Temporal memory for threatening events encoded in a haunted house.

Despite the salient experience of encoding threatening events, these memories are prone to distortions and often non-veridical from encoding to recall. Further, threat has been shown to preferentially disrupt the binding of event details and enhance goal-relevant information. While extensive work has characterised distinctive features of emotional memory, research has not fully explored the influence threat has on temporal memory, a process putatively supported by the binding of event details into a temporal context. Two primary competing hypotheses have been proposed; that threat can impair or enhance temporal memory. We analysed two datasets to assess temporal memory for an in-person haunted house experience. In study 1, we examined the temporal structure of memory by characterising memory contiguity in free recall as a function of individual levels of heart rate as a proxy of threat. In study 2, we replicated marginal findings of threat-related increases in memory contiguity found in study 1. We extended these findings by showing threat-related increases in recency discriminations, an explicit test of temporal memory. Together, these findings demonstrate that threat enhances temporal memory regarding free recall structure and during explicit memory judgments.

Physiological arousal guides situational appraisals and metacognitive recall for naturalistic experiences.

As individuals navigate the world, they are bound to have emotionally intense experiences. These events not only influence momentary physiological and affective responses, but may also have a powerful impact on one's memory for their emotional experience. In this research, we used the naturalistic context of a haunted house to examine how physiological arousal is associated with metacognitive emotional memory (i.e., the extent to which an individual remembers having experienced a certain emotion). Participants first navigated the haunted house while heart rate and explicit situational appraisals were recorded, and then recalled specific events from the haunted house and the intensity of these affective events approximately one week later. We found that heart rate predicted both the intensity of reported scariness in the haunted house and meta-cognitive memory of affect during recall. Critically, we found evidence for malleability in metacognitive emotional memory based on how the event was initially labeled. Individuals tended to recall events that they explicitly labeled as fear-evoking as being more intense than they reported at the time of the event. We found the opposite relationship for events that they labeled as not fear-evoking. Taken together, this indicates that there are strong relationships between physiological arousal and emotional experiences in naturalistic contexts, but that affective labeling can modulate the relationship between these features when reflecting on the emotionality of that experience in memory.

Choosing for others changes dissociable computational mechanisms underpinning risky decision-making.

Choices under risk often have consequences for ourselves and others. Yet, it is unclear how the other's identity (stranger, close friend, etc.) influences risky choices made on their behalf. In a mixed within and between subjects design, two participant groups made three series of risky economic decisions: for themselves, another person, or for both themselves and another person (i.e., shared outcomes). One group made choices involving a same-sex stranger (n = 29), the other made choices involving a same-sex close friend (n = 28). Hierarchical Bayesian estimation of computations underlying risky decision-making revealed that relative to choosing for themselves, people were more risk averse, loss averse, and consistent when choices involved another person. Partner identity was additionally crucial: people became risk neutral and more consistent when choosing for friends relative to strangers. These findings establish that the complexity of the social world is mirrored in its nuanced consequences for our choices.