ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVES: The resurgence in cases and deaths due to COVID-19 in many countries suggests complacency in adhering to COVID-19 preventive guidelines. Vaccination, therefore, remains a key intervention in mitigating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. This study investigated the level of adherence to COVID-19 preventive measures and intention to receive the COVID-19 vaccine among Ugandans. DESIGN, SETTING AND PARTICIPANTS: A nationwide cross-sectional survey of 1053 Ugandan adults was conducted in March 2021 using telephone interviews. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Participants reported on adherence to COVID-19 preventive measures and intention to be vaccinated with COVID-19 vaccines. RESULTS: Overall, 10.2% of the respondents adhered to the COVID-19 preventive guidelines and 57.8% stated definite intention to receive a SARS-CoV-2 vaccine. Compared with women, men were less likely to adhere to COVID-19 guidelines (Odds Ratio (OR)=0.64, 95% CI 0.41 to 0.99). Participants from the northern (4.0%, OR=0.28, 95% CI 0.12 to 0.92), western (5.1%, OR=0.30, 95% CI 0.14 to 0.65) and eastern regions (6.5%, OR=0.47, 95% CI 0.24 to 0.92), respectively, had lower odds of adhering to the COVID-19 guidelines than those from the central region (14.7%). A higher monthly income of ≥US$137 (OR=2.31, 95% CI 1.14 to 4.58) and a history of chronic disease (OR=1.81, 95% CI 1.14 to 2.86) were predictors of adherence. Concerns about the chances of getting COVID-19 in the future (Prevalence Ratio (PR)=1.26, 95% CI 1.06 to 1.48) and fear of severe COVID-19 infection (PR=1.20, 95% CI 1.04 to 1.38) were the strongest predictors for a definite intention, while concerns for side effects were negatively associated with vaccination intent (PR=0.75, 95% CI 0.68 to 0.83). CONCLUSION: Behaviour change programmes need to be strengthened to promote adherence to COVID-19 preventive guidelines as vaccination is rolled out as another preventive measure. Dissemination of accurate, safe and efficacious information about the vaccines is necessary to enhance vaccine uptake.
Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Vaccines , Adult , COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19/prevention & control , COVID-19 Vaccines/therapeutic use , Cross-Sectional Studies , Female , Humans , Intention , Male , Pandemics/prevention & control , SARS-CoV-2 , Uganda/epidemiology , VaccinationABSTRACT
BACKGROUND: Since the declaration of the 10th Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in DRC on 1st Aug 2018, several neighboring countries have been developing and implementing preparedness efforts to prevent EVD cross-border transmission to enable timely detection, investigation, and response in the event of a confirmed EVD outbreak in the country. We describe Uganda's experience in EVD preparedness. RESULTS: On 4 August 2018, the Uganda Ministry of Health (MoH) activated the Public Health Emergency Operations Centre (PHEOC) and the National Task Force (NTF) for public health emergencies to plan, guide, and coordinate EVD preparedness in the country. The NTF selected an Incident Management Team (IMT), constituting a National Rapid Response Team (NRRT) that supported activation of the District Task Forces (DTFs) and District Rapid Response Teams (DRRTs) that jointly assessed levels of preparedness in 30 designated high-risk districts representing category 1 (20 districts) and category 2 (10 districts). The MoH, with technical guidance from the World Health Organisation (WHO), led EVD preparedness activities and worked together with other ministries and partner organisations to enhance community-based surveillance systems, develop and disseminate risk communication messages, engage communities, reinforce EVD screening and infection prevention measures at Points of Entry (PoEs) and in high-risk health facilities, construct and equip EVD isolation and treatment units, and establish coordination and procurement mechanisms. CONCLUSION: As of 31 May 2019, there was no confirmed case of EVD as Uganda has continued to make significant and verifiable progress in EVD preparedness. There is a need to sustain these efforts, not only in EVD preparedness but also across the entire spectrum of a multi-hazard framework. These efforts strengthen country capacity and compel the country to avail resources for preparedness and management of incidents at the source while effectively cutting costs of using a "fire-fighting" approach during public health emergencies.
Subject(s)
Civil Defense/standards , Disease Outbreaks/statistics & numerical data , Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola/therapy , Civil Defense/methods , Civil Defense/statistics & numerical data , Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola/epidemiology , Humans , Public Health/methods , Public Health/standards , Uganda/epidemiology , World Health Organization/organization & administrationABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION: Contact tracing is a critical strategy required for timely prevention and control of Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreaks. Available evidence suggests that poor contact tracing was a driver of the EVD outbreak in West Africa, including Sierra Leone. In this article, we answered the question as to whether EVD contact tracing, as practiced in Western Area (WA) districts of Sierra Leone from 2014 to 2015, was effective. The goal is to describe contact tracing and identify obstacles to its effective implementation. METHODS: Mixed methods comprising secondary data analysis of the EVD case and contact tracing data sets collected from WA during the period from 2014 to 2015, key informant interviews of contact tracers and their supervisors, and a review of available reports on contact tracing were implemented to obtain data for this study. RESULTS: During the study period, 3,838 confirmed cases and 32,706 contacts were listed in the viral hemorrhagic fever and contact databases for the district (mean 8.5 contacts per case). Only 22.1% (852) of the confirmed cases in the study area were listed as contacts at the onset of their illness, which indicates incomplete identification and tracing of contacts. Challenges associated with effective contact tracing included lack of community trust, concealing of exposure information, political interference with recruitment of tracers, inadequate training of contact tracers, and incomplete EVD case and contact database. While the tracers noted the usefulness of community quarantine in facilitating their work, they also reported delayed or irregular supply of basic needs, such as food and water, which created resistance from the communities. CONCLUSION: Multiple gaps in contact tracing attributed to a variety of factors associated with implementers, and communities were identified as obstacles that impeded timely control of the EVD outbreak in the WA of Sierra Leone. In future outbreaks, early community engagement and participation in contact tracing, establishment of appropriate mechanisms for selection, adequate training and supervision of qualified contact tracers, establishment of a well-managed and complete contact tracing database, and provision of basic needs to quarantined contacts are recommended as measures to enhance effective contact tracing.