Changes in Diagnoses and Site of Care for Patients Receiving Hospice Care From Agencies Acquired by Private Equity Firms and Publicly Traded Companies.

Importance: Private equity firms and publicly traded companies have been acquiring US hospice agencies; an estimated 16% of US hospice agencies are owned by private equity (PE) firms or publicly traded companies (PTC). Objective: To examine the association of PE and PTC acquisitions of hospices with Medicare patients' site of care and clinical diagnoses. Design, Setting, and Participants: This cohort study of US hospice agencies used a novel national database of acquisitions merged with the Medicare Post-Acute Care and Hospice Public Use File for 2013 to 2020. Changes in sites of care and patient characteristics for hospice agencies acquired by PE or PTCs were compared with changes for patients in nonacquired for-profit hospice agencies. Exposure: Private equity and publicly traded company acquisitions. Main Outcomes and Measures: This study used a difference-in-differences approach within an event-study framework to examine the association of PE and PTC acquisitions of hospice agencies with changes in patient diagnoses and sites of care. Dependent variables were annual hospice-level measures of the Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) score and proportion of patients diagnosed with cancer or dementia. Sites of care included the proportion of patients receiving hospice care in their personal home, nursing home, or assisted living facility. Results: A total of 158 hospice agencies acquired by PEs, 250 acquired by PTCs, and 1559 other for-profit hospice agencies were included. Preacquisition, hospice agencies that would later be acquired by PE or PTC served a mean (IQR) 30.1% (12.0%-44.0%) and 29.4% (13.0%-43.0%) of their patients in nursing homes respectively, a greater proportion compared with the 27.1% (8.0%-43.8%) served by for-profit hospices that were never acquired. Agencies acquired by PE between 2014 and 2019 saw a significant relative increase of 5.98% in dementia patients (1.38 percentage points; 95% CI, 0.35-2.40 percentage points; P = .008). In PTC-owned hospices, the proportion of patients receiving care at home increased by 5.26% (2.98 percentage points; 95% CI, 1.46-4.51 percentage points; P < .001), the proportion of dementia patients rose by 13.49% (3.11 percentage points; 95% CI, 2.14-4.09 percentage points; P < .001), and the HCC score decreased by 1.37% (-3.19 percentage points; 95% CI, -5.92 to -0.47 percentage points; P = .02). Conclusions and Relevance: These findings suggest that PE and PTCs select patients and sites of care to maximize profits.

Association of Physician Management Companies and Private Equity Investment With Commercial Health Care Prices Paid to Anesthesia Practitioners.

IMPORTANCE: Physician management companies (PMCs), often backed by private equity (PE), are increasingly providing staffing and management services to health care facilities, yet little is known of their influence on prices. OBJECTIVE: To study changes in prices paid to practitioners (anesthesiologists and certified registered nurse anesthetists) before and after an outpatient facility contracted with a PMC. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: This retrospective cohort study used difference-in-differences methods to compare price changes before and after a facility contracted with a PMC with facilities that did not and to compare differences between PMCs with and without PE investment. Commercial claims data (2012-2017) from 3 large national insurers in the Health Care Cost Institute database were combined with a novel data set of PMC facility contracts to identify prices paid to anesthesia practitioners in hospital outpatient departments and ambulatory surgery centers. The cohort included 2992 facilities that never contracted with a PMC and 672 facilities that contracted with a PMC between 2012 and 2017, collectively representing 2 255 933 anesthesia claims. EXPOSURES: Temporal variation in facility-level exposure to PMC contracts for anesthesia services. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES: Main outcomes were (1) allowed amounts and the unit price (allowed amounts standardized per unit of service) paid to anesthesia practitioners; and (2) the probability that a practitioner was out of network. RESULTS: From before to after the PMC contract period, allowed amounts increased by 16.5% (+$116.39; 95% CI, $76.11 to $156.67; P < .001), and the unit price increased by 18.7% (+$18.79; 95% CI, $12.73 to $24.84; P < .001) in PMC facilities relative to non-PMC facilities. Results did not show evidence that anesthesia practitioners were moved out of network (+2.25; 95% CI, -2.56 to 7.06; P < .36). In subsample analyses, PMCs without PE investment increased allowed amounts by 12.9% (+$89.88; 95% CI, $42.07 to $137.69; P < .001), while PE-backed PMCs (representing half of the PMCs in the sample) increased allowed amounts by 26.0% ($187.06; 95% CI, $133.59 to $240.52; P < .001). Similar price increases were observed for unit prices. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: In this cohort study, prices paid to anesthesia practitioners increased after hospital outpatient departments and ambulatory surgery centers contracted with a PMC and were substantially higher if the PMC received PE investment. This research provides insights into the role of corporate ownership in health care relevant to policy makers, payers, practitioners, and patients.