Naming and shaming as a strategy for enforcing the Paris Agreement: The role of political institutions and public concern.

Enforcement is a challenge for effective international cooperation. In human rights and environmental law, along with many other domains of international cooperation, "naming and shaming" is often used as an enforcement mechanism in the absence of stronger alternatives. Naming and shaming hinges on the ability to identify countries whose efforts are inadequate and effectively shame them toward better behavior. Research on this approach has struggled to identify factors that explain when it influences state behavior in ways that lead to more cooperation. Via survey of a large (N = 910) novel sample of experienced diplomats involved in the design of the Paris Agreement, we find support for the proposition that naming and shaming is most accepted and effective in influencing the behavior of countries that have high-quality political institutions, strong internal concern about climate change, and ambitious and credible international climate commitments. Naming and shaming appears less effective in other countries, so further enforcement mechanisms will be needed for truly global cooperation. We also find that the climate diplomacy experts favor a process of naming and shaming that relies on official intergovernmental actors, in contrast with studies suggesting that NGOs, media, and other private actors are more effective at naming and shaming. We suggest that these tensions-the inability for naming and shaming to work effectively within the countries least motivated for climate action and the preference for namers and shamers that seem least likely to be effective-will become central policy debates around making cooperation on climate change more enforceable.

Emergency deployment of direct air capture as a response to the climate crisis.

Though highly motivated to slow the climate crisis, governments may struggle to impose costly polices on entrenched interest groups, resulting in a greater need for negative emissions. Here, we model wartime-like crash deployment of direct air capture (DAC) as a policy response to the climate crisis, calculating funding, net CO2 removal, and climate impacts. An emergency DAC program, with investment of 1.2-1.9% of global GDP annually, removes 2.2-2.3 GtCO2 yr-1 in 2050, 13-20 GtCO2 yr-1 in 2075, and 570-840 GtCO2 cumulatively over 2025-2100. Compared to a future in which policy efforts to control emissions follow current trends (SSP2-4.5), DAC substantially hastens the onset of net-zero CO2 emissions (to 2085-2095) and peak warming (to 2090-2095); yet warming still reaches 2.4-2.5 °C in 2100. Such massive CO2 removals hinge on near-term investment to boost the future capacity for upscaling. DAC is most cost-effective when using electricity sources already available today: hydropower and natural gas with renewables; fully renewable systems are more expensive because their low load factors do not allow efficient amortization of capital-intensive DAC plants.

Unintended Effects of Residential Energy Storage on Emissions from the Electric Power System.

In many jurisdictions, policy-makers are seeking to decentralize the electric power system while also promoting deep reductions in the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG). We examine the potential roles for residential energy storage (RES), a technology thought to be at the epicenter of these twin revolutions. We model the impact of grid-connected RES operation on electricity costs and GHG emissions for households in 16 of the largest U.S. utility service territories under 3 plausible operational modes. Regardless of operation mode, RES mostly increases emissions when users seek to minimize their electricity cost. When operated with the goal of minimizing emissions, RES can reduce average household emissions by 2.2-6.4%, implying a cost equivalent of $180 to $5160 per metric ton of carbon dioxide avoided. While RES is costly compared with many other emission-control measures, tariffs that internalize the social cost of carbon would reduce emissions by 0.1-5.9% relative to cost-minimizing operation. Policy-makers should be careful about assuming that decentralization will clean the electric power system, especially if it proceeds without carbon-mindful tariff reforms.

Evaluation of a proposal for reliable low-cost grid power with 100% wind, water, and solar.

A number of analyses, meta-analyses, and assessments, including those performed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, and the International Energy Agency, have concluded that deployment of a diverse portfolio of clean energy technologies makes a transition to a low-carbon-emission energy system both more feasible and less costly than other pathways. In contrast, Jacobson et al. [Jacobson MZ, Delucchi MA, Cameron MA, Frew BA (2015) Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 112(49):15060-15065] argue that it is feasible to provide "low-cost solutions to the grid reliability problem with 100% penetration of WWS [wind, water and solar power] across all energy sectors in the continental United States between 2050 and 2055", with only electricity and hydrogen as energy carriers. In this paper, we evaluate that study and find significant shortcomings in the analysis. In particular, we point out that this work used invalid modeling tools, contained modeling errors, and made implausible and inadequately supported assumptions. Policy makers should treat with caution any visions of a rapid, reliable, and low-cost transition to entire energy systems that relies almost exclusively on wind, solar, and hydroelectric power.

The role of self-interest in elite bargaining.

One of the best-known and most replicated laboratory results in behavioral economics is that bargainers frequently reject low offers, even when it harms their material self-interest. This finding could have important implications for international negotiations on many problems facing humanity today, because models of international bargaining assume exactly the opposite: that policy makers are rational and self-interested. However, it is unknown whether elites who engage in diplomatic bargaining will similarly reject low offers because past research has been based almost exclusively on convenience samples of undergraduates, members of the general public, or small-scale societies rather than highly experienced elites who design and bargain over policy. Using a unique sample of 102 policy and business elites who have an average of 21 y of practical experience conducting international diplomacy or policy strategy, we show that, compared with undergraduates and the general public, elites are actually more likely to reject low offers when playing a standard "ultimatum game" that assesses how players bargain over a fixed resource. Elites with more experience tend to make even higher demands, suggesting that this tendency only increases as policy makers advance to leadership positions. This result contradicts assumptions of rational self-interested behavior that are standard in models of international bargaining, and it suggests that the adoption of global agreements on international trade, climate change, and other important problems will not depend solely on the interests of individual countries, but also on whether these accords are seen as equitable to all member states.

Regulating the geological sequestration of CO2.

Governments worldwide should provide incentives for initial large-scale GS projects to help build the knowledge base for a mature, internationally harmonized GS regulatory framework. Health, safety, and environmental risks of these early projects can be managed through modifications of existing regulations in the EU, Australia, Canada, and the U.S. An institutional mechanism, such as the proposed Federal Carbon Sequestration Commission in the U.S., should gather data from these early projects and combine them with factors such as GS industrial organization and climate regime requirements to create an efficient and adaptive regulatory framework suited to large-scale deployment. Mechanisms to structure long-term liability and fund long-term postclosure care must be developed, most likely at the national level, to equitably balance the risks and benefits of this important climate change mitigation technology. We need to do this right. During the initial field experiences, a single major accident, resulting from inadequate regulatory oversight, anywhere in the world, could seriously endanger the future viability of GS. That, in turn, could make it next to impossible to achieve the needed dramatic global reductions in CO2 emissions over the next several decades. We also need to do it quickly. Emissions are going up, the climate is changing, and impacts are growing. The need for safe and effective CO2 capture with deep GS is urgent.