Is it true that negative emotions cause more utilitarian judgements? from the influence of emotion and cognition.

ABSTRACTThe affect-as-information (AAI) model proposes that emotions influence the accessibility and value of information (Avramova & Inbar, 2013). Furthermore, according to the dual-process model of moral judgement, emotions and cognition influence moral judgement (Greene, 2007; Greene et al., 2001, 2008); however, there is no direct evidence of a causal chain to support this model's proposition. By using a 3 (emotions: positive vs. neutral vs. negative) × 2 (primed rule: save lives vs. do not kill) between-participants design, we examined two hypotheses in two experiments: supraliminal (Experiment 1) and subliminal (Experiment 2) priming. Our results partially supported the AAI model and confirmed that emotions and cognition independently influence moral judgement. Specifically, the positive emotions group made more utilitarian decisions after being primed with the "save lives" rule and more deontological decisions after being primed with the do not kill rule. However, priming did not affect moral judgement in the negative emotion condition. Further, irrespective of whether priming was done, the negative emotion group mostly made utilitarian decisions. Accordingly, we propose a dynamic dual-process model of moral judgement, that can help clarify how emotion and cognition influence moral judgement.

Diversified social cognition in temporal lobe epilepsy.

OBJECTIVES: In an integrated model of social cognition (SC), the theory of mind (ToM), the recognition of behavior in social situations (RBSS), empathy, and sensitivity to moral and conventional rules (SMCR) cooperate in generating mental representations of the interpersonal relationships. The aim of this study was to extend our knowledge of the SC of temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) patients by characterizing its various aspects and predictors. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Fifty adult patients with TLE and 50 healthy controls were assessed using ToM, RBSS and SMCR neuropsychological tests, the Empathy Questionnaire, and the psychopathology Symptoms Check List 90R (SCL90-R). RESULTS: Patients and controls were similar in terms of occupation, income level, age, sex, marital status and the number of family members. Multivariate analysis of variance with demographic variables as the covariates showed that they were similar in SMCR and empathy. The patients, conversely, had lower ToM and RBSS scores, and higher scores on the SCL90-R psychoticism, depression, paranoid ideation, obsessive-compulsive, somatization and anxiety scales. Impaired RBSS was predicted by psychopathological symptoms, income level, schooling and the duration of epilepsy; ToM related to TLE laterality, seizure frequency and epilepsy duration. CONCLUSIONS: In adult patients with TLE, SC is simultaneously partially impaired and partially preserved, and the fact this is associated with clinical, demographic and psychological variables suggests that SC depends on the integrity of the temporal lobe and the interconnected brain regions, as well as psychosocial stimuli. This approach may contribute to clarify the neurobehavioural phenotype of TLE.

Moral empiricism and the bias for act-based rules.

Previous studies on rule learning show a bias in favor of act-based rules, which prohibit intentionally producing an outcome but not merely allowing the outcome. Nichols, Kumar, Lopez, Ayars, and Chan (2016) found that exposure to a single sample violation in which an agent intentionally causes the outcome was sufficient for participants to infer that the rule was act-based. One explanation is that people have an innate bias to think rules are act-based. We suggest an alternative empiricist account: since most rules that people learn are act-based, people form an overhypothesis (Goodman, 1955) that rules are typically act-based. We report three studies that indicate that people can use information about violations to form overhypotheses about rules. In study 1, participants learned either three "consequence-based" rules that prohibited allowing an outcome or three "act-based" rules that prohibiting producing the outcome; in a subsequent learning task, we found that participants who had learned three consequence-based rules were more likely to think that the new rule prohibited allowing an outcome. In study 2, we presented participants with either 1 consequence-based rule or 3 consequence-based rules, and we found that those exposed to 3 such rules were more likely to think that a new rule was also consequence based. Thus, in both studies, it seems that learning 3 consequence-based rules generates an overhypothesis to expect new rules to be consequence-based. In a final study, we used a more subtle manipulation. We exposed participants to examples act-based or accident-based (strict liability) laws and then had them learn a novel rule. We found that participants who were exposed to the accident-based laws were more likely to think a new rule was accident-based. The fact that participants' bias for act-based rules can be shaped by evidence from other rules supports the idea that the bias for act-based rules might be acquired as an overhypothesis from the preponderance of act-based rules.

The Costs and Benefits of Calculation and Moral Rules.

There has been a recent upsurge of research on moral judgment and decision making. One important issue with this body of work concerns the relative advantages of calculating costs and benefits versus adherence to moral rules. The general tenor of recent research suggests that adherence to moral rules is associated with systematic biases and that systematic cost-benefit analysis is a normatively superior decision strategy. This article queries both the merits of cost-benefit analyses and the shortcomings of moral rules. We argue that outside the very narrow domain in which consequences can be unambiguously anticipated, it is not at all clear that calculation processes optimize outcomes. In addition, there are good reasons to believe that following moral rules can lead to superior consequences in certain contexts. More generally, different modes of decision making can be seen as adaptations to particular environments.

The Limits of Cost-Benefit Calculation: Commentary on Bennis, Medin, & Bartels (2010).

Bennis, Medin, and Bartels (2010, this issue) correctly identify real limits to the efficacy of cost-benefit analysis in comparison to moral rules. In this commentary, I suggest that those very same limits apply to decision making in general. Cost-benefit analysis may be the best way to arrive at decisions under a set of "closed-world assumptions" like those described by Bennis et al. But those assumptions virtually never hold, and in the absence of those assumptions, cost-benefit analysis often substitutes counting for thinking.

The method of 'principlism': a critique of the critique.

Several scholars have recently criticized the dominant emphasis upon mid-level principles in bioethics best exemplified by Beauchamp and Childress's Principles of Biomedical Ethics. In Part I of this essay, I assess the fairness and cogency of three broad criticisms raised against 'principlism' as an approach: (1) that principlism, as an exercise in applied ethics, is insufficiently attentive to the dialectical relations between ethical theory and mortal practice; (2) that principlism fails to offer a systematic account of the principles of non-maleficence, beneficence, respect for autonomy, and justice; and (3) that principlism, as a version of moral pluralism, is fatally flawed by its theoretical agnosticism. While acknowledging that Beauchamp and Childress's reliance upon Ross's version of intuitionism is problematic, I conclude that the critics of principlism have failed to make a compelling case against its theoretical or practical adequacy as an ethical approach. In Part II, I assess the moral theory developed by Bernard Gert in Mortality: A New Justification of the Moral Rules, because Gert has recommended his approach as a systematic alternative to principlism. I judge Gert's theory to be seriously incomplete and, in contrast to principlism, unable to generate coherent conclusions about cases of active euthanasia and paternalism.