Inseminação artificial homóloga póstuma: análise bioética do planejamento familiar / Posthumous homologous artificial insemination: a bioethical analysis of family planning / Inseminación artificial homóloga póstuma: un análisis bioético de la planificación familiar

Resumo Este artigo trata de questões relacionadas à inseminação artificial homóloga post mortem. Tomando como referência normas éticas que asseguram a livre escolha do casal no planejamento familiar, objetivou-se descobrir de que forma tais regulamentações influenciariam na concretização desse projeto parental. A partir do método hipotético-dedutivo, realizou-se revisão de literatura em bioética e biodireito, além de pesquisa documental no sítio eletrônico do Conselho Federal de Medicina. Refletiu-se, então, sobre o princípio de autonomia dos pacientes submetidos às técnicas de reprodução assistida, levando em conta algumas das repercussões dessa técnica sobre o direito de família e sucessões. Por fim, descreveu-se o método de casuística clínica, utilizado pelas clínicas como parâmetro para tomar decisões e aconselhar o cônjuge sobrevivente acerca da problemática da concepção póstuma.

Abstract This article discusses issues related to post mortem homologous artificial insemination. Taking as reference ethical norms that ensure the couple's free choice in family planning, the objective was to understand how such regulations would influence the accomplishment of this parental project. Using the hypothetical-deductive method, a literature review on bioethics and biolaw was carried out, in addition to a documentary research on the website of the Federal Council of Medicine. Then, reflections on the principle of autonomy of patients undergoing assisted reproduction techniques were made, considering some of the repercussions of this technique on family and succession law. Finally, a description of the method of clinical casuistry is presented, being used by clinics as a parameter to make decisions and advise the surviving spouse about the problem of posthumous conception.

Resumen Este artículo trata aspectos relacionados a la inseminación artificial homóloga post mortem. Con base en la normativa ética que garantiza la libre elección de la pareja en la planificación familiar, el objetivo fue identificar la influencia de la legislación en la realización de este proyecto parental. A partir del método hipotético-deductivo, se realizó una revisión bibliográfica sobre bioética y bioderecho, además de una búsqueda documental en el sitio web del Consejo Federal de Medicina. Con esto, se reflexionó sobre el principio de autonomía de los pacientes sometidos a técnicas de reproducción asistida, teniendo en cuenta algunas de las repercusiones de esta técnica en el derecho de familia y de sucesiones. Por último, se describió el método de la casuística clínica utilizado por las clínicas como parámetro en la toma de decisiones y asesoramiento al cónyuge sobreviviente en el tema de la concepción póstuma.

Children of the Dead: Posthumous Conception, Critical Interests and Consent.

Artificial Reproductive Technology now enables the conception of children after the death of their genetic father. There is little consensus on how posthumous conception should be dealt with by the law and this article examines alternative approaches to such regulation. The goal of any such regulatory regime should be the vindication of the deceased's critical or objective interests after death. Alternative approaches risk instrumentalising the dead to serve the interests of the living, or weigh too heavily the deceased's past decisional autonomy at the cost of respecting his or her likely wishes after death. Separate requirements should apply to applications for posthumous sperm retrieval and its subsequent use, with the former being less onerous given the emergency nature of the procedure and the latter involving a tribunal whose function is to consider how best to give effect to the deceased's reproductive autonomy after death.

Posthumous conception by presumed consent. A pragmatic position for a rare but ethically challenging dilemma.

The prevailing legal position and opinion of professional societies such as the European Society for Human Reproduction and Embryology and the American Society for Reproductive Medicine is that posthumous sperm conception should only occur in the presence of explicit written consent from the deceased man. However, in our opinion this is an impractical approach as the majority of deaths of reproductive-age men are sudden and unexpected, thereby precluding explicit consent. Previously in this journal we have outlined arguments supporting a move to a standard of presumed consent for posthumous conception, with provisions for men to 'opt out' and safeguards to protect the welfare of the prospective mother and her child. In a recent commentary in this journal, Kroon outlines arguments against our position of presumed consent as an unacceptable violation of the deceased's autonomy. However, such arguments on the primacy of the rights of the dead are in our opinion not paramount, especially since this position blocks access to posthumous conception for the majority who support its use. The objective of this commentary is to provide a rebuttal to the concerns raised by Kroon and hopefully reorientate the discussion towards the rights and welfare of the living (widow, prospective child), not the dead.