The allure of consensus: People (over)seek consensus in selecting group persuasion strategies.

How do people select targets when tasked with persuading a group of people? One approach would be to prioritize getting people in support of the persuader's position to hold relatively extreme attitudes-an extremity strategy. An alternative approach would be to prioritize getting as many people as possible to support the persuader's position, regardless of how extreme they are-a consensus strategy. Although some situations might allow persuaders to combine these strategies, the present work examines how people select targets and strategies when a natural trade-off exists between acquiring fewer people with more extreme attitudes versus more people with less extreme attitudes. Prior work suggests that potential advantages exist for both extremity and consensus strategies. However, the current research finds that people exhibit a strong preference for a consensus strategy when tasked with selecting targets in group persuasion contexts. Further, this preference prevails even when consensus strategies would backfire and cause one's persuasive efforts to fail. This allure of consensus is demonstrated across eight primary experiments, which also reveal why people are drawn to a consensus strategy as well as explore potential boundary conditions for this preference. This work has implications for understanding how persuaders select targets and strategies in the context of group persuasion. In addition, the paradigms and results invite a host of new avenues for future research. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

The Attitude-Behavior Relationship Revisited.

The attitude-behavior relationship is of great import to many areas of psychology. Indeed, psychologists across disciplines have published thousands of articles on the topic. The majority of this research implies that the attitude-behavior relationship is linear. However, observations from 4,101 participants on Amazon's Mechanical Turk and 321,876 online reviews demonstrate that this relationship is systematically nonlinear. Across diverse topics, measures, and contexts, as attitudes move from extremely negative to extremely positive, the corresponding shift in behavior tends to be relatively flat at first (as attitudes move from extremely to moderately negative), to steepen when attitudes cross neutral and shift from negative to positive, and to taper off again as attitudes move from moderately to extremely positive. This result can be explained on the basis of research on categorical perception. The present research suggests a fundamental pivot in how researchers construe, study, and assess the attitude-behavior relationship.

Undermining Your Case to Enhance Your Impact: A Framework for Understanding the Effects of Acts of Receptiveness in Persuasion.

Past research has uncovered actions that would seem to undermine but in fact frequently enhance persuasion. For example, expressing doubt about one's view or presenting arguments against it would seem to weaken one's case, but can sometimes promote it. We propose a framework for understanding these findings. We posit that these actions constitute acts of receptiveness-behaviors that signal openness to new information and opposing viewpoints. We review four classes of acts of receptiveness: conveying uncertainty, acknowledging mistakes, highlighting drawbacks, and asking questions. We identify conditions under which and mechanisms through which these actions boost persuasion. Acts of receptiveness appear to be more persuasive when they come from expert or high-status sources, rather than non-expert or low-status sources, and to operate through two primary mechanisms: increased involvement and enhanced source perceptions. Following a review of this work, we delineate potentially novel acts of receptiveness and outline directions for future research.

Do I support that it's good or oppose that it's bad? The effect of support-oppose framing on attitude sharing.

The rise of social media has led to unprecedented opportunities for individuals to share, or express, their attitudes on social and political issues. What factors affect whether individuals choose to share? This research identifies a novel determinant of attitude sharing-support-oppose framing, defined as whether individuals think of their own attitude in terms of what they support or what they oppose. Support-oppose framing is distinct from attitude valence, as the same attitude can be framed in terms of support (e.g., I support that this policy is bad) or opposition (e.g., I oppose that this policy is good). Seven experiments, two correlational studies, and one field study provide evidence for a support-oppose framing effect, whereby individuals are more likely to share attitudes framed in terms of positions they support rather than positions they oppose. This effect occurs via two pathways. In the first, support-framed attitudes are viewed as more value expressive, which facilitates greater attitude sharing. In the second, support-framed attitudes are believed to promote more positive impressions, which also leads to greater sharing. This effect is attenuated when individuals' typical impression-management goals are relaxed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Individual Differences in Attitude Consistency Over Time: The Personal Attitude Stability Scale.

This research finds evidence for reliable individual differences in people's perceived attitude stability that predict the actual stability of their attitudes over time. Study 1 examines the reliability and factor structure of an 11-item Personal Attitude Stability Scale (PASS). Study 2 establishes test-retest reliability for the PASS over a 5-week period. Studies 3a and 3b demonstrate the convergent and discriminant validity of the PASS in relation to relevant existing individual differences. Studies 4 and 5 show that the PASS predicts attitude stability following a delay period across several distinct topics. Across multiple attitude objects, for people with high (vs. low) scores on the PASS, Time 1 attitudes were more predictive of their Time 2 attitudes, indicative of greater attitudinal consistency over time. The final study also demonstrates that the PASS predicts attitude stability above and beyond other related scales.

Perspective Taking and Self-Persuasion: Why "Putting Yourself in Their Shoes" Reduces Openness to Attitude Change.

Counterattitudinal-argument generation is a powerful tool for opening people up to alternative views. On the basis of decades of research, it should be especially effective when people adopt the perspective of individuals who hold alternative views. In the current research, however, we found the opposite: In three preregistered experiments (total N = 2,734), we found that taking the perspective of someone who endorses a counterattitudinal view lowers receptiveness to that view and reduces attitude change following a counterattitudinal-argument-generation task. This ironic effect can be understood through value congruence: Individuals who take the opposition's perspective generate arguments that are incongruent with their own values, which diminishes receptiveness and attitude change. Thus, trying to "put yourself in their shoes" can ultimately undermine self-persuasion. Consistent with a value-congruence account, this backfire effect is attenuated when people take the perspective of someone who holds the counterattitudinal view yet has similar overall values.

The Curvilinear Relationship Between Attitude Certainty and Attitudinal Advocacy.

Do people advocate more on behalf of their own attitudes and opinions when they feel certain or uncertain? Although considerable past research suggests that people are more likely to advocate when they feel highly certain, there also is evidence for the opposite effect-that people sometimes advocate more when they experience a loss of certainty. The current research seeks to merge these insights. Specifically, we explore the possibility that the relationship between attitude certainty and attitudinal advocacy is curvilinear. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find evidence for a J-shaped curve: Advocacy intentions (and behavior) peak under high certainty, bottom out under moderate certainty, and show an uptick under low (relative to moderate) certainty. We document this relationship and investigate its potential mechanisms in three studies by examining advocacy intentions and the actual advocacy messages participants write when they feel high, moderate, or low certainty.

Valence asymmetries in attitude ambivalence.

Existing models of ambivalence suggest that as the number of conflicting reactions (e.g., attitude components) increases, so too does the experience of ambivalence. Interestingly, though, these models overwhelmingly assume that this relationship is independent of valence. Across 3 studies we observe that this effect is in fact heavily influenced by 2 established valence asymmetries: positivity offset (baseline positive reactions even in the absence of positive information) and negativity bias (greater impact of negative reactions than positive reactions). Consistent with positivity offset, we observe that subjective ambivalence is greater when people have univalent negative rather than univalent positive attitudes. However, as conflicting information is acquired, subjective ambivalence rises more quickly when that information is negative rather than positive. The latter effect is consistent with negativity bias and suggests that although people feel more conflicted when they have only negative (vs. only positive) reactions, they also feel more conflicted when they have mostly positive (vs. mostly negative) reactions. Our investigation also uncovers an interesting consequence of these asymmetries: When people have mixed reactions, they do not experience maximum ambivalence at equal levels of positivity and negativity, as suggested by canonical ambivalence theory. Rather, subjective ambivalence peaks when positive reactions outnumber negative reactions. These effects are found to have downstream consequences for other dimensions of attitude strength. (PsycINFO Database Record

Attitude Certainty and Attitudinal Advocacy: The Unique Roles of Clarity and Correctness.

When and why do people advocate on behalf of their attitudes? Past research suggests that attitude certainty is one important determinant. The current research seeks to provide more nuanced insight into this relationship by (a) exploring the unique roles of attitude clarity and attitude correctness, and (b) mapping clarity and correctness onto different forms of advocacy (sharing intentions and persuasion intentions). Across four studies, we find that correctness but not clarity plays an important role in promoting persuasion intentions, whereas both correctness and clarity help shape sharing intentions. Thus, this research unpacks the certainty-advocacy relation and helps identify experimental manipulations that uniquely drive persuasion and sharing intentions.

Motivated reflection on attitude-inconsistent information: an exploration of the role of fear of invalidity in self-persuasion.

The mere thought effect is defined in part by the tendency of self-reflective thought to heighten the generation of and reflection on attitude-consistent thoughts. By focusing on individuals' fears of invalidity, we explored the possibility that the mere opportunity for thought sometimes motivates reflection on attitude-inconsistent thoughts. Across three experiments, dispositional and situational fear of invalidity was shown to heighten reflection on attitude-inconsistent thoughts. This heightened reflection, in turn, interacted with individuals' thought confidence to determine whether attitude-inconsistent thoughts were assimilated or refuted and consequently whether individuals' attitudes and behavioral intentions depolarized or polarized following a sufficient opportunity for thought, respectively. These findings emphasize the impact of motivational influences on thought reflection and generation, the importance of thought confidence in the assimilation and refutation of self-generated thought, and the dynamic means by which the mere thought bias can impact self-persuasion.

Weak > strong: the ironic effect of argument strength on supportive advocacy.

When people seek support for a cause, they typically present the strongest case they can muster. The present research suggests that under some conditions, the opposite strategy may be superior-in particular, presenting weak rather than strong arguments might stimulate greater advocacy and action. Across four studies, we show that when individuals already agree with a cause (i.e., it is pro-attitudinal), receiving weak arguments in its favor can prompt them into advocating more on its behalf. Perceived argumentation efficacy mediates this effect such that people exposed to weak arguments are more likely to think they have something valuable to contribute. Moreover, consistent with the notion that it is driven by feelings of increased efficacy, the effect is more likely to emerge when initial argumentation efficacy and attitude certainty are moderate or low. Individuals with high argumentation efficacy and high certainty generally advocate more, regardless of the strength of arguments received.

The preference for potential.

When people seek to impress others, they often do so by highlighting individual achievements. Despite the intuitive appeal of this strategy, we demonstrate that people often prefer potential rather than achievement when evaluating others. Indeed, compared with references to achievement (e.g., "this person has won an award for his work"), references to potential (e.g., "this person could win an award for his work") appear to stimulate greater interest and processing, which can translate into more favorable reactions. This tendency creates a phenomenon whereby the potential to be good at something can be preferred over actually being good at that very same thing. We document this preference for potential in laboratory and field experiments, using targets ranging from athletes to comedians to graduate school applicants and measures ranging from salary allocations to online ad clicks to admission decisions.

Cognitive and affective matching effects in persuasion: an amplification perspective.

Past research suggests that cognitive and affective attitudes are more open to change toward cognitive and affective (i.e., matched) persuasive attacks, respectively. The present research investigates how attitude certainty influences this openness. Although an extensive literature suggests that certainty generally reduces an attitude's openness to change, the authors explore the possibility that certainty might increase an attitude's openness to change in the context of affective or cognitive appeals. Based on the recently proposed amplification hypothesis, the authors posit that high (vs. low) attitude certainty will boost the resistance of attitudes to mismatched attacks (e.g., affective attitudes attacked by cognitive messages) but boost the openness of attitudes to matched attacks (e.g., affective attitudes attacked by affective messages). Two experiments provide support for this hypothesis. Implications for increasing the openness of attitudes to both matched and mismatched attacks are discussed.

Does fast or slow evaluation foster greater certainty?

This research investigates the effect of perceived evaluation duration--that is, the perceived time or speed with which one generates an evaluation--on attitude certainty. Integrating diverse findings from past research, the authors propose that perceiving either fast or slow evaluation can augment attitude certainty depending on specifiable factors. Across three studies, it is shown that when people express opinions, evaluate familiar objects, or typically trust their gut reactions, perceiving fast rather than slow evaluation generally promotes greater certainty. In contrast, when people form opinions, evaluate unfamiliar objects, or typically trust more thoughtful responses, perceiving slow rather than fast evaluation generally promotes greater certainty. Mediation analyses reveal that these effects stem from trade-offs between perceived rational thought and the perceived ease of retrieving an attitude. Implications for research on deliberative versus intuitive decision making are discussed.

Counterfactual potency.

Counterfactual thoughts typically take the form of implied or explicit if-then statements. We propose that the multiplicative combination of "if likelihood" (the degree to which the antecedent condition of the counterfactual is perceived to be likely) and "then likelihood" (the perceived conditional likelihood of the outcome of the counterfactual, given the antecedent condition) determine the strength and impact of counterfactuals. This construct, termed counterfactual potency, is a reliable predictor of the degree of influence of counterfactual thinking upon judgments of regret, causation, and responsibility. Through 4 studies, we demonstrate the predictive power of this construct in a variety of contexts and show that it plays a causal role in determining the strength of the effects of counterfactual thought. Implications of counterfactual potency as a central factor of counterfactual influence are discussed.

"Think" versus "feel" framing effects in persuasion.

Three studies explored think ("I think . . . ") versus feel ("I feel . . . ") message framing effects on persuasion.The authors propose a matching hypothesis, suggesting that think framing will be more persuasive when the target attitude or message recipient is cognitively oriented, whereas feel framing will be more persuasive when the target attitude or message recipient is affectively oriented. Study 1 presented cognitively and affectively oriented individuals with a think- or feel-framed message. Study 2 primed cognitive or affective orientation and then presented a think- or feel-framed message. Study 3 presented male and female participants with an advertisement containing think- or feel-framed arguments. Results indicated that think (feel) framing was more persuasive when the target attitude or recipient was cognitively (affectively) oriented. Moreover, Study 2 demonstrated that this matching effect was mediated by processing fluency. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

The effects of minority/majority source status on attitude certainty: a matching perspective.

Building on recent work exploring metacognitive factors in minority/majority influence, three studies tested the hypothesis that when people receive persuasive messages from sources in the minority or majority, their attitude certainty can be determined by the extent to which source status and perceived argument quality match or mismatch. In Study 1, participants were presented with strong or weak arguments from a minority or majority source. Minority condition participants reported greater attitude certainty when arguments were weak rather than strong. Majority condition participants showed the opposite effect. Study 2 replicated this interaction using a manipulation of perceived rather than actual argument quality. In Study 3, these effects only emerged when message recipients' processing motivation was high. Taken together, the results suggest that attitude certainty can be high or low following minority or majority messages, depending on processing motivation and message recipients' assessments of other persuasive evidence.

A new look at the consequences of attitude certainty: the amplification hypothesis.

It is well established that increasing attitude certainty makes attitudes more resistant to attack and more predictive of behavior. This finding has been interpreted as indicating that attitude certainty crystallizes attitudes, making them more durable and impactful. The current research challenges this crystallization hypothesis and proposes an amplification hypothesis, which suggests that instead of invariably strengthening an attitude, attitude certainty amplifies the dominant effect of the attitude on thought, judgment, and behavior. In 3 experiments, the authors test these competing hypotheses by comparing the effects of attitude certainty manipulations on univalent versus ambivalent attitudes. Across experiments, it is demonstrated that increasing attitude certainty strengthens attitudes (e.g., increases their resistance to persuasion) when attitudes are univalent but weakens attitudes (e.g., decreases their resistance to persuasion) when attitudes are ambivalent. These results are consistent with the amplification hypothesis.

The perceived informational basis of attitudes: implications for subjective ambivalence.

Three studies tested the hypothesis that when people receive persuasive messages, their perceptions of the information on which they base their attitudes can determine feelings of subjective ambivalence. Across studies, it is shown that when elaboration (e.g., need for cognition, personal relevance) is high, people have more subjective ambivalence when they perceive that they have based their attitudes on the source of a message rather than the arguments contained in that message. When elaboration is low, this effect is reversed. These findings suggest that people can assess the informational basis of their attitudes and that these assessments influence feelings of attitude ambivalence.

Ease of retrieval effects in social judgment: the role of unrequested cognitions.

The present research explores a new mechanism for ease of retrieval effects in social judgment. It is suggested that in the most common ease of retrieval paradigm, when it is difficult for people to generate or retrieve the specific type of cognition requested (e.g., positive thoughts about an issue or memories of assertive behavior), they are more likely to spontaneously generate or retrieve unrequested cognitions (e.g., negative thoughts about the issue or memories of unassertive behavior), and the presence of these unrequested cognitions can affect social judgment. In 4 experiments, participants were asked to generate a high (difficult) or low (easy) number of cognitions in a given direction. Across experiments, when participants were asked to generate a high number of cognitions, they also had more unrequested cognitions, and these unrequested cognitions played a mediating role in the ease of retrieval effect on judgment. In the 3rd and 4th experiments, this mechanism was found to be independent of previously identified mediators.