MIT CAACB Risk Assessment Case Study: Assessing Virus Cross-Contamination Risk between Two Simultaneous Processes in an Open Biomanufacturing Facility.

Some members of MIT's Consortium on Adventitious Agent Contamination in Biomanufacturing (CAACB) previously published content on the "Quality Risk Management in the Context of Viral Contamination", which described tools, procedures, and methodologies for assessing and managing the risk of a potential virus contamination in cell culture processes. To address the growing industry interest in moving manufacturing toward open ballrooms with functionally closed systems and to demonstrate how the ideas of risk management can be leveraged to perform a risk assessment, CAACB conducted a case study exercise of these new manufacturing modalities. In the case study exercise, a cross-functional team composed of personnel from many of CAACB's industry membership collaboratively assessed the risks of viral cross-contamination between a human and non-human host cell system in an open manufacturing facility. This open manufacturing facility had no walls to provide architectural separation of two processes occurring simultaneously, specifically a recombinant protein perfusion cell culture process using the human cell line, HEK-293 (Process 1) and a downstream postviral filtration unit operation (Process 2) of a recombinant protein produced in CHO cells. This viral risk assessment focused on cross-contamination of the Process 2 filtration unit operation after the Process 1 perfusion bioreactor was contaminated with a virus that went undetected. The workflow for quality risk management that is recommended by the International Council for Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH) was followed, which included identifying and mapping the manufacturing process, defining the risk question, risk evaluation, and risk control. The case study includes a completed Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to provide descriptions of the specific risks and corresponding recommended risk reduction actions.

Revisiting mouse minute virus inactivation by high temperature short time treatment.

In recent years, high temperature short time (HTST) treatment technology has been increasingly adopted for medium treatment to mitigate the potential risk of viral contamination in mammalian cell culture GMP manufacturing facilities. Mouse minute virus (MMV), also called minute virus of mice (MVM), implicated in multiple viral contamination events is commonly used as a relevant model virus to assess the effectiveness of HTST treatment of cell culture media. However, results from different studies vary broadly in inactivation kinetics as well as log reduction factors (LRFs) achieved under given treatment conditions. To determine whether the reported discrepancies stemmed from differences in MMV strains, laboratory-scale HTST devices, medium matrices, and/or experimental designs, we have taken a collaborative approach to systematically assess the effectiveness of HTST treatment for MMV inactivation. This effort was conceptualized based on a media treatment gap analysis conducted by the Consortium on Adventitious Agent Contamination in Biomanufacturing (CAACB) under the MIT Center for Biomedical Innovation (CBI). Specifically, two different MMV strains were used to evaluate the effectiveness of HTST at various treatment conditions with regard to exposure temperature and hold time duration by two independent laboratories within two different companies. To minimize experimental variations, the two sites used the same batches of MMV stocks, the same commercially purchased medium, and the same model of thermocyclers as the laboratory-scale HTST device. The two independent laboratories yielded similar MMV inactivation kinetics and comparable LRF. No significant differences were observed between the two MMV strains evaluated, suggesting that the variations from prior studies were likely due to differences in equipment, medium matrices, or other factors. The data presented here indicate that MMV inactivation by HTST treatment obeys first-order kinetics and can be mathematically modeled using an Arrhenius equation. The model-based extrapolation provides a quantitative estimate of MMV inactivation by the current industry standard HTST condition (102°C for a hold time of 10 s) used for medium treatment. Finally, based on the data from the current study and the industry experience, it is recommended that any alternative virus barrier technologies adopted for medium treatment should provide a clearance of at least 3.0 LRF based on a worst-case model virus to effectively mitigate potential risks of viral contamination.

Viral contamination in biologic manufacture and implications for emerging therapies.

Recombinant protein therapeutics, vaccines, and plasma products have a long record of safety. However, the use of cell culture to produce recombinant proteins is still susceptible to contamination with viruses. These contaminations cost millions of dollars to recover from, can lead to patients not receiving therapies, and are very rare, which makes learning from past events difficult. A consortium of biotech companies, together with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has convened to collect data on these events. This industry-wide study provides insights into the most common viral contaminants, the source of those contaminants, the cell lines affected, corrective actions, as well as the impact of such events. These results have implications for the safe and effective production of not just current products, but also emerging cell and gene therapies which have shown much therapeutic promise.

Biopharmaceutical Industry Approaches to Facility Segregation for Viral Safety: An Effort from the Consortium on Adventitious Agent Contamination in Biomanufacturing.

Appropriate segregation within manufacturing facilities is required by regulators and utilized by manufacturers to ensure that the final product has not been contaminated with (a) adventitious viruses, (b) another pre-/postviral clearance fraction of the same product, or (c) another product processed in the same facility. However, there is no consensus on what constitutes appropriate facility segregation to minimize these risks. In part, this is due to the fact that a wide variety of manufacturing facilities and operational practices exist, including single-product and multiproduct manufacturing, using traditional segregation strategies with separate rooms for specific operations that may use stainless steel or disposable equipment to more modern ballroom-style operations that use mostly disposable equipment (i.e., pre- and postviral clearance manufacturing operations are not physically segregated by walls). Further, consensus is lacking around basic definitions and approaches related to facility segregation. For example, given that several unit operations provide assurance of virus clearance during downstream processing, how does one define pre- and postviral clearance and at which point(s) should a viral segregation barrier be introduced? What is a "functionally closed" system? How can interventions be conducted so that the system remains functionally closed? How can functionally closed systems be used to adequately isolate a product stream and ensure its safety? To address these issues, the member companies of the Consortium on Adventitious Agent Contamination in Biomanufacturing (CAACB) have conducted a facility segregation project with the following goals: define "pre- and postviral clearance zones" and "pre- and postviral clearance materials"; define "functionally closed" manufacturing systems; and identify an array of facility segregation approaches that are used for the safe and effective production of recombinant biologics as well as plasma products. This article reflects the current thinking from this collaborative endeavor.LAY ABSTRACT: Operations in biopharmaceutical manufacturing are segregated to ensure that the final product has not been contaminated with adventitious viruses, another fraction of the same product, or with another product from within the same facility. Yet there is no consensus understanding of what appropriate facility segregation looks like. There are a wide variety of manufacturing facilities and operational practices. There are existing facilities with separate rooms and more modern approaches that use disposable equipment in an open ballroom without walls. There is also no agreement on basic definitions and approaches related to facility segregation approaches. For example, many would like to claim that their manufacturing process is functionally closed, yet exactly how a functionally closed system may be defined is not clear. To address this, the member companies of the Consortium on Adventitious Agent Contamination in Biomanufacturing (CAACB) have conducted a project with the goal of defining important manufacturing terms relevant to designing an appropriately segregated facility and identifying different facility segregation approaches that are used for the safe and effective production of recombinant biologics as well as plasma products.