Evolutionary game analysis for multi-level collaborative governance under public crisis in China: From a value perception perspective.

In a risk society, the survival and development of humans are facing threats of complex and severe public crisis events. Public participation in collaborative governance (CG) of public crisis events is increasingly recognized as an important direction for the reform of the current and future emergency management system. Previous studies of CG have mainly focused on the macro level and ignored to address micro-level discussions of the behavioral strategy evolution of stakeholders. From a fresh value perception perspective, this study constructs an evolutionary game model to clarify the evolution mechanism of multi-level emergency CG. First, the value perception model is built based on Prospect Theory and Mental Accounting to optimize the traditional game matrix. Second, the evolutionary stability is analyzed to solve the system evolution law. Finally, numerical simulation is conducted in the case of Heilongjiang province, a main region of food and energy supply in China. Results showed that (1) the CG game system has a complex evolutionary path; (2) the behavior of game players is affected by perceived incomes and perceived costs; (3) compared with the reference value and the risk aversion coefficient of income accounts, game players are more sensitive to that of cost accounts; (4) enhancing the perceived value of public psychological satisfaction and government reputation is helpful for the long-term construction of CG. Overall, this study aims to highlight the potential utility of value perception in promoting effective implementations of CG and to provide new insights for the development of CG in China and other countries.

The Mechanism of Social Organization Participation in Natural Hazards Emergency Relief: A Case Study Based on the Social Network Analysis.

The uncertainty and complexity of natural hazards put forward new requirements for emergency management systems. In order to deal with natural hazards effectively, it is important to build a cooperative network between government organizations and social organizations. The social network analysis method is adopted, the April 2013 Ya'an China earthquake is taken as a case study, the institutionalized emergency organization network before the disaster and the actual response organization network after the disaster are analyzed, and centrality, between centrality, closeness centrality and core-periphery are calculated. Through qualitative and quantitative research, the functions of social organization in the process of natural hazards emergency relief are revealed, the role orientation of social organization in the emergency management network is analyzed, and the influence factors of the social organization participation in the natural hazards relief is pointed out. Research results will help to promote the cooperation between social organization and government, and improve the efficiency of natural hazards emergency relief.

The Relationship among Government, Enterprise, and Public in Environmental Governance from the Perspective of Multi-Player Evolutionary Game.

Environmental governance is an important component of the national governance system. China's current environmental problems are particularly complex. How to let the government, enterprises, and the public participate in environmental governance is the key to enhance the ability of environmental governance. Based on the evolutionary game theory, the interaction and influencing factors among enterprise pollution control, government supervision, and public participation are analyzed, and the empirical analysis is carried out based on China's 30 provincial panel data from 2009 to 2018. The research results show that government supervision has a positive effect on the environmental governance and can urge enterprises to actively perform pollution control. The effect of government supervision is constrained by the income and cost of enterprises, and the penalties for passive pollution control should be raised. At the same time, improving the government's reputation loss can effectively stimulate the government's environmental supervision behavior. Public participation significantly promotes the governance effect of three industrial wastes, and the enthusiasm of public participation is closely related to participation cost and psychological benefits. Public participation can replace government supervision to a certain extent. The interaction between government and public has a positive effect on environmental governance. The research results will help to build an effective environmental governance system and improve environmental governance performance and public satisfaction.