Seroprevalence of peste des petits ruminants disease in Indonesian buffaloes may be an emerging threat to small ruminants.

Background and Aim: The peste des petit ruminants (PPR) is a disaster-class virus that causes catastrophic drawbacks to small ruminant industries in affected countries. As PPR disease has been reported in neighboring countries, Indonesia, which has a large population of sheep and goats, has become prone to the emerging threat of infection. Because the virus can also infect other animals with subclinical manifestations, large ruminants, such as buffaloes, may play an important role in spreading the virus in the environment. Therefore, the main objective of this study was to identify PPR seroprevalence in the buffalo population of Indonesia. Materials and Methods: A competitive enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay was performed to identify the specific antibody for PPR viruses in the buffalo population using serum bank collection from the National Research and Innovation Agency, Indonesia. Results: PPR virus seroprevalence was detected in buffalo from Central Java, East Java, and East Nusa Tenggara Province in Indonesia. Although seroprevalence was low in the population, the antibody titer was relatively high in the positive samples. Sex and age were identified as determinant factors in the seroprevalence distribution of the buffalo population. Conclusion: The presence of antibodies against the PPR virus in buffaloes may indicate that PPR virus is circulating in the buffalo population of Indonesia.

Molecular characterization of recombinant LSDV isolates from 2022 outbreak in Indonesia through phylogenetic networks and whole-genome SNP-based analysis.

Lumpy skin disease (LSD) is a transboundary viral disease of cattle and water buffaloes caused by the LSD virus, leading to high morbidity, low mortality, and a significant economic impact. Initially endemic to Africa only, LSD has spread to the Middle East, Europe, and Asia in the past decade. The most effective control strategy for LSD is the vaccination of cattle with live-attenuated LSDV vaccines. Consequently, the emergence of two groups of LSDV strains in Asian countries, one closely related to the ancient Kenyan LSDV isolates and the second made of recombinant viruses with a backbone of Neethling-vaccine and field isolates, emphasized the need for constant molecular surveillance. This current study investigated the first outbreak of LSD in Indonesia in 2022. Molecular characterization of the isolate circulating in the country based on selected LSDV-marker genes: RPO30, GPCR, EEV glycoprotein gene, and B22R, as well as whole genome analysis using several analytical tools, indicated the Indonesia LSDV isolate as a recombinant of LSDV_Neethling_vaccine_LW_1959 and LSDV_NI-2490. The analysis clustered the Indonesia_LSDV with the previously reported LSDV recombinants circulating in East and Southeast Asia, but different from the recombinant viruses in Russia and the field isolates in South-Asian countries. Additionally, this study has demonstrated alternative accurate ways of LSDV whole genome analysis and clustering of isolates, including the recombinants, instead of whole-genome phylogenetic tree analysis. These data will strengthen our understanding of the pathogens' origin, the extent of their spread, and determination of suitable control measures required.

Laboratory-acquired infections and pathogen escapes worldwide between 2000 and 2021: a scoping review.

Laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) and accidental pathogen escape from laboratory settings (APELS) are major concerns for the community. A risk-based approach for pathogen research management within a standard biosafety management framework is recommended but is challenging due to reasons such as inconsistency in risk tolerance and perception. Here, we performed a scoping review using publicly available, peer-reviewed journal and media reports of LAIs and instances of APELS between 2000 and 2021. We identified LAIs in 309 individuals in 94 reports for 51 pathogens. Eight fatalities (2·6% of all LAIs) were caused by infection with Neisseria meningitidis (n=3, 37·5%), Yersinia pestis (n=2, 25%), Salmonella enterica serotype Typhimurium (S Typhimurium; n=1, 12·5%), or Ebola virus (n=1, 12·5%) or were due to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (n=1, 12·5%). The top five LAI pathogens were S Typhimurium (n=154, 49·8%), Salmonella enteritidis (n=21, 6·8%), vaccinia virus (n=13, 4·2%), Brucella spp (n=12, 3·9%), and Brucella melitensis (n=11, 3·6%). 16 APELS were reported, including those for Bacillus anthracis, SARS-CoV, and poliovirus (n=3 each, 18·8%); Brucella spp and foot and mouth disease virus (n=2 each, 12·5%); and variola virus, Burkholderia pseudomallei, and influenza virus H5N1 (n=1 each, 6·3%). Continual improvement in LAI and APELS management via their root cause analysis and thorough investigation of such incidents is essential to prevent future occurrences. The results are biased due to the reliance on publicly available information, which emphasises the need for formalised global LAIs and APELS reporting to better understand the frequency of and circumstances surrounding these incidents.

The Biosafety Research Road Map: The Search for Evidence to Support Practices in the Laboratory-Foot and Mouth Disease Virus.

Introduction: Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious infection of cloven-hoofed animals. The Biosafety Research Road Map reviewed scientific literature regarding the foot and mouth disease virus (FMDV). This project aims to identify gaps in the data required to conduct evidence-based biorisk assessments, as described by Blacksell et al., and strengthen control measures appropriate for local and national laboratories. Methods: A literature search was conducted to identify potential gaps in biosafety and focused on five main sections: the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, laboratory-acquired infections, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies. Results: The available data regarding biosafety knowledge gaps and existing evidence have been collated. Some gaps include the need for more scientific data that identify the specific safety contribution of engineering controls, support requirements for showering out after in vitro laboratory work, and whether a 3- to 5-day quarantine period should be applied to individuals conducting in vitro versus in vivo work. Addressing these gaps will contribute to the remediation and improvement of biosafety and biosecurity systems when working with FMDV.

The Biosafety Research Road Map: The Search for Evidence to Support Practices in the Laboratory-Crimean Congo Haemorrhagic Fever Virus and Lassa Virus.

Introduction: Crimean Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF) virus and Lassa virus (LASV) are zoonotic agents regarded as high-consequence pathogens due to their high case fatality rates. CCHF virus is a vector-borne disease and is transmitted by tick bites. Lassa virus is spread via aerosolization of dried rat urine, ingesting infected rats, and direct contact with or consuming food and water contaminated with rat excreta. Methods: The scientific literature for biosafety practices has been reviewed for both these two agents to assess the evidence base and biosafety-related knowledge gaps. The review focused on five main areas, including the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, laboratory-acquired infections, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies. Results: There is a lack of data on the safe collection and handling procedures for tick specimens and the infectious dose from an infective tick bite for CCHF investigations. In addition, there are gaps in knowledge about gastrointestinal and contact infectious doses for Lassa virus, sample handling and transport procedures outside of infectious disease areas, and the contribution of asymptomatic carriers in viral circulation. Conclusion: Due to the additional laboratory hazards posed by these two agents, the authors recommend developing protocols that work effectively and safely in highly specialized laboratories in non-endemic regions and a laboratory with limited resources in endemic areas.

The Biosafety Research Road Map: The Search for Evidence to Support Practices in the Laboratory-Zoonotic Avian Influenza and Mycobacterium tuberculosis.

Introduction: The Biosafety Research Road Map reviewed the scientific literature on a viral respiratory pathogen, avian influenza virus, and a bacterial respiratory pathogen, Mycobacterium tuberculosis. This project aims at identifying gaps in the data required to conduct evidence-based biorisk assessments, as described in Blacksell et al. One significant gap is the need for definitive data on M. tuberculosis sample aerosolization to guide the selection of engineering controls for diagnostic procedures. Methods: The literature search focused on five areas: routes of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, laboratory-acquired infections, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination methods. Results: The available data regarding biosafety knowledge gaps and existing evidence have been collated and presented in Tables 1 and 2. The guidance sources on the appropriate use of biosafety cabinets for specific procedures with M. tuberculosis require clarification. Detecting vulnerabilities in the biorisk assessment for respiratory pathogens is essential to improve and develop laboratory biosafety in local and national systems.

The Biosafety Research Road Map: The Search for Evidence to Support Practices in the Laboratory-Mpox/Monkeypox Virus.

Introduction: The virus formerly known as monkeypox virus, now called mpoxv, belongs to the Orthopoxvirus genus and can cause mpox disease through both animal-to-human and human-to-human transmission. The unexpected spread of mpoxv among humans has prompted the World Health Organization (WHO) to declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). Methods: We conducted a literature search to identify the gaps in biosafety, focusing on five main areas: how the infection enters the body and spreads, how much of the virus is needed to cause infection, infections acquired in the lab, accidental release of the virus, and strategies for disinfecting and decontaminating the area. Discussion: The recent PHEIC has shown that there are gaps in our knowledge of biosafety when it comes to mpoxv. We need to better understand where this virus might be found, how much of it can spread from person-to-person, what are the effective control measures, and how to safely clean up contaminated areas. By gathering more biosafety evidence, we can make better decisions to protect people from this zoonotic agent, which has recently become more common in the human population.

The Biosafety Research Road Map: The Search for Evidence to Support Practices in Human and Veterinary Laboratories.

Introduction: Lack of evidence-based information regarding potential biological risks can result in inappropriate or excessive biosafety and biosecurity risk-reduction strategies. This can cause unnecessary damage and loss to the physical facilities, physical and psychological well-being of laboratory staff, and community trust. A technical working group from the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH, formerly OIE), World Health Organization (WHO), and Chatham House collaborated on the Biosafety Research Roadmap (BRM) project. The goal of the BRM is the sustainable implementation of evidence-based biorisk management of laboratory activities, particularly in low-resource settings, and the identification of gaps in the current biosafety and biosecurity knowledge base. Methods: A literature search was conducted for the basis of laboratory design and practices for four selected high-priority subgroups of pathogenic agents. Potential gaps in biosafety were focused on five main sections, including the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, laboratory-acquired infections, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies. Categories representing miscellaneous, respiratory, bioterrorism/zoonotic, and viral hemorrhagic fever pathogens were created within each group were selected for review. Results: Information sheets on the pathogens were developed. Critical gaps in the evidence base for safe sustainable biorisk management were identified. Conclusion: The gap analysis identified areas of applied biosafety research required to support the safety, and the sustainability, of global research programs. Improving the data available for biorisk management decisions for research with high-priority pathogens will contribute significantly to the improvement and development of appropriate and necessary biosafety, biocontainment and biosecurity strategies for each agent.

The Biosafety Research Road Map: The Search for Evidence to Support Practices in the Laboratory-SARS-CoV-2.

Introduction: The SARS-CoV-2 virus emerged as a novel virus and is the causative agent of the COVID-19 pandemic. It spreads readily human-to-human through droplets and aerosols. The Biosafety Research Roadmap aims to support the application of laboratory biological risk management by providing an evidence base for biosafety measures. This involves assessing the current biorisk management evidence base, identifying research and capability gaps, and providing recommendations on how an evidence-based approach can support biosafety and biosecurity, including in low-resource settings. Methods: A literature search was conducted to identify potential gaps in biosafety and focused on five main sections, including the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, laboratory-acquired infections, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies. Results: There are many knowledge gaps related to biosafety and biosecurity due to the SARS-CoV-2 virus's novelty, including infectious dose between variants, personal protective equipment for personnel handling samples while performing rapid diagnostic tests, and laboratory-acquired infections. Detecting vulnerabilities in the biorisk assessment for each agent is essential to contribute to the improvement and development of laboratory biosafety in local and national systems.

The Biosafety Research Road Map: The Search for Evidence to Support Practices in the Laboratory-Bacillus anthracis and Brucella melitensis.

Introduction: Brucella melitensis and Bacillus anthracis are zoonoses transmitted from animals and animal products. Scientific information is provided in this article to support biosafety precautions necessary to protect laboratory workers and individuals who are potentially exposed to these pathogens in the workplace or other settings, and gaps in information are also reported. There is a lack of information on the appropriate effective concentration for many chemical disinfectants for this agent. Controversies related to B. anthracis include infectious dose for skin and gastrointestinal infections, proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE) during the slaughter of infected animals, and handling of contaminated materials. B. melitensis is reported to have the highest number of laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) to date in laboratory workers. Methods: A literature search was conducted to identify potential gaps in biosafety and focused on five main sections including the route of inoculation/modes of transmission, infectious dose, LAIs, containment releases, and disinfection and decontamination strategies. Results: Scientific literature currently lacks information on the effective concentration of many chemical disinfectants for this agent and in the variety of matrices where it may be found. Controversies related to B. anthracis include infectious dose for skin and gastrointestinal infections, proper use of PPE during the slaughter of infected animals, and handling contaminated materials. Discussion: Clarified vulnerabilities based on specific scientific evidence will contribute to the prevention of unwanted and unpredictable infections, improving the biosafety processes and procedures for laboratory staff and other professionals such as veterinarians, individuals associated with the agricultural industry, and those working with susceptible wildlife species.

The Biosafety Research Road Map: The Search for Evidence to Support Practices in the Laboratory-Shigella spp.

Introduction: Shigella bacteria cause shigellosis, a gastrointestinal infection most often acquired from contaminated food or water. Methods: In this review, the general characteristics of Shigella bacteria are described, cases of laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) are discussed, and evidence gaps in current biosafety practices are identified. Results: LAIs are undoubtedly under-reported. Owing to the low infectious dose, rigorous biosafety level 2 practices are required to prevent LAIs resulting from sample manipulation or contact with infected surfaces. Conclusions: It is recommended that, before laboratory work with Shigella, an evidence-based risk assessment be conducted. Particular emphasis should be placed on personal protective equipment, handwashing, and containment practices for procedures that generate aerosols or droplets.

Evidence of coinfection of pigs with African swine fever virus and porcine circovirus 2.

Archival swine DNA samples from Indonesia and Mongolia, some of which were previously shown to be positive for African swine fever virus, were screened for the presence of porcine circovirus 2 (PCV-2) and porcine circovirus 3 (PCV-3) by PCR. Samples from both countries were positive for PCV-2 (three from Mongolia and two from Indonesia), while none were positive for PCV-3. The PCV-2 amplicons were sequenced, and phylogenetic analysis revealed that the PCV-2 strains belonged to four different genotypes: PCV-2a (Mongolia), PCV-2b (Mongolia and Indonesia), PCV-2d (Indonesia), and PCV-2g (Mongolia). This is the first report of ASFV/PCV-2 coinfection in pigs and the first report of the presence of PCV-2 in Mongolia.

African swine fever in North Sumatra and West Java provinces in 2019 and 2020, Indonesia.

African swine fever (ASF) is a highly lethal and contagious viral haemorrhagic disease of domestic and wild pigs, caused by the ASF virus (ASFV). After entering China in 2018, the disease has continued to spread through Asia. In September 2019, a team from the Indonesian Research Center for Veterinary Science, Bogor, investigated outbreaks in backyard pigs in the Dairi and Humbang Hasundutan districts of North Sumatra province. In January 2020, three pigs purchased from a pig seller in Bogor District, West Java province were also tested. Real-time PCR results confirmed ASFV DNA in sixteen out of twenty-nine samples, with nine positive samples from North Sumatra and seven from West Java. Four partial or full-length genes (i.e. p72, p54, pB602L and CD2v) and a 356-bp fragment between the I73R and I329L genes were sequenced from representative samples. Phylogenetic analysis established that the ASFV in the samples from both North Sumatra and West Java were identical, indicating a common source of infection, and that they belonged to the p72 genotype II and serogroup 8. The sequences from the Indonesian ASFVs were also identical to other genotype II ASFV from domestic pigs in Vietnam, China and Russia.

Genomic analysis of bluetongue virus episystems in Australia and Indonesia.

The distribution of bluetongue viruses (BTV) in Australia is represented by two distinct and interconnected epidemiological systems (episystems)-one distributed primarily in the north and one in the east. The northern episystem is characterised by substantially greater antigenic diversity than the eastern episystem; yet the forces that act to limit the diversity present in the east remain unclear. Previous work has indicated that the northern episystem is linked to that of island South East Asia and Melanesia, and that BTV present in Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and East Timor, may act as source populations for new serotypes and genotypes of BTV to enter Australia's north. In this study, the genomes of 49 bluetongue viruses from the eastern episystem and 13 from Indonesia were sequenced and analysed along with 27 previously published genome sequences from the northern Australian episystem. The results of this analysis confirm that the Australian BTV population has its origins in the South East Asian/Melanesian episystem, and that incursions into northern Australia occur with some regularity. In addition, the presence of limited genetic diversity in the eastern episystem relative to that found in the north supports the presence of substantial, but not complete, barriers to gene flow between the northern and eastern Australian episystems. Genetic bottlenecks between each successive episystem are evident, and appear to be responsible for the reduction in BTV genetic diversity observed in the north to south-east direction.

Nipah virus in the fruit bat Pteropus vampyrus in Sumatera, Indonesia.

Nipah virus causes periodic livestock and human disease with high case fatality rate, and consequent major economic, social and psychological impacts. Fruit bats of the genus Pteropus are the natural reservoir. In this study, we used real time PCR to screen the saliva and urine of P. vampyrus from North Sumatera for Nipah virus genome. A conventional reverse transcriptase (RT-PCR) assay was used on provisionally positive samples to corroborate findings. This is the first report of Nipah virus detection in P. vampyrus in Sumatera, Indonesia.

The distribution of henipaviruses in Southeast Asia and Australasia: is Wallace's line a barrier to Nipah virus?

Nipah virus (NiV) (Genus Henipavirus) is a recently emerged zoonotic virus that causes severe disease in humans and has been found in bats of the genus Pteropus. Whilst NiV has not been detected in Australia, evidence for NiV-infection has been found in pteropid bats in some of Australia's closest neighbours. The aim of this study was to determine the occurrence of henipaviruses in fruit bat (Family Pteropodidae) populations to the north of Australia. In particular we tested the hypothesis that Nipah virus is restricted to west of Wallace's Line. Fruit bats from Australia, Papua New Guinea, East Timor and Indonesia were tested for the presence of antibodies to Hendra virus (HeV) and Nipah virus, and tested for the presence of HeV, NiV or henipavirus RNA by PCR. Evidence was found for the presence of Nipah virus in both Pteropus vampyrus and Rousettus amplexicaudatus populations from East Timor. Serology and PCR also suggested the presence of a henipavirus that was neither HeV nor NiV in Pteropus alecto and Acerodon celebensis. The results demonstrate the presence of NiV in the fruit bat populations on the eastern side of Wallace's Line and within 500 km of Australia. They indicate the presence of non-NiV, non-HeV henipaviruses in fruit bat populations of Sulawesi and Sumba and possibly in Papua New Guinea. It appears that NiV is present where P. vampyrus occurs, such as in the fruit bat populations of Timor, but where this bat species is absent other henipaviruses may be present, as on Sulawesi and Sumba. Evidence was obtained for the presence henipaviruses in the non-Pteropid species R. amplexicaudatus and in A. celebensis. The findings of this work fill some gaps in knowledge in geographical and species distribution of henipaviruses in Australasia which will contribute to planning of risk management and surveillance activities.