Feature binding is slow: Temporal integration explains apparent ultrafast binding.

Visual perception involves binding of distinct features into a unified percept. Although traditional theories link feature binding to time-consuming recurrent processes, Holcombe and Cavanagh (2001) demonstrated ultrafast, early binding of features that belong to the same object. The task required binding of orientation and luminance within an exceptionally short presentation time. However, because visual stimuli were presented over multiple presentation cycles, their findings can alternatively be explained by temporal integration over the extended stimulus sequence. Here, we conducted three experiments manipulating the number of presentation cycles. If early binding occurs, one extremely short cycle should be sufficient for feature integration. Conversely, late binding theories predict that successful binding requires substantial time and improves with additional presentation cycles. Our findings indicate that task-relevant binding of features from the same object occurs slowly, supporting late binding theories.

How (not) to demonstrate unconscious priming: Overcoming issues with post-hoc data selection, low power, and frequentist statistics.

One widely used scientific approach to studying consciousness involves contrasting conscious operations with unconscious ones. However, challenges in establishing the absence of conscious awareness have led to debates about the extent and existence of unconscious processes. We collected experimental data on unconscious semantic priming, manipulating prime presentation duration to highlight the critical role of the analysis approach in attributing priming effects to unconscious processing. We demonstrate that common practices like post-hoc data selection, low statistical power, and frequentist statistical testing can erroneously support claims of unconscious priming. Conversely, adopting best practices like direct performance-awareness contrasts, Bayesian tests, and increased statistical power can prevent such erroneous conclusions. Many past experiments, including our own, fail to meet these standards, casting doubt on previous claims about unconscious processing. Implementing these robust practices will enhance our understanding of unconscious processing and shed light on the functions and neural mechanisms of consciousness.

The Scientific Study of Consciousness Cannot and Should Not Be Morally Neutral.

A target question for the scientific study of consciousness is how dimensions of consciousness, such as the ability to feel pain and pleasure or reflect on one's own experience, vary in different states and animal species. Considering the tight link between consciousness and moral status, answers to these questions have implications for law and ethics. Here we point out that given this link, the scientific community studying consciousness may face implicit pressure to carry out certain research programs or interpret results in ways that justify current norms rather than challenge them. We show that because consciousness largely determines moral status, the use of nonhuman animals in the scientific study of consciousness introduces a direct conflict between scientific relevance and ethics-the more scientifically valuable an animal model is for studying consciousness, the more difficult it becomes to ethically justify compromises to its well-being for consciousness research. Finally, in light of these considerations, we call for a discussion of the immediate ethical corollaries of the body of knowledge that has accumulated and for a more explicit consideration of the role of ideology and ethics in the scientific study of consciousness.

Guns Are Not Faster to Enter Awareness After Seeing a Black Face: Absence of Race-Priming in a Gun/Tool Task During Continuous Flash Suppression.

In the Weapon Identification Task (WIT), Black faces prime the identification of guns compared with tools. We measured race-induced changes in visual awareness of guns and tools using continuous flash suppression (CFS). Eighty-four participants, primed with Black or Asian faces, indicated the location of a gun or tool target that was temporarily rendered invisible through CFS, which provides a sensitive measure of effects on early visual processing. The same participants also completed a standard (non-CFS) WIT. We replicated the standard race-priming effect in the WIT. In the CFS task, Black and Asian primes did not affect the time guns and tools needed to enter awareness. Thus, race priming does not alter early visual processing but does change the identification of guns and tools. This confirms that race-priming originates from later post-perceptual memory- or response-related processing.

Intact prioritization of fearful faces during continuous flash suppression in psychopathy.

Affective state recognition and in particular the identification of fear is known to be impaired in psychopathy. It is unclear, however, whether this reflects a deficit in basic perception ('fear blindness') or a deficit in later cognitive processing. To test for a perceptual deficit, 63 male incarcerated offenders, assessed with the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), detected fearful, neutral, and happy facial expressions rendered invisible through continuous flash suppression (CFS). Fearful faces were detected faster than neutral and happy faces. There was no reduction of the fear advantage in the 20 offenders diagnosed with psychopathy according to the PCL-R, and there was no correlation between the fear advantage and PCL-R scores. Deficits in the processing of fearful facial expressions in psychopathy may thus not reflect fear blindness, but impairments at later postperceptual processing stages. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Gaze direction and face orientation modulate perceptual sensitivity to faces under interocular suppression.

Faces convey information essential for social interaction. Their importance has prompted suggestions that some facial features may be processed unconsciously. Although some studies have provided empirical support for this idea, it remains unclear whether these findings were due to perceptual processing or to post-perceptual decisional factors. Evidence for unconscious processing of facial features has predominantly come from the Breaking Continuous Flash Suppression (b-CFS) paradigm, which measures the time it takes different stimuli to overcome interocular suppression. For example, previous studies have found that upright faces are reported faster than inverted faces, and direct-gaze faces are reported faster than averted-gaze faces. However, this procedure suffers from important problems: observers can decide how much information they receive before committing to a report, so their detection responses may be influenced by differences in decision criteria and by stimulus identification. Here, we developed a new procedure that uses predefined exposure durations, enabling independent measurement of perceptual sensitivity and decision criteria. We found higher detection sensitivity to both upright and direct-gaze (compared to inverted and averted-gaze) faces, with no effects on decisional factors. For identification, we found both greater sensitivity and more liberal criteria for upright faces. Our findings demonstrate that face orientation and gaze direction influence perceptual sensitivity, indicating that these facial features may be processed unconsciously.

No effect of value learning on awareness and attention for faces: Evidence from continuous flash suppression and the attentional blink.

It is widely believed that the emotional and movtivational value of social signals, such as faces, influences perception and attention. However, effects reported for stimuli with intrinsic affective value, such as emotional facial expressions, can often be explained by differences in low-level stimulus properties. To rule out such low-level effects, here we used a value-learning procedure, in which faces were associated with different probabilities of monetary gain and loss in a choice game. In three experiments involving 149 participants, we tested the influence of affective valence (win- vs. loss-associated faces) and motivational salience (probability of monetary gain or loss) on visual awareness, attention, and memory. Using continuous flash suppression and rapid serial visual presentation, we found no effects of affective valence or motivational salience on visual awareness of faces. Furthermore, in two experiments, there was no evidence for a modulation of the attentional blink, indicating that acquired emotional and motivational value does not influence attentional priority of faces. However, we found that motivational salience boosted recognition memory, and this effect was particularly pronounced for win-associated faces. These results indicate that acquired affective valence and motivational salience affect only later processing of faces related to memory but do not directly affect visual awareness and attention. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The Electronic Bee Spy: Eavesdropping on Honeybee Communication via Electrostatic Field Recordings.

As a canary in a coalmine warns of dwindling breathable air, the honeybee can indicate the health of an ecosystem. Honeybees are the most important pollinators of fruit-bearing flowers, and share similar ecological niches with many other pollinators; therefore, the health of a honeybee colony can reflect the conditions of a whole ecosystem. The health of a colony may be mirrored in social signals that bees exchange during their sophisticated body movements such as the waggle dance. To observe these changes, we developed an automatic system that records and quantifies social signals under normal beekeeping conditions. Here, we describe the system and report representative cases of normal social behavior in honeybees. Our approach utilizes the fact that honeybee bodies are electrically charged by friction during flight and inside the colony, and thus they emanate characteristic electrostatic fields when they move their bodies. These signals, together with physical measurements inside and outside the colony (temperature, humidity, weight of the hive, and activity at the hive entrance) will allow quantification of normal and detrimental conditions of the whole colony. The information provided instructs how to setup the recording device, how to install it in a normal bee colony, and how to interpret its data.

The human visual system differentially represents subjectively and objectively invisible stimuli.

The study of unconscious processing requires a measure of conscious awareness. Awareness measures can be either subjective (based on participant's report) or objective (based on perceptual performance). The preferred awareness measure depends on the theoretical position about consciousness and may influence conclusions about the extent of unconscious processing and about the neural correlates of consciousness. We obtained functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) measurements from 43 subjects while they viewed masked faces and houses that were either subjectively or objectively invisible. Even for objectively invisible (perceptually indiscriminable) stimuli, we found significant category information in both early, lower-level visual areas and in higher-level visual cortex, although representations in anterior, category-selective ventrotemporal areas were less robust. For subjectively invisible stimuli, similar to visible stimuli, there was a clear posterior-to-anterior gradient in visual cortex, with stronger category information in ventrotemporal cortex than in early visual cortex. For objectively invisible stimuli, however, category information remained virtually unchanged from early visual cortex to object- and category-selective visual areas. These results demonstrate that although both objectively and subjectively invisible stimuli are represented in visual cortex, the extent of unconscious information processing is influenced by the measurement approach. Furthermore, our data show that subjective and objective approaches are associated with different neural correlates of consciousness and thus have implications for neural theories of consciousness.

Dissociating conscious and unconscious influences on visual detection effects.

The scope of unconscious processing is highly debated, with recent studies showing that even high-level functions such as perceptual integration and category-based attention occur unconsciously. For example, upright faces that are suppressed from awareness through interocular suppression break into awareness more quickly than inverted faces. Similarly, verbal object cues boost otherwise invisible objects into awareness. Here, we replicate these findings, but find that they reflect a general difference in detectability not specific to interocular suppression. To dissociate conscious and unconscious influences on visual detection effects, we use an additional discrimination task to rule out conscious processes as a cause for these differences. Results from this detection-discrimination dissociation paradigm reveal that, while face orientation is processed unconsciously, category-based attention requires awareness. These findings provide insights into the function of conscious perception and offer an experimental approach for mapping out the scope and limits of unconscious processing.

Sorry, baby: Infant faces reach awareness more slowly than adult faces.

Past research has found an attentional bias for positive relative to neutral stimuli, with a greater attentional bias for stimuli that are more motivationally relevant. Baby faces are an example of a motivationally relevant stimulus because they elicit caretaking behaviors. Building on previous work demonstrating that baby faces capture attention, the current study used breaking continuous flash suppression (bCFS) to investigate whether infant faces are prioritized for access to awareness. On each trial of the task, a face was shown to one eye and a rapidly changing Mondrian pattern to the other. Participants were asked to report the location of the face as soon as it emerged from suppression. The faces were either infant or adult faces, presented in upright or inverted orientation. Despite evidence suggesting that infant faces might reach awareness more quickly than adult faces, the opposite was found: Adult faces reached awareness more quickly than infant faces. Moreover, a stronger face inversion effect was observed for adult versus infant faces, indicating that the shorter suppression times for adult faces were due to increased expertise with adult faces. A past bCFS study demonstrated an own-age face effect for young adults, but it left open the possibility that this effect was due to the youthful appearance of the young versus old faces. The current results rule out this possibility and provide further support for the idea that experience with faces of one's own social group facilitates the access of those faces to awareness. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

The hard problem makes the easy problems hard - a reply to Doerig et al.

In their paper Doerig et al. argue that we should put the hard problem aside and focus on empirical data to solve the 'easy' problems of consciousness - finding the neural and functional correlates of consciousness. In other words 'shut up and measure'. This has worked well with other thorny issues, such as explaining life, so why not adopt this approach here? We argue that despite the popularity of this view it is not feasible. In order to collect any consciousness data one needs to take an implicit or explicit stance on the hard problem.

Unconscious semantic priming from pictures under backward masking and continuous flash suppression.

It is debated whether the meaning of invisible pictures can be processed unconsciously. We tested whether pictures of animals or objects presented under backward masking or continuous flash suppression could prime the subsequent categorization of target words into animal or non-animal. In Experiment 1, the backward masking part failed to replicate the priming effect reported in two previous studies, despite sufficient statistical power (N = 59). Similarly, the continuous flash suppression part provided no evidence for a priming effect. In Experiment 2 (N = 65) we shortened the prime-target SOA from 290 ms to 90 ms, but again failed to obtain unconscious semantic priming under backward masking. Thus, our study did not provide evidence for unconscious semantic processing of pictures. These findings support the emerging view that unconscious processing is rather limited in scope.

Examining motion speed processing in schizophrenia using the flash lag illusion.

Research on visual perception in schizophrenia suggests a deficit in motion processing. Specifically, difficulties with discriminating motion speed are commonly reported. However, speed discrimination tasks typically require participants to make judgments about the difference between two stimuli in a two-interval forced choice (2IFC) task. Such tasks not only tap into speed processing mechanisms, but also rely on higher executive functioning including working memory and attention which has been shown to be compromised in schizophrenia. We used the Flash Lag illusion to examine speed processing in patients with schizophrenia. Based on previous research showing a strong dependence between motion speed and the illusion magnitude, we expected a deficit in speed processing to alter this relationship. A motion processing deficit in patients would also predict overall reductions in perceived lag. We found the magnitude and speed dependence of the Flash Lag illusion to be similar in patients and controls. Together, the findings suggest no general abnormality in motion speed processing in schizophrenia.

A new set of metal-organic frameworks synthesised from diisophthalate-based, 2'-phosphorus-substituted m-terphenyl linker molecules.

Four metal-organic frameworks employing the m-terphenyl diisophthalate linker molecule with 2' substitution by P(v)-based functional groups of the central aryl have been synthesised. The dense packing of POMe2/PSMe2 functional groups within UHM-60/UHM-61 (UHM: University of Hamburg Materials) with an underlying net of ucp topology was overcome by increasing the sterical demand of phosphorus substituents. Replacement of the PEMe2 (E = O, S) functional groups by POEt2 or POPh2 gave UHM-62 and UHM-63, respectively, where valid deconstructions of the underlying topology to types 3,3,4,4T199, tim, and tst were found. The potential influence of the now-accessible phosphoryl functional group towards CO2 and CH4 adsorption as well as the selectivity towards CO2/CH4 separation was studied. Based on a comprehensive survey of literature-known Cu(ii)-based MOFs with m-terphenyl-based linker molecules, we propose the deconstruction of inter-isophthalate plane angles to angular components of twist and fold allowing for the sophisticated classification of topologies that can be realised in Cu(ii)-based MOFs using the m-terphenyl tetracarboxylate linker molecule.

Intact prioritisation of unconscious face processing in schizophrenia.

INTRODUCTION: Faces provide a rich source of social information, crucial for the successful navigation of daily social interactions. People with schizophrenia suffer a wide range of social-cognitive deficits, including abnormalities in face perception. However, to date, studies of face perception in schizophrenia have primarily employed tasks that require patients to make judgements about the faces. It is, thus, unclear whether the reported deficits reflect an impairment in encoding visual face information, or biased social-cognitive evaluative processes. METHODS: We assess the integrity of early unconscious face processing in 21 out-patients diagnosed with Schizophrenia or Schizoaffective Disorder (15M/6F) and 21 healthy controls (14M/7F). In order to control for any direct influence of higher order cognitive processes, we use a behavioural paradigm known as breaking continuous flash suppression (b-CFS), where participants simply respond to the presence and location of a face. In healthy adults, this method has previously been used to show that upright faces gain rapid and privileged access to conscious awareness over inverted faces and other inanimate objects. RESULTS: Here, we report similar effects in patients, suggesting that the early unconscious stages of face processing are intact in schizophrenia. CONCLUSION: Our data indicate that face processing deficits reported in the literature must manifest at a conscious stage of processing, where the influence of mentalizing or attribution biases might play a role.

The danger of interpreting detection differences between image categories: A brief comment on "Mind the snake: Fear detection relies on low spatial frequencies" (Gomes, Soares, Silva, & Silva, 2018).

Using breaking continuous flash suppression (b-CFS; a perceptual suppression technique), Gomes, Soares, Silva, and Silva (2018) showed that human observers have an advantage in detecting images of snakes (constituting an evolutionarily old threat) over birds. In their study, images of snakes and birds were filtered to contain either coarse-scale or fine-grained information. The preferential detection of snakes relied on coarse-scale (rather than fine-grained) information, which was taken as support for the existence of an evolutionarily old subcortical pathway dedicated to snake detection. Here, we raise the concern that images of snakes and birds inherently differ in their visual characteristics, which can strongly affect detection times in b-CFS. Images of snakes, for instance, have a larger perimeter-to-surface ratio than images of birds. Importantly, these visual characteristics are not snake specific, as they are shared with many nonthreatening object categories. To illustrate this point, we compared detection times between images of bicycles and cars-nonthreatening image categories that differ in visual characteristics but for which detection is unlikely to capitalize on an evolutionarily old dedicated subcortical pathway. Observers exhibited an advantage for detecting bicycles over cars. Mirroring the snake-bird differences reported in Gomes et al., this advantage was driven by the coarse-scale (rather than fine-grained) information in the images. Hence, differences in visual characteristics between two nonthreatening, semantically matched stimulus categories suffice to produce the exact same pattern of findings as observed with snakes versus birds. We conclude that spatial frequency-specific detection differences in b-CFS cannot be unequivocally attributed to differences in processing pathways. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

No evidence for abnormal priors in early vision in schizophrenia.

The predictive coding account of psychosis postulates the abnormal formation of prior beliefs in schizophrenia, resulting in psychotic symptoms. One domain in which priors play a crucial role is visual perception. For instance, our perception of brightness, line length, and motion direction are not merely based on a veridical extraction of sensory input but are also determined by expectation (or prior) of the stimulus. Formation of such priors is thought to be governed by the statistical regularities within natural scenes. Recently, the use of such priors has been attributed to a specific set of well-documented visual illusions, supporting the idea that perception is biased toward what is statistically more probable within the environment. The Predictive Coding account of psychosis proposes that patients form abnormal representations of statistical regularities in natural scenes, leading to altered perceptual experiences. Here we use classical vision experiments involving a specific set of visual illusions to directly test this hypothesis. We find that perceptual judgments for both patients and control participants are biased in accordance with reported probability distributions of natural scenes. Thus, despite there being a suggested link between visual abnormalities and psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia, our results provide no support for the notion that altered formation of priors is a general feature of the disorder. These data call for a refinement in the predictions of quantitative models of psychosis.

Unconscious processing of facial dominance: The role of low-level factors in access to awareness.

Visual stimuli with social-emotional relevance have been claimed to gain preferential access to awareness. For example, recent studies used the breaking continuous flash suppression paradigm (b-CFS) to show that faces that are perceived as less dominant and more trustworthy are prioritized for awareness. Here we asked whether these effects truly reflect differences in social-emotional meaning or whether they can be equally explained by differences in low-level stimulus properties. In Experiment 1, we successfully replicated dominance- and untrustworthiness-related slowing for upright faces. However, these effects were equally strong for inverted faces, even though it was more difficult to perceive social characteristics in inverted faces. The previously reported correlation between dominance- and untrustworthiness-related slowing in b-CFS and self-reported propensity to trust did not replicate. Experiment 2 showed that dominance-related slowing in b-CFS can also be observed when only presenting the eye region of faces, and even when the eye region was presented inverted and/or with reversed contrast polarity, in which case personality traits were no longer discernible. These results were replicated in Experiment 3 following a preregistration protocol. Altogether, our findings link dominance-related slowing in b-CFS to physical differences in the eye region that are-when presented in isolation-unrelated to the perception of dominance. We conclude that low-level physical stimulus differences provide a parsimonious explanation for the effect of social facial characteristics on access to awareness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).