ABSTRACT
This paper considers how 5- to 11-year-olds' verbal reasoning about the causality underlying extended, dynamic natural processes links to various facets of their statistical thinking. Such continuous processes typically do not provide perceptually distinct causes and effect, and previous work suggests that spatial-temporal analysis, the ability to analyze spatial configurations that change over time, is a crucial predictor of reasoning about causal mechanism in such situations. Work in the Humean tradition to causality has long emphasized on the importance of statistical thinking for inferring causal links between distinct cause and effect events, but here we assess whether this is also viable for causal thinking about continuous processes. Controlling for verbal and non-verbal ability, two studies (N = 107; N = 124) administered a battery of covariation, probability, spatial-temporal, and causal measures. Results indicated that spatial-temporal analysis was the best predictor of causal thinking across both studies, but statistical thinking supported and informed spatial-temporal analysis: covariation assessment potentially assists with the identification of variables, while simple probability judgment potentially assists with thinking about unseen mechanisms. We conclude that the ability to find out patterns in data is even more widely important for causal analysis than commonly assumed, from childhood, having a role to play not just when causally linking already distinct events but also when analyzing the causal process underlying extended dynamic events without perceptually distinct components.
ABSTRACT
Past research has largely ignored children's ability to conjointly manipulate spatial and temporal information, but there are indications that the capacity to do so may provide important support for reasoning about causal processes. We hypothesised that spatial-temporal thinking is central to children's ability to identify the invisible mechanisms that tie cause and effect together in continuous casual processes, which are focal in primary school science and crucial to understanding of the natural world. We investigated this in two studies (N = 107, N = 124), employing two methodologies, one shorter, the other more in depth. Further tasks assessed spatial-temporal (flow of liquid, extrapolation of relative speed, distance-time-velocity), spatial (two mental rotation, paper folding), verbal (expressive vocabulary), and nonverbal (block design) ability. Age dependent patterns were detected for both causal and predictor tasks. Two spatial-temporal tasks were unique and central predictors of children's causal reasoning, especially inference of mechanism. Nonverbal ability predicted the simpler components of causal reasoning. One mental rotation task predicted only young children's causal thinking. Verbal ability became significant when the sample included children from a wide range of socioeconomic backgrounds. Causal reasoning about continuous processes, including inferences of causal mechanism, appears to be within the reach of children from school entry age, but mechanism inference is uncommon. Analytic forms of spatial-temporal capacity seem to be important requirements for children to progress to this rather than merely perceptual forms.
Subject(s)
Cognition , Spatial Behavior , Time Perception , Child , Female , Humans , Language , Male , Play and Playthings/psychology , Psychology, Child/methods , Spatial Memory , ThinkingABSTRACT
BACKGROUND: Causes produce effects via underlying mechanisms that must be inferred from observable and unobservable structures. Preschoolers show sensitivity to mechanisms in machine-like systems with perceptually distinct causes and effects, but little is known about how children extend causal reasoning to the natural continuous processes studied in elementary school science, or how other abilities impact on this. AIMS: We investigated the development of children's ability to predict, observe, and explain three causal processes, relevant to physics, biology, and chemistry, taking into account their verbal and non-verbal ability. SAMPLE: Children aged 5-11 years (N = 107) from London and Oxford, with wide ethnic/linguistic variation, drawn from the middle/upper socioeconomic status (SES) range. METHODS: Children were tested individually on causal tasks focused on sinking, absorption, and dissolving, using a novel approach in which they observed contrasting instances of each, to promote attention to mechanism. Further tasks assessed verbal (expressive vocabulary) and non-verbal (block design) ability. RESULTS: Reports improved with age, though with differences between tasks. Even young participants gave good descriptions of what they observed. Causal explanations were more strongly related to observation than to prediction from prior knowledge, but developed more slowly. Non-verbal but not generic verbal ability predicted performance. CONCLUSIONS: Reasoning about continuous processes is within the capacity of children from school entry, even using verbal reports, though they find it easier to address more rapid processes. Mechanism inference is uncommon, with non-verbal ability an important influence on progress. Our research is the first to highlight this key factor in children's progress towards thinking about scientific phenomena.
Subject(s)
Aptitude/physiology , Child Development/physiology , Language , Thinking/physiology , Child , Child, Preschool , Female , Humans , MaleABSTRACT
Current theories of causality from visual input predict causal impressions only in the presence of realistic interactions, sequences of events that have been frequently encountered in the past of the individual or of the species. This strong requirement limits the capacity for 1-shot induction and, thus, does not sit well with our abilities for rapid creative causal learning, as illustrated, for example, by the effortless way we adapt to new technology. We present 4 experiments (N = 720) that reveal strong causal impressions upon first encounter with collision-like sequences that the literature typically labels "noncausal." Our stimuli include both the commonly used computer-based animations and edited video sequences. Besides direct reports, we present evidence based on goal-oriented behavior that makes sense only in the presence of strong causal assumptions. Finally, we document impressions of causality in highly unrealistic sequences involving, for example, instantaneous shape or size change. In the case of the more realistic clips used in the past, causal ratings abruptly decline and approach the findings of previous work, only after a canonical collision (launch event) is presented. We argue that previously used experimental procedures conceal order effects because of participants adapting to the task and reinterpreting its demands. We discuss ways to account for this adaptation whereby people either focus on experiences of perceptual causation or take realism into account even when asked for impressions of causality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).
Subject(s)
Photic Stimulation/methods , Virtual Reality , Visual Perception , Adult , Causality , Female , Humans , Male , Research DesignABSTRACT
How do children reward individual members of a team that has just won or lost a game? We know that from pre-school age, children consider agents' performance when allocating reward. Here we assess whether children can go further and appreciate performance in context: The same pattern of performance can contribute to a team outcome in different ways, depending on the underlying rule framework. Two experiments, with three age groups (4/5-year-olds, 6/7-year-olds, and adults), varied performance of team members, with the same performance patterns considered under three different game rules for winning or losing. These three rules created distinct underlying causal structures (additive, conjunctive, disjunctive), for how individual performance affected the overall team outcome. Even the youngest children differentiated between different game rules in their reward allocations. Rather than only rewarding individual performance, or whether the team won/lost, children were sensitive to the team structure and how players' performance contributed to the win/loss under each of the three game rules. Not only do young children consider it fair to allocate resources based on merit, but they are also sensitive to the causal structure of the situation which dictates how individual contributions combine to determine the team outcome.
Subject(s)
Reward , Social Behavior , Thinking , Adolescent , Adult , Child , Child, Preschool , Female , Games, Experimental , Humans , Interpersonal Relations , Male , Models, Structural , Resource Allocation , Young AdultABSTRACT
Humans, even babies, perceive causality when one shape moves briefly and linearly after another. Motion timing is crucial in this and causal impressions disappear with short delays between motions. However, the role of temporal information is more complex: it is both a cue to causality and a factor that constrains processing. It affects ability to distinguish causality from non-causality, and social from mechanical causality. Here we study both issues with 3- to 7-year-olds and adults who saw two computer-animated squares and chose if a picture of mechanical, social or non-causality fit each event best. Prior work fit with the standard view that early in development, the distinction between the social and physical domains depends mainly on whether or not the agents make contact, and that this reflects concern with domain-specific motion onset, in particular, whether the motion is self-initiated or not. The present experiments challenge both parts of this position. In Experiments 1 and 2, we showed that not just spatial, but also animacy and temporal information affect how children distinguish between physical and social causality. In Experiments 3 and 4 we showed that children do not seem to use spatio-temporal information in perceptual causality to make inferences about self- or other-initiated motion onset. Overall, spatial contact may be developmentally primary in domain-specific perceptual causality in that it is processed easily and is dominant over competing cues, but it is not the only cue used early on and it is not used to infer motion onset. Instead, domain-specific causal impressions may be automatic reactions to specific perceptual configurations, with a complex role for temporal information.
ABSTRACT
Two experiments (N=136) studied how 4- to 6-month-olds perceive a simple schematic event, seen as goal-directed action and reaction from 3 years of age. In our causal reaction event, a red square moved toward a blue square, stopping prior to contact. Blue began to move away before red stopped, so that both briefly moved simultaneously at a distance. Primarily, our study sought to determine from what age infants see the causal structure of this reaction event. In addition, we looked at whether this causal percept depends on an animate style of motion and whether it correlates with tasks assessing goal perception and goal-directed action. Infants saw either causal reactions or noncausal delayed control events in which blue started some time after red stopped. These events involved squares that moved either rigidly or nonrigidly in an apparently animate manner. After habituation to one of the four events, infants were tested on reversal of the habituation event. Spatiotemporal features reversed for all events, but causal roles changed only in reversed reactions. The 6-month-olds dishabituated significantly more to reversal of causal reaction events than to noncausal delay events, whereas younger infants reacted similarly to reversal of both. Thus, perceptual causality for reaction events emerges by 6 months of age, a younger age than previously reported but, crucially, the same age at which perceptual causality for launch events has emerged in prior research. On our second question, animate/inanimate motion had no effect at any age, nor did significant correlations emerge with our additional tasks assessing goal perception or goal-directed object retrieval. Available evidence, here and elsewhere, is as compatible with a view that infants initially see A affecting B, without differentiation into physical or psychological causality, as with the standard assumption of distinct physical/psychological causal perception.
Subject(s)
Causality , Child Development , Cognition , Goals , Social Perception , Age Factors , Female , Habituation, Psychophysiologic , Humans , Infant , MaleABSTRACT
Under the normative Expected Value (EV) model, multiple outcomes are additive, but in everyday worth judgement intuitive averaging prevails. Young children also use averaging in EV judgements, leading to a disordinal, crossover violation of utility when children average the part worths of simple gambles involving independent events (Schlottmann, 2000). This study explored the origins of this averaging bias in childrens worth judgements, assessing whether averaging also appears for riskless judgements and for other types of risky judgements. In Experiment 1, 8- year-olds judged the worth of having either one or two squares of chocolates in two formally equivalent tasks: Children made additive worth judgements when chocolates varied in size, but used averaging when they varied in winning probability. Performance on the EV task was slightly more advanced when risky followed riskless judgements, with some evidence of transfer. In Experiment 2, 5-year-olds gave additive worth judgements when judging variable fractions of chocolate pies, with displays closely parallel to the spinner discs used for the gambles in Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, 5-yearolds gave additive worth judgements of gambles in which to win either one or two prizes, with alternative rather than independent probabilities of winning. Thus the overgeneralisation of averaging processes to EV judgement, while persistent, neither reflects a general difficulty with additive value judgement, nor with displays showing positive and negative information, nor with risky judgement per se. It may come into play because children have difficulty appreciating the implications of independence, apparent also in other domains. Despite such difficulty, children realize that risky game outcomes go beyond what they can see, and so may apply averaging, as default strategy for population judgement, whereas addition might be the default for judging the sample itself(AU)
Subject(s)
Humans , Male , Female , Child , Child Behavior/physiology , Child Behavior/psychology , Psychology, Child/methods , Play and Playthings/psychology , Video Games/psychology , Generalization, Stimulus/physiology , Imprinting, Psychological/physiology , Psychology, Child/organization & administration , Psychology, Child/standards , Psychology, Child/trends , Child Development/physiology , Cacao/physiology , Analysis of VarianceABSTRACT
Infants are sensitive to biological motion, but do they recognize it as animate? As a first step towards answering this question, two experiments investigated whether 6-month-olds selectively attribute goals to shapes moving like animals. We habituated infants to a square moving towards one of two targets. When target locations were switched, infants reacted more to movement towards a new goal than a new location - but only if the square moved non-rigidly and rhythmically, in a schematic version of bio-mechanical movement older observers describe as animal-like (Michotte, 1963). Goal attribution was specific to schematic animal motion: It did not occur if the square moved rigidly with the same rhythm as the animate stimulus, or if the square had the same amount of non-rigid deformation, but in an inanimate configuration. The data would seem to show that perception of schematic animal motion is linked to a system for psychological reasoning from infancy. This in turn suggests that 6-month-olds may already interpret biological motion as animate.
Subject(s)
Attention/physiology , Child Development/physiology , Goals , Motion Perception/physiology , Movement/physiology , Biomechanical Phenomena , Female , Fixation, Ocular , Humans , Infant , Male , Reaction Time/physiologyABSTRACT
We investigated perception of social and physical causality and animacy in simple motion events, for high-functioning children with autism (CA = 13, VMA = 9.6). Children matched 14 different animations to pictures showing physical, social or non-causality. In contrast to previous work, children with autism performed at a high level similar to VMA-matched controls, recognizing physical causality in launch and social causality in reaction events. The launch deficit previously found in younger children with autism, possibly related to attentional/verbal difficulties, is apparently overcome with age. Some events involved squares moving non-rigidly, like animals. Children with autism had difficulties recognizing this, extending the biological motion literature. However, animacy prompts amplified their attributions of social causality. Thus children with autism may overcome their animacy perception deficit strategically.
Subject(s)
Autistic Disorder/epidemiology , Cognition Disorders/epidemiology , Perceptual Disorders/epidemiology , Psychophysics , Social Perception , Adolescent , Child , Cognition Disorders/diagnosis , Female , Humans , Male , Neuropsychological Tests , Perceptual Disorders/diagnosis , Severity of Illness IndexABSTRACT
Studies using an Information Integration approach have shown that children from four years have a good intuitive understanding of probability and expected value. Experience of skill-related uncertainty may provide one naturalistic opportunity to develop this intuitive understanding. To test the viability of this view, 16 5- and 16 7-year-olds played a marble rolling game in which size of the target and distance from it varied factorially. Task difficulty judgements (prior to practical experience with the game) reflected both objective task structure and subsequent performance for both age groups. Children then judged how happy they would be playing games of variable difficulty for different prizes. These judgements had the multiplicative structure predicted by the normative expected value model, again for both age groups. Thus children can use task difficulties as estimates of personal success probability in skill-related tasks. Our findings therefore extend previous work on early probability understanding from games of chance to games of skill(AU)
Subject(s)
Humans , Male , Female , Child , Comprehension , Psychology, Child/statistics & numerical data , Motivation , Psychology, Experimental/statistics & numerical data , Psychology, Experimental/trends , Child Behavior , Analysis of Variance , Psychology, Experimental/methods , Psychology, Experimental/organization & administration , Psychology, Experimental/standardsABSTRACT
Four experiments with 202 8- to 10-month-old infants studied their sensitivity to causation-at-a-distance in schematic events seen as goal-directed action and reaction by adults and whether this depends on attributes associated with animate agents. In Experiment 1, a red square moved toward a blue square without making contact; in "reaction" events blue moved away while red was approaching, whereas in "delay" events blue started after red stopped. Infants were habituated to one event and then tested on its reversal. Spatiotemporal features reversed for both events, but causal roles changed only in reversed reactions. Infants dishabituated more to reversed reaction events than to reversed delay events. Squares moved rigidly or in a nonrigid animal-like fashion. Infants discriminated these, but motion pattern did not affect responses to reversal. Infants also discriminated reactions from launching and dishabituated to reversed reactions lacking self-initiated motion. These results suggest that sensitivity to causation-at-a-distance depends on the event structure but not pattern or onset typical of animal motion.
Subject(s)
Discrimination, Psychological , Habituation, Psychophysiologic , Motion Perception , Orientation , Pattern Recognition, Visual , Reaction Time , Space Perception , Female , Humans , Infant , Male , Neuropsychological Tests , Psychomotor PerformanceABSTRACT
Michotte argued that we perceive cause-and-effect, without contributions from reasoning or learning, even in displays of two-dimensional moving shapes. Two studies extend this line of work from perception of mechanical to social causality. We compared verbal reports with structured ratings of causality to gain a better understanding of the extent to which perceptual causality occurs spontaneously or depends on instruction or context. A total of 120 adult observers (72 in the main experiment, 48 in an initial experiment) saw 12 (or 8) different computer animations of shape A moving up to B, which in turn moved away. Animations factorially varied the temporal and spatial relations of the shapes, and whether they moved rigidly or in a non-rigid, animal-like manner. Impressions of social as well as physical causality appeared in both free reports and ratings. Perception of physical causality was stronger than perception of social causality, particularly in free reports. No differences of this nature appear in infants and children, so the asymmetry may reflect learnt knowledge. Physical causality was relatively unspecific initially, but discrimination of causal and delayed control events improved with exposure to multiple events. Experience seems to affect the causal illusion even over a short timeframe; the idea of 'one-trial causality' may be somewhat misleading. Regardless of such effects on the absolute level of responses, the different measures showed similar patterns of variation with the spatio-temporal configuration and type of motion. The good fit of ratings and reports validates much recent work in this area.
Subject(s)
Motion Perception , Movement , Reaction Time , Visual Perception , Adolescent , Adult , Cognition , Female , Form Perception , Humans , Male , Middle Aged , Optical IllusionsABSTRACT
Three experiments considered the development of perceptual causality in children from 3 to 9 years of age (N = 176 in total). Adults tend to see cause and effect even in schematic, two-dimensional motion events: Thus, if square A moves toward B, which moves upon contact, they report that A launches B--physical causality. If B moves before contact, adults report that B tries to escape from A--social or psychological causality. A brief pause between movements eliminates such impressions. Even infants in the first year of life are sensitive to causal structure in both contact and no-contact events, but previous research with talking-age children found poor verbal reports. The present experiments used a picture-based forced-choice task to reduce linguistic demands. Observers saw eight different animations involving squares A and B. Events varied in whether or not these agents made contact; whether or not there was a delay at the closest point; and whether they moved rigidly or with a rhythmic, nonrigid "caterpillar" motion. Participants of all ages assigned events with contact to the physical domain and events without contact to the psychological domain. In addition, participants of all ages chose causality more often for events without delay than with delay, but these events became more distinct over the preschool range. The manipulation of agent motion had only minor and inconsistent effects across studies, even though children of all ages considered only the nonrigid motion to be animal-like. These results agree with the view that perceptual causality is available early in development.