COVID-19 in Correctional and Detention Facilities - United States, February-April 2020.

An estimated 2.1 million U.S. adults are housed within approximately 5,000 correctional and detention facilities† on any given day (1). Many facilities face significant challenges in controlling the spread of highly infectious pathogens such as SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Such challenges include crowded dormitories, shared lavatories, limited medical and isolation resources, daily entry and exit of staff members and visitors, continual introduction of newly incarcerated or detained persons, and transport of incarcerated or detained persons in multiperson vehicles for court-related, medical, or security reasons (2,3). During April 22-28, 2020, aggregate data on COVID-19 cases were reported to CDC by 37 of 54 state and territorial health department jurisdictions. Thirty-two (86%) jurisdictions reported at least one laboratory-confirmed case from a total of 420 correctional and detention facilities. Among these facilities, COVID-19 was diagnosed in 4,893 incarcerated or detained persons and 2,778 facility staff members, resulting in 88 deaths in incarcerated or detained persons and 15 deaths among staff members. Prompt identification of COVID-19 cases and consistent application of prevention measures, such as symptom screening and quarantine, are critical to protecting incarcerated and detained persons and staff members.

Free-standing acute inpatient rehabilitation hospital enhanced practices and policies in response to the COVID-19 outbreak.

This special report was developed to communicate policy and procedures for free-standing acute inpatient rehabilitation hospitals (AIRHs) to protect patients and healthcare personnel and to prevent further spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2. The recommended policies were developed in conjunction with the New Mexico Department of Health and hospital leadership. As we attain additional knowledge and experience during this pandemic, suggestions of best practice will continue to evolve for AIRHs. The authors encourage readers to work with local regulatory officials to ensure regulatory compliance as well as respect of the availability of local resources.

An Assessment of the Cocooning Strategy for Preventing Infant Pertussis-United States, 2011.

BACKGROUND: Infants are at greatest risk for severe pertussis. In 2006, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices recommended that adolescents and adults, especially those with infant contact, receive a single dose of Tdap (tetanus toxoid, reduced diphtheria toxoid, and acellular pertussis vaccine). To assess the effectiveness of cocooning, we conducted a case-control evaluation of infant close contacts. METHODS: Pertussis cases aged <2 months with onset between 1 January 2011 and 31 December 2011 were identified in Emerging Infections Program Network sites. For each case, we recruited 3 controls from birth certificates and interviewed identified adult close contacts (CCs) or parents of CCs aged <18 years. Pertussis vaccination was verified through medical providers and/or immunization registries. RESULTS: Forty-two cases were enrolled, with 154 matched controls. Around enrolled infants, 859 CCs were identified (600 adult and 259 nonadult). An average of 5.4 CCs was identified per case and 4.1 CCs per control. Five hundred fifty-four (64.5%) CCs were enrolled (371 adult and 183 non-adult CCs); 119 (32.1% of enrolled) adult CCs had received Tdap. The proportion of Tdap-vaccinated adult CCs was similar between cases and controls (P = .89). The 600 identified adult CCs comprised 172 potential cocoons; 71 (41.3%) potential cocoons had all identified adult CCs enrolled. Of these, 9 were fully vaccinated and 43.7% contained no Tdap-vaccinated adults. The proportion of fully vaccinated case (4.8%) and control (10.0%) cocoons was similar (P = .43). CONCLUSIONS: Low Tdap coverage among adult CCs reinforces the difficulty of implementing the cocooning strategy and the importance of vaccination during pregnancy to prevent infant pertussis.

Pertactin-negative Bordetella pertussis strains: evidence for a possible selective advantage.

BACKGROUND: A recent increase in Bordetella pertussis without the pertactin protein, an acellular vaccine immunogen, has been reported in the United States. Determining whether pertactin-deficient (PRN(-)) B. pertussis is evading vaccine-induced immunity or altering the severity of illness is needed. METHODS: We retrospectively assessed for associations between pertactin production and both clinical presentation and vaccine history. Cases with isolates collected between May 2011 and February 2013 from 8 states were included. We calculated unadjusted and adjusted odds ratios (ORs) using multivariable logistic regression analysis. RESULTS: Among 753 isolates, 640 (85%) were PRN(-). The age distribution differed between cases caused by PRN(-) B. pertussis and cases caused by B. pertussis producing pertactin (PRN(+)) (P = .01). The proportion reporting individual pertussis symptoms was similar between the 2 groups, except a higher proportion of PRN(+) case-patients reported apnea (P = .005). Twenty-two case-patients were hospitalized; 6% in the PRN(+) group compared to 3% in the PRN(-) group (P = .11). Case-patients having received at least 1 pertussis vaccine dose had a higher odds of having PRN(-) B. pertussis compared with unvaccinated case-patients (adjusted OR = 2.2; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.3-4.0). When restricted to case-patients at least 1 year of age and those age-appropriately vaccinated, the adjusted OR increased to 2.7 (95% CI, 1.2-6.1). CONCLUSIONS: The significant association between vaccination and isolate pertactin production suggests that the likelihood of having reported disease caused by PRN(-) compared with PRN(+) strains is greater in vaccinated persons. Additional studies are needed to assess whether vaccine effectiveness is diminished against PRN(-) strains.

Outbreak of hepatitis A in the USA associated with frozen pomegranate arils imported from Turkey: an epidemiological case study.

BACKGROUND: In May, 2013, an outbreak of symptomatic hepatitis A virus infections occurred in the USA. Federal, state, and local public health officials investigated the cause of the outbreak and instituted actions to control its spread. We investigated the source of the outbreak and assessed the public health measures used. METHODS: We interviewed patients, obtained their shopping information, and did genetic analysis of hepatitis A virus recovered from patients' serum and stool samples. We tested products for the virus and traced supply chains. FINDINGS: Of 165 patients identified from ten states, 69 (42%) were admitted to hospital, two developed fulminant hepatitis, and one needed a liver transplant; none died. Illness onset occurred from March 31 to Aug 12, 2013. The median age of patients was 47 years (IQR 35-58) and 91 (55%) were women. 153 patients (93%) reported consuming product B from retailer A. 40 patients (24%) had product B in their freezers, and 113 (68%) bought it according to data from retailer A. Hepatitis A virus genotype IB, uncommon in the Americas, was recovered from specimens from 117 people with hepatitis A virus illness. Pomegranate arils that were imported from Turkey--where genotype IB is common--were identified in product B. No hepatitis A virus was detected in product B. INTERPRETATION: Imported frozen pomegranate arils were identified as the vehicle early in the investigation by combining epidemiology--with data from several sources--genetic analysis of patient samples, and product tracing. Product B was removed from store shelves, the public were warned not to eat product B, product recalls took place, and postexposure prophylaxis with both hepatitis A virus vaccine and immunoglobulin was provided. Our findings show that modern public health actions can help rapidly detect and control hepatitis A virus illness caused by imported food. Our findings show that postexposure prophylaxis can successfully prevent hepatitis A illness when a specific product is identified. Imported food products combined with waning immunity in some adult populations might make this type of intervention necessary in the future. FUNDING: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, US Food and Drug Administration, and US state and local public health departments.

Risk factors for 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1)-related hospitalization and death among racial/ethnic groups in New Mexico.

OBJECTIVES: We assessed risk factors for 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1)-related hospitalization, mechanical ventilation, and death among New Mexico residents. METHODS: We calculated population rate ratios using Poisson regression to analyze risk factors for H1N1-related hospitalization. We performed a cross-sectional analysis of hospitalizations during September 14, 2009 through January 13, 2010, using logistic regression to assess risk factors for mechanical ventilation and death among those hospitalized. RESULTS: During the study period, 926 laboratory-confirmed H1N1-related hospitalizations were identified. H1N1-related hospitalization was significantly higher among American Indians (risk ratio [RR] = 2.6; 95% confidence interval [CI] = 2.2, 3.2), Blacks (RR = 1.7; 95% CI = 1.2, 2.4), and Hispanics (RR = 1.8; 95% CI = 1.5, 2.0) than it was among non-Hispanic Whites, and also was higher among persons of younger age and lower household income. Mechanical ventilation was significantly associated with age 25 years and older, obesity, and lack of or delayed antiviral treatment. Death was significantly associated with male gender, cancer during the previous 12 months, and liver disorder. CONCLUSIONS: This analysis supports recent national efforts to include American Indian/Alaska Native race as a group at high risk for complications of influenza with respect to vaccination and antiviral treatment recommendations.