Confidence carryover during interleaved memory and perception judgments.

Recognition memory tests typically consist of randomly intermixed studied and nonstudied items that subjects classify as old or new, often while indicating their confidence in these classifications. Under most decision theories, confidence ratings index an item's memory strength-the extent to which it elicits evidence of prior occurrence. Because the test probes are randomly ordered, these theories predict that confidence judgments should be sequentially independent: confidence on trial n should not predict confidence on n + 1. However, analysis of two extant data sets demonstrated reliable serial correlations in recognition memory confidence (confidence carryover). In a new experiment, we examined the domain specificity of confidence carryover by serially interleaving recognition and perceptual classification judgments. Analysis revealed domain-general and domain-specific confidence carryover effects: The confidence of a current recognition judgment was shown to reflect both the confidence of an immediately preceding perceptual gender judgment (domain-general carryover at Lag 1) and also the confidence of the recognition judgment prior to that (domain-specific carryover at Lag 2). Moreover, the domain-specific effect was sensitive to response consistency: Confidence carryover was highest when old-new classifications repeated across trials. Whereas the domain-general effect may reflect metacognitive monitoring of internal factors such as alertness, the domain-specific effect was easily simulated by assuming that evidence within domains is "sticky," such that current memory or perceptual evidence is pulled toward prior evidence representations.

Building metamemorial knowledge over time: insights from eye tracking about the bases of feeling-of-knowing and confidence judgments.

Metamemory processes depend on different factors across the learning and memory time-scale. In the laboratory, subjects are often asked to make prospective feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments about target retrievability, or are asked to make retrospective confidence judgments (RCJs) about the retrieved target. We examined distinct and shared contributors to metamemory judgments, and how they were built over time. Eye movements were monitored during a face-scene associative memory task. At test, participants viewed a studied scene, then rated their FOK that they would remember the associated face. This was followed by a forced choice recognition test and RCJs. FOK judgments were less accurate than RCJ judgments, showing that the addition of mnemonic experience can increase metacognitive accuracy over time. However, there was also evidence that the given FOK rating influenced RCJs. Turning to eye movements, initial analyses showed that higher cue fluency was related to both higher FOKs and higher RCJs. However, further analyses revealed that the effects of the scene cue on RCJs were mediated by FOKs. Turning to the target, increased viewing time and faster viewing of the correct associate related to higher FOKs, consistent with the idea that target accessibility is a basis of FOKs. In contrast, the amount of viewing directed to the chosen face, regardless of whether it was correct, predicted higher RCJs, suggesting that choice experience is a significant contributor RCJs. We also examined covariates of the change in RCJ rating from the FOK rating, and showed that increased and faster viewing of the chosen face predicted raising one's confidence above one's FOK. Taken together these results suggest that metamemory judgments should not be thought of only as distinct subjective experiences, but complex processes that interact and evolve as new psychological bases for subjective experience become available.

What you know can hurt you: effects of age and prior knowledge on the accuracy of judgments of learning.

How do aging and prior knowledge affect memory and metamemory? We explored this question in the context of a dual-process approach to Judgments of Learning (JOLs), which require people to predict their ability to remember information at a later time. Young and older adults (n = 36, mean ages = 20.2 & 73.1) studied the names of actors who were famous in the 1950s or 1990s, providing a JOL for each. Recognition memory for studied and unstudied actors was then assessed using a Recollect/Know/No-Memory (R/K/N) judgment task. Results showed that prior knowledge increased recollection in both age groups such that older adults recollected significantly more 1950s actors than younger adults. Also, for both age groups and both decades, actors judged R at test garnered significantly higher JOLs at study than actors judged K or N. However, while the young showed benefits of prior knowledge on relative JOL accuracy, older adults did not, showing lower levels of JOL accuracy for 1950s actors despite having higher recollection for, and knowledge about, those actors. Overall, the data suggest that prior knowledge can be a double-edged sword, increasing the availability of details that can support later recollection, but also increasing nondiagnostic feelings of familiarity that can reduce the accuracy of memory predictions.