US Public Health Preparedness and Response to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Viruses.

US public health preparedness and response to highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses are assessed in this survey study conducted by the CDC.

Travel history among persons infected with SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern in the United States, December 2020-February 2021.

The first three SARS-CoV-2 phylogenetic lineages classified as variants of concern (VOCs) in the United States (U.S.) from December 15, 2020 to February 28, 2021, Alpha (B.1.1.7), Beta (B.1.351), and Gamma (P.1) lineages, were initially detected internationally. This investigation examined available travel history of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases reported in the U.S. in whom laboratory testing showed one of these initial VOCs. Travel history, demographics, and health outcomes for a convenience sample of persons infected with a SARS-CoV-2 VOC from December 15, 2020 through February 28, 2021 were provided by 35 state and city health departments, and proportion reporting travel was calculated. Of 1,761 confirmed VOC cases analyzed, 1,368 had available data on travel history. Of those with data on travel history, 1,168 (85%) reported no travel preceding laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-2 and only 105 (8%) reported international travel during the 30 days preceding a positive SARS-CoV-2 test or symptom onset. International travel was reported by 92/1,304 (7%) of persons infected with the Alpha variant, 7/55 (22%) with Beta, and 5/9 (56%) with Gamma. Of the first three SARS-CoV-2 lineages designated as VOCs in the U.S., international travel was common only among the few Gamma cases. Most persons infected with Alpha and Beta variant reported no travel history, therefore, community transmission of these VOCs was likely common in the U.S. by March 2021. These findings underscore the importance of global surveillance using whole genome sequencing to detect and inform mitigation strategies for emerging SARS-CoV-2 VOCs.

Determining the role of natural SARS-CoV-2 infection in the death of domestic pets: 10 cases (2020-2021).

OBJECTIVE: To establish a pathoepidemiological model to evaluate the role of SARS-CoV-2 infection in the first 10 companion animals that died while infected with SARS-CoV-2 in the US. ANIMALS: 10 cats and dogs that tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 and died or were euthanized in the US between March 2020 and January 2021. PROCEDURES: A standardized algorithm was developed to direct case investigations, determine the necessity of certain diagnostic procedures, and evaluate the role, if any, that SARS-CoV-2 infection played in the animals' course of disease and death. Using clinical and diagnostic information collected by state animal health officials, state public health veterinarians, and other state and local partners, this algorithm was applied to each animal case. RESULTS: SARS-CoV-2 was an incidental finding in 8 animals, was suspected to have contributed to the severity of clinical signs leading to euthanasia in 1 dog, and was the primary reason for death for 1 cat. CONCLUSIONS AND CLINICAL RELEVANCE: This report provides the global community with a standardized process for directing case investigations, determining the necessity of certain diagnostic procedures, and determining the clinical significance of SARS-CoV-2 infections in animals with fatal outcomes and provides evidence that SARS-CoV-2 can, in rare circumstances, cause or contribute to death in pets.

Coronavirus Disease among Workers in Food Processing, Food Manufacturing, and Agriculture Workplaces.

We describe coronavirus disease (COVID-19) among US food manufacturing and agriculture workers and provide updated information on meat and poultry processing workers. Among 742 food and agriculture workplaces in 30 states, 8,978 workers had confirmed COVID-19; 55 workers died. Racial and ethnic minority workers could be disproportionately affected by COVID-19.

Facility-Wide Testing for SARS-CoV-2 in Nursing Homes - Seven U.S. Jurisdictions, March-June 2020.

Undetected infection with SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) contributes to transmission in nursing homes, settings where large outbreaks with high resident mortality have occurred (1,2). Facility-wide testing of residents and health care personnel (HCP) can identify asymptomatic and presymptomatic infections and facilitate infection prevention and control interventions (3-5). Seven state or local health departments conducted initial facility-wide testing of residents and staff members in 288 nursing homes during March 24-June 14, 2020. Two of the seven health departments conducted testing in 195 nursing homes as part of facility-wide testing all nursing homes in their state, which were in low-incidence areas (i.e., the median preceding 14-day cumulative incidence in the surrounding county for each jurisdiction was 19 and 38 cases per 100,000 persons); 125 of the 195 nursing homes had not reported any COVID-19 cases before the testing. Ninety-five of 22,977 (0.4%) persons tested in 29 (23%) of these 125 facilities had positive SARS-CoV-2 test results. The other five health departments targeted facility-wide testing to 93 nursing homes, where 13,443 persons were tested, and 1,619 (12%) had positive SARS-CoV-2 test results. In regression analyses among 88 of these nursing homes with a documented case before facility-wide testing occurred, each additional day between identification of the first case and completion of facility-wide testing was associated with identification of 1.3 additional cases. Among 62 facilities that could differentiate results by resident and HCP status, an estimated 1.3 HCP cases were identified for every three resident cases. Performing facility-wide testing immediately after identification of a case commonly identifies additional unrecognized cases and, therefore, might maximize the benefits of infection prevention and control interventions. In contrast, facility-wide testing in low-incidence areas without a case has a lower proportion of test positivity; strategies are needed to further optimize testing in these settings.

Update: COVID-19 Among Workers in Meat and Poultry Processing Facilities - United States, April-May 2020.

Meat and poultry processing facilities face distinctive challenges in the control of infectious diseases, including coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) (1). COVID-19 outbreaks among meat and poultry processing facility workers can rapidly affect large numbers of persons. Assessment of COVID-19 cases among workers in 115 meat and poultry processing facilities through April 27, 2020, documented 4,913 cases and 20 deaths reported by 19 states (1). This report provides updated aggregate data from states regarding the number of meat and poultry processing facilities affected by COVID-19, the number and demographic characteristics of affected workers, and the number of COVID-19-associated deaths among workers, as well as descriptions of interventions and prevention efforts at these facilities. Aggregate data on confirmed COVID-19 cases and deaths among workers identified and reported through May 31, 2020, were obtained from 239 affected facilities (those with a laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 case in one or more workers) in 23 states.* COVID-19 was confirmed in 16,233 workers, including 86 COVID-19-related deaths. Among 14 states reporting the total number of workers in affected meat and poultry processing facilities (112,616), COVID-19 was diagnosed in 9.1% of workers. Among 9,919 (61%) cases in 21 states with reported race/ethnicity, 87% occurred among racial and ethnic minority workers. Commonly reported interventions and prevention efforts at facilities included implementing worker temperature or symptom screening and COVID-19 education, mandating face coverings, adding hand hygiene stations, and adding physical barriers between workers. Targeted workplace interventions and prevention efforts that are appropriately tailored to the groups most affected by COVID-19 are critical to reducing both COVID-19-associated occupational risk and health disparities among vulnerable populations. Implementation of these interventions and prevention efforts† across meat and poultry processing facilities nationally could help protect workers in this critical infrastructure industry.

Seoul Virus Infection and Spread in United States Home-Based Ratteries: Rat and Human Testing Results From a Multistate Outbreak Investigation.

BACKGROUND: During 2017, a multistate outbreak investigation occurred after the confirmation of Seoul virus (SEOV) infections in people and pet rats. A total of 147 humans and 897 rats were tested. METHODS: In addition to immunoglobulin (Ig)G and IgM serology and traditional reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), novel quantitative RT-PCR primers/probe were developed, and whole genome sequencing was performed. RESULTS: Seventeen people had SEOV IgM, indicating recent infection; 7 reported symptoms and 3 were hospitalized. All patients recovered. Thirty-one facilities in 11 US states had SEOV infection, and among those with ≥10 rats tested, rat IgG prevalence ranged 2%-70% and SEOV RT-PCR positivity ranged 0%-70%. Human laboratory-confirmed cases were significantly associated with rat IgG positivity and RT-PCR positivity (P = .03 and P = .006, respectively). Genomic sequencing identified >99.5% homology between SEOV sequences in this outbreak, and these were >99% identical to SEOV associated with previous pet rat infections in England, the Netherlands, and France. Frequent trade of rats between home-based ratteries contributed to transmission of SEOV between facilities. CONCLUSIONS: Pet rat owners, breeders, and the healthcare and public health community should be aware and take steps to prevent SEOV transmission in pet rats and to humans. Biosecurity measures and diagnostic testing can prevent further infections.

Transmission of Eastern Equine Encephalitis Virus From an Organ Donor to 3 Transplant Recipients.

BACKGROUND: In fall 2017, 3 solid organ transplant (SOT) recipients from a common donor developed encephalitis within 1 week of transplantation, prompting suspicion of transplant-transmitted infection. Eastern equine encephalitis virus (EEEV) infection was identified during testing of endomyocardial tissue from the heart recipient. METHODS: We reviewed medical records of the organ donor and transplant recipients and tested serum, whole blood, cerebrospinal fluid, and tissue from the donor and recipients for evidence of EEEV infection by multiple assays. We investigated blood transfusion as a possible source of organ donor infection by testing remaining components and serum specimens from blood donors. We reviewed data from the pretransplant organ donor evaluation and local EEEV surveillance. RESULTS: We found laboratory evidence of recent EEEV infection in all organ recipients and the common donor. Serum collected from the organ donor upon hospital admission tested negative, but subsequent samples obtained prior to organ recovery were positive for EEEV RNA. There was no evidence of EEEV infection among donors of the 8 blood products transfused into the organ donor or in products derived from these donations. Veterinary and mosquito surveillance showed recent EEEV activity in counties nearby the organ donor's county of residence. Neuroinvasive EEEV infection directly contributed to the death of 1 organ recipient and likely contributed to death in another. CONCLUSIONS: Our investigation demonstrated EEEV transmission through SOT. Mosquito-borne transmission of EEEV to the organ donor was the likely source of infection. Clinicians should be aware of EEEV as a cause of transplant-associated encephalitis.

A Cluster of Group A Streptococcal Infections in a Skilled Nursing Facility-the Potential Role of Healthcare Worker Presenteeism.

OBJECTIVES: To determine the extent of a group A streptococcus (GAS) cluster (2 residents with invasive GAS (invasive case-patients), 2 carriers) caused by a single strain (T antigen type 2 and M protein gene subtype 2.0 (T2, emm 2.0)), evaluate factors contributing to transmission, and provide recommendations for disease control. DESIGN: Cross-sectional analysis and retrospective review. SETTING: Skilled nursing facility (SNF). PARTICIPANTS: SNF residents and staff. MEASUREMENTS: The initial cluster was identified through laboratory notification and screening of SNF residents with wounds. Laboratory and SNF administrative records were subsequently reviewed to identify additional residents with GAS, oropharyngeal and wound (if present) swabs were collected from SNF staff and residents to examine GAS colonization, staff were surveyed to assess infection control practices and risk factors for GAS colonization, epidemiologic links between case-patients and persons colonized with GAS were determined, and facility infection control practices were assessed. RESULTS: No additional invasive case-patients were identified. Oropharyngeal swabs obtained from all 167 SNF residents were negative; one wound swab grew GAS that was the same as the outbreak strain (T2, emm 2.0). The outbreak strain was not identified in any of the 162 staff members. One of six staff members diagnosed with GAS pharyngitis worked while ill and had direct contact with invasive case-patients within a few weeks before their onset of symptoms. Additional minor breaches in infection control were noted. CONCLUSION: Sick healthcare workers may have introduced GAS into the SNF, with propagation by infection control lapses. "Presenteeism," or working while ill, may introduce and transmit GAS to vulnerable in SNF populations. Identification of an invasive GAS case-patient should trigger a prompt response by facilities to prevent further transmission and workplace culture, and policies should be in place to discourage presenteeism in healthcare settings.

Serologic response in eight alpacas vaccinated by extralabel use of a large animal rabies vaccine during a public health response to a rabid alpaca in South Carolina.

CASE DESCRIPTION A female alpaca, kept at pasture with 12 other female alpacas, 2 crias, and 5 goats, was evaluated because of clinical signs of aggression. CLINICAL FINDINGS The clinical signs of aggression progressed to include biting at other animals as well as disorientation. Three days later, the alpaca was euthanized because of suspicion of rabies virus infection. TREATMENT AND OUTCOME No physical injuries were found at necropsy. Brain tissue specimens were confirmed positive for rabies on the basis of direct fluorescent antibody test results. Molecular typing identified the rabies virus variant as one that is enzootic in raccoons. The farm was placed under quarantine, restricting movement of animals on and off the property for 6 months. To prevent further rabies cases, 14 alpacas (12 adults and 2 crias) were vaccinated by extralabel use of a large animal rabies vaccine. Of the 14 vaccinated alpacas, 8 had paired serum samples obtained immediately before and 21 days after vaccination; all 8 alpacas had adequate serum antirabies antibody production in response to rabies vaccination. As a result of an adequate serologic response, the quarantine was reduced to 3 months. In the year after the index rabies case, no other animals on the farm developed rabies. CLINICAL RELEVANCE Extralabel use of rabies vaccines in camelids was used in the face of a public health investigation. This report provides an example of handling of a rabies case for future public health investigations, which will undoubtedly need to develop ad-hoc rabies vaccination recommendations on the basis of the unique characteristics of the event.

Hepatitis B virus transmissions associated with a portable dental clinic, West Virginia, 2009.

BACKGROUND: Although hepatitis B virus (HBV) transmission in dental settings is rare, in 2009 a cluster of acute HBV infections was reported among attendees of a two-day portable dental clinic in West Virginia. METHODS: The authors conducted a retrospective investigation by using treatment records and volunteer logs, interviews of patients and volunteers with acute HBV infection as well as of other clinic volunteers, and molecular sequencing of the virus from those acutely infected. RESULTS: The clinic was held under the auspices of a charitable organization in a gymnasium staffed by 750 volunteers, including dental care providers who treated 1,137 adults. Five acute HBV infections-involving three patients and two volunteers-were identified by the local and state health departments. Of four viral isolates available for testing, all were genotype D. Three case patients underwent extractions; one received restorations and one a dental prophylaxis. None shared a treatment provider with any of the others. One case volunteer worked in maintenance; the other directed patients from triage to the treatment waiting area. Case patients reported no behavioral risk factors for HBV infection. The investigation revealed numerous infection control breaches. CONCLUSIONS: Transmission of HBV to three patients and two volunteers is likely to have occurred at a portable dental clinic. Specific breaches in infection control could not be linked to these HBV transmissions. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: All dental settings should adhere to recommended infection control practices, including oversight; training in prevention of bloodborne pathogens transmission; receipt of HBV vaccination for staff who may come into contact with blood or body fluids; use of appropriate personal protective equipment, sterilization and disinfection procedures; and use of measures, such as high-volume suction, to minimize the spread of blood.

Knowledge, attitudes, and practices of veterinary facility owners regarding rabies preexposure prophylaxis--West Virginia, 2011.

OBJECTIVE: To assess the knowledge, attitudes, and practices regarding rabies preexposure prophylaxis among veterinary facility owners in West Virginia and to compare facilities in counties where raccoon rabies virus variant (RRVV) is or is not enzootic. DESIGN: Cross-sectional telephone survey. SAMPLE: 124 owners of facilities licensed by the West Virginia Board of Veterinary Medicine. PROCEDURES: In 2011, an owner of each licensed facility in West Virginia was contacted by telephone to complete a questionnaire regarding practice demographics, knowledge of rabies epidemiology, and preexposure prophylaxis policies. Data from facilities in counties where RRVV is enzootic were compared with data from facilities in counties where RRVV is not enzootic. Prevalence ratios and 95% confidence intervals were calculated to quantify the strength of associations. RESULTS: Owners of 124 of the 162 (77%) veterinary facilities participated in the survey. West Virginia veterinarians were knowledgeable of rabies epidemiology in the state. Respondents agreed that veterinarians (122/124 [98%]) and technicians and assistants (111/124 [90%]) should receive preexposure prophylaxis. Fifty-six (45%) respondents required that veterinarians receive preexposure prophylaxis, whereas 19 (15%) respondents required that technicians and assistants receive preexposure prophylaxis. A preexposure prophylaxis policy was in effect at 20 of 64 (31%) facilities in counties where RRVV is enzootic and 6 of 60 (10%) facilities in counties where RRVV is not enzootic. Concerns related to cost of preexposure prophylaxis were reported. CONCLUSIONS AND CLINICAL RELEVANCE: Except for veterinarians, veterinary staff in West Virginia did not commonly receive preexposure prophylaxis or regular assessments of serum rabies virus neutralizing antibody titers. All veterinary practices are encouraged to consider revising or implementing a preexposure prophylaxis policy based on the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices' recommendations.

Severe methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus infections associated with epidural injections at an outpatient pain clinic.

BACKGROUND: Recent outbreaks in ambulatory care settings have highlighted infection control breaches as risk factors for disease transmission. In May 2009, 3 patients were hospitalized with severe methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus (MSSA) infections after receiving epidural injections at a West Virginia outpatient pain clinic. METHODS: We conducted a retrospective cohort study evaluating clinic patients who received injections during a 3-week period. A case was defined as laboratory-confirmed infection or clinical evidence of infection ≤ 14 days after a patient received an injection. Infection control procedures were assessed. MSSA isolates from patient infections and clinic staff nasal swabs were genotyped by using pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. RESULTS: Eight (7%) of 110 cohort patients met the case definition; 6 (75%) cases were laboratory confirmed. Eight (12%) of 69 patients who received epidural injections were case patients compared with none of the other 41 patients (P = .02). During procedures, staff use of face masks and preparation of patient skin were suboptimal; epidural injection syringes were reused to access shared medication vials. MSSA isolates from 2 patients and 1 staff member were indistinguishable by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. CONCLUSION: Infection control breaches likely facilitated MSSA transmission to patients receiving epidural injections. Adhering to correct infection control practices in ambulatory care settings is critical to prevent disease transmission.