The neural representation of stereotype content.

Judgments about social groups are characterized by their position in a representational space defined by two axes, warmth and competence. We examined serial dependence (SD) in evaluations of warmth and competence while measuring participants' electroencephalographic (EEG) activity, as a means to address the independence between these two psychological axes. SD is the attraction of perceptual reports towards things seen in the recent past and has recently been intensely investigated in vision. SD occurs at multiple levels of visual processing, from basic features to meaningful objects. The current study aims to (1) measure whether SD occurs between non-visual objects, in particular social groups and (2) uncover the neural correlates of social group evaluation and SD using EEG. Participants' judgments about social groups such as "nurses" or "accountants" were serially dependent, but only when the two successive groups were close in representational space. The pattern of results argues in favor of a non-separability between the two axes, because groups nearby on one dimension but far on the other were not subject to SD, even though that other dimension was irrelevant to the task at hand. Using representational similarity analysis, we found a brain signature that differentiated social groups as a function of their position in the representational space. Our results thus argue that SD may be a ubiquitous cognitive phenomenon, that social evaluations are serially dependent, and that reproducible neural signatures of social evaluations can be uncovered.

You're heartless, I'm less: self-image and social norms in moral judgment.

Are moral judgments to sacrificial dilemmas shaped by a latent social norm? The present research addresses this issue. We report a set of six studies (plus a supplementary one) which question the existence of a social norm in the longstanding deontism/utilitarian debate by relying on two original tools, namely substitution technique and self-presentation paradigm. Study 1 showed that American participants asked to answer like most Americans would do gave more utilitarian responses than control participants who answered in their own name (Study 1). Study 2 showed that participants instructed to answer in a disapproval fashion were more utilitarian than both participants instructed to answer in an approval fashion and control participants. Importantly, no difference was observed between the approval and control conditions, suggesting that participants naturally align their moral judgments with a latent norm they think is the most socially desirable. Studies 3-5 explored in addition the effect of the activation of a deontism-skewed norm using the substitution instruction on subsequent impression formation. For the latter task, participants were instructed to evaluate a random participant selected from a previous study who gave utilitarian-like responses (Studies 3a-3b), or to evaluate a fictitious politician who endorsed either a deontic or utilitarian orientation (Studies 4-5). Although we consistently replicated the effect of substitution instruction, we failed to show that attempts to activate a norm in a given individual shaped their evaluation of other people who do not align with this norm. Finally, we report a mini meta-analysis targeting the pooled effect and homogeneity among our studies.

Social representations of the coronavirus and causal perception of its origin: The role of reasons for fear.

In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic (between 26 March and 2 April 2020), we analysed (n = 1144) the social representations of the coronavirus and the differentiated perceptions according to the origins attributed to the appearance of the virus (Human vs Non-Human and Intentional vs Unintentional) in a French population. The results show that the social representation is organized around five potentially central descriptive, anxiety-provoking and globally negative elements. But death and contagion are the only stable and structuring elements. The other elements vary according to the reason attributed to the object of fear. Depending on how individuals attribute the origin of the virus, social representations of it vary not only in terms of their content but also in terms of their structure. These results indicate how important it is to consider the perceptions that individuals share about the human (vs non-human) and intentional (vs unintentional) origin of an object of fear in the analysis of their representation of that object.

Evaluation of Knowledge and Risk Perception about Antibiotic Resistance in Biology and Mathematics Young Students in Nîmes University in France.

In response to the antimicrobial resistance issue, the World Health Organization developed and conducted a survey in 2015 dealing with habits, antibiotic use, awareness of appropriate use and sensitization to the issue of antibacterial resistance. In France, we conducted a similar survey to investigate the use of antibiotics and students' perceptions of the antibiotic resistance risk. Our results indicated that antibiotics are moderately taken (42% in the last six months), but mistakes remain in appropriate practices and knowledge. Many people still believe that the body develops resistance to antibiotics and 24% responded that antibiotics can be stopped before the end of the treatment if they feel better. Furthermore, only 14% said antibiotics could be used to treat gonorrhea while 57% indicated that influenza could be treated with antibiotics. We looked at risk perception as well, and noticed that students in biology were more aware of risk (mean score = 48.87) and health consequences (mean score = 40.33) than mathematics students (mean score = 44.11 and 37.44). They were more aware of the threat, had a better understanding of antibiotic resistance and their denial of this risk was less significant (mean score = 27.04 against 23.81). However, the importance of providing a minimum level of knowledge to young students has been emphasized, regardless of the field of expertise.

La Théorie des Représentations Sociales: orientations conceptuelles, champs d'applications et méthodes / The Theory of Social Representations: Conceptual approaches, fields of application and methods / La Teoría de las Representaciones Sociales: Orientaciones conceptuales, campos de aplicaciones y métodos

Depuis sa formulation initiale, la Théorie des Représentations Sociales (TRS, Moscovici, 1961) a connu un essor remarquable au niveau mondial et constitue aujourd'hui une théorie majeure et incontournable au sein du champ disciplinaire que constitue la psychologie sociale. Cependant, de par les différentes orientations développées au sein de cette théorie, sa diffusion et son succès ont largement dépassé les frontières de cette discipline. Cet article se propose de dessiner les contours de la TRS en proposant un panorama des différentes orientations qu'elle a vu naítre, des applications dont elle a pu faire l'objet et enfin des méthodologies qu'elle utilise et qu'elle a suscitées.

Since its early formulation, Social Representations Theory (SRT, Moscovici, 1961) presented a remarkable development in the world. And today, it is an essential and ineluctable theory in the field of social psychology. However, due to the various directions that have been developed within this theory, its diffusion and success have widely exceeded the borders of this discipline. This article aims to draw the outlines of the SRT by proposing an overview of the arisen approaches, its contributions, and finally, the methodologies the theory has implemented and promoted.

Desde su formulación inicial, la Teoría de las Representaciones Sociales (TRS, Moscovici, 1961) conoció un desarrollo notable a nivel mundial y constituye hoy una teoría fundamental e inevitable en el campo de esta disciplina que constituye la psicología social. Sin embargo, según las diferentes orientaciones desarrolladas al interior de esta teoría, su difusión y su éxito han superado ampliamente las fronteras de dicha disciplina. Este artículo se propone dibujar los contornos de la TRS proponiendo un panorama de las diversas orientaciones que ha visto nacer, de las aplicaciones de las que puede ser objeto y finalmente de las metodologías que utiliza y que ha suscitado.

La Teoría de las Representaciones Sociales: Orientaciones conceptuales, campos de aplicaciones y métodos / La Théorie des Représentations Sociales: orientations conceptuelles, champs d'applications et méthodes / The Theory of Social Representations: Conceptual approaches, fields of application and methods

Desde su formulación inicial, la Teoría de las Representaciones Sociales (TRS, Moscovici, 1961) conoció un desarrollo notable a nivel mundial y constituye hoy una teoría fundamental e inevitable en el campo de esta disciplina que constituye la psicología social. Sin embargo, según las diferentes orientaciones desarrolladas al interior de esta teoría, su difusión y su éxito han superado ampliamente las fronteras de dicha disciplina. Este artículo se propone dibujar los contornos de la TRS proponiendo un panorama de las diversas orientaciones que ha visto nacer, de las aplicaciones de las que puede ser objeto y finalmente de las metodologías que utiliza y que ha suscitado.

Depuis sa formulation initiale, la Théorie des Représentations Sociales (TRS, Moscovici, 1961) a connu un essor remarquable au niveau mondial et constitue aujourd'hui une théorie majeure et incontournable au sein du champ disciplinaire que constitue la psychologie sociale. Cependant, de par les différentes orientations développées au sein de cette théorie, sa diffusion et son succès ont largement dépassé les frontières de cette discipline. Cet article se propose de dessiner les contours de la TRS en proposant un panorama des différentes orientations qu'elle a vu naítre, des applications dont elle a pu faire l'objet et enfin des méthodologies qu'elle utilise et qu'elle a suscitées.

Since its early formulation, Social representations theory (SRT, Moscovici, 1961) presented a remarkable development in the world. And today, it is an essential and ineluctable theory in the field of social psychology. However, due to the various directions that have been developed within this theory, its diffusion and success have widely exceeded the borders of this discipline. This article aims to draw the outlines of the SRT by proposing an overview of the arisen approaches, its contributions, and finally, the methodologies the theory has implemented and promoted.

Michel-Louis Rouquette et le modèle de l'architecture de la pensée sociale / Michel-Louis Rouquette and the social thinking architecture model

Si la psychologie sociale a bien permis une chose, c’est de reconnaître que l’individu humain n’est décidemment pas, du moins spontanément, « rationnel ». Tout donne à penser que si les gens ne se conforment pas à la norme scientifique dans leurs raisonnements quotidiens, cen’est pas toujours qu’ils en sont incapables, mais plutôt parce que des « préférences » les conduisent à raisonner autrement. Dès 1973, Michel-Louis Rouquette propose la notion de«pensée sociale » considérant que la pensée quotidienne, celle qui s’exprime dans les conversations de tous les jours, dans la transmission des rumeurs, la narration des souvenirs, ou les passions des foules, ne possède finalement aucune des spécificités et des contraintes de la pensée scientifique à laquelle on puisse la comparer mais qu’elle en a d’autres. Qu’elle possède,autrement dit, une cohérence et une logique propres qu’il revient à la psychologie sociale de comprendre et de restituer. Après l’exposition de l’architecture de la pensée sociale, les principes de régulation de ce type de pensée seront présentés à travers plusieurs illustrations empiriques. (AU)

If social psychology has made one thing possible, it was the possibility ofacknowledging that the human being is definitely not, at least spontaneously, “rational”. All leads to think that while people do not conform to the scientific norm in their everyday reasoning, it isnot always because they are incapable of doing so, but rather because some “preferences” make them think differently. From 1973, Michel-Louis Rouquette proposes the notion of “socialthinking” considering that everyday thinking, which is expressed in casual conversation, in the transmission of rumors, in the reporting of memories, or in the passion of crowds, does notpossess any of the specificities and constraints of scientific thinking that we might compare it to, but does have others. In other words, it has its own coherence and logic that must be understood and retrieved by social psychology. After the presentation of the social thinking architecture, theregulation principles of such kind of thinking are exposed through various empirical illustrations. (AU)

Michel-Louis Rouquette et le modèle de l'architecture de la pensée sociale / Michel-Louis Rouquette and the social thinking architecture model

Si la psychologie sociale a bien permis une chose, c’est de reconnaître que l’individu humain n’est décidemment pas, du moins spontanément, ® rationnel ¼. Tout donne à penser que si les gens ne se conforment pas à la norme scientifique dans leurs raisonnements quotidiens, cen’est pas toujours qu’ils en sont incapables, mais plutôt parce que des ® préférences ¼ les conduisent à raisonner autrement. Dès 1973, Michel-Louis Rouquette propose la notion de®pensée sociale ¼ considérant que la pensée quotidienne, celle qui s’exprime dans les conversations de tous les jours, dans la transmission des rumeurs, la narration des souvenirs, ou les passions des foules, ne possède finalement aucune des spécificités et des contraintes de la pensée scientifique à laquelle on puisse la comparer mais qu’elle en a d’autres. Qu’elle possède,autrement dit, une cohérence et une logique propres qu’il revient à la psychologie sociale de comprendre et de restituer. Après l’exposition de l’architecture de la pensée sociale, les principes de régulation de ce type de pensée seront présentés à travers plusieurs illustrations empiriques.

If social psychology has made one thing possible, it was the possibility ofacknowledging that the human being is definitely not, at least spontaneously, “rational”. All leads to think that while people do not conform to the scientific norm in their everyday reasoning, it isnot always because they are incapable of doing so, but rather because some “preferences” make them think differently. From 1973, Michel-Louis Rouquette proposes the notion of “socialthinking” considering that everyday thinking, which is expressed in casual conversation, in the transmission of rumors, in the reporting of memories, or in the passion of crowds, does notpossess any of the specificities and constraints of scientific thinking that we might compare it to, but does have others. In other words, it has its own coherence and logic that must be understood and retrieved by social psychology. After the presentation of the social thinking architecture, theregulation principles of such kind of thinking are exposed through various empirical illustrations.

Princípios organizadores e núcleo central das representações sociais. Hipóteses empíricas / Organizing principles and central core of social representations. Empirical hypothesis

Este artigo visa estudar uma possível articulação entre a teoria do núcleo central das representações sociais e a dos princípios organizadores. A confrontação dos resultados de três investigações efetuadas a propósito da representação social dos estudos (dois já publicados e um original) em três populações distintas indica profundas diferenças em termos de núcleo central entre estas populações, mas há importante transversalidade dos princípios organizadores das tomadas de posição. Emite-se, assim, a hipótese de que os princípios organizadores constituem a base comum de tomadas de posições diversificadas de acordo com a posição social dos grupos considerados e que, entre estas tomadas de posições, algumas são objeto de forte consenso dentro dos grupos e constituem, portanto, o sistema central da sua representação. Esta hipótese implica que princípios organizadores comuns poderiam dar conta de representações diferentes em termos de sistema central(AU)