What drives disagreement about moral hypocrisy? Perceived comparability and how people exploit it to criticize enemies and defend allies.

Charges of hypocrisy are usually thought to be to be damning. Yet when a hypocrisy charge is made, there often remains disagreement about whether or not its target really is a hypocrite. Why? Three pre-registered experiments (N = 2599) conceptualize and test the role of perceived comparability in evaluating hypocrisy. Calling someone a hypocrite typically entails invoking a comparison-one meant to highlight internal contradiction and cast moral character into question. Yet there is ambiguity about which sorts of comparisons are valid in the first place. We argue that disagreements about moral hypocrisy often boil down to disagreements about comparability. Although the comparability of two situations should not depend on whose behavior is being scrutinized, observers shift comparability judgments in line with social motives to criticize or defend. In short, we identify a cognitive factor that can help to explain why, for similar patterns of behavior, people see hypocrisy in their enemies but consistency in themselves and their allies.

Moral paragons, but crummy friends: The case of snitching.

Loyalty to friends is an important moral value, but does that mean snitching on friends is considered immoral? Across six preregistered studies, we examine how loyalty obligations impact people's moral evaluations of snitching (i.e., turning in others who commit transgressions). In vignette and incentivized partner choice paradigms, we find that witnesses who snitch (vs. do not snitch) are seen as more moral and as better leaders (Studies 1-6), regardless of whether they snitch on a friend or an acquaintance (Studies 1-3). We find that a willingness to turn in one's friends increases perceived morality, while an unwillingness to do so diminishes it, with the latter effect exhibiting a stronger impact than the former (Study 2). Our experiments also demonstrate that snitches receive less moral credit when snitching on nonmoral (vs. moral) transgressions (Study 3) and when snitching aligns with self-interest (Study 4). We demonstrate that although snitching is often seen as morally right, turning in transgressors entails important reputational trade-offs: Snitching makes one appear disloyal and a bad friend but boosts perceptions of morality and leadership. This reveals a context in which what is loyal is no longer considered moral. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

When and why "staying out of it" backfires in moral and political disagreements.

People care where others around them stand on contentious moral and political issues. Yet when faced with the prospect of taking sides and the possibility of alienating observers with whom they might disagree, actors often try to "stay out of it"-communicating that they would rather not to take a side at all. We demonstrate that despite its intuitive appeal for reducing conflict, opting not to take sides over moralized issues can harm trust, even relative to siding against an observer's viewpoint outright. Across eleven experiments (N = 4,383) using controlled scenarios, real press video clips, and incentivized economic games, we find that attempts to stay out of the fray are often interpreted as deceptive and untrustworthy. When actors choose not to take sides, observers often ascribe concealed opposition, an attribution of strategic deception which provokes distrust and undermines real-stakes cooperation and partner choice. We further demonstrate that this effect arises only when staying out of it seems strategic: Actors who seem to hold genuine middle-ground beliefs or who lack incentives for impression management are not distrusted for avoiding conflict. People are often asked to take sides in moral and political disagreement. Our findings outline a reputational risk awaiting those who opt not to do so. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Prosocial behavior and reputation: When does doing good lead to looking good?

One reason people engage in prosocial behavior is to reap the reputational benefits associated with being seen as generous. Yet, there isn't a direct connection between doing good deeds and being seen as a good person. Prosocial actors are often met with suspicion and sometimes castigated as disingenuous braggarts, empty virtue-signalers, or holier-than-thou hypocrites. In this article, we review recent research on how people evaluate those who engage in prosocial behavior and identify key factors that influence whether observers will praise or denigrate a prosocial actor for doing a good deed.

Pint-Sized Public Relations: The Development of Reputation Management.

Until recently, many psychologists were skeptical that young children cared about reputation. New evidence suggests that by age five, children begin to understand the broad importance of reputation and to engage in surprisingly sophisticated impression management. These findings prompt exciting new questions about the development of a fundamental social competency.

No Harm, Still Foul: Concerns About Reputation Drive Dislike of Harmless Plagiarizers.

Across a variety of situations, people strongly condemn plagiarizers who steal credit for ideas, even when the theft in question does not appear to harm anyone. Why would people react negatively to relatively harmless acts of plagiarism? In six experiments, we predict and find that these negative reactions are driven by people's aversion toward agents who attempt to falsely improve their reputations. In Studies 1-3, participants condemn plagiarism cases that they agree are harmless (i.e., stealing credit from an anonymous source). This effect is mediated by the extent to which participants perceive the plagiarizer to have falsely benefitted from plagiarizing. In Studies 4-5, we demonstrate that this effect is not explained solely by participants' negative response to lies or violations of permission. In Study 6, participants condemn a plagiarism case in which the idea's original author actually benefits, providing the strongest evidence that people condemn plagiarism for reasons beyond perceived harm. We discuss how this work connects to broader questions of intellectual property and impression management.

The texture of causal construals: Domain-specific biases shape causal inferences from discourse.

We conducted five sets of experiments asking whether psychological and physical events are construed in broadly different manners concerning the underlying textures of their causes. In Experiments 1a-1d, we found a robust tendency to estimate fewer causes (but not effects) for psychological than for physical events; Experiment 2 showed a similar pattern of results when participants were asked to generate hypothetical causes and effects; Experiment 3 revealed a greater tendency to ascribe linear chains of causes (but not effects) to physical events; Experiment 4 showed that the expectation of linear chains was related to intuitions about deterministic processes; and Experiment 5 showed that simply framing a given ambiguous event in psychological versus physical terms is sufficient to induce changes in the patterns of causal inferences. Adults therefore consistently show a tendency to think about psychological and physical events as being embedded in different kinds of causal structures.