation of aIns was particularly related to the emotional component that someone shared with another person's genuine pain, but not to pretended pain. This suggests that neurons in the aIns track a truly empathic response when seeing someone who is actually experiencing pain. Effective connectivity analyses which reflect how brain areas 'crosstalk' also revealed distinct patterns when people viewed expressions of genuine, as opposed to pretended pain. Zhao et al. focused on the interactions between the alns and the right supramarginal gyrus, a brain region which helps to distinguish another person's emotions from our own. This crosstalk tracked others' feelings when participants viewed expressions of genuine but not of pretended pain. Put together, these findings provide a more refined model of empathy and its neural underpinnings. This will help further our understanding of conditions such as autism or depression, in which a person's social skills and emotional processing are impaired.

Placebo Analgesia Does Not Reduce Empathy for Naturalistic Depictions of Others' Pain in a Somatosensory Specific Way.

The shared representations account postulates that sharing another's pain recruits underlying brain functions also engaged during first-hand pain. Critically, direct causal evidence for this was mainly shown for affective pain processing, while the contribution of somatosensory processes to empathy remains controversial. This controversy may be explained, however, by experimental paradigms that did not direct attention towards a specific body part, or that did not employ naturalistic depictions of others' pain. In this preregistered functional magnetic resonance imaging study, we aimed to test whether causal manipulation of first-hand pain affects empathy for naturalistic depictions of pain in a somatosensory-matched manner. Forty-five participants underwent a placebo analgesia induction in their right hand and observed pictures of other people's right and left hands in pain. We found neither behavioral nor neural evidence for somatosensory-specific modulation of pain empathy. However, exploratory analyses revealed a general effect of the placebo on empathy, and higher brain activity in bilateral anterior insula when viewing others' right hands in pain (i.e., corresponding to one's own placebo hand). These results refine our knowledge regarding the neural mechanisms of pain empathy, and imply that the sharing of somatosensory representations seems to play less of a causal role than the one of affective representations.

Detached empathic experience of others' pain in remitted states of depression - An fMRI study.

BACKGROUND: Major depressive disorder is strongly associated with impairments and difficulties in social interactions. Deficits in empathy, a vital skill for social interactions, have been identified as a risk factor for relapse. However, research on empathy in remitted states of depression is scarce. We chose a social neuroscience approach to investigate potentially altered neural processes involved in sub-components of empathy in remitted states of depression. We expected aberrations in cognitive components of empathy, based on previous reports regarding their role as risk factors for relapse. METHODS: Employing functional magnetic resonance imaging and a pain empathy task (video clips of painful medical treatments), we compared behavioral and neural empathic responses of unmedicated remitted depressive patients (N = 32) to those of untreated acutely depressed patients (N = 29) and healthy controls (N = 35). Self-report ratings of pain evaluation and affect-sharing were obtained. RESULTS: Compared to controls and acutely depressed patients, remitted depressive patients reported higher pain evaluation and showed increased activity in the right temporo-parietal junction. This region, which is central to self-other distinction and which has been linked to adopting a detached perspective, also exhibited reduced connectivity to the anterior insula. Furthermore, we observed reduced activity in regions involved in emotion processing (amygdala) and perception of affective facial expressions (fusiform face area, posterior superior temporal sulcus). CONCLUSIONS: Remitted states of depression are associated with a detached empathic style in response to others' pain, characterized by increased self-other distinction, lowered affective processing, and reduced connectivity between empathy-related brain regions. Although this may prevent emotional harm in specific situations, it may reduce opportunities for positive experiences in social interactions in the long run.

Beyond Sharing Unpleasant Affect-Evidence for Pain-Specific Opioidergic Modulation of Empathy for Pain.

It is not known how specific the neural mechanisms underpinning empathy for different domains are. In the present study, we set out to test whether shared neural representations between first-hand pain and empathy for pain are pain-specific or extend to empathy for unpleasant affective touch as well. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging and psychopharmacological experiments, we investigated if placebo analgesia reduces first-hand and empathic experiences of affective touch, and compared them with the effects on pain. Placebo analgesia also affected the first-hand and empathic experience of unpleasant touch, implicating domain-general effects. However, and in contrast to pain and pain empathy, administering an opioid antagonist did not block these effects. Moreover, placebo analgesia reduced neural activity related to both modalities in the bilateral insular cortex, while it specifically modulated activity in the anterior midcingulate cortex for pain and pain empathy. These findings provide causal evidence that one of the major neurochemical systems for pain regulation is involved in pain empathy, and crucially substantiates the role of shared representations in empathy.

Another's pain in my brain: No evidence that placebo analgesia affects the sensory-discriminative component in empathy for pain.

The shared representations account of empathy suggests that sharing other people's emotions relies on neural processes similar to those engaged when directly experiencing such emotions. Recent research corroborated this by showing that placebo analgesia induced for first-hand pain resulted in reduced pain empathy and decreased activation in shared neural networks. However, those studies did not report any placebo-related variation of somatosensory engagement during pain empathy. The experimental paradigms used in these studies did not direct attention towards a specific body part in pain, which may explain the absence of effects for somatosensation. The main objective of this preregistered study was to implement a paradigm overcoming this limitation, and to investigate whether placebo analgesia may also modulate the sensory-discriminative component of empathy for pain. We induced a localized, first-hand placebo analgesia effect in the right hand of 45 participants by means of a placebo gel and conditioning techniques, and compared this to the left hand as a control condition. Participants underwent a pain task in the MRI scanner, receiving painful or non-painful electrical stimulation on their left or right hand, or witnessing another person receiving such stimulation. In contrast to a robust localized placebo analgesia effect for self-experienced pain, the empathy condition showed no differences between the two hands, neither for behavioral nor neural responses. We thus report no evidence for somatosensory sharing in empathy, while replicating previous studies showing overlapping brain activity in the affective-motivational component for first-hand and empathy for pain. Hence, in a more rigorous test aiming to overcome limitations of previous work, we again find no causal evidence for the engagement of somatosensory sharing in empathy. Our study refines the understanding of the neural underpinnings of empathy for pain, and the use of placebo analgesia in investigating such models.

Pharmacological fMRI provides evidence for opioidergic modulation of discrimination of facial pain expressions.

The endogenous opioid system is strongly involved in the modulation of pain. However, the potential role of this system in perceiving painful facial expressions from others has not been sufficiently explored as of yet. To elucidate the contribution of the opioid system to the perception of painful facial expressions, we conducted a double-blind, within-subjects pharmacological functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, in which 42 participants engaged in an emotion discrimination task (pain vs. disgust expressions) in two experimental sessions, receiving either the opioid receptor antagonist naltrexone or an inert substance (placebo). On the behavioral level, participants less frequently judged an expression as pain under naltrexone as compared to placebo. On the neural level, parametric modulation of activation in the (putative) right fusiform face area (FFA), which was correlated with increased pain intensity, was higher under naltrexone than placebo. Regression analyses revealed that brain activity in the right FFA significantly predicted behavioral performance in disambiguating pain from disgust, both under naltrexone and placebo. These findings suggest that reducing opioid system activity decreased participants' sensitivity for facial expressions of pain, and that this was linked to possibly compensatory engagement of processes related to visual perception, rather than to higher level affective processes, and pain regulation.

Placebo-induced pain reduction is associated with negative coupling between brain networks at rest.

Placebos can reduce pain by inducing beliefs in the effectiveness of an actually inert treatment. Such top-down effects on pain typically engage lateral and medial prefrontal regions, the insula, somatosensory cortex, as well as the thalamus and brainstem during pain anticipation or perception. Considering the level of large-scale brain networks, these regions spatially align with fronto-parietal/executive control, salience, and sensory-motor networks, but it is unclear if and how placebos alter interactions between them during rest. Here, we investigated how placebo analgesia affected intrinsic network coupling. Ninety-nine human participants were randomly assigned to a placebo or control group and underwent resting-state fMRI after pain processing. Results revealed inverse coupling between two resting-state networks in placebo but not control participants. Specifically, networks comprised the bilateral somatosensory cortex and posterior insula, as well as the brainstem, thalamus, striatal regions, dorsal and rostral anterior cingulate cortex, and the anterior insula, respectively. Across participants, more negative between-network coupling was associated with lower individual pain intensity as assessed during a preceding pain task, and there was no significant relation with expectations of medication effectiveness in the placebo group. Altogether, these findings provide initial evidence that placebo analgesia affects the intrinsic communication between large-scale brain networks, even in the absence of pain. We suggest a theoretical model where placebo analgesia might affect processing within a descending pain-modulatory network, potentially segregating it from somatosensory regions that may code for painful experiences.

Pattern similarity and connectivity of hippocampal-neocortical regions support empathy for pain.

Empathy is thought to engage mental simulation, which in turn is known to rely on hippocampal-neocortical processing. Here, we tested how hippocampal-neocortical pattern similarity and connectivity contributed to pain empathy. Using this approach, we analyzed a data set of 102 human participants who underwent functional MRI while painful and non-painful electrical stimulation was delivered to themselves or to a confederate. As hypothesized, results revealed increased pattern similarity between first-hand pain and pain empathy (compared to non-painful control conditions) within the hippocampus, retrosplenial cortex, the temporo-parietal junction and anterior insula. While representations in these regions were unaffected by confederate similarity, pattern similarity in the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex was increased the more dissimilar the other individual was perceived. Hippocampal-neocortical connectivity during first-hand pain and pain empathy engaged largely distinct but neighboring primary motor regions, and empathy-related hippocampal coupling with the fusiform gyrus positively scaled with trait measures of perspective taking. These findings suggest that shared representations and mental simulation might contribute to pain empathy via hippocampal-neocortical pattern similarity and connectivity, partially affected by personality traits and the similarity of the observed individual.

Antidepressant treatment, not depression, leads to reductions in behavioral and neural responses to pain empathy.

Major depressive disorder (MDD) has been hypothesized to lead to impairments in empathy. Previous cross-sectional studies did not disentangle effects of MDD itself and antidepressant treatment. In this first longitudinal neuroimaging study on empathy in depression, 29 patients with MDD participated in two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) sessions before and after 3 months of antidepressant therapy. We compared their responses to an empathy for pain task to a group of healthy controls (N = 35). All participants provided self-report ratings targeting cognitive (perspective taking) and affective (unpleasant affect) aspects of empathy. To control for general effects on processing of negative affective states, participants additionally underwent an electrical pain task. Before treatment, we found no differences in empathic responses between controls and patients with MDD. After treatment, patients showed significant decreases in both affective empathy and activity of three a priori selected brain regions associated with empathy for pain. Decreases in affective empathy were moreover correlated with symptom improvement. Moreover, functional connectivity during the empathy task between areas associated with affective (anterior insula) and cognitive (precuneus) empathy decreased between sessions in the MDD group. Neither cognitive empathy nor responses to painful electrical shocks were changed after treatment. These findings contradict previous cross-sectional reports of empathy deficits in acute MDD. Rather, they suggest that antidepressant treatment reduces the aversive responses triggered by exposure to the suffering of others. Importantly, this cannot be explained by a general blunting of negative affect, as treatment did not change self-experienced pain.

Imaging empathy and prosocial emotions.

Empathy is a multi-faceted construct with important implications for social behavior. Based on a selective review of the neuroscientific evidence collected in humans, the present paper discusses the neural representations underlying affect sharing, its relation to mentalizing, the importance of self-other distinction, the distinction between empathy, sympathy and compassion, and how these phenomena are linked to prosocial behavior. Apart from reviewing the literature, we also highlight open questions and how they might be addressed by a research approach that tries to integrate across these diverse constructs.

Are we really measuring empathy? Proposal for a new measurement framework.

Empathy - currently defined as the sharing of another's affective state - has been the focus of much psychological and neuroscientific research in the last decade, much of which has been focused on ascertaining the empathic ability of individuals with various clinical conditions. However, most of this work tends to overlook the fact that empathy is the result of a complex process requiring a number of intermediate processing steps. It is therefore the case that describing an individual or group as 'lacking empathy' lacks specificity. We argue for an alternative measurement framework, in which we explain variance in empathic response in terms of individual differences in the ability to identify another's emotional state ('emotion identification'), and the degree to which identification of another's state causes a corresponding state in the self ('affect sharing'). We describe how existing empathy paradigms need to be modified in order to fit within this measurement framework, and illustrate the utility of this approach with reference to examples from both cognitive neuroscience and clinical psychology.

Placebo analgesia and its opioidergic regulation suggest that empathy for pain is grounded in self pain.

Empathy for pain activates brain areas partially overlapping with those underpinning the first-hand experience of pain. It remains unclear, however, whether such shared activations imply that pain empathy engages similar neural functions as first-hand pain experiences. To overcome the limitations of previous neuroimaging research, we pursued a conceptually novel approach: we used the phenomenon of placebo analgesia to experimentally reduce the first-hand experience of pain, and assessed whether this results in a concomitant reduction of empathy for pain. We first carried out a functional MRI experiment (n = 102) that yielded results in the expected direction: participants experiencing placebo analgesia also reported decreased empathy for pain, and this was associated with reduced engagement of anterior insular and midcingulate cortex: that is, areas previously associated with shared activations in pain and empathy for pain. In a second step, we used a psychopharmacological manipulation (n = 50) to determine whether these effects can be blocked via an opioid antagonist. The administration of the opioid antagonist naltrexone blocked placebo analgesia and also resulted in a corresponding "normalization" of empathy for pain. Taken together, these findings suggest that pain empathy may be associated with neural responses and neurotransmitter activity engaged during first-hand pain, and thus might indeed be grounded in our own pain experiences.

Reduction of empathy for pain by placebo analgesia suggests functional equivalence of empathy and first-hand emotion experience.

Previous research in social neuroscience has consistently shown that empathy for pain recruits brain areas that are also activated during the first-hand experience of pain. This has been interpreted as evidence that empathy relies upon neural processes similar to those underpinning the first-hand experience of emotions. However, whether such overlapping neural activations imply that equivalent neural functions are engaged by empathy and direct emotion experiences remains to be demonstrated. We induced placebo analgesia, a phenomenon specifically modulating the first-hand experience of pain, to test whether this also reduces empathy for pain. Subjective and neural measures of pain and empathy for pain were collected using self-report and event-related potentials (ERPs) while participants underwent painful electrical stimulation or witnessed that another person was undergoing such stimulation. Self-report showed decreased empathy during placebo analgesia, and this was mirrored by reduced amplitudes of the pain-related P2, an ERP component indexing neural computations related to the affective-motivational component of pain. Moreover, these effects were specific for pain, as self-report and ERP measures of control conditions unrelated to pain were not affected by placebo analgesia. Together, the present results suggest that empathy seems to rely on neural processes that are (partially) functionally equivalent to those engaged by first-hand emotion experiences. Moreover, they imply that analgesics may have the unwanted side effect of reducing empathic resonance and concern for others.