Emotions of the pandemic: phenomenological perspectives.

This article provides an introduction to the special issue "Emotions of the Pandemic: Phenomenological Perspectives". We begin by outlining how phenomenological research can illuminate various forms of emotional experience associated with the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, we propose that a consideration of pandemic experience, in all its complexity and diversity, has the potential to yield wider-ranging phenomenological insights. We go on to discuss the thirteen contributions that follow, identifying common themes and points of complementarity.

The lived experience of depression: a bottom-up review co-written by experts by experience and academics.

We provide here the first bottom-up review of the lived experience of depression, co-written by experts by experience and academics. First-person accounts within and outside the medical field were screened and discussed in collaborative workshops involving numerous individuals with lived experience of depression, family members and carers, representing a global network of organizations. The material was enriched by phenomenologically informed perspectives and shared with all collaborators in a cloud-based system. The subjective world of depression was characterized by an altered experience of emotions and body (feeling overwhelmed by negative emotions, unable to experience positive emotions, stuck in a heavy aching body drained of energy, detached from the mind, the body and the world); an altered experience of the self (losing sense of purpose and existential hope, mismatch between the past and the depressed self, feeling painfully incarcerated, losing control over one's thoughts, losing the capacity to act on the world; feeling numb, empty, non-existent, dead, and dreaming of death as a possible escape route); and an altered experience of time (experiencing an alteration of vital biorhythms, an overwhelming past, a stagnation of the present, and the impossibility of the future). The experience of depression in the social and cultural context was characterized by altered interpersonal experiences (struggling with communication, feeling loneliness and estrangement, perceiving stigma and stereotypes), and varied across different cultures, ethnic or racial minorities, and genders. The subjective perception of recovery varied (feeling contrasting attitudes towards recovery, recognizing recovery as a journey, recognizing one's vulnerability and the need for professional help), as did the experience of receiving pharmacotherapy, psychotherapy, and social as well as physical health interventions. These findings can inform clinical practice, research and education. This journey in the lived experience of depression can also help us to understand the nature of our own emotions and feelings, what is to believe in something, what is to hope, and what is to be a living human being.

Corrigendum: The pandemic experience survey II: A second corpus of subjective reports of life under social restrictions during COVID-19 in the UK, Japan, and Mexico.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.3389/fpubh.2022.913096.].

Phenomenological reflections on grief during the COVID-19 pandemic.

This paper addresses how and why social restrictions imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic have affected people's experiences of grief. To do so, I adopt a broadly phenomenological approach, one that emphasizes how our experiences, thoughts, and activities are shaped by relations with other people. Drawing on first-person accounts of grief during the pandemic, I identify two principal (and overlapping) themes: (a) deprivation and disruption of interpersonal processes that play important roles in comprehending and adapting to bereavement; (b) disturbance of an experiential world in the context of which loss is more usually recognized and negotiated. The combination, I suggest, can amount to a sort of "grief within grief", involving a sense of stasis consistent with clinical descriptions of prolonged grief disorder.

Sensory and Quasi-Sensory Experiences of the Deceased in Bereavement: An Interdisciplinary and Integrative Review.

Bereaved people often report having sensory and quasi-sensory experiences of the deceased (SED), and there is an ongoing debate over whether SED are associated with pathology, such as grief complications. Research into these experiences has been conducted in various disciplines, including psychiatry, psychology, and anthropology, without much crossover. This review brings these areas of research together, drawing on the expertise of an interdisciplinary working group formed as part of the International Consortium for Hallucination Research (ICHR). It examines existing evidence on the phenomenology, associated factors, and impact of SED, including the role of culture, and discusses the main theories on SED and how these phenomena compare with unusual experiences in other contexts. The review concludes that the vast majority of these experiences are benign and that they should be considered in light of their biographical, relational, and sociocultural contexts.

Atmosphere: On the Phenomenology of "Atmospheric" Alterations in Schizophrenia - Overall Sense of Reality, Familiarity, Vitality, Meaning, or Relevance (Ancillary Article to EAWE Domain 5).

"Atmospheric" alterations are key aspects of altered subjectivity in mental disorder. Karl Jaspers famously described the "delusional mood": a sense of uncanny salience and ominousness that often precedes the onset of schizophrenic psychosis or of delusions. Such experiences, he writes, involve "a transformation in our total awareness of reality" that often verges on ineffability. In psychiatry, these experiential alterations are often referred to in terms of "derealization." Though derealization most obviously refers to a decline in the sense of objective presence or felt actuality, it can also refer to other unusual experiences in which things seem unlike normal or standard reality, including altered familiarity, vitality, meaning, or relevance. This paper first describes two complementary ways of approaching these phenomena: the notion of an "ontological" dimension (Sass) and that of "existential feeling" (Ratcliffe). It then offers a wider-ranging synopsis of work in phenomenological psychopathology that has sought to address atmospheric alterations believed to be especially characteristic of schizophrenia spectrum conditions, focusing on the themes of a diminished sense of reality, altered sense of meaning, disrupted feeling of familiarity, and diminished vitality and relevance.

How anxiety induces verbal hallucinations.

Verbal hallucinations are often associated with pronounced feelings of anxiety, and it has also been suggested that anxiety somehow triggers them. In this paper, we offer a phenomenological or 'personal-level' account of how it does so. We show how anxious anticipation of one's own thought contents can generate an experience of their being 'alien'. It does so by making an experience of thinking more like one of perceiving, resulting in an unfamiliar kind of intentional state. This accounts for a substantial subset of verbal hallucinations, which are experienced as falling within one's psychological boundaries and lacking in auditory qualities.

Thought Insertion Clarified.

'Thought insertion' in schizophrenia involves somehow experiencing one's own thoughts as someone else's. Some philosophers try to make sense of this by distinguishing between ownership and agency: one still experiences oneself as the owner of an inserted thought but attributes it to another agency. In this paper, we propose that thought insertion involves experiencing thought contents as alien, rather than episodes of thinking. To make our case, we compare thought insertion to certain experiences of 'verbal hallucination' and show that they amount to different descriptions of the same phenomenon: a quasi-perceptual experience of thought content. We add that the agency/ownership distinction is unhelpful here. What requires explanation is not why a person experiences a type of intentional state without the usual sense of agency, but why she experiences herself as the agent of one type of intentional state rather than another. We conclude by sketching an account of how this might happen.

What is a "sense of foreshortened future?" A phenomenological study of trauma, trust, and time.

One of the symptoms of trauma is said to be a "sense of foreshortened future." Without further qualification, it is not clear how to interpret this. In this paper, we offer a phenomenological account of what the experience consists of. To do so, we focus on the effects of torture. We describe how traumatic events, especially those that are deliberately inflicted by other people, can lead to a loss of "trust" or "confidence" in the world. This undermines the intelligibility of one's projects, cares, and commitments, in a way that amounts to a change in the structure of temporal experience. The paper concludes by briefly addressing the implications of this for how we respond to trauma, as well as offering some remarks on the relationship between trauma and psychosis.

The phenomenology of depression and the nature of empathy.

This paper seeks to illuminate the nature of empathy by reflecting upon the phenomenology of depression. I propose that depression involves alteration of an aspect of experience that is seldom reflected upon or discussed, thus making it hard to understand. This alteration involves impairment or loss of a capacity for interpersonal relatedness that mutual empathy depends upon. The sufferer thus feels cut off from other people, and may remark on their indifference, hostility or inability to understand. Drawing upon the example of depression, I argue that empathy is not principally a matter of 'simulating' another person's experience. It is better conceived of as a perception-like exploration of others' experiences that develops progressively through certain styles of interpersonal interaction.

Varieties of temporal experience in depression.

People with depression often report alterations in their experience of time, a common complaint being that time has slowed down or stopped. In this paper, I argue that depression can involve a range of qualitatively different changes in the structure of temporal experience, some of which I proceed to describe. In addition, I suggest that current diagnostic categories such as "major depression" are insensitive to the differences between these changes. I conclude by briefly considering whether the kinds of temporal experience associated with depression are specific to depression.