Comparing self-other distinction across motor, cognitive and affective domains.

The self-other distinction (SOD) is a process by which humans disentangle self from other-related mental representations. This online study investigated two unresolved questions: (i) whether partially the same processes underpin SOD for motor, cognitive and affective representations, and (ii) whether SOD overlaps with domain-general cognitive control processes. Participants (N = 243) performed three SOD tasks (motor: automatic imitation inhibition (AIT); cognitive: visual perspective-taking (VPT); affective: emotional egocentricity bias (av-EEB) tasks) and two cognitive control tasks (Stroop and stop-signal reaction time (SSRT) tasks). Correlation analyses showed no associations among the motor, cognitive and affective SOD indexes. Similarly, distinct SOD clusters emerged in the hierarchical clustering dendrogram, indicating clear separations among SODs. However, the results of multidimensional scaling suggested a tendency towards two clusters, as evidenced by the proximity of AIT and VPT indexes in relation to EEB indexes. AIT spatial laterality and Stroop domain-general cognitive control confounded AIT and VPT indexes, albeit slightly differently depending on the analysis method used. SSRT showed neither associations with SODs nor with other domain-general indexes. These findings underscore the complexity of SOD processes and have notable implications for basic and applied research, e.g. in the domain of clinical disorders affected by deficiencies in SOD.

Self-other boundary under social threat in schizophrenia.

Spatial representation of the self plays a vital role constructing our sense of bodily self-boundary that distinguishes the self from others. This perceptual border, known as the peripersonal space (PPS), has been suggested to be altered in individuals with schizophrenia (SZ). PPS represents a protective defensive zone that triggers alarm signals upon threat detection; thus disrupted PPS could lead to social interactional difficulties. However, very little is known about the impact of threat on PPS. To address this gap, a visual-tactile response-time (RT) experiment was conducted in immersive virtual reality (VR) for SZ and matched controls (CO). Participants were asked to detect a tactile vibration on their hand while an avatar (either threatening or neutral) approached them. Avatars were presented at different distance from the participants. PPS size and slope were estimated by identifying significant RT drop at the hypothesized self-other boundary. We also examined the relationship between PPS parameters, clinical symptoms and social disconnection. There was no overall group difference in PPS size. Perceived social threat posed in the avatars sharpened the self-boundary in CO but not in SZ. In SZ, shallower PPS slope was associated with delusion, persecution, negative symptoms and loneliness but not in CO. These results show that the regulation of self-other boundary in response to impending social threat may be maladaptive in SZ. Further research is needed on the causal mechanisms between self-disturbance and social impairments.

Visual self-face and self-body recognition in a left-brain-damaged prosopagnosic patient.

The present case study describes the patient N.G., who reported prosopagnosia along with difficulty in recognising herself in the mirror following a left-sided temporo-occipital hemispheric stroke. The neuropsychological and experimental investigation revealed only a mild form of apperceptive prosopagnosia, without visual agnosia, primarily caused by an impaired visual processing of face-parts and body parts but not of full faces. Emotional expressions did not modulate her face processing. On the other hand, N.G. showed a marked impairment of visual self-recognition, as assessed with visual matching-to-sample tasks, both at the level of body-part and face-part processing and at a full-face level, featured by a deficit in the perceptual discrimination of her own face and body, as compared to the others' face and body. N.G.'s lesion mapping showed damage to the left inferior occipito-temporal cortex, affecting the inferior occipital gyrus and compromising long-range connections between the occipital/temporo-occipital areas and the anterior fronto-temporal areas. Overall, the present case report documents that visual processing of the person's own face may be selectively compromised by a left-sided hemispheric lesion disconnecting extra-striate body- and face-selective visual areas to self-representation regions. Moreover, others' (full) face processing may be preserved, as compared with the impaired ability to discriminate others' body and face parts.

Dissociative Symptoms and Interoceptive Integration.

Dissociative symptoms and disorders of dissociation are characterised by disturbances in the experience of the self and the surrounding world, manifesting as a breakdown in the normal integration of consciousness, memory, identity, emotion, and perception. This paper aims to provide insights into dissociative symptoms from the perspective of interoception, the sense of the body's internal physiological state, adopting a transdiagnostic framework.Dissociative symptoms are associated with a blunting of autonomic reactivity and a reduction in interoceptive precision. In addition to the central function of interoception in homeostasis, afferent visceral signals and their neural and mental representation have been shown to shape emotional feeling states, support memory encoding, and contribute to self-representation. Changes in interoceptive processing and disrupted integration of interoceptive signals into wider cognition may contribute to detachment from the body and the world, blunted emotional experience, and altered subjective recall, as experienced by individuals who suffer from dissociation.A better understanding of the role of altered interoceptive integration across the symptom areas of dissociation could thus provide insights into the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying dissociative disorders. As new therapeutic approaches targeting interoceptive processing emerge, recognising the significance of interoceptive mechanisms in dissociation holds potential implications for future treatment targets.

Brain Activation for Social Cognition and Emotion Processing Tasks in Borderline Personality Disorder: A Meta-Analysis of Neuroimaging Studies.

The present meta-analysis summarizes brain activation for social cognition and emotion-processing tasks in borderline personality disorder (BPD). We carried out two meta-analyses to elaborate on commonalities and potential differences between the two types of tasks. In the first meta-analysis, we implemented a more liberal strategy for task selection (including social and emotional content). The results confirmed previously reported hyperactivations in patients with BPD in the bilateral amygdala and prefrontal cortex and hypoactivations in bilateral inferior frontal gyri. When applying a stricter approach to task selection, focusing narrowly on social cognition tasks, we only found activation in prefrontal areas, particularly in the anterior cingulate and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. We review the role of these areas in social cognition in healthy adults, suggesting that the observed BPD hyperactivations may reflect an overreliance on self-related thought in social cognition.

I understand your pain but I do not feel it: lower affective empathy in response to others' social pain in narcissism.

Introduction: While the relationship between narcissism and empathy has been well-researched, studies have paid less attention to empathic accuracy, i.e., appreciating the precise strength of another person's emotions, and self-other distinction, in terms of the disparity between affective ratings for self and other in response to emotive stimuli. Furthermore, empathic responses may vary depending on whether the pain is physical or social. Methods: We investigated empathic accuracy, affective empathy, and the distinction between pain, emotion and intensity ratings for self and other, in high (n = 44) and low (n = 43) narcissism groups (HNG and LNG, respectively) selected from 611 students, in response to both types of pain. Participants watched six videos where targets expressed genuine experiences of physical and social pain, and rated the perceived affect and pain experienced by the person in the video and their own empathic emotional responses. Results and discussion: The HNG displayed lower affective empathy and empathic accuracy than the LNG for both pain types. Within the HNG there was higher empathic accuracy for social vs. physical pain, despite reduced affective empathy for social pain, in contrast to the LNG. In addition to this paradox, the HNG demonstrated greater differences between ratings for the self and for target others than the LNG, suggesting that narcissism is associated with higher self-other distinction in response to viewing other people describing social pain.

Studying trait-characteristics and neural correlates of the emotional ego- and altercentric bias using an audiovisual paradigm.

In social interactions, emotional biases can arise when the emotional state of oneself and another person are incongruent. A person's ability to judge the other's emotional state can then be biased by their own emotional state, leading to an emotional egocentric bias (EEB). Alternatively, a person's perception of their own emotional state can be biased by the other's emotional state leading to an emotional altercentric bias (EAB). Using a modified audiovisual paradigm, we examined in three studies (n = 171; two online & one lab-based study) whether emotional biases can be considered traits by measuring two timepoints within participant and relating empathy trait scores to emotional biases, as well as the electrophysiological correlates of emotional biases. In all studies, we found a congruency effect, reflecting an EEB and EAB of small size. Both biases failed to correlate significantly within participants across timepoints and did not display significant relationships with empathy trait scores. On the electrophysiological level, we did not find any neural emotional bias effects in the time-frequency domain. Our results suggest that EEB and EAB effects are strongly task sensitive. Caution is warranted when studying interindividual differences in emotional biases using this paradigm, as they did not show significant test-retest reliabilities.

Transdiagnostic investigation into the relationship between mirror neuron system activity, echo-phenomena, and theory of mind in major psychoses.

The association between social cognition and putative mirror neuron system (MNS)-activity in major psychoses might be contingent upon frontal dysregulation. We used a transdiagnostic ecological approach to enrich a specific behavioral phenotype (echophenomena or hyper-imitative states) across clinical diagnoses (mania and schizophrenia) to compare behavioral and physiological markers of social cognition and frontal disinhibition. We examined 114 participants with schizophrenia (N = 53) and mania (N = 61) for the presence and severity of echo-phenomena (echopraxia, incidental, and induced echolalia) using an ecological paradigm to simulate real-life social communication. Symptom severity, frontal release reflexes, and theory of mind performance were also assessed. In a proportion of these participants with (N = 20) and without (N = 20) echo-phenomena, we compared motor resonance (motor evoked potential facilitation during action observation compared to static image viewing) and cortical silent period (CSP) as putative markers of MNS-activity and frontal disinhibition, respectively, using Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation. While the prevalence of echo-phenomena was similar between mania and schizophrenia, incidental echolalia was more severe in mania. Participants with echo-phenomena (compared to those without) had significantly greater motor resonance with singlepulse (not with paired-pulse) stimuli, poorer theory of mind scores, higher frontal release reflexes but similar CSP, and greater symptom severity. None of these parameters significantly differed between participants with mania and schizophrenia. We observed relatively better phenotypic and neurophysiological characterization of major psychoses by categorizing participants based on the presence of echophenomena than clinical diagnoses. Higher putative MNS-activity was associated with poorer theory of mind in a hyper-imitative behavioral state.

Whose emotion is it? Perspective matters to understand brain-body interactions in emotions.

Feeling happy, or judging whether someone else is feeling happy are two distinct facets of emotions that nevertheless rely on similar physiological and neural activity. Differentiating between these two states, also called Self/Other distinction, is an essential aspect of empathy, but how exactly is it implemented? In non-emotional cognition, the transient neural response evoked at each heartbeat, or heartbeat evoked response (HER), indexes the self and signals Self/Other distinction. Here, using electroencephalography (n = 32), we probe whether HERs' role in Self/Other distinction extends also to emotion - a domain where brain-body interactions are particularly relevant. We asked participants to rate independently validated affective scenes, reporting either their own emotion (Self) or the emotion expressed by people in the scene (Other). During the visual cue indicating to adopt the Self or Other perspective, before the affective scene, HERs distinguished between the two conditions, in visual cortices as well as in the right frontal operculum. Physiological reactivity (facial electromyogram, skin conductance, heart rate) during affective scene co-varied as expected with valence and arousal ratings, but also with the Self- or Other- perspective adopted. Finally, HERs contributed to the subjective experience of valence in the Self condition, in addition to and independently from physiological reactivity. We thus show that HERs represent a trans-domain marker of Self/Other distinction, here specifically contributing to experienced valence. We propose that HERs represent a form of evidence related to the 'I' part of the judgement 'To which extent do I feel happy'. The 'I' related evidence would be combined with the affective evidence collected during affective scene presentation, accounting at least partly for the difference between feeling an emotion and identifying it in someone else.

The role of oxytocin in modulating self-other distinction in human brain: a pharmacological fMRI study.

Self-other distinction is crucial for human interaction. Although with conflicting results, studies have found that oxytocin (OT) sharpens the self-other perceptual boundary. However, little is known about the effect of OT on self-other perception, especially its neural basis. Moreover, it is unclear whether OT influences self-other discrimination when the other is a child or an adult. This double-blind, placebo-controlled study investigated the effect of OT on self-face perception at the behavioral and neural levels. For the stimuli, we morphed participants' faces and child or adult strangers' faces, resulting in 4 conditions. After treatment with either OT or placebo, participants reported whether a stimulus resembled themselves while being scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Behavioral results showed that people judged adult-morphed faces better than child-morphed faces. Moreover, fMRI results showed that the OT group exhibited increased activity in visual areas and the inferior frontal gyrus for self-faces. This difference was more pronounced in the adult-face condition. In multivariate fMRI and region of interest analyses, better performance in the OT group indicated that OT increased self-other distinction, especially for adult faces and in the left hemisphere. Our study shows a significant effect of OT on self-referential processes, proving the potential effect of OT on a left hemisphere self-network.

Neural processing of self-touch and other-touch in anorexia nervosa and autism spectrum condition.

INTRODUCTION: The tactile sense plays a crucial role in the development and maintenance of a functional bodily self. The ability to differentiate between self- and nonself-generated touch contributes to the perception of the bodies' boundaries and more generally to self-other-distinction, both of which are thought be altered in anorexia nervosa (AN) and autism spectrum condition (AS). While it has been suggested that AN and AS are characterized by overlapping symptomatology, they might differ regarding body perception and self-other-distinction. METHODS: Participants with a diagnosis of AN (n = 25), AS (n = 29), and a comparison group without diagnoses (n = 57) performed a self-other-touch task during functional brain imaging. In the experimental conditions, they stroked their own arm or were stroked on the arm by an experimenter. RESULTS: As shown previously, the CG group showed lower activation or deactivation in response to self-touch compared to social touch from someone else. A main group effect was found in areas including somatosensory cortex, frontal and temporal gyri, insula, and subcortical regions. This was driven by increased activations in participants with AN, while participants in the AS group showed mostly comparable activations to the comparison group. CONCLUSIONS: AN diagnosis was associated with an increased neural activity in response to both self-touch and social touch. Failure to attenuate self-touch might relate to altered predictions regarding the own body and reduced perception of bodily boundaries. Participants with an AS diagnosis were mostly comparable to the comparison group, potentially indicating unaltered tactile self-other-distinction.

The Transdiagnostic Relevance of Self-Other Distinction to Psychiatry Spans Emotional, Cognitive and Motor Domains.

Self-other distinction refers to the ability to distinguish between our own and other people's physical and mental states (actions, perceptions, emotions etc.). Both the right temporo-parietal junction and brain areas associated with the human mirror neuron system are likely to critically influence self-other distinction, given their respective contributions to theory of mind and embodied empathy. The degree of appropriate self-other distinction will vary according to the exact social situation, and how helpful it is to feel into, or remain detached from, another person's mental state. Indeed, the emotional resonance that we can share with others affords the gift of empathy, but over-sharing may pose a downside, leading to a range of difficulties from personal distress to paranoia, and perhaps even motor tics and compulsions. The aim of this perspective paper is to consider how evidence from behavioral and neurophysiological studies supports a role for problems with self-other distinction in a range of psychiatric symptoms spanning the emotional, cognitive and motor domains. The various signs and symptoms associated with problematic self-other distinction comprise both maladaptive and adaptive (compensatory) responses to dysfunction within a common underlying neuropsychological mechanism, compelling the adoption of more holistic transdiagnostic therapeutic approaches within Psychiatry.

Emotional Ego- and Altercentric Biases in High-Functioning Autism Spectrum Disorder: Behavioral and Neurophysiological Evidence.

Self-other distinction is a crucial aspect of social cognition, as it allows us to differentiate our own mental and emotional states from those of others. Research suggests that this ability might be impaired in individuals on the autism spectrum, but convincing evidence of self-other distinction difficulties in the emotional domain is lacking. Here we aimed at evaluating emotional self-other distinction abilities in autistic and non-autistic adults, in two behavioral pilot studies and one fMRI study. By using a newly developed virtual ball-tossing game that induced simultaneous positive and negative emotional states in each participant and another person, we were able to measure emotional egocentric and altercentric biases (namely the tendency to ascribe self-/other-related emotions to others/ourselves, respectively). Despite no behavioral differences, individuals on the autism spectrum showed decreased activation (1) in the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) during active overcoming of the emotional egocentric bias vs. passive game viewing, and (2) in the right supramarginal gyrus (rSMG) during ego- vs. altercentric biases, compared to neurotypical participants. These results suggest a different recruitment of these two regions in autistic individuals when dealing with conflicting emotional states of oneself and another person. Furthermore, they highlight the importance of considering different control conditions when interpreting the involvement of rTPJ and rSMG during self-other distinction processes.

The performance monitoring system is attuned to others' actions during dyadic motor interactions.

Interpersonal motor interactions require the simultaneous monitoring of one's own and one's partner's actions. To characterize how the action monitoring system tracks self and other behavior during synchronous interactions, we combined electroencephalography recordings and immersive virtual reality in two tasks where participants were asked to synchronize their actions with those of a virtual partner (VP). The two tasks differed in the features to be monitored: the Goal task required participants to predict and monitor the VP's reaching goal; the Spatial task required participants to predict and monitor the VP's reaching trajectory. In both tasks, the VP performed unexpected movement changes to which the participant needed to adapt. By extracting the neural activity locked to the detection of unexpected changes in the VP's action (other-monitoring) or to the participants' action-replanning (self-monitoring), we show that the monitoring system is more attuned to others' than to one's own actions. Additionally, distinctive neural responses to VP's unexpected goals and trajectory corrections were found: goal changes were reflected both in early fronto-central and later posterior neural responses while trajectory deviations were reflected only in later posterior responses. Altogether, our results indicate that the monitoring system adopts an inherent social mode to handle interpersonal motor interactions.

A neural signature for combined action observation and motor imagery? An fNIRS study into prefrontal activation, automatic imitation, and self-other perceptions.

INTRODUCTION: Research indicates that both observed and imagined actions can be represented in the brain as two parallel sensorimotor representations. One proposal is that higher order cognitive processes would align these two hypothetical action simulations. METHODS: We investigated this hypothesis using an automatic imitation paradigm, with functional near-infrared spectroscopy recordings over the prefrontal cortex during different motor simulation states. On each trial, participants (n = 14) observed a picture of a rhythmical action (instructed action) followed by a distractor movie showing the same or different action. Participants then executed the instructed action. Distractor actions were manipulated to be fast or slow, and instructions were manipulated during distractor presentation: action observation (AO), combined action observation and motor imagery (AO+MI) and observe to imitate (intentional imitation). A pure motor imagery (MI) condition was also included. RESULTS: Kinematic analyses showed that although distractor speed effects were significant under all instructions (shorter mean cycle times in execution for fast compared to slow trials), this imitation bias was significantly stronger for combined AO+MI than both AO and MI, and stronger for intentional imitation than the other three automatic imitation conditions. In the left prefrontal cortex, cerebral oxygenation was significantly greater for combined AO+MI than all other instructions. Participants reported that their representation of the self overlapped with the observed model significantly more during AO+MI than AO. CONCLUSION: Left prefrontal activation may therefore be a neural signature of AO+MI, supporting attentional switching between concurrent representations of self (MI, top-down) and other (AO, bottom-up) to increase imitation and perceived closeness.

Taking the pulse of social cognition: Cardiac afferent activity and interoceptive accuracy modulate emotional egocentricity bias.

At the heart of social cognition is our ability to distinguish between self and other and correctly attribute mental and affective states to their origin. Emotional egocentricity bias (EEB) reflects the tendency to use one's own emotional state when relating to others. Although interoception underpins our emotional experience, little is known about its role on how we affectively relate to others. Here, we assessed how cardiac interoceptive impact, manipulated by presenting affective stimuli across different phases of the cardiac cycle coupled with trait-like levels of interoceptive accuracy, modulate the EEB. Individuals with higher interoceptive accuracy displayed an increased EEB when the other's emotional state was presented at the point of maximum interoceptive impact (i.e., at systole), whereas the reverse was observed for individuals with lower interoceptive accuracy. These findings show how interoceptive activity provides the physiological context within which we process other's emotional states in parallel to ours.

Neural dynamics between anterior insular cortex and right supramarginal gyrus dissociate genuine affect sharing from perceptual saliency of pretended pain.

Empathy for pain engages both shared affective responses and self-other distinction. In this study, we addressed the highly debated question of whether neural responses previously linked to affect sharing could result from the perception of salient affective displays. Moreover, we investigated how the brain network involved in affect sharing and self-other distinction underpinned our response to a pain that is either perceived as genuine or pretended (while in fact both were acted for reasons of experimental control). We found stronger activations in regions associated with affect sharing (anterior insula [aIns] and anterior mid-cingulate cortex) as well as with affective self-other distinction (right supramarginal gyrus [rSMG]), in participants watching video clips of genuine vs. pretended facial expressions of pain. Using dynamic causal modeling, we then assessed the neural dynamics between the right aIns and rSMG in these two conditions. This revealed a reduced inhibitory effect on the aIns to rSMG connection for genuine pain compared to pretended pain. For genuine pain only, brain-to-behavior regression analyses highlighted a linkage between this inhibitory effect on the one hand, and pain ratings as well as empathic traits on the other. These findings imply that if the pain of others is genuine and thus calls for an appropriate empathic response, neural responses in the aIns indeed seem related to affect sharing and self-other distinction is engaged to avoid empathic over-arousal. In contrast, if others merely pretend to be in pain, the perceptual salience of their painful expression results in neural responses that are down-regulated to avoid inappropriate affect sharing and social support.

Empathy enables us to share and understand the emotional states of other people, often based on their facial expressions. This empathic response involves being able to distinguish our own emotional state from someone else's, and it is influenced by how we recognize that person's emotion. In real life, knowing and identifying whether the facial expression we are witnessing reflects genuine or pretended pain is particularly important so that we can appropriately react to someone's emotions and avoid unnecessary personal distress. How our brains manage to do this is still heavily debated. Two areas, the anterior insular (aIns for short) and the mid-cingulate cortex, appear to be activated when someone 'feels' someone else's pain. However, these regions might just automatically be triggered by vivid emotional facial expressions, regardless of whether we really respond to that pain. To examine this question, Zhao et al. measured brain activity as healthy adults watched video clips of people either feeling or pretending to feel pain. The activation of aIns was particularly related to the emotional component that someone shared with another person's genuine pain, but not to pretended pain. This suggests that neurons in the aIns track a truly empathic response when seeing someone who is actually experiencing pain. Effective connectivity analyses which reflect how brain areas 'crosstalk' also revealed distinct patterns when people viewed expressions of genuine, as opposed to pretended pain. Zhao et al. focused on the interactions between the alns and the right supramarginal gyrus, a brain region which helps to distinguish another person's emotions from our own. This crosstalk tracked others' feelings when participants viewed expressions of genuine but not of pretended pain. Put together, these findings provide a more refined model of empathy and its neural underpinnings. This will help further our understanding of conditions such as autism or depression, in which a person's social skills and emotional processing are impaired.

Two Faces of a Coin? A Systematic Review of Source Monitoring and Its Relationship with Memory in Autism.

The ability to discriminate the origin of stimuli, known as source monitoring, is crucial for self-other distinction and the integration of internally generated and externally generated experiences. Despite its valence, evidence on source monitoring in autism is yet scarce and unclear. We systematically reviewed literature concerning source monitoring in autism and its relationship with other constructs, such as memory type, encoding effects, social cognition, general intelligence, and clinical factors. Source-monitoring performance (operationalized as error or accuracy) was reduced in autistic participants in 9 of the 15 studies that met the inclusion criteria. When explicitly investigated, free-recall memory impairments in autism were shown to influence source monitoring deficits. General intelligence was another important factor linked to source-monitoring performance. Conversely, other memory types or encoding effects were not impaired in autism, and no univocal association could be found with source monitoring. Social cognition and clinical symptoms were rarely assessed in spite of their possible involvement in source monitoring. The heterogeneity of the task design, outcome measures and demographical factors limited study comparability. As a research framework on source monitoring as a construct of primary interest in autism is still lacking, we propose preliminary indications for future investigations based on the collected findings.

Simultaneous self-other integration and segregation support real-time interpersonal coordination in a musical joint action task.

The ability to distinguish between an individual's own actions and those of another person is a requirement for successful joint action, particularly in domains such as group music making where precise interpersonal coordination ensures perceptual overlap in the effects of co-performers' actions. We tested the hypothesis that such coordination benefits from simultaneous integration and segregation of information about 'self' and 'other' in an experiment using a musical joint action paradigm. Sixteen pairs of individuals with little or no musical training performed a dyadic synchronization task on a pair of electronic music boxes. The relationship between pitches produced by paired participants (same vs. different) and the relationship between movement frequencies required to trigger synchronous tones (congruent vs. incongruent) were varied in a repeated measures design. The results indicate that interpersonal coordination was most accurate when sounds were different in pitch but movement frequency was congruent. Under other conditions, participants often drifted apart, resulting in poor coordination, especially with same sounds and incongruent movements across co-performers. These findings suggest that interpersonal coordination was facilitated when simultaneous self-other integration and segregation occurred across sensory modalities in an asymmetrical manner where pitch relations favoured segregation via auditory streaming while movement congruence favoured integration via visuo-motor coupling. Such self-other representational balance may enable co-performers to maintain autonomous control while attending, anticipating, and adapting to each other's timing when joint action requires precise temporal coordination.

Staying in touch with our bodies: Stronger sense of ownership during self- compared to other touch despite temporal mismatches.

Self-touch is considered important for bodily self-consciousness and self-other distinction and has been reported to improve clinical symptoms of disembodiment. To investigate the link between self-touch and disembodiment in healthy participants, we studied the effect of self-touch versus touch produced by another person (other-touch) on experimentally induced disembodiment. In a mixed reality paradigm, across two experiments, participants could see their own body and surroundings with a controllable visual delay and either stroked their own hand with a paintbrush or were stroked with it by the experimenter. Experiment 1 first assessed the sensitivity to temporal multimodal mismatches and delay-induced changes in the sense of body ownership in three conditions, namely self-touch, other-touch and hidden-self-touch (visually occluding the touching hand). In a second block, we compared phenomenological and physiological (threat response) measures of disembodiment between the self-touch and other-touch conditions. Experiment 2 roughly replicated the first block of Experiment 1 but included a condition in which participants performed the self-touch gesture without touching their hand. Such experiment attempted to control for the potential role of efferent signals. Our results show that increasing visual delay generally enhances the feeling of disembodiment, yet the decrease of body ownership is less pronounced during self-touch. For sensitivity to delay between conditions, however, diverging findings are discussed. This study provides evidence for the importance of self-touch in sustaining a healthy sense of body in the context of disembodiment.