Influenza aerosols in UK hospitals during the H1N1 (2009) pandemic--the risk of aerosol generation during medical procedures.

BACKGROUND: Nosocomial infection of health-care workers (HCWs) during outbreaks of respiratory infections (e.g. Influenza A H1N1 (2009)) is a significant concern for public health policy makers. World Health Organization (WHO)-defined 'aerosol generating procedures' (AGPs) are thought to increase the risk of aerosol transmission to HCWs, but there are presently insufficient data to quantify risk accurately or establish a hierarchy of risk-prone procedures. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: This study measured the amount of H1N1 (2009) RNA in aerosols in the vicinity of H1N1 positive patients undergoing AGPs to help quantify the potential risk of transmission to HCWs. There were 99 sampling occasions (windows) producing a total of 198 May stages for analysis in the size ranges 0.86-7.3 µm. Considering stages 2 (4-7.3 µm) and 3 (0.86-4 µm) as comprising one sample, viral RNA was detected in 14 (14.1%) air samples from 10 (25.6%) patients. Twenty three air samples were collected while potential AGPs were being performed of which 6 (26.1%) contained viral RNA; in contrast, 76 May samples were collected when no WHO 2009 defined AGP was being performed of which 8 (10.5%) contained viral RNA (unadjusted OR = 2.84 (95% CI 1.11-7.24) adjusted OR = 4.31 (0.83-22.5)). CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: With our small sample size we found that AGPs do not significantly increase the probability of sampling an H1N1 (2009) positive aerosol (OR (95% CI) = 4.31 (0.83-22.5). Although the probability of detecting positive H1N1 (2009) positive aerosols when performing various AGPs on intensive care patients above the baseline rate (i.e. in the absence of AGPs) did not reach significance, there was a trend towards hierarchy of AGPs, placing bronchoscopy and respiratory and airway suctioning above baseline (background) values. Further, larger studies are required but these preliminary findings may be of benefit to infection control teams.

Diagnostic issues and capabilities in 48 isolation facilities in 16 European countries: data from EuroNHID surveys.

BACKGROUND: Highly infectious diseases (HIDs) are defined as being transmissible from person to person, causing life-threatening illnesses and presenting a serious public health hazard. The sampling, handling and transport of specimens from patients with HIDs present specific bio-safety concerns. FINDINGS: The European Network for HID project aimed to record, in a cross-sectional study, the infection control capabilities of referral centers for HIDs across Europe and assesses the level of achievement to previously published guidelines. In this paper, we report the current diagnostic capabilities and bio-safety measures applied to diagnostic procedures in these referral centers. Overall, 48 isolation facilities in 16 European countries were evaluated. Although 81% of these referral centers are located near a biosafety level 3 laboratory, 11% and 31% of them still performed their microbiological and routine diagnostic analyses, respectively, without bio-safety measures. CONCLUSIONS: The discrepancies among the referral centers surveyed between the level of practices and the European Network of Infectious Diseases (EUNID) recommendations have multiple reasons of which the interest of the individuals in charge and the investment they put in preparedness to emerging outbreaks. Despite the fact that the less prepared centers can improve by just updating their practice and policies any support to help them to achieve an acceptable level of biosecurity is welcome.

Review of Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever infection in Kosova in 2008 and 2009: prolonged viremias and virus detected in urine by PCR.

Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever (CCHF) is a virus transmitted predominantly by ticks. However, contact with infected body fluids or tissues can result in animal-to-human or human-to-human transmission. Numbers of CCHF cases appear to be increasing, especially in Europe. We reviewed cases admitted to a tertiary referral unit in Kosova with suspected CCHF in 2008 and 2009, and looked at a smaller number of specimens which were sent to the Health Protection Agency, Porton Down, U.K., in further detail. The clinical features of cases admitted with suspected CCHF infection were assessed in more detail, and these are the focus of this article. Between 2008 and 2009, the numbers of patients admitted for suspected CCHF infection increased. Of the samples received in Porton Down, CCHF virus was detected in urine samples, and these patients were found to have prolonged viremia. The detection of CCHF in urine, as well as the prolonged viremias seen, are important for clinicians to know, as they may have public health implications with regard to the risk of infection, as well as provide insights into the biology and pathophysiology of infection. Further studies are required regarding the pathogenesis of this virus.

Biosecurity measures in 48 isolation facilities managing highly infectious diseases.

Biosecurity measures are traditionally applied to laboratories, but they may also be usefully applied in highly specialized clinical settings, such as the isolation facilities for the management of patients with highly infectious diseases (eg, viral hemorrhagic fevers, SARS, smallpox, potentially severe pandemic flu, and MDR- and XDR-tuberculosis). In 2009 the European Network for Highly Infectious Diseases conducted a survey in 48 isolation facilities in 16 European countries to determine biosecurity measures for access control to the facility. Security personnel are present in 39 facilities (81%). In 35 facilities (73%), entrance to the isolation area is restricted; control methods include electronic keys, a PIN system, closed-circuit TV, and guards at the doors. In 25 facilities (52%), identification and registration of all staff entering and exiting the isolation area are required. Access control is used in most surveyed centers, but specific lacks exist in some facilities. Further data are needed to assess other biosecurity aspects, such as the security measures during the transportation of potentially contaminated materials and measures to address the risk of an "insider attack."

Infection control management of patients with suspected highly infectious diseases in emergency departments: data from a survey in 41 facilities in 14 European countries.

BACKGROUND: In Emergency and Medical Admission Departments (EDs and MADs), prompt recognition and appropriate infection control management of patients with Highly Infectious Diseases (HIDs, e.g. Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers and SARS) are fundamental for avoiding nosocomial outbreaks. METHODS: The EuroNHID (European Network for Highly Infectious Diseases) project collected data from 41 EDs and MADs in 14 European countries, located in the same facility as a national/regional referral centre for HIDs, using specifically developed checklists, during on-site visits from February to November 2009. RESULTS: Isolation rooms were available in 34 facilities (82,9%): these rooms had anteroom in 19, dedicated entrance in 15, negative pressure in 17, and HEPA filtration of exhausting air in 12. Only 6 centres (14,6%) had isolation rooms with all characteristics. Personnel trained for the recognition of HIDs was available in 24 facilities; management protocols for HIDs were available in 35. CONCLUSIONS: Preparedness level for the safe and appropriate management of HIDs is partially adequate in the surveyed EDs and MADs.

Preventing the next 'SARS' - European healthcare workers' attitudes towards monitoring their health for the surveillance of newly emerging infections: qualitative study.

BACKGROUND: Hospitals are often the epicentres of newly circulating infections. Healthcare workers (HCWs) are at high risk of acquiring infectious diseases and may be among the first to contract emerging infections. This study aims to explore European HCWs' perceptions and attitudes towards monitoring their absence and symptom reports for surveillance of newly circulating infections. METHODS: A qualitative study with thematic analysis was conducted using focus group methodology. Forty-nine hospital-based HCWs from 12 hospitals were recruited to six focus groups; two each in England and Hungary and one each in Germany and Greece. RESULTS: HCWs perceived risk factors for occupationally acquired infectious diseases to be 1.) exposure to patients with undiagnosed infections 2.) break-down in infection control procedures 3.) immuno-naïvety and 4.) symptomatic colleagues. They were concerned that a lack of monitoring and guidelines for infectious HCWs posed a risk to staff and patients and felt employers failed to take a positive interest in their health. Staffing demands and loss of income were noted as pressures to attend work when unwell. In the UK, Hungary and Greece participants felt monitoring staff absence and the routine disclosure of symptoms could be appropriate provided the effectiveness and efficiency of such a system were demonstrable. In Germany, legislation, privacy and confidentiality were identified as barriers. All HCWs highlighted the need for knowledge and structural improvements for timelier recognition of emerging infections. These included increased suspicion and awareness among staff and standardised, homogenous absence reporting systems. CONCLUSIONS: Monitoring absence and infectious disease symptom reports among HCWs may be a feasible means of surveillance for emerging infections in some settings. A pre-requisite will be tackling the drivers for symptomatic HCWs to attend work.

Travellers and viral haemorrhagic fevers: what are the risks?

Viral haemorrhagic fevers (VHF) are caused by zoonotic viral infections transmitted to humans directly or by ticks or mosquitoes. The overall risk to travellers is conservatively estimated at <1 in 1 million travel episodes to African countries where infection is present, and febrile patients returning from these countries are at least 1000 times more likely to have malaria than Lassa fever or another VHF. No cases have been reported in fellow travellers exposed to a travelling case and only one asymptomatic seroconversion (to Lassa) has been reported in over 2000 contacts following care of VHF cases in modern Western hospital settings. However, healthcare-associated transmission of infection has been a major problem in some endemic settings. The potential for healthcare-associated infection and the threats posed by unrecognised or new agents necessitate a high index of suspicion and a standardised risk assessment approach to febrile travellers. Travel-related hantavirus infections are increasingly being reported from Europe and the Americas. This article summarises the epidemiology and reports of travel-related VHF cases in the past 40 years, together with strategies for their recognition, management and prevention.

Ribavirin for Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever: systematic review and meta-analysis.

BACKGROUND: Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever epidemics often occur in areas where health services are limited, and result in high case fatality rates. Besides intensive care, ribavirin is often recommended. A solid evidence base for the use of this drug will help justify assuring access to the drug in areas where epidemics are common. METHODS: We carried out a systematic review of observational and experimental studies of people with suspected or confirmed Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever that included comparisons between patients given ribavirin and those not. We extracted data on mortality, hospital stay, and adverse events. Risk of bias was assessed using a standard checklist, and data were presented in meta-analytical graphs, stratified by study design, and GRADE tables presented. The risk of bias was summarised using the GRADE method. RESULTS: 21 unique studies, including one randomised controlled trial of ribavirin, were included. Quality of the evidence was very low, with a Down and Black median score of 4 (maximum possible 33). Ribavirin treatment was not shown to be superior to no ribavirin treatment for mortality rate in a single RCT (RR: 1.13, 95%CI: 0.29 to 4.32, 136 participants, GRADE=low quality evidence); but ribavirin was associated with reduced mortality by 44% when compared to no ribavirin treatment in the pooled observational studies (RR: 0.56, 95%CI: 0.35 to 0.90, 955 participants; GRADE=very low quality evidence). Adverse events were more common with the ribavirin patients, but no severe adverse events were reported. No difference in length of hospital stay was reported. CONCLUSIONS: No clear message of benefit is available from the current data on ribavirin as observational data are heavily confounded, and the one trial carried out has limited power. However, ribavirin could potentially have benefits in this condition and these results clearly indicate a pragmatic, randomised controlled trial in the context of good quality supportive care, is urgently needed and ethically justified.

WHO Rapid Advice Guidelines for pharmacological management of sporadic human infection with avian influenza A (H5N1) virus.

Recent spread of avian influenza A (H5N1) virus to poultry and wild birds has increased the threat of human infections with H5N1 virus worldwide. Despite international agreement to stockpile antivirals, evidence-based guidelines for their use do not exist. WHO assembled an international multidisciplinary panel to develop rapid advice for the pharmacological management of human H5N1 virus infection in the current pandemic alert period. A transparent methodological guideline process on the basis of the Grading Recommendations, Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) approach was used to develop evidence-based guidelines. Our development of specific recommendations for treatment and chemoprophylaxis of sporadic H5N1 infection resulted from the benefits, harms, burden, and cost of interventions in several patient and exposure groups. Overall, the quality of the underlying evidence for all recommendations was rated as very low because it was based on small case series of H5N1 patients, on extrapolation from preclinical studies, and high quality studies of seasonal influenza. A strong recommendation to treat H5N1 patients with oseltamivir was made in part because of the severity of the disease. Similarly, strong recommendations were made to use neuraminidase inhibitors as chemoprophylaxis in high-risk exposure populations. Emergence of other novel influenza A viral subtypes with pandemic potential, or changes in the pathogenicity of H5N1 virus strains, will require an update of these guidelines and WHO will be monitoring this closely.