The impact of terminating cost-sharing reductions payments on health insurance plan choices.

The Trump administration terminated cost-sharing reductions (CSRs) payments to health insurers in 2017, while still required insurers to provide CSRs to eligible enrollees in the Marketplace. Marketplace administration data reveals that, in response to this termination, insurers raised premiums to compensate for their loss. Consequently, premium increases led to more advanced premium tax credits for enrollees in the Marketplace. To investigate the impact of CSRs payment termination on low-income consumer insurance plan choices, I leverage variations in state price regulations and employed a difference-in-differences design. In a robustness analysis, I utilized differences in county income distributions to examine the effects of the termination on insurance choices. The results indicate that after the termination, more low-income enrollees opted for cheaper bronze plans, and fewer chose silver plans. These results suggest that alterations in subsidy channels may inadvertently encourage low-income individuals to purchase less expensive health insurance plans, highlighting an unintended consequence of the termination of cost-sharing subsidies.

Identifying undercompensated groups defined by multiple attributes in risk adjustment.

OBJECTIVE: To identify undercompensated groups in plan payment risk adjustment that are defined by multiple attributes with a systematic new approach, improving on the arbitrary and inconsistent nature of existing evaluations. METHODS: Extending the concept of variable importance for single attributes, we construct a measure of 'group importance' in the random forests algorithm to identify groups with multiple attributes that are undercompensated by current risk adjustment formulas. Using 2016-2018 IBM MarketScan and 2015-2018 Medicare claims and enrolment data, we evaluate two risk adjustment scenarios: the risk adjustment formula used in the individual health insurance Marketplaces and the risk adjustment formula used in Medicare. RESULTS: A number of previously unidentified groups with multiple chronic conditions are undercompensated in the Marketplaces risk adjustment formula, while groups without chronic conditions tend to be overcompensated in the Marketplaces. The magnitude of undercompensation when defining groups with multiple attributes is many times larger than with single attributes. No complex groups were found to be consistently undercompensated or overcompensated in the Medicare risk adjustment formula. CONCLUSIONS: Our method is effective at identifying complex undercompensated groups in health plan payment risk adjustment where undercompensation creates incentives for insurers to discriminate against these groups. This work provides policy-makers with new information on potential targets of discrimination in the healthcare system and a path towards more equitable health coverage.

Impact of the Affordable Care Act Insurance Marketplaces on Out-of-Pocket Spending Among Surgical Patients.

OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the association between the introduction of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) Health Insurance Marketplaces ("Marketplaces") and financial protection for patients undergoing surgery. BACKGROUND: The ACA established Marketplaces through which individuals could purchase subsidized insurance coverage. However, the effect of these Marketplaces on surgical patients' healthcare spending remains largely unknown. METHODS: We analyzed a nationally representative sample of adults aged 19-64 who underwent surgery in 2010-2017, using the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. Low-income patients eligible for cost-sharing and premium subsidies in the Marketplaces [income 139%-250% federal poverty level (FPL)] and middle-income patients eligible only for premium subsidies (251%-400% FPL) were compared to high-income controls ineligible for subsidies (>400% FPL) using a quasi-experimental difference-in-differences approach. We evaluated 3 main outcomes: (1) out-of-pocket spending, (2) premium contributions, and (3) likelihood of experiencing catastrophic expenditures, defined as out-of-pocket plus premium spending exceeding 19.5% of family income. RESULTS: Our sample included 5450 patients undergoing surgery, representing approximately 69 million US adults. Among low-income patients, Marketplace implementation was associated with $601 lower [95% confidence interval (CI): -$1169 to -$33; P = 0.04) out-of-pocket spending; $968 lower (95% CI: -$1652 to -$285; P = 0.006) premium spending; and 34.6% lower probability (absolute change: -8.3 percentage points; 95% CI: -14.9 to -1.7; P = 0.01) of catastrophic expenditures. We found no evidence that health expenditures changed for middle-income surgical patients. CONCLUSIONS: The ACA's insurance Marketplaces were associated with improved financial protection among low-income surgical patients eligible for both cost-sharing and premium subsidies, but not in middle-income patients eligible for only premium subsidies.

Provider networks and health plan premium variation.

OBJECTIVE: To examine how plan premiums are associated with physician network breadth, hospital network breadth, and hospital network quality on the Affordable Care Act's Health Insurance Marketplaces in all 50 states and the DC in 2016. DATA SOURCES: Data on plan premiums and characteristics came from 2016 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Health Insurance Exchange (HIX) Compare. Provider network information was obtained from Vericred. Hospital characteristics were obtained from CMS Hospital Compare and the American Hospital Association (AHA) survey. STUDY DESIGN: We analyzed how plan premiums were associated with variations in physician network breadth, hospital network breadth, and hospital network quality using ordinary least square regressions with state-rating area fixed effects and carrier fixed effects. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Plan premiums were positively associated with physician network breadth and hospital network breadth. We find the following statistically significant results: a one standard deviation increase in physician network breadth was linked to a premium increase of 2.8 percent or $101 per year; a one standard deviation increase in hospital network breadth was linked to a premium increase of 2.4 percent or $86 per year. There was no significant association between premiums and hospital network quality, as measured by hospital star ratings and the inclusion of teaching hospitals or the top-20 hospitals nationwide. CONCLUSIONS: Physician network breadth and hospital network breadth contributed positively to plan premiums. The roles of the two types of provider network breadth are quantitatively similar. Premiums appear to be insensitive to hospital network quality.

Same Game, Different Names: Cream-Skimming in the Post-ACA Individual Health Insurance Market.

One of the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) signature reforms was creating centralized Health Insurance Marketplaces to offer comprehensive coverage in the form of comprehensive insurance complying with the ACA's coverage standards. Yet, even after the ACA's implementation, millions of people were covered through noncompliant plans, primarily in the form of continued enrollment in "grandmothered" and "grandfathered" plans that predated ACA's full implementation and were allowed under federal and state regulations. Newly proposed and enacted federal legislation may grow the noncompliant segment in future years, and the employment losses of 2020 may grow reliance on individual market coverage further. These factors make it important to understand how the noncompliant segment affects the compliant segment, including the Marketplaces. We show, first, that the noncompliant segment of the individual insurance market substantially outperformed the compliant segment, charging lower premiums but with vastly lower costs, suggesting that insurers have a strong incentive to enter the noncompliant segment. We show, next, that state's decisions to allow grandmothered plans is associated with stronger financial performance of the noncompliant market, but weaker performance of the compliant segment, as noncompliant plans attract lower-cost enrollees. This finding indicates important linkages between the noncompliant and compliant segments and highlights the role state policy can play in the individual insurance market. Taken together, our results point to substantial cream-skimming, with noncompliant plans enrolling the healthiest enrollees, resulting in higher average claims cost in the compliant segment.

The ACA's Choice Problem.

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) is in many ways a success. Millions more Americans now have access to health care, and the ACA catalyzed advances in health care delivery reform. Simultaneously, it has reinforced and bolstered a problem at the heart of American health policy and regulation: a love affair with choice. The ACA's insurance reforms doubled down on the particularly American obsession with choice. This article describes three ways in which that doubling down is problematic for the future of US health policy. First, pragmatically, health policy theory predicts that choice among health plans will produce tangible benefits that it does not actually produce. Most people do not like choosing among health plan options, and many people-even if well educated and knowledgeable-do not make good choices. Second, creating the regulatory structures to support these choices built and reinforced a massive market bureaucracy. Finally, and most important, philosophically and sociologically the ACA reinforces the idea that the goal of health regulation should be to preserve choice, even when that choice is empty. This vicious cycle seems likely to persist based on the lead up to the 2020 presidential election.

Sources of Success in California's Individual Marketplace under the Affordable Care Act.

When passed in 2010, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) became the greatest piece of health care reform in the United States since the creation of Medicare and Medicaid. In the 9 years since its passage, the law has ushered in a drastic decrease in the number of uninsured Americans and has encouraged delivery system innovation. However, the ACA has not been uniformly embraced, and states differ in their implementation of the law and in their individual health insurance marketplace's successfulness. Furthermore, under the Trump administration the law's future and the stability of the individual market have been uncertain. Throughout, however, California has been a leader. Today, the state's marketplace, known as Covered California, offers comprehensive, standardized health plans to over 1.3 million consumers. California's success with the ACA is largely attributable to its historical receptiveness to health reform; its early adoption of the law; its decision to have Covered California operate as an active purchaser, help shape the plans sold through the marketplace, and design a consumer-friendly enrollment experience; its engagement with stakeholders and community partners to encourage enrollment; and Covered California's commitment to continually innovate, improve, and anticipate the needs of the individual market as the law moves forward.

Individual market health plan affordability after cost-sharing reduction subsidy cuts.

OBJECTIVE: To investigate how changes in insurer participation and composition as well as state policies affect health plan affordability for individual market enrollees. DATA SOURCES: 2014-2019 Qualified Health Plan Landscape Files augmented with supplementary insurer-level information. STUDY DESIGN: We measured plan affordability for subsidized enrollees using premium spreads, the difference between the benchmark plan and the lowest cost plan, and premium levels for unsubsidized enrollees. We estimated how premium spreads and levels varied with insurer participation, insurer composition, and state policies using log-linear models for 15 222 county-years. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Increased insurer participation reduces premium levels, which is beneficial for unsubsidized enrollees. However, it also reduces premium spreads, leading to lower plan affordability for subsidized enrollees. States responding to cost-sharing reduction subsidy payment cuts by increasing only silver plans' premiums increase premium spreads, particularly when premium increases are restricted to on-Marketplace silver plans. The latter approach also protects unsubsidized, off-Marketplace enrollees from experiencing premium shocks. CONCLUSIONS: Insurer participation and insurer composition affect subsidized and unsubsidized enrollees' health plan affordability in different ways. Decisions by state regulators regarding health plan pricing can significantly affect health plan affordability for each enrollee segment.

Impacts of shifting responsibility for high-cost individuals on Health Insurance Exchange plan premiums and cost-sharing provisions.

Insurance companies can respond to increases in expected per-capita healthcare expenditures by adjusting premiums, cost-sharing requirements, and/or plan generosity. We use a Difference-in-Difference model with Plan-level Fixed Effects to estimate the impacts of increases in expected expenditures generated by closure of state-operated High Risk Pools (HRPs). For Silver plans, we find that issuers responded to HRP closures by increasing both premiums and deductibles, and by increasing the ratios of premiums to deductibles. This adjustment to the structure of plan prices is consistent with the hypothesis that issuers will be reluctant to adjust deductibles, because consumers tend to overweight changes in deductibles over changes in premiums. The increase in the ratio of premiums to deductibles indicates that the increase in expected expenditures triggered an increase in the share of total risk-pool healthcare expenditures paid by low healthcare utilizers, and a decrease in the share paid by high utilizers.

The Association Between Hospital Concentration And Insurance Premiums In ACA Marketplaces.

Keeping the Affordable Care Act's health insurance Marketplaces financially accessible is critically important to their viability. While the relationship between the number of insurers and Marketplace premiums has received widespread attention, the role of hospital market concentration on premiums has been understudied. We examined the relationship between hospital market concentration and Marketplace insurance premiums in the period 2014-17, the extent to which the number of insurers modified this relationship, and whether community-level characteristics were associated with varying levels of concentration. We found that areas with the highest levels of hospital market concentration had annual premiums that were, on average, 5 percent higher than those in the least concentrated areas. Additionally, while an increased number of insurers was independently associated with lower premiums, that was not sufficient to offset the effects of increased hospital concentration on premium costs. Communities with lower socioeconomic status (as measured by median income) were more likely to have higher hospital market concentration. However, this was not consistent across all measures of socioeconomic status, such as measures of unemployment, use of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, and education. These findings help underscore the importance of exploring antitrust policy and other efforts that may reduce hospital concentration and help keep Marketplace premiums affordable.

Plan Choice And Affordability In The Individual And Small-Group Markets: Policy And Performance-Past And Present.

The individual and small-group health insurance markets have experienced considerable changes since the passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010, affecting access, choice, and affordability for enrollees in these markets. We examined how health plan access, choice, and affordability varied between the individual on-Marketplace, individual off-Marketplace, and small-group markets in 2018. We found relatively similar outcomes across the three markets with respect to deductibles and out-of-pocket spending maximums. However, the small-group market maintained greater plan choice and lower premiums-outcomes that appear to be associated with higher insurer participation. States may consider a variety of policy proposals such as reinsurance or the introduction of a public option to increase insurer participation and improve the plan choices offered in the individual market.

What are consumers willing to pay for a broad network health plan?: Evidence from covered California.

Health Insurance Marketplaces have received considerable attention for their narrow network health plans. Yet, little is known about consumer tastes for network breadth and how they affect plan selection. I estimate demand for health plans in California's Marketplace, Covered California. Using 2017 individual enrollment data and provider network directories, I develop a geospatial measure of network breadth that reflects the physical locations of households and network providers. I find that households are sensitive to network breath in their plan choices. Mean willingness to pay for a broad network plan relative to a narrow network plan, defined as a two standard deviation, 17.44 percentage point increase in network breadth, is $45.83 in post-subsidy monthly premiums. Variation in WTP indicates a selection mechanism exists whereby older households sort into broader network plans. I also find that households are highly premium sensitive, which may be a result of plan standardization in Covered California.

Estimated Costs of a Reinsurance Program to Stabilize the Individual Health Insurance Market: National- and State-Level Estimates.

Reinsurance, an insurance product designed to protect health insurers against the financial risk of covering high-cost enrollees, has attracted bipartisan policy interest as a mechanism to stabilize individual health insurance markets. Three states-Alaska, Minnesota, and Oregon-have implemented state-based reinsurance programs under the Affordable Care Act's 1332 State Innovation Waivers, and reinsurance waivers have been approved though not yet enacted in Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, and Wisconsin. In this article, we estimate the costs of implementing national and state-based reinsurance programs using health spending data from the 2007-2016 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey and state demographic and health insurance coverage data from the 2015-2017 Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement. We project that a reinsurance program with an 80% payment rate for expenditures between $40,000 and $250,000 would cost $30.1 billion from 2020-2022. We observed considerable variation in reinsurance programs and estimated costs between the 4 states we examined: California, Florida, Illinois, and Texas. Our projections provide updated estimates of the costs of implementing federal reinsurance programs for the individual health insurance market.

Decision-Making Experiences Of Consumers Choosing Individual-Market Health Insurance Plans.

The health insurance Marketplaces established by the Affordable Care Act include features designed to simplify the process of choosing a health plan in the individual, or nongroup, insurance market. While most individual health insurance enrollees purchase plans through the federal and state-based Marketplaces, millions also purchase plans directly from an insurance carrier (off Marketplace). This study was a descriptive comparison of the decision-making processes and shopping experiences of consumers in two states who purchased a health insurance plan from the same large insurer in 2017, either through the federal Marketplaces or off Marketplace. In a survey, those who selected plans through the Marketplaces reported less difficulty finding the best or most affordable plan than did those enrolling off Marketplace. Respondents in families with chronic health conditions who enrolled through the Marketplaces reported better overall experiences than those who enrolled off Marketplace. Respondents with low health insurance literacy reported poor experiences in enrolling both through the Marketplaces and off Marketplace. Access to consumer assistance in the individual health insurance market should target off-Marketplace populations as well as all populations with low health insurance literacy.

The Roles Of Assisters And Automated Decision Support Tools In Consumers' Marketplace Choices: Room For Improvement.

Assisters provide in-person and phone-based support to help consumers narrow their plan options on the Affordable Care Act's health insurance Marketplaces. We elicited the perspectives of a national sample of thirty-two assisters from ten states on consumer plan selection and available Marketplace decision support tools (for example, total cost estimators and provider network look-up tools). Assisters identified several shortcomings that limited their use of decision support tools, such as nonspecific cost estimates and inaccurate provider network data. Assisters instead provided individualized cost estimates, called provider offices to verify network coverage, and found innovative strategies to help consumers access care affordably under their chosen plan. Two priorities emerged for optimizing consumers' Marketplace insurance selection process: improve the quality of data used in decision support tools and invest in assister programs. Assister strategies should be a benchmark for improving decision support tools, with lessons to be learned for future tool development.

Public validation and its impact on the initial Affordable Care Act enrollment.

The 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA) resulted in the creation of state-based marketplaces (SBMs) and federally facilitated marketplaces (FFMs), and provided financial assistance to a portion of those eligible to enroll. This study looks at how choosing to create a SBM rather than a FFM, and the financial assistance provided to some, influenced enrollments rates as signals of support for the ACA in the eyes of those eligible to enroll. The findings show that the enrollment behavior of those most strongly in support of the ACA legislation was influenced by those external signals of support for the ACA.