Introducing the ImPACT-5: An Empirically Derived Multivariate Validity Composite.

OBJECTIVE: To create novel Immediate Post-Concussion and Cognitive Testing (ImPACT)-based embedded validity indicators (EVIs) and to compare the classification accuracy to 4 existing EVIImPACT. METHOD: The ImPACT was administered to 82 male varsity football players during preseason baseline cognitive testing. The classification accuracy of existing EVIImPACT was compared with a newly developed index (ImPACT-5A and B). The ImPACT-5A represents the number of cutoffs failed on the 5 ImPACT composite scores at a liberal cutoff (0.85 specificity); ImPACT-5B is the sum of failures on conservative cutoffs (≥0.90 specificity). RESULTS: ImPACT-5A ≥1 was sensitive (0.81), but not specific (0.49) to invalid performance, consistent with EVIImPACT developed by independent researchers (0.68 sensitivity at 0.73-0.75 specificity). Conversely, ImPACT-5B ≥3 was highly specific (0.98), but insensitive (0.22), similar to Default EVIImPACT (0.04 sensitivity at 1.00 specificity). ImPACT-5A ≥3 or ImPACT-5B ≥2 met forensic standards of specificity (0.91-0.93) at 0.33 to 0.37 sensitivity. Also, the ImPACT-5s had the strongest linear relationship with clinically meaningful levels of invalid performance of existing EVIImPACT. CONCLUSIONS: The ImPACT-5s were superior to the standard EVIImPACT and comparable to existing aftermarket EVIImPACT, with the flexibility to optimize the detection model for either sensitivity or specificity. The wide range of ImPACT-5 cutoffs allows for a more nuanced clinical interpretation.

Translating (lack of) memories into reports: Conversion processes in responding to unanswerable questions.

When queried about events in the past, a person may face questions that concern details that have been witnessed-answerable questions-and details that have not been witnessed-unanswerable questions. With regard to answerable questions, the person's willingness to answer these questions increases as a function of not only information available about the queried detail itself, but also as a function of contextual information. The present research assesses whether the willingness to report specific-and thus incorrect-answers when facing unanswerable questions also increases with the amount of available contextual information. In 3 experiments, we show that when recognition questions for critical details one had not encoded are preceded by reinstated contexts, participants are less willing to respond "don't know" to these questions, thus making more commission errors. These results show how greater access to contextual information, commonly associated with better memory for answerable questions, can also lead to more incorrect responses in the case of unanswerable questions. This documents how conversion processes-metacognitive processes of monitoring retrieval from memory and controlling the quality of output-play an important role in shaping the accuracy of memory reports. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Cannabis-associated impairments in the fading affect bias and autobiographical memory specificity.

We investigated potential relationships between cannabis use and 2 phenomena associated with autobiographical remembering: the fading affect bias (FAB) and memory specificity. The FAB is an emotional affect regulation mechanism that is observed when the intensity of affect associated with experiencing negative memories fades faster than the intensity of affect associated with experiencing positive memories. Memory specificity refers to the level of detail with which events are recalled. No studies have examined the relationships between cannabis use, the FAB, and memory specificity simultaneously. Chronic cannabis users (N = 47) and non-users (N = 52) recalled and described positive and negative autobiographical events and rated the affective intensity for the events at the time of occurrence and at time of test. Participants retrieved additional memories using a sentence-completion recall task, which were coded for specificity. Cannabis users showed reduced fading affect for unpleasant events and reduced memory specificity compared to non-users.

On the role of autobiographical knowledge in shaping belief in the future occurrence of imagined events.

Recent studies suggest that different forms of episodic simulation-mental representations of past, future, or atemporal events-recruit many of the same underlying cognitive and neural processes. This leads to the question whether there are distinctive hallmark characteristics of episodic future thinking: the subjective sense that imagined events belong to and will occur in the personal future. In this study, we aimed at shedding light on the cognitive ingredients that contribute to this sense of future occurrence by asking participants to imagine personal and experimenter-provided future events associated with high or low degrees of belief in future occurrence and then to reflect on the bases for their beliefs. Results showed that contextualising autobiographical knowledge (i.e., articulating links between items of information associated with imagined future events, goals, and personal characteristics) is a critical aspect of belief in future occurrence, and autobiographical knowledge can be flexibly used to either support or suppress belief in future occurrence. These findings indicate that episodic future thought not only depends on simulation processes (i.e., the construction of detailed mental representations for future events) but also requires that imagined events are meaningfully integrated within an autobiographical context.

Defending and reducing belief in memories: An experimental laboratory analogue.

When receiving disconfirmatory social feedback about recollected events, people sometimes defend and sometimes reduce their belief that the event genuinely occurred. To improve estimates of the rates of memory defense and reduction, and of the magnitude of the change in belief in occurrence that results, in the present studies we examined the effect of disconfirmatory social challenges made to correctly recalled memories for actions performed in the lab. Adult participants performed, imagined, or heard action statements and imagined some of the initial actions multiple times. One week later, they completed a source-monitoring test and rated the actions on belief in their occurrence, recollection, visual detail, vividness, and reexperiencing. Four of the correctly recalled performed actions were challenged either prior to making the ratings during the test (Study 1, N = 44) or after making initial ratings after completing the test, following which the ratings were taken again (Study 2, N = 85). Across both studies, challenges were associated with lower belief-in-occurrence and recollection ratings on average than for control items, and belief in occurrence was affected to a greater extent than recollective features. Challenges that occurred during the test produced more instances of defense, whereas challenges that occurred after the test produced more instances of reduction. A closer analysis showed that some participants always defended, some always reduced, and some both defended and reduced belief. Responses to the first challenge positively predicted the responses to subsequent challenges. In addition, the procedure in Study 2 produced a variety of types of nonbelieved memories.

Sub-types of nonbelieved memories reveal differential outcomes of challenges to memories.

Nonbelieved memories (NBMs) highlight the independence between distinct metamemorial judgements that contribute to the experience of remembering. Initial definitions of NBMs portrayed them as involving the withdrawal of belief in occurrence despite sustained recollection. While people rate belief for their NBMs as weaker than recollection, the average difference is too small to support the idea that autobiographical belief is completely withdrawn in all cases. Furthermore, autobiographical belief and recollection ratings vary considerably across NBMs. In two studies, we reanalysed data from prior studies to examine whether NBM reports reflect a single category or multiple sub-categories using cluster analytic methods. In Study 1, we identified three sub-types of NBMs. In Study 2 we incorporated the concept of belief in accuracy, and found that two of the clusters from Study 1 split into two clusters apiece. All clusters were characterised by higher recollection than belief in occurrence ratings, and clusters were differentiated by the degree of difference between these variables. In both studies the clusters were discriminated by a number of memory characteristic ratings and by reasons reported as leading to the alteration of belief. Implications for understanding the remembering of past events and predicting the creation of NBMs are discussed.

A mega-analysis of memory reports from eight peer-reviewed false memory implantation studies.

Understanding that suggestive practices can promote false beliefs and false memories for childhood events is important in many settings (e.g., psychotherapeutic, medical, and legal). The generalisability of findings from memory implantation studies has been questioned due to variability in estimates across studies. Such variability is partly due to false memories having been operationalised differently across studies and to differences in memory induction techniques. We explored ways of defining false memory based on memory science and developed a reliable coding system that we applied to reports from eight published implantation studies (N = 423). Independent raters coded transcripts using seven criteria: accepting the suggestion, elaboration beyond the suggestion, imagery, coherence, emotion, memory statements, and not rejecting the suggestion. Using this scheme, 30.4% of cases were classified as false memories and another 23% were classified as having accepted the event to some degree. When the suggestion included self-relevant information, an imagination procedure, and was not accompanied by a photo depicting the event, the memory formation rate was 46.1%. Our research demonstrates a useful procedure for systematically combining data that are not amenable to meta-analysis, and provides the most valid estimate of false memory formation and associated moderating factors within the implantation literature to date.

Dissociating appraisals of accuracy and recollection in autobiographical remembering.

Recent studies of metamemory appraisals implicated in autobiographical remembering have established distinct roles for judgments of occurrence, recollection, and accuracy for past events. In studies involving everyday remembering, measures of recollection and accuracy correlate highly (>.85). Thus although their measures are structurally distinct, such high correspondence might suggest conceptual redundancy. This article examines whether recollection and accuracy dissociate when studying different types of autobiographical event representations. In Study 1, 278 participants described a believed memory, a nonbelieved memory, and a believed-not-remembered event and rated each on occurrence, recollection, accuracy, and related covariates. In Study 2, 876 individuals described and rated 1 of these events, as well as an event about which they were uncertain about their memory. Confirmatory structural equation modeling indicated that the measurement dissociation between occurrence, recollection and accuracy held across all types of events examined. Relative to believed memories, the relationship between recollection and belief in accuracy was meaningfully lower for the other event types. These findings support the claim that recollection and accuracy arise from distinct underlying mechanisms. (PsycINFO Database Record

The consequences of suggesting false childhood food events.

We combined data across eight published experiments (N=1369) to examine the formation and consequences of false autobiographical beliefs and memories. Our path models revealed that the formation of false autobiographical belief fully mediated the pathway between suggesting to people that they had experienced a positive or negative food-related event in the past and current preference for that food. Suggestion indirectly affected intention to eat the food via change in autobiographical belief. The development of belief with and without memory produced similar changes in food preferences and behavior intention, indicating that belief in the event drives changes in suggestion-related attitudes. Finally, positive suggestions (e.g., "you loved asparagus the first time you tried it") yielded stronger effects than negative suggestions (e.g., "you got sick eating egg salad"). These findings show that false autobiographical suggestions lead to the development of autobiographical beliefs, which in turn, have consequences for one's attitudes and behaviors.

Metamemory appraisals in autobiographical event recall.

Two studies examined whether belief in the occurrence of events, recollecting events, and belief in the accuracy of recollections are distinct aspects of autobiographical remembering. In Study 1, 299 student participants received a cue to recall five childhood events, after which they rated each event on these constructs and other characteristics associated with remembering. Structural equation modelling revealed that variance in ratings was best explained by the three anticipated latent variables. In Study 2, an online sample of 1026 adults recalled and rated a childhood event and an event about which they were somehow uncertain. Confirmatory modelling replicated the three latent variables. The relationship of key predictors (perceptual detail, spatial detail, re-experiencing, and event plausibility) to the latent variables confirmed the distinction. These studies demonstrate that belief in occurrence and belief in accuracy appraisals are distinct, the former indexing the truth status of the event and the latter the degree to which the event representation accurately reflects prior experience. Further, they suggest that belief in accuracy indexes the monitoring of the quality of recollections.

Reasons for withdrawing belief in vivid autobiographical memories.

Previous studies have shown that many people hold personal memories for events that they no longer believe occurred. This study examines the reasons that people provide for choosing to reduce autobiographical belief in vividly recollected autobiographical memories. A body of non-believed memories provided by 374 individuals was reviewed to develop a qualitatively derived categorisation system. The final scheme consisted of 8 major categories (in descending order of mention): social feedback, event plausibility, alternative attributions, general memory beliefs, internal event features, consistency with external evidence, views of self/others, personal motivation and numerous sub-categories. Independent raters coded the reports and judged the primary reason that each person provided for withdrawing belief. The nature of each category, frequency of category endorsement, category overlap and phenomenological ratings are presented, following which links to related literature and implications are discussed. This study documents that a wide variety of recollective and non-recollective sources of information influence decision-making about the occurrence of autobiographical events.

Reappraising Past and Future Transitional Events: The Effects of Mental Focus on Present Perceptions of Personal Impact and Self-Relevance.

This research examined how instructions to focus on the concrete details (experience focus) versus broader life significance (coherence focus) influence present perceptions of transitional impact and self-relevance for past and future transitional events. Participants (Study 1, N = 119; Study 2, N = 251) selected a past or future transition and wrote about it using either an experiential or coherence focus. Participants then rated the event on transitional impact, self-relevance, and other phenomenological characteristics. Individuals instructed to use a coherence focus on a past transition reported higher levels of material and psychological impact and rated the event as more self-relevant, compared to those instructed to use an experiential focus. The manipulation did not influence ratings for future events. Controlling for temporal distance and emotional valence did not alter the findings. Future transitions were regarded as more personally important than past transitions. Appraisals of the impact and self-relevance of transformative past events (but not future events) are affected by the mental focus adopted at retrieval. The findings are considered in light of essential differences between remembering and forecasting and support the notion that a coherence focus promotes adaptive self-reflection by affording people the cognitive means with which to reconcile transitional experiences.

Enhancing older adults' eyewitness memory for present and future events with the Self-Administered Interview.

Older adults' memory reports are often less complete and accurate than those by younger adults. The current study assessed the suitability of the Self-Administered Interview (SAI) as retrieval support for older eyewitnesses, and examines whether experience with the SAI leads to improved performance on subsequent events where the SAI is not used. Participants recalled an event with the SAI or free recall instructions. After 1 week, all participants watched a second event and freely recalled its content. SAI participants reported more correct details for the initial event, and a "transfer" of the initial recall advantage to the second event was observed.

The cognitive interview buffers the effects of subsequent repeated questioning in the absence of negative feedback.

The Cognitive Interview (CI) is known to elicit high-quality information from cooperative witnesses. The present study examined whether the CI protects against two suggestive interview techniques: repeated questioning and negative feedback. Young adults (n = 98) watched one of two crime videos and were interviewed with either a CI or free recall. One week later, a second interviewer asked answerable questions (about information in the video) and unanswerable questions (about information not in the video). Half of the participants received negative feedback about their performance. All participants were then asked the questions a second time. The CI resulted in more correct responses to answerable questions and fewer errors to unanswerable questions at the first questioning. The CI produced the highest consistency for answerable questions in the face of repeated questioning in the absence of negative feedback, and resulted in the most changes in responses to answerable questions when negative feedback was applied. No effects were found for unanswerable questions. The CI protected against repeated questioning, but only in the absence of negative feedback.

The role of belief in occurrence within autobiographical memory.

This article examines the idea that believing that events occurred in the past is a non-memorial decision that reflects underlying processes that are distinct from recollecting events. Research on autobiographical memory has often focused on events that are both believed to have occurred and remembered, thus tending to overlook the distinction between autobiographical belief and recollection. Studying event representations such as false memories, believed-not-remembered events, and non-believed memories shows the influence of non-memorial processes on evaluations of occurrence. Believing that an event occurred and recollecting an event may be more strongly dissociated than previously stated. The relative independence of these constructs was examined in 2 studies. In Study 1, multiple events were cued, and then each was rated on autobiographical belief, recollection, and other memory characteristics. In Study 2, participants described a nonbelieved memory, a believed memory, and a believed-not-remembered event, and they made similar ratings. In both studies, structural equation modeling techniques revealed distinct belief and recollection latent variables. Modeling the predictors of these factors revealed a double dissociation: Perceptual, re-experiencing, and emotional features predicted recollection and not belief, whereas event plausibility strongly predicted belief and weakly predicted recollection. The results show that judgments of autobiographical belief and recollection are distinct, that each is influenced by different sources of information and processes, and that the strength of their relationship varies depending on the type of event under study. The concept of autobiographical belief is elaborated, and implications of the findings are discussed in relation to decision making about events, social influence on memory, metacognition, and recognition processes.

Indirect cueing elicits distinct types of autobiographical event representations.

Studies that distinguish among believed memories, believed-not-remembered events (e.g., family stories), and nonbelieved memories (i.e., memories no longer believed to have occurred) typically rely on experimenter provided or overtly elicited events. These methods may mis-estimate the frequency and nature of such events in everyday memory. Three studies examined whether such events would be elicited via indirect cueing. Participants recalled and rated events on autobiographical belief, recollection, and other characteristics associated with remembering. All three event types resulted, but with a low rate of nonbelieved memories. Believed and nonbelieved memories received similar perceptual and re-experiencing ratings, and both exceeded believed-not-remembered events. Lifespan cueing found nonbelieved memories to be most frequent in middle childhood (ages 6-11). Cueing for "events" vs. "memories" revealed that "memory" cues lead to retrieval of a more homogeneous set of events and differences when predicting autobiographical belief and recollection. These studies support the distinction between autobiographical belief and recollection for autobiographical events.

Encouraging and clarifying "don't know" responses enhances interview quality.

Investigative interviewers seek to obtain complete and accurate accounts of events from witnesses. Two studies examined the influence of instructions about the use of don't know (DK) responses and of clarifying the meanings of DK responses on the quality of responding to questioning. Participants watched a video, and after a delay (Study 1, 30 min; Study 2, 1 week) were randomized to a DK encouraged, DK discouraged, or control group. They then responded to answerable and unanswerable questions, after which they clarified the meanings of DK responses. Across studies, individuals encouraged to use DK responses answered fewer questions and made fewer errors at initial questioning. Discouraged and control participants showed similar performance, suggesting that interviewees assume that DK responses are not desired unless otherwise instructed. Clarifying the meanings of DK responses revealed that a majority of DK responses were correct statements about the presence or nonpresence of information in the video. The encouraged group showed greater gains in output after clarification while maintaining lower errors. Encouragement and clarification of DK responses were each associated with higher diagnosticity that substantive answers were in fact correct responses to answerable questions. Encouraging DK responses and clarifying the meaning of DK responses leads to more accurate reports in response to questioning. Encouraging DK responses reduces the tendency to overreport, which can reduce the quality of responding. DK responses frequently convey different meanings that, if clarified, can lead to useful information about the occurrence or nonoccurrence of information.

Experimentally evoking nonbelieved memories for childhood events.

We report on the 1st experimental elicitation of nonbelieved memories for childhood events in adults (Study 1) and children (Study 2) using a modified false memory implantation paradigm. Participants received true (trip to a theme park) and false (hot air balloon ride) narratives and recalled these events during 2 interviews. After debriefing, 13% of adults and 15% of children reported nonbelieved memories. While phenomenal ratings were higher for true than for nonbelieved memories immediately after the debriefing, after a month nonbelieved memories behaved as true memories. Also following debriefing, 23% of adults and 15% of children retracted their false memory claims. Prior to debriefing, participants with nonbelieved memories were most likely to indicate remembering the event, whereas participants with false memories who retracted their claim were most likely to endorse believing but not remembering the event. This research suggests that debriefings in previous false memory studies can lead to the development of nonbelieved memories. Additional findings regarding the correspondence between subjective belief, subjective memory, and objective memory judgments prior to and following debriefing are discussed.

Implausibility inhibits but does not eliminate false autobiographical beliefs.

The role of the plausibility of suggested events in the formation of false autobiographical beliefs and memories has long been debated. In two studies, the shape of the relationship between presuggestion personal plausibility and the development of postsuggestion false beliefs was examined. Participants rated personal plausibility and autobiographical belief for childhood events. They later received a suggestion that an unlikely event occurred during their childhood and provided postsuggestion ratings. The best fit was a curvilinear relationship between plausibility and belief, with the lowest risk for false belief at the plausibility scale floor. Above this threshold, the risk for false belief increased sharply and remained similar across all other levels of plausibility. A minority of those who initially viewed the event as highly implausible showed increased beliefs; this was accompanied by large increases in personal plausibility. We conclude that only extreme implausibility inhibits suggestion-induced false autobiographical beliefs, unless suggestions cause increases in plausibility ratings.