Taking embodiment seriously in public policy and practice: adopting a procedural approach to health and welfare.

It is a common refrain amongst phenomenologists, disability theorists, and feminist legal theorists that medical practice pays insufficient attention to people's embodiment. The complaint that we take insufficient account of people's embodiment isn't limited to the clinical interaction. It has also been directed at healthcare regulation and welfare policy. In this paper, I examine the arguments for taking embodiment seriously in both medical practice and welfare policy, concluding we have good reasons to take better account of people's embodiment. I then set out two challenges to taking embodiment seriously in public policy. First, given the amount of variation in how people are embodied, there is strong possibility that adjusting policy to benefit particular individuals based on an appreciation of their embodied experiences could be detrimental towards other individuals. The second challenge concerns how to ensure that people's testimony about their first-person embodied experience is subject to adequate scrutiny without this resulting in epistemic injustice. I argue that the solution to both of these challenges is to devise a just procedure for soliciting people's testimony and taking it into account in the policy development process. As such, I also provide an outline of what a just procedure should look like.

User and Healthcare Professional Perspectives on Do-It-Yourself Artificial Pancreas Systems: A Need for Guidelines.

A growing number of individuals with type 1 diabetes are choosing to use "do-it-yourself" artificial pancreas systems (DIY APS) to support their diabetes self-management. Observational and self-report data of glycemic benefits of DIY APS are promising; however, without rigorous clinical trials or regulation from governing bodies, liability and user safety continue to be central concerns for stakeholders. Despite DIY APS having been used for several years now, there are no guidelines to assist users and healthcare professionals in addressing DIY APS use in routine clinical care. This commentary reports key stakeholders' perspectives presented at the annual Advanced Technologies and Treatments in Diabetes conference in February 2020. Important considerations to inform the development of clinical care guidelines are also presented to generate further debate.

How to Regulate the Right to Self-Medicate.

In Pharmaceutical Freedom Professor Flanigan argues we ought to grant people self-medication rights for the same reasons we respect people's right to give (or refuse to give) informed consent to treatment. Despite being the most comprehensive argument in favour of self-medication written to date, Flanigan's Pharmaceutical Freedom leaves a number of questions unanswered, making it unclear how the safe-guards Flanigan incorporates to protect people from harming themselves would work in practice. In this paper, I extend Professor Flanigan's account by discussing a hypothetical case to illustrate how these safe-guards could work together to protect people from harms caused by their own ignorance or incompetence.

Prescribing unapproved medical devices? The case of DIY artificial pancreas systems.

In response to slow progress regarding technological innovations to manage type 1 diabetes, some patients have created unregulated do-it-yourself artificial pancreas systems (DIY APS). Yet both in the United Kingdom (UK) and internationally, there is an almost complete lack of specific guidance - legal, regulatory, or ethical - for clinicians caring for DIY APS users. Uncertainty regarding their professional obligations has led to them being cautious about discussing DIY APS with patients, let alone recommending or prescribing them. In this article, we argue that this approach threatens to undermine trust and transparency. Analysing the professional guidance from the UK regulator - the General Medical Council - we demonstrate that nothing within it ought to be interpreted as precluding clinicians from initiating discussions about DIY APS. Moreover, in some circumstances, it may require that clinicians do so. We also argue that the guidance does not preclude clinicians from prescribing such unapproved medical devices.

Autonomy, Competence and Non-interference.

In light of the variety of uses of the term autonomy in recent bioethics literature, in this paper, I suggest that competence, not being as contested, is better placed to play the anti-paternalistic role currently assigned to autonomy. The demonstration of competence, I will argue, can provide individuals with robust spheres of non-interference in which they can pursue their lives in accordance with their own values. This protection from paternalism is achieved by granting individuals rights to non-interference upon demonstration of competence. In this paper, I present a risk-sensitive account of competence as a means of grounding rights to non-interference. On a risk-sensitive account of competence individuals demonstrate their competence by exercising three capacities to the extent necessary to meet a threshold determined by the riskiness of the decision. These three capacities are the capacity to (i) acquire knowledge, (ii) use instrumental rationality, and (iii) form and revise a life plan.