Eyewitness confidence and decision time reflect identification accuracy in actual police lineups.

OBJECTIVE: Although there are many lab-based studies demonstrating the utility of confidence and decision time as indicators of eyewitness accuracy, there is almost no research on how well these variables function for lineups in the real world. In two experiments, we examined confidence and decision time associated with real lineups that had been conducted using research-based recommendations. HYPOTHESES: We expected that how confident an eyewitness sounded and how quickly that eyewitness made their identification would be associated with whether that eyewitness identified a suspect or a filler. We also hypothesized that people's interpretations of eyewitness confidence could be easily influenced by additional, biasing information. METHOD: Using audio recordings of these lineups, we examined (a) participants' subjective ratings of how confident an eyewitness sounded at the time of the identification and (b) objective data regarding how quickly the eyewitness made the identification decision. We also manipulated what additional information, if any, participants received in Experiment 2. RESULTS: In both experiments, decision time and confidence predicted whether the eyewitnesses identified the suspect or a known-innocent filler, and when decision time and confidence diverged, it is likely that the eyewitness identified a filler. In Experiment 2, we found that people's interpretations of eyewitness's confidence statements could be biased. When observers believed that the witness picked a filler rather than a suspect, or vice versa, this changed how confident they thought the witness sounded. CONCLUSIONS: Confidence and decision time should both be collected when administering real lineups, but objective decision time data may be the most useful because people's perceptions of confidence are easily altered. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Improving face identification of mask-wearing individuals.

Research has consistently shown that concealing facial features can hinder subsequent identification. The widespread adoption of face masks due to the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the critical and urgent need to discover techniques to improve identification of people wearing face coverings. Despite years of research on face recognition and eyewitness identifications, there are currently no evidence-based recommendations for lineup construction for cases involving masked individuals. The purpose of this study was to examine identification accuracy of a masked perpetrator as a function of lineup type (i.e., unmasked or masked lineups) and perpetrator presence (i.e., absent or present). In both experiments, discriminability was superior for masked lineups, a result that was due almost exclusively to higher hits rates in target-present conditions. These data suggest that presenting a masked lineup can enhance identification of masked faces, and they have important implications for both eyewitness identification and everyday face recognition of people with face coverings.

Test a Witness's Memory of a Suspect Only Once.

Eyewitness misidentifications are almost always made with high confidence in the courtroom. The courtroom is where eyewitnesses make their last identification of defendants suspected of (and charged with) committing a crime. But what did those same eyewitnesses do on the first identification test, conducted early in a police investigation? Despite testifying with high confidence in court, many eyewitnesses also testified that they had initially identified the suspect with low confidence or failed to identify the suspect at all. Presenting a lineup leaves the eyewitness with a memory trace of the faces in the lineup, including that of the suspect. As a result, the memory signal generated by the face of that suspect will be stronger on a later test involving the same witness, even if the suspect is innocent. In that sense, testing memory contaminates memory. These considerations underscore the importance of a newly proposed recommendation for conducting eyewitness identifications: Avoid repeated identification procedures with the same witness and suspect. This recommendation applies not only to additional tests conducted by police investigators but also to the final test conducted in the courtroom, in front of the judge and jury.

Eyewitnesses' free-report verbal confidence statements are diagnostic of accuracy.

OBJECTIVES: We assessed recent policy recommendations to collect eyewitnesses' confidence statements in witnesses' own words as opposed to numerically. We conducted an experiment to test whether eyewitnesses' free-report verbal confidence statements are as diagnostic of eyewitness accuracy as their numeric confidence statements and whether the diagnostic utility of eyewitnesses' verbal and numeric confidence statements varies across witnessing conditions. HYPOTHESES: We hypothesized that eyewitnesses' verbal and numeric confidence statements are both significantly associated with identification accuracy among choosers and that their diagnostic utility holds across varying witnessing conditions. METHOD: In the first phase of the experiment, eyewitnesses (N = 4,795 MTurkers; 48.8% female; 50.8% male; .3% other; age M = 36.9) viewed a videotaped mock-crime and made an identification decision from a culprit-present or culprit-absent lineup. We manipulated witnessing conditions at encoding and retrieval to obtain varied levels of memory performance. In the second phase of the experiment, evaluators (N = 456 MTurkers; 35.5% female; 62.7% male .4% other; age M = 36.5) translated witnesses' verbal confidence statements to a numeric estimate and we used calibration and confidence-accuracy characteristic analyses to compare the diagnosticity of witnesses' verbal and numeric confidence statements across the two levels of memory performance. RESULTS: Witnesses' verbal and numeric confidence statements were significantly and nondifferentially diagnostic of eyewitness accuracy for both choosers and nonchoosers, and their diagnostic utility held across variations in witnessing conditions. CONCLUSIONS: These findings suggest the applied utility of collecting either verbal or numeric confidence statements from eyewitnesses immediately following an identification decision. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Psychological science on eyewitness identification and its impact on police practices and policies.

The development of forensic DNA testing has led to the discovery of hundreds of cases of mistaken eyewitness identification in which innocent people were convicted. Although these discoveries of wrongful convictions from mistaken identification based on DNA testing have been a surprise and shock to the legal system and the public, psychological scientists have been less surprised. This is because psychological scientists were "blowing the whistle" on the eyewitness identification problem for decades prior to forensic DNA testing. Today, most law enforcement agencies in the United States have adopted reformed policies and procedures on eyewitness identification that are based on research by experimental social and cognitive psychologists. This article describes core aspects of this research and how the research has managed to have this impact on the U.S. legal system. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Distinguishing Between Investigator Discriminability and Eyewitness Discriminability: A Method for Creating Full Receiver Operating Characteristic Curves of Lineup Identification Performance.

The conceptual frameworks provided by both the lineups-as-experiments analogy and signal detection theory have proven important to understanding how eyewitness lineups work. The lineups-as-experiments analogy proposes that when investigators use a lineup procedure, they are acting as experimenters and should therefore follow the same tried-and-true procedures that experimenters follow when executing an experiment. Signal detection theory offers a framework for distinguishing between factors that improve the trade-off between culprit and innocent-suspect identifications and factors that affect the frequency of suspect identifications. We integrate these two conceptual frameworks. We argue that an eyewitness lineup procedure is characterized by two simultaneous signal detection tasks. On one hand, the witness is tasked with determining whether the culprit is present in the lineup and identifying that person. On the other hand, the investigator knows which lineup member is the suspect and which lineup members are known-innocent fillers and is therefore tasked only with determining whether the suspect is the culprit. The investigator uses the witness's identification decision and associated level of confidence to decide whether the suspect is the culprit. We leverage this realization to demonstrate a method for creating full receiver operating characteristic curves for eyewitness lineup procedures.

Policy and procedure recommendations for the collection and preservation of eyewitness identification evidence.

OBJECTIVE: The Executive Committee of the American Psychology-Law Society (Division 41 of the American Psychological Association) appointed a subcommittee to update the influential 1998 scientific review paper on guidelines for eyewitness identification procedures. METHOD: This was a collaborative effort by six senior eyewitness researchers, who all participated in the writing process. Feedback from members of AP-LS and the legal communities was solicited over an 18-month period. RESULTS: The results yielded nine recommendations for planning, designing, and conducting eyewitness identification procedures. Four of the recommendations were from the 1998 article and concerned the selection of lineup fillers, prelineup instructions to witnesses, the use of double-blind procedures, and collection of a confidence statement. The additional five recommendations concern the need for law enforcement to conduct a prelineup interview of the witness, the need for evidence-based suspicion before conducting an identification procedure, video-recording of the entire procedure, avoiding repeated identification attempts with the same witness and same suspect, and avoiding the use of showups when possible and improving how showups are conducted when they are necessary. CONCLUSIONS: The reliability and integrity of eyewitness identification evidence is highly dependent on the procedures used by law enforcement for collecting and preserving the eyewitness evidence. These nine recommendations can advance the reliability and integrity of the evidence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Mistaken eyewitness identification rates increase when either witnessing or testing conditions get worse.

We examined how giving eyewitnesses a weak recognition experience impacts their identification decisions. In 2 experiments we forced a weak recognition experience for lineups by impairing either encoding or retrieval conditions. In Experiment 1 (n = 245), undergraduate participants were randomly assigned to watch either a clear or a degraded culprit video and then viewed either a culprit-present or culprit-removed lineup identification procedure. In Experiment 2 (n = 227), all participants watched the same clear culprit video but were then randomly assigned to either view a clear or noise-degraded lineup procedure. Half of the participants viewed a culprit-present lineup procedure and the remaining participants viewed a culprit-removed lineup procedure. Not surprisingly, degrading either encoding or retrieval conditions led to a sharp drop in culprit identifications. Critically, and as predicted, degrading either encoding or retrieval conditions also led to a sharp increase in the identification of innocent persons. These results suggest that when a lineup procedure gives a witness a weak match-to-memory experience, the witness will lower her criterion for making an affirmative identification decision. This pattern of results is troubling because it suggests that witnesses who encounter lineups that do not include the culprit might have a tendency to use a lower criterion for identification than do witnesses who encounter lineups that actually include the culprit. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Do masked-face lineups facilitate eyewitness identification of a masked individual?

Perpetrators often wear disguises like ski masks to hinder subsequent identification by witnesses or law enforcement officials. In criminal cases involving a masked perpetrator, the decision of whether and how to administer a lineup often rests on the investigating officer. To date, no evidence-based recommendations are available for eyewitness identifications of a masked perpetrator. In 4 experiments, we examined lineup identification performance depending on variations in both encoding (studying a full face vs. a partial/masked face) and retrieval conditions (identifying a target from a full-face lineup vs. a partial/masked-face lineup). In addition, we manipulated whether the target was present or absent in the lineup in Experiments 3 and 4. Across all experiments, when participants had encoded a masked face, the masked-face lineup increased identification accuracy relative to the full-face lineup. These data provide preliminary evidence that matching lineup construction to how witnesses originally encoded the perpetrator may enhance the accuracy of eyewitness identifications. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Four utilities in eyewitness identification practice: Dissociations between receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis and expected utility analysis.

The present article focuses on a utility-based understanding of criminal justice practice regarding eyewitness identifications. We argue that there are 4 distinct types of utility that should be considered when evaluating an identification procedure. These include the utility associated with all identifications, the utility associated with only the high confidence identifications, the average utility across the full range of identifications, and the maximum utility that can be attained by selecting an ideal criterion. We show that in almost all cases in which the difference between 2 procedures is defined by a tradeoff between increased guilty suspect IDs and increased innocent suspect IDs, current ROC (receiver operating characteristic) curve approaches fail to provide unambiguous information about which eyewitness identification procedures are best in practice. We introduce a novel graphical technique called utility difference curves that illustrates the impact that differential assumptions about base rates and cost structures have on the likely benefits of different identification procedures. The research emphasizes the importance of considering assumptions about base rates and costs associated with different types of eyewitness errors. We also clarify situations in which the outcome of eyewitness experiments are unambiguous and those in which careful consideration of tradeoffs are necessary. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Fillers can help control for contextual bias in forensic comparison tasks.

Forensic examiners are often exposed to contextual information that can bias their conclusions about evidence samples (e.g., fingerprints, fibers, tool marks). We tested the recently proposed filler-control method for moderating the biasing effects of contextual information for forensic comparisons. Borrowing from an analogy to eyewitness lineups versus showups, the filler-control method embeds a suspect's sample among known-innocent samples rather than the standard practice of presenting the analyst with only the suspect's sample for comparison. Our test of the filler-control method used fingerprints. After brief training, 234 participants compared eight sets of fingerprints in which suspect prints either matched the crime print or not, the prints were high or low in ambiguity, there was or was not contextual information suggesting there should be a match, and the suspect print was either embedded among filler prints or presented alone. Although the filler-control procedure reduced both hits and false alarms, the filler-control procedure produced better results overall as measured by d' analyses on suspect samples. These findings suggest the filler-control procedure should be considered for use in everyday forensic examination judgments, particularly when the error rate for a technique is unknown, or the risk of contextual bias is obvious, such as when examiners are called to make verification decisions. (PsycINFO Database Record

Eyewitness identification performance on showups improves with an additional-opportunities instruction: Evidence for present-absent criteria discrepancy.

We tested the proposition that when eyewitnesses find it difficult to recognize a suspect (as in a culprit-absent showup), eyewitnesses accept a weaker match to memory for making an identification. We tie this proposition to the basic recognition memory literature, which shows people use lower decision criteria when recognition is made difficult so as to not miss their chance of getting a hit on the target. We randomly assigned participant-witnesses (N = 610) to a condition in which they were told that if they did not believe the suspect was the culprit, they would have additional opportunities to make an identification later (additional-opportunities instruction). We fully crossed this instruction with the standard admonition (i.e., the culprit may or may not be present) and with the presence or absence of the culprit in a showup identification procedure. The standard admonition had no impact on eyewitness decision-making; however, the additional-opportunities instruction reduced innocent-suspect identifications (from 33% to 15%) to a greater extent than culprit identifications (57% to 51%). The additional-opportunities instruction yielded a better tradeoff between culprit and innocent-suspect identifications as indicated by binary logistic regression and receiver operator characteristic (ROC) analyses. (PsycINFO Database Record

The Relationship Between Eyewitness Confidence and Identification Accuracy: A New Synthesis.

The U.S. legal system increasingly accepts the idea that the confidence expressed by an eyewitness who identified a suspect from a lineup provides little information as to the accuracy of that identification. There was a time when this pessimistic assessment was entirely reasonable because of the questionable eyewitness-identification procedures that police commonly employed. However, after more than 30 years of eyewitness-identification research, our understanding of how to properly conduct a lineup has evolved considerably, and the time seems ripe to ask how eyewitness confidence informs accuracy under more pristine testing conditions (e.g., initial, uncontaminated memory tests using fair lineups, with no lineup administrator influence, and with an immediate confidence statement). Under those conditions, mock-crime studies and police department field studies have consistently shown that, for adults, (a) confidence and accuracy are strongly related and (b) high-confidence suspect identifications are remarkably accurate. However, when certain non-pristine testing conditions prevail (e.g., when unfair lineups are used), the accuracy of even a high-confidence suspect ID is seriously compromised. Unfortunately, some jurisdictions have not yet made reforms that would create pristine testing conditions and, hence, our conclusions about the reliability of high-confidence identifications cannot yet be applied to those jurisdictions. However, understanding the information value of eyewitness confidence under pristine testing conditions can help the criminal justice system to simultaneously achieve both of its main objectives: to exonerate the innocent (by better appreciating that initial, low-confidence suspect identifications are error prone) and to convict the guilty (by better appreciating that initial, high-confidence suspect identifications are surprisingly accurate under proper testing conditions).

Fair lineups are better than biased lineups and showups, but not because they increase underlying discriminability.

Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) analysis has recently come in vogue for assessing the underlying discriminability and the applied utility of lineup procedures. Two primary assumptions underlie recommendations that ROC analysis be used to assess the applied utility of lineup procedures: (a) ROC analysis of lineups measures underlying discriminability, and (b) the procedure that produces superior underlying discriminability produces superior applied utility. These same assumptions underlie a recently derived diagnostic-feature detection theory, a theory of discriminability, intended to explain recent patterns observed in ROC comparisons of lineups. We demonstrate, however, that these assumptions are incorrect when ROC analysis is applied to lineups. We also demonstrate that a structural phenomenon of lineups, differential filler siphoning, and not the psychological phenomenon of diagnostic-feature detection, explains why lineups are superior to showups and why fair lineups are superior to biased lineups. In the process of our proofs, we show that computational simulations have assumed, unrealistically, that all witnesses share exactly the same decision criteria. When criterial variance is included in computational models, differential filler siphoning emerges. The result proves dissociation between ROC curves and underlying discriminability: Higher ROC curves for lineups than for showups and for fair than for biased lineups despite no increase in underlying discriminability. (PsycINFO Database Record

A Bayesian analysis on the (dis)utility of iterative-showup procedures: The moderating impact of prior probabilities.

A showup is an identification procedure in which a lone suspect is presented to the eyewitness for an identification attempt. Showups are commonly used when law enforcement personnel locate a suspect near the scene of a crime in both time and space but lack probable cause to make an arrest. If an eyewitness rejects a suspect from a showup, law enforcement personnel might find another suspect and run another showup. Indeed, law enforcement personnel might go through several iterations of finding suspects and running showups with the same eyewitness. We label this phenomenon the iterative-showup procedure. The consequence of this procedure is that innocent suspect identifications increase disproportionately to culprit identifications. This happens because there is only one culprit, but a seemingly endless supply of innocent suspects. We apply Bayesian modeling to single- and iterative-showup procedures to demonstrate that iterative showups are almost always associated with lower probative value. We demonstrate that the prior probabilities that later suspects are the culprit are greatly constrained by the posterior probabilities that earlier suspects were the culprit. Identifications from iterative-showup procedures are of questionable reliability. We review alternative investigative strategies that police might consider in order to limit the use of iterative-showup procedures. (PsycINFO Database Record

Eyewitness identification: Bayesian information gain, base-rate effect equivalency curves, and reasonable suspicion.

We provide a novel Bayesian treatment of the eyewitness identification problem as it relates to various system variables, such as instruction effects, lineup presentation format, lineup-filler similarity, lineup administrator influence, and show-ups versus lineups. We describe why eyewitness identification is a natural Bayesian problem and how numerous important observations require careful consideration of base rates. Moreover, we argue that the base rate in eyewitness identification should be construed as a system variable (under the control of the justice system). We then use prior-by-posterior curves and information-gain curves to examine data obtained from a large number of published experiments. Next, we show how information-gain curves are moderated by system variables and by witness confidence and we note how information-gain curves reveal that lineups are consistently more proficient at incriminating the guilty than they are at exonerating the innocent. We then introduce a new type of analysis that we developed called base rate effect-equivalency (BREE) curves. BREE curves display how much change in the base rate is required to match the impact of any given system variable. The results indicate that even relatively modest changes to the base rate can have more impact on the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence than do the traditional system variables that have received so much attention in the literature. We note how this Bayesian analysis of eyewitness identification has implications for the question of whether there ought to be a reasonable-suspicion criterion for placing a person into the jeopardy of an identification procedure.

Double-blind photo lineups using actual eyewitnesses: an experimental test of a sequential versus simultaneous lineup procedure.

Eyewitnesses (494) to actual crimes in 4 police jurisdictions were randomly assigned to view simultaneous or sequential photo lineups using laptop computers and double-blind administration. The sequential procedure used in the field experiment mimicked how it is conducted in actual practice (e.g., using a continuation rule, witness does not know how many photos are to be viewed, witnesses resolve any multiple identifications), which is not how most lab experiments have tested the sequential lineup. No significant differences emerged in rates of identifying lineup suspects (25% overall) but the sequential procedure produced a significantly lower rate (11%) of identifying known-innocent lineup fillers than did the simultaneous procedure (18%). The simultaneous/sequential pattern did not significantly interact with estimator variables and no lineup-position effects were observed for either the simultaneous or sequential procedures. Rates of nonidentification were not significantly different for simultaneous and sequential but nonidentifiers from the sequential procedure were more likely to use the "not sure" response option than were nonidentifiers from the simultaneous procedure. Among witnesses who made an identification, 36% (41% of simultaneous and 32% of sequential) identified a known-innocent filler rather than a suspect, indicating that eyewitness performance overall was very poor. The results suggest that the sequential procedure that is used in the field reduces the identification of known-innocent fillers, but the differences are relatively small.

Confirming feedback following a mistaken identification impairs memory for the culprit.

This research examined whether confirming postidentification feedback following a mistaken identification impairs eyewitness memory for the original culprit. We also examined whether the degree of similarity between a mistakenly identified individual and the actual culprit plays a role in memory impairment. Participant-witnesses (N = 145) made mistaken identifications from a "similar" or a "dissimilar" culprit-absent photo lineup. The similar lineup contained individuals who were similar in appearance to the actual culprit and the dissimilar lineup contained individuals who were dissimilar in appearance to the actual culprit. After their identifications, witnesses were given confirming feedback ("Good job! You identified the suspect.") or no feedback. The experimenter then feigned having accidentally given the witnesses the wrong photo lineup. After telling witnesses to disregard whatever they saw in the first lineup, the experimenter gave witnesses the "correct" (culprit-present) lineup and told the witnesses to do their best to identify the culprit. Identifying a dissimilar individual and receiving confirming feedback after a misidentification had independent impairing effects on memory for the original culprit. Results extend the traditional conceptualization of the postidentification feedback effect by showing that confirming feedback not only distorts witnesses' retrospective self-reports, but it also impairs recognition memory for the culprit.

Post-identification feedback to eyewitnesses impairs evaluators' abilities to discriminate between accurate and mistaken testimony.

Giving confirming feedback to mistaken eyewitnesses has robust distorting effects on their retrospective judgments (e.g., how certain they were, their view, etc.). Does feedback harm evaluators' abilities to discriminate between accurate and mistaken identification testimony? Participant-witnesses to a simulated crime made accurate or mistaken identifications from a lineup and then received confirming feedback or no feedback. Each then gave videotaped testimony about their identification, and a new sample of participant-evaluators judged the accuracy and credibility of the testimonies. Among witnesses who were not given feedback, evaluators were significantly more likely to believe the testimony of accurate eyewitnesses than they were to believe the testimony of mistaken eyewitnesses, indicating significant discrimination. Among witnesses who were given confirming feedback, however, evaluators believed accurate and mistaken witnesses at nearly identical rates, indicating no ability to discriminate. Moreover, there was no evidence of overbelief in the absence of feedback whereas there was significant overbelief in the confirming feedback conditions. Results demonstrate that a simple comment following a witness' identification decision ("Good job, you got the suspect") can undermine fact-finders' abilities to discern whether the witness made an accurate or a mistaken identification.