Bridging the gap: Experimental evidence on information provision and health insurance choices.

Previous research has shown that individuals do not always make rational decisions when selecting their health insurance, for example, due to the existence of information frictions or mental gaps. We study the effect of specific types of information provision for decision support on health plan choices and test their potential to improve decision quality by implementing a randomized laboratory experiment. We provide personalized and generic aids, differentiate between numerical and visual decision support, and provide one or two optional formats of personalized information. We find that generic aids have no effect on health plan choices while personalized information leads to better choices as measured by several indicators of decision quality. The largest effects were observed for those who "opted in" to visualize personalized information, with immediate and lasting improvements in health insurance decisions. By reducing information frictions, our results suggest that accessible and easy-to-use tools can positively impact health insurance navigation, improve decision-making, and reduce switching costs.

On the Relative Importance of Different Factors Explaining Health Plan Choices: Evidence From Mandatory Health Insurance in Switzerland.

Many factors influence health plan choices. Classical individual-level determinants include socioeconomic and health-related characteristics, and risk attitudes. However, little is known to what extent personality traits can determine insurance choices. Using representative survey data from Switzerland, we investigate the associations between choices of health plans and traditional individual factors as well as personality traits. We employ dominance analysis to explore the relative importance of the different predictors. We find that personality traits play an at least equally important role in predicting health plan choices as common factors like age, health status, and income. Our results have implications regarding recent efforts to empower people in making better health plan choices and support theoretical models that integrate insights from behavioral sciences.

Switching Costs in Medicare Advantage.

This paper estimates the magnitude of switching costs in the Medicare Advantage program. Consumers are generally assumed to pick plans that provide the combination of benefits and premiums that maximize their individual utility. However, the plan choice literature has generally omitted prior choices from choice models. The analysis is based on five years of the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, a nationally representative longitudinal dataset. The MCBS data were combined with data on Medicare Advantage Part C plan benefits and premiums. Individual choices are modeled as a function of individual characteristics, plan characteristics and prior year plan choices using a mixed logit model. We found relatively high rates of switching between plans within insurer (20%), although less switching between insurers. Prior year plan choices were highly significant at both the contract and plan level. Premium was negative and significant. Loyalty (contract and plan), premium and plan structure were found to be heterogeneous in preferences. We found a statistically significant willingness to pay for a lower prescription drug deductible and lower copays. Switching costs were higher for sicker individuals. Switching costs between plans offered by the same insurer are far lower than switching costs between insurers; beneficiaries will switch plans if an alternative is perceived as $233 a month better than the current choice and switch insurers if the alternative is perceived as $944 better than the current plan/contract, on average. Premium elasticities would be 34% greater in magnitude if prior choices were irrelevant. We provide evidence that the state dependence is structural rather than spurious.

Introducing risk adjustment and free health plan choice in employer-based health insurance: Evidence from Germany.

To equalize differences in health plan premiums due to differences in risk pools, the German legislature introduced a simple Risk Adjustment Scheme (RAS) based on age, gender and disability status in 1994. In addition, effective 1996, consumers gained the freedom to choose among hundreds of existing health plans, across employers and state-borders. This paper (a) estimates RAS pass-through rates on premiums, financial reserves, and expenditures and assesses the overall RAS impact on market price dispersion. Moreover, it (b) characterizes health plan switchers and investigates their annual and cumulative switching rates over time. Our main findings are based on representative enrollee panel data linked to administrative RAS and health plan data. We show that sickness funds with bad risk pools and high pre-RAS premiums lowered their total premiums by 42 cents per additional euro allocated by the RAS. Consequently, post-RAS, health plan prices converged but not fully. Because switchers are more likely to be white collar, young and healthy, the new consumer choice resulted in more risk segregation and the amount of money redistributed by the RAS increased over time.

Health insurance subsidies and deductible choice: Evidence from regional variation in subsidy schemes.

The extent to which premium subsidies can influence health insurance choices is an open question. In this paper, we explore the regional variation in subsidy schemes in Switzerland, designed as either in-kind or cash transfers, to study their impact on the choice of health insurance deductibles. Using health survey data and a difference-in-differences methodology, we find that in-kind transfers increase the likelihood of choosing a low deductible plan by approximately 4 percentage points (or 7%). Our results indicate that the response to in-kind transfers is strongest among women, middle-aged and unmarried individuals, which we explain by differences in risk-taking behavior, health status, financial constraints, health insurance and financial literacy. We discuss our results in the light of potential extra-marginal effects on the demand for health care services, which are however not supported by our data.

What health plans do people prefer? The trade-off between premium and provider choice.

Within a healthcare system with managed competition, health insurers are expected to act as prudent buyers of care on behalf of their customers. To fulfil this role adequately, understanding consumer preferences for health plan characteristics is of vital importance. Little is known, however, about these preferences and how they vary across consumers. Using a discrete choice experiment (DCE) we quantified trade-offs between basic health plan characteristics and analysed whether there are differences in preferences according to age, health status and income. We selected four health plan characteristics to be included in the DCE: (i) the level of provider choice and associated level of reimbursement, (ii) the primary focus of provider contracting (price, quality, social responsibility), (iii) the level of service benefits, and (iv) the monthly premium. This selection was based on a literature study, expert interviews and focus group discussions. The DCE consisted of 17 choice sets, each comprising two hypothetical health plan alternatives. A representative sample (n = 533) of the Dutch adult population, based on age, gender and educational level, completed the online questionnaire during the annual open enrolment period for 2015. The final model with four latent classes showed that being able to choose a care provider freely was by far the most decisive characteristic for respondents aged over 45, those with chronic conditions, and those with a gross income over €3000/month. Monthly premium was the most important choice determinant for young, healthy, and lower income respondents. We conclude that it would be very unlikely for half of the sample to opt for health plans with restricted provider choice. However, a premium discount up to €15/month by restricted health plans might motivate especially younger, healthier, and less wealthy consumers to choose these plans.

Switching health insurers: the role of price, quality and consumer information search.

We examine the impact of price, service quality and information search on people's propensity to switch health insurers in the competitive Dutch health insurance market. Using panel data from annual household surveys and data on health insurers' premiums and quality ratings over the period 2006-2012, we estimate a random effects logit model of people's switching decisions. We find that switching propensities depend on health plan price and quality, and on people's age, health, education and having supplementary or group insurance. Young people (18-35 years) are more sensitive to price, whereas older people are more sensitive to quality. Searching for health plan information has a much stronger impact on peoples' sensitivity to price than to service quality. In addition, searching for health plan information has a stronger impact on the switching propensity of higher than lower educated people, suggesting that higher educated people make better use of available health plan information. Finally, having supplementary insurance significantly reduces older people's switching propensity.

Price elasticities in the German Statutory Health Insurance market before and after the health care reform of 2009.

This paper investigates the change in price elasticity of health insurance choice in Germany after a reform of health insurance contributions. Using a comprehensive data set of all sickness funds between 2004 and 2013, price elasticities are calculated both before and after the reform for the entire market. The general price elasticity is found to be increased more than 4-fold from -0.81 prior to the reform to -3.53 after the reform. By introducing a new kind of health insurance contribution the reform seemingly increased the price elasticity of insured individuals to a more appropriate level under the given market parameters. However, further unintended consequences of the new contribution scheme were massive losses of market share for the more expensive sickness funds and therefore an undivided focus on pricing as the primary competitive element to the detriment of quality.