Hospital-acquired listeriosis outbreak caused by contaminated diced celery--Texas, 2010.

BACKGROUND: Listeria monocytogenes causes often-fatal infections affecting mainly immunocompromised persons. Sources of hospital-acquired listeriosis outbreaks can be difficult to identify. We investigated a listeriosis outbreak spanning 7 months and involving 5 hospitals. METHODS: Outbreak-related cases were identified by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) and confirmed by multiple-locus variable-number tandem-repeat analysis (MLVA). We conducted patient interviews, medical records reviews, and hospital food source evaluations. Food and environmental specimens were collected at a hospital (hospital A) where 6 patients had been admitted before listeriosis onset; these specimens were tested by culture, polymerase chain reaction (PCR), and PFGE. We collected and tested food and environmental samples at the implicated processing facility. RESULTS: Ten outbreak-related patients were immunocompromised by ≥1 underlying conditions or treatments; 5 died. All patients had been admitted to or visited an acute-care hospital during their possible incubation periods. The outbreak strain of L. monocytogenes was isolated from chicken salad and its diced celery ingredient at hospital A, and in 19 of >200 swabs of multiple surfaces and in 8 of 11 diced celery products at the processing plant. PCR testing detected Listeria in only 3 of 10 environmental and food samples from which it was isolated by culturing. The facility was closed, products were recalled, and the outbreak ended. CONCLUSIONS: Contaminated diced celery caused a baffling, lengthy outbreak of hospital-acquired listeriosis. PCR testing often failed to detect the pathogen, suggesting its reliability should be further evaluated. Listeriosis risk should be considered in fresh produce selections for immunocompromised patients.

Virus detection and duration of illness among patients with 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus infection in Texas.

Knowledge from early outbreaks is limited regarding the virus detection and illness duration of the 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) infections. During the period from April to May 2009 in Texas, we collected serial nasopharyngeal (NP) and stool specimens from 35 participants, testing by real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) and culture. The participants were aged 2 months to 71 years; 25 (71%) were under 18. The median duration of measured fever was 3.0 days and of virus detection in NP specimens was 4.2 days; however, few specimens were collected between days 5-9. The duration of virus detection (4.2 days) was similar to the duration of fever (3.5 days) (RR, 1.14; 95% CI, .66-1.95; P = .8), but was shorter than the duration of cough (11.0 days) (RR, .41; 95% CI, .24-.68; P < .001). We detected viral RNA in two participants' stools. All cultures were negative. This investigation suggests that the duration of virus detection was likely similar to the seasonal influenza virus.

Household transmission of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) and nonpharmaceutical interventions among households of high school students in San Antonio, Texas.

San Antonio, Texas, was one of the first metropolitan areas where 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus (pH1N1) was detected. Identification of laboratory-confirmed pH1N1 in 2 students led to a preemptive 8-day closure of their high school. We assessed transmission of pH1N1 and changes in adoption of nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) within households of students attending the affected school. Household secondary attack rates were 3.7% overall and 9.1% among those 0-4 years of age. Widespread adoption of NPIs was reported among household members. Respondents who viewed pH1N1 as very serious were more likely to adopt certain NPIs than were respondents who viewed pH1N1 as not very serious. NPIs may complement influenza vaccine prevention programs or be the only line of defense when pandemic vaccine is unavailable. The 2009 pandemic provided a unique opportunity to study NPIs, and these real-world experiences provide much-needed data to inform pandemic response policy.

Household transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 2009, San Antonio, Texas, USA, April-May 2009.

To assess household transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in San Antonio, Texas, USA, during April 15-May 8, 2009, we investigated 77 households. The index case-patient was defined as the household member with the earliest onset date of symptoms of acute respiratory infection (ARI), influenza-like illness (ILI), or laboratory-confirmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Median interval between illness onset in index and secondary case-patients was 4 days (range 1-9 days); the index case-patient was likely to be < or =18 years of age (p = 0.034). The secondary attack rate was 4% for pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 9% for ILI, and 13% for ARI. The secondary attack rate was highest for children <5 years of age (8%-19%) and lowest for adults > or =50 years of age (4%-12%). Early in the outbreak, household transmission primarily occurred from children to other household members and was lower than the transmission rate for seasonal influenza.