Neural Dynamic Principles for an Intentional Embodied Agent.

How situated embodied agents may achieve goals using knowledge is the classical question of natural and artificial intelligence. How organisms achieve this with their nervous systems is a central challenge for a neural theory of embodied cognition. To structure this challenge, we borrow terms from Searle's analysis of intentionality in its two directions of fit and six psychological modes (perception, memory, belief, intention-in-action, prior intention, desire). We postulate that intentional states are instantiated by neural activation patterns that are stabilized by neural interaction. Dynamic instabilities provide the neural mechanism for initiating and terminating intentional states and are critical to organizing sequences of intentional states. Beliefs represented by networks of concept nodes are autonomously learned and activated in response to desired outcomes. The neural dynamic principles of an intentional agent are demonstrated in a toy scenario in which a robotic agent explores an environment and paints objects in desired colors based on learned color transformation rules.

Attributional and attentional patterns in the perception of ambiguous harmful encounters involving peer and authority figures.

BACKGROUND: Self-construal influences the way people ascribe blame to victims, but it is not clear whether the same applies to harm doers, especially those in a position of authority. PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE: We examined (N = 122, men n = 60) participants' ascriptions of both blame and intentionality to harm doers (authority figure versus peer) while priming self-construal (relational versus individual self). Using eye-tracking, we explored whether priming relational self, compared to individual self, affects the allocation of attention to faces versus objects. RESULTS: Although no effects of priming were found, the type of harm doer influenced the way people interpreted harmful social encounters. Participants attributed both greater intentionality and blame to peer than authority perpetrators. Also, in the case of peer perpetrators, blame ascription was higher than judgements of intentionality, which was the opposite pattern for authority perpetrators, where judgements of intentionality were greater than ascribed blame. In regard to encoding, participants independently of the type of harm doer looked significantly longer at faces than at objects in violent scenes. CONCLUSIONS: Our results suggest the status of perpetrator influences judgements of harm independently of intrapersonal factors, such as primed self-construal. Moreover, people perceived as authority figures are not blamed for the hurtful action, despite attributed intentionality.

Psychomatics-A Multidisciplinary Framework for Understanding Artificial Minds.

Although large language models (LLMs) and other artificial intelligence systems demonstrate cognitive skills similar to humans, such as concept learning and language acquisition, the way they process information fundamentally differs from biological cognition. To better understand these differences, this article introduces Psychomatics, a multidisciplinary framework bridging cognitive science, linguistics, and computer science. It aims to delve deeper into the high-level functioning of LLMs, focusing specifically on how LLMs acquire, learn, remember, and use information to produce their outputs. To achieve this goal, Psychomatics will rely on a comparative methodology, starting from a theory-driven research question-is the process of language development and use different in humans and LLMs?-drawing parallels between LLMs and biological systems. Our analysis shows how LLMs can map and manipulate complex linguistic patterns in their training data. Moreover, LLMs can follow Grice's Cooperative principle to provide relevant and informative responses. However, human cognition draws from multiple sources of meaning, including experiential, emotional, and imaginative facets, which transcend mere language processing and are rooted in our social and developmental trajectories. Moreover, current LLMs lack physical embodiment, reducing their ability to make sense of the intricate interplay between perception, action, and cognition that shapes human understanding and expression. Ultimately, Psychomatics holds the potential to yield transformative insights into the nature of language, cognition, and intelligence, both artificial and biological. Moreover, by drawing parallels between LLMs and human cognitive processes, Psychomatics can inform the development of more robust and human-like artificial intelligence systems.

Unequal by malice, protesters by outrage: Agent perceptions drive moralization of, and collective action against, inequality.

Economic inequality does not encounter strong protests even though individuals are generally against it. One potential explanation of this paradox is that individuals do not perceive inequality as caused by intentional agents, which, in line with the Theory of Dyadic Morality (Schein & Gray, 2018), should prevent its assessment as immoral and consequently dampen moral outrage and collective action. Across three studies, we test and confirm this hypothesis. In Studies 1 (N = 395) and 2 (N = 337), the more participants believed that inequality is human driven and caused by intentional agents, the more they moralized inequality, felt outraged and wanted to engage in collective action. This was confirmed in Study 3 (N = 243) through an experimental design. Thus, our research shows that agent perception is crucial in the moralization of economic inequality and, more broadly, that morality can be a powerful motivator and effectively mobilize people to action.

Distributing Blame Among Multiple Entities When Autonomous Technologies Cause Harm.

As autonomous technology emerges, new variations in old questions arise. When autonomous technologies cause harm, who is to blame? The current studies compare reactions toward harms caused by human-controlled vehicles (HCVs) or human soldiers (HSs) to identical harms by autonomous vehicles (AVs) or autonomous robot soldiers. Drivers of HCVs, or HSs, were blamed more than mere users of AVs or HSs who outsourced their duties to ARSs. However, as human drivers/soldiers became less involved in (or were unaware of the preprogramming that led to) the harm, blame was redirected toward other entities (i.e., manufacturers and the tech company's executives), showing the opposite pattern as human drivers/soldiers. Results were robust to how blame was measured (i.e., degrees of blame versus apportionment of total blame). Overall, this research furthers the blame literature, raising questions about why, how (much), and to whom blame is assigned when multiple agents are potentially culpable.

Vision, body and interpretation in medical imaging diagnostics.

This article explores the profound impact of visualism and visual perception in the context of medical imaging diagnostics. It emphasizes the intricate interplay among vision, embodiment, subjectivity, language, and historicity within the realm of medical science and technology, with a specific focus on image consciousness. The study delves into the role of subjectivity in perception, facilitating the communication of opacity and historicity to the perceiving individual. Additionally, it scrutinizes the image interpretation process, drawing parallels to text interpretation and highlighting the influence of personal biases and individuality in medical practice. By revisiting Husserl's conceptualization of "image consciousness" and introducing the notion of "image theme", the paper seeks to establish a theoretical framework for making sense of images within the context of technological interpretation. A key objective is to enhance the phenomenology of technology through a systematic analysis of medical imaging diagnosis, contributing to an expanded epistemological foundation for medical practice. The article recognizes that the construction of medical knowledge incorporates subjective elements, especially within a historical context. The interpretation of images involves both instrumental and expert interpretation, with human subjectivity playing a crucial role. The article asserts that human creativity and conscious engagement are indispensable in interpreting all medical images.

Revisiting causal pluralism: Intention, process, and dependency in cases of double prevention.

Causal pluralism proposes that humans can reason about causes and effects in terms of both dependency and process relations, depending on the scenario. Support for this view is provided by responses to double prevention scenarios in which an affector attempts to bring about an outcome, a preventer attempts to prevent the outcome, and a double preventer intervenes to stop the preventer's prevention attempt. Previous research indicates that reasoners award the affector high causal ratings regardless of whether their action was executed intentionally, whereas reasoners only award the double preventer high causal ratings when the double preventer acts intentionally. These results were interpreted as evidence that intentional actions prompt reasoners to differentially weight separately maintained representations of dependency and process relations. The current study presents three challenges to this causal pluralism account by (1) questioning whether intentionality only affects causal ratings by increasing the weighting placed on dependency relations during reasoning (Experiments 1-2), (2) presenting evidence consistent with the possibility that reasoners interpret the double preventer's action in terms of a process relation (Experiments 1-2), and (3) demonstrating that an unintentional double preventer can receive significantly higher causal ratings than an intentional affector when the order in which the characters act is altered (Experiments 3-4). These results underscore the need to revisit fundamental questions regarding how reasoners form, maintain, and reason over representations of causal scenarios featuring intentional actions.

Extending cognition: a vegetal rejoinder to extensionless thought and to extended cognition.

In this paper, we propose a crucial supplement to the framework of plant cognition, namely extending cognition. We argue that plants and other organisms with an open-ended body plan actively extend their cognition when growing tissues or organs. Their cognition expands with their body expansion. After considering the defining features of extending cognition, we present a model where growth, along with aspects of plant physiology (e.g. biochemical exudates), as well as the "negative extension" of growing away from obstacles or stressful environments, are the building blocks for a more refined understanding of plant cognition. We conclude by outlining the general implications of the theory of extending cognition and indicating directions for future research.

Gestural communication in wild spider monkeys (Ateles geoffroyi).

Gestures play a central role in the communication systems of several animal families, including primates. In this study, we provide a first assessment of the gestural systems of a Platyrrhine species, Geoffroy's spider monkeys (Ateles geoffroyi). We observed a wild group of 52 spider monkeys and assessed the distribution of visual and tactile gestures in the group, the size of individual repertoires and the intentionality and effectiveness of individuals' gestural production. Our results showed that younger spider monkeys were more likely than older ones to use tactile gestures. In contrast, we found no inter-individual differences in the probability of producing visual gestures. Repertoire size did not vary with age, but the probability of accounting for recipients' attentional state was higher for older monkeys than for younger ones, especially for gestures in the visual modality. Using vocalizations right before the gesture increased the probability of gesturing towards attentive recipients and of receiving a response, although age had no effect on the probability of gestures being responded. Overall, our study provides first evidence of gestural production in a Platyrrhine species, and confirms this taxon as a valid candidate for research on animal communication.

On the Highway to Hell: Slippery Slope Perceptions in Judgments of Moral Character.

Across four studies, we test the hypothesis that people exhibit "slippery slope" thinking in their judgments of moral character-that is, do observers judge that a person who behaves immorally will become increasingly immoral over time? In Study 1, we find that a person who commits an immoral act is judged as more likely to behave immorally and as having a worse character in the future than in the past. In Study 2, we find that it is the commission of an immoral act specifically-rather than merely attempting an immoral act-that drives this slippery slope effect. In Study 3, we demonstrate that observers judge the moral agent as more likely to commit acts of greater severity further in time after the initial immoral act. In Study 4, we find that this effect is driven by an anticipated corrupting of moral character, related to perceptions of the agent's guilt.

A conexão entre a intencionalidade e a consciência: um estudo filosófico / La conexión entre la intencionalidad y la conciencia: un estudio filosófico / The connection between intentionality and consciousness: a philosophical study

Este artigo aborda a relação entre consciência e intencionalidade, argumentando que essas duas características fundamentais da mente estão intrinsecamente entrelaçadas. A partir da perspectiva da Teoria da Intencionalidade Fenomenal (TIF), exploramos como a intencionalidade afenomenal (não-fenomenal) depende da consciência para sua adequada representação pelos sujeitos, destacando a visão de Dennett sobre uma intencionalidade original e fenomenal. Em seguida, analisamos o argumento transcendental proposto por Searle para o livre arbítrio, que revelou insights valiosos sobre como a racionalidade pode ser experimentada. Ao unir os pressupostos da TIF com a análise do livre arbítrio, sustentamos que a experiência da liberdade de agir está baseada em razões e é mediada pela consciência. Concluímos que a intencionalidade e a consciência não estão separadas como entidades isoladas, mas são interdependentes e complementares. Portanto, compreender essas facetas como elementos integrados é essencial para uma compreensão abrangente da mente. Este estudo contribui para o avanço teórico e conceitual no campo da psicologia da consciência e fornece um arcabouço para pesquisas futuras sobre a interação entre consciência e intencionalidade.(AU)

This paper discusses the relationship between consciousness and intentionality, arguing that these two fundamental features of mind are intrinsically interwoven. From the perspective of the Phenomenal Intentionality Theory (PIT), we explore how phenomenal intentionality depends on consciousness for its proper representation by subjects, highlighting Dennett's view on original phenomenal intentionality. Then, we analyze Searle's transcendental argument for free will, which has revealed valuable insights into how rationality can be experienced. By combining PIT's assumptions with the analysis of free will, we argue that the experience of freedom to act is based on reasons and is mediated by consciousness. We conclude that consciousness and intentionality are not separate as isolated entities, but are interdependent and complementary. Therefore, understanding these facets as integrated elements is essential for a comprehensive understanding of mind. This study contributes to the theoretical and conceptual advancement in the field of consciousness psychology and provides a framework for future research on the interaction between consciousness and intentionality.(AU)

Este artículo aborda la relación entre conciencia e intencionalidad, argumentando que estas dos características fundamentales de la mente están intrínsecamente entrelazadas. Desde la perspectiva de la Teoría de la Intencionalidad Fenomenal (TIF), exploramos cómo la intencionalidad afenomenal (no fenomenal) depende de la conciencia para su adecuada representación por los sujetos, destacando la visión de Dennett sobre una intencionalidad original y fenomenal. A continuación, analizamos el argumento trascendental propuesto por Searle para el libre albedrío, que ha revelado conocimientos valiosos sobre cómo la racionalidad puede ser experimentada. Al unir los presupuestos de la TIF con el análisis del libre albedrío, sostenemos que la experiencia de la libertad de actuar está basada en razones y está mediada por la conciencia. Concluimos que la intencionalidad y la conciencia no están separadas como entidades aisladas, sino que son interdependientes y complementarias. Por lo tanto, comprender estas facetas como elementos integrados es esencial para una comprensión integral de la mente. Este estudio contribuye al avance teórico y conceptual en el campo de la psicología de la conciencia y proporciona un marco para futuras investigaciones sobre la interacción entre conciencia e intencionalidad.(AU)

Re-evaluating the structure of consciousness through the symintentry hypothesis.

The Projective Consciousness Model and its extension to the phenomenal selfhood model are the generic invariant structures of consciousness through five symmetries. They include the following: situated 3D spatiality; temporal integration through encompassing the three "nows" that constitute the Now; multimodal synchronic integration; relational phenomenal intentionality; and consciousness entails a pre-reflective awareness of the uniqueness of the phenomenal self. These symmetries stem from the evolution and emergence of the phenomenal self through modeling, and that is realized through the phenomenal modeling of the intentionality relationship. We propose that this set of symmetries is based on and can be explicated in terms of a more fundamental symmetry, symmetry-based modeling. The proposal stems from (a) Kant's transcendental structuralism, which asserts that "Objects" conform to models prescribed through the inherent structure of the phenomenal mind, and (b) Cassirer's proposition that a mathematical group underpins this structure. To validate our proposal, we stipulate this group defining symmetry-based modeling and its emergence and adaptation into structuring the Now. We find that Cassirer's group requires a more powerful dual quaternion operator to be able to support intentionality and the five symmetries. We propose that the efficacy of this operator stems from unifying symmetry-based modeling and intentionality as "symintentry." Symintentry, we argue, is not just a new form of symmetry but is the archetypical form of symmetry. Symintentry provides fresh insights into the nature of symmetry, intentionality, and consciousness.

Testing the automaticity features of the affect misattribution procedure: The roles of awareness and intentionality.

The affect misattribution procedure (AMP) is a measure of implicit evaluations, designed to index the automatic retrieval of evaluative knowledge. The AMP effect consists in participants evaluating neutral target stimuli positively when preceded by positive primes and negatively when preceded by negative primes. After multiple prior tests of intentionality, Hughes et al. (Behav Res Methods 55(4):1558-1586, 2023) examined the role of awareness in the AMP and found that AMP effects were larger when participants indicated that their response was influenced by the prime than when they did not. Here we report seven experiments (six preregistered; N = 2350) in which we vary the methodological features of the AMP to better understand this awareness effect. In Experiments 1-4, we establish variability in the magnitude of the awareness effect in response to variations in the AMP procedure. By introducing further modifications to the AMP procedure, Experiments 5-7 suggest an alternative explanation of the awareness effect, namely that awareness can be the outcome, rather than the cause, of evaluative congruency between primes and responses: Awareness effects emerged even when awareness could not have contributed to AMP effects, including when participants judged influence awareness for third parties or primes were presented post hoc. Finally, increasing the evaluative strength of the primes increased participants' tendency to misattribute AMP effects to the influence of target stimuli. Together, the present findings suggest that AMP effects can create awareness effects rather than vice versa and support the AMP's construct validity as a measure of unintentional evaluations of which participants are also potentially unaware.

A Shared Intentionality Account of Uniquely Human Social Bonding.

Many mechanisms of social bonding are common to all primates, but humans seemingly have developed some that are unique to the species. These involve various kinds of interactive experiences-from taking a walk together to having a conversation-whose common feature is the triadic sharing of experience. Current theories of social bonding have no explanation for why humans should have these unique bonding mechanisms. Here we propose a shared intentionality account of uniquely human social bonding. Humans evolved to participate with others in unique forms of cooperative and communicative activities that both depend on and create shared experience. Sharing experience in these activities causes partners to feel closer because it allows them to assess their partner's cooperative competence and motivation toward them and because the shared representations created during such interactions make subsequent cooperative interactions easier and more effective.

Is meaning commensurable in scientific theories? From arbitrariness to non-nomological relations in meaning-making.

For scientific projects to deal with something as diffuse as meaning-making there are multiple hurdles to solve, starting with the validity of meaning as a specific phenomenon to be represented scientifically. Modulating the concept of meaning into a comprehensible phenomenon across different scales of validity - as a top-to-bottom approach in the sense of applying meaning to areas where it is not commonplace - requires being able to both differentiate its expression in subjective systems (as, for instance, individuals with the faculty of language) and as a biological principle that takes place in other forms of life. In this paper we will examine whether the latter sense of meaning can be somewhat commensurable with the former, and propose a philosophical change of gears in regards to the way we express the issues of meaning as arbitrary vs the non-nomological relations witnessed in accounts of biological meaning, making the latter the more accurate way to invoke the secondary sense of meaning without marring it with issues of subjectivity as it happens in the first sense. We propose the concept of "surjectivity" to account for processes underlying behavior that cannot be explained away by appealing to physical law.

Age-Related Differences in Moral Judgment: The Role of Probability Judgments.

Research suggests that moral evaluations change during adulthood. Older adults (75+) tend to judge accidentally harmful acts more severely than younger adults do, and this age-related difference is in part due to the greater negligence older adults attribute to the accidental harmdoers. Across two studies (N = 254), we find support for this claim and report the novel discovery that older adults' increased attribution of negligence, in turn, is associated with a higher perceived likelihood that the accident would occur. We propose that, because older adults perceive accidents as more likely than younger adults do, they condemn the agents and their actions more and even infer that the agents' omission to exercise due care is intentional. These findings refine our understanding of the cognitive processes underpinning moral judgment in older adulthood and highlight the role of subjective probability judgments in negligence attribution.

Catalyst for Change: Future of DEI in Academia.

In this paper, we propose ways to address diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) challenges and outline steps and methodologies for creating allies and empowering leaders to support DEI efforts in science, technology, engineering, mathematics, and medicine (STEMM) for underrepresented minorities (URMs).

Modeling intentionality in the human brain.

This paper is focusing on a rather neglected issue that concerns both aspects of philosophy and neurobiology in relation to the concept of intentionality. Intentionality is concerned with the 'directedness' or 'aboutness' of mental phenomena towards an object. Despite the fact that in philosophy both concepts of aboutness and directedness are conceptually identical with intentionality, a careful neuroscientific approach can demonstrate that these two phenomena represent two distinct conceptual and neurobiological aspects of intentionality with complementary functions. We described the interaction between a series of intentionality and pathogenetic psychobiological factors, the corresponding brain topography, and the resulting clinical manifestation and psychopathology. A permanent failure of intentionality dominates in psychosis, which includes an inappropriateness of the intentional object or connection, from the outset, or even from the prodromal phase of the disorder. Affective disorders may result from imprecise interoceptive prediction error signals, due to a confused identification of the intentional object. In suicidal patients there is an emotional intentionality failure, characterized by an absence of intentional object or a loss of conscious access to normal intentional objects. We may model an 'intentional system' as a higher order system, with a monitoring and regulatory role attributed to the brain and behavior. Also, we may consider mental disorders as the result of a radical disruption of intentionality, due to an inappropriateness or lack of the intentional object or due to an inappropriate connection in some points of the suggested brain pathways of intentionality.