Molecular investigation of infection sources and transmission chains of brucellosis in Zhejiang, China.

In the present study, a total of 7793 samples from 5 different types of hosts were collected and tested, with a seroprevalence of 2.4% (184/7793). Although the seroprevalence of human and animal brucellosis is relatively low, numbers of human brucellosis cases reported have increased continuously from 2004 to 2018. A total of 118 Brucella strains containing 4 biotypes were obtained, including Brucella melitensis bv.1 (n = 8) and bv.3 (n = 106), Brucella abortus bv.3 (n = 3) and bv.7 (n = 1). Twenty-one shared MLVA-16 genotypes, each composed of 2 to 19 strains obtained from different hosts, suggest the occurrence of a brucellosis outbreak epidemic with multiple source points and laboratory infection events. Moreover, 30 shared MLVA-16 genotypes were observed among 59.6% (68/114) B. melitensis isolates from Zhejiang and strains from other 21 different provinces, especially northern provinces, China. The analysis highlighted the imported nature of the strains from all over the northern provinces with a dominant part from the developed areas of animal husbandry. These data revealed a potential transmission pattern of brucellosis in this region, due to introduced infected sheep leading to a brucellosis outbreak epidemic, and eventually causing multiple laboratory infection events. It is urgent to strengthen the inspection and quarantine of the introduced animals.

Brucella Exposure Risk Events in 10 Clinical Laboratories, New York City, USA, 2015 to 2017.

From 2015 to 2017, 11 confirmed brucellosis cases were reported in New York City, leading to 10 Brucella exposure risk events (Brucella events) in 7 clinical laboratories (CLs). Most patients had traveled to countries where brucellosis is endemic and presented with histories and findings consistent with brucellosis. CLs were not notified that specimens might yield a hazardous organism, as the clinicians did not consider brucellosis until they were notified that bacteremia with Brucella was suspected. In 3 Brucella events, the CLs did not suspect that slow-growing, small Gram-negative bacteria might be harmful. Matrix-assisted laser desorption ionization-time of flight mass spectrometry (MALDI-TOF MS), which has a limited capacity to identify biological threat agents (BTAs), was used during 4 Brucella events, which accounted for 84% of exposures. In 3 of these incidents, initial staining of liquid media showed Gram-positive rods or cocci, including some cocci in chains, suggesting streptococci. Over 200 occupational exposures occurred when the unknown isolates were manipulated and/or tested on open benches, including by procedures that could generate infectious aerosols. During 3 Brucella events, the CLs examined and/or manipulated isolates in a biological safety cabinet (BSC); in each CL, the CL had previously isolated Brucella Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommendations to prevent laboratory-acquired brucellosis (LAB) were followed; no seroconversions or LAB cases occurred. Laboratory assessments were conducted after the Brucella events to identify facility-specific risks and mitigations. With increasing MALDI-TOF MS use, CLs are well-advised to adhere strictly to safe work practices, such as handling and manipulating all slow-growing organisms in BSCs and not using MALDI-TOF MS for identification until BTAs have been ruled out.

Laboratory exposure to Coccidioides: lessons learnt in a non-endemic country.

Coccidioides is a primary pathogenic fungus, which infects humans through highly infectious arthroconidia, causing substantial morbidity including life-threatening disseminated infections. Due to the low infectious dose, laboratory personnel might become infected during diagnostic procedures. Accordingly, coccidioidomycosis is reported as the most frequent laboratory-acquired systemic mycosis worldwide. This risk is aggravated in non-endemic countries, where the diagnosis may not be suspected. We report on an inadvertent exposure of 44 persons to Coccidioides posadasii in a clinical microbiology laboratory in Chile, the measures of containment after rapid diagnosis with matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionization time-of-flight mass spectrometry, and the lessons learnt in a non-endemic setting.

Laboratory-acquired Scrub Typhus and Murine Typhus Infections: The Argument for a Risk-based Approach to Biosafety Requirements for Orientia tsutsugamushi and Rickettsia typhi Laboratory Activities.

This study examined the literature on laboratory-acquired infections (LAIs) associated with scrub typhus (Orientia tsutsugamushi) and murine typhus (Rickettsia typhi) research to provide an evidence base for biosafety and biocontainment. Scrub typhus LAIs were documented in 25 individuals, from 1931 to 2000 with 8 (32%) deaths during the preantibiotic era. There were 35 murine typhus LAI reports and no deaths. Results indicated that the highest-risk activities were working with infectious laboratory animals involving significant aerosol exposures, accidental self-inoculation, or bite-related infections. A risk-based biosafety approach for in vitro and in vivo culture of O. tsutsugamushi and R. typhi would require that only high-risk activities (animal work or large culture volumes) be performed in high-containment biosafety level (BSL) 3 laboratories. We argue that relatively low-risk activities including inoculation of cell cultures or the early stages of in vitro growth using low volumes/low concentrations of infectious materials can be performed safely in BSL-2 laboratories within a biological safety cabinet.

[Preliminary studies on pathogenic microorganisms laboratory-acquired infections cases in recent years and its control strategies].

OBJECTIVE: To analyze and study types, infections routes and causes of global pathogenic microorganisms laboratory-acquired infections cases reported in the literatures from 2000 to 2009 and to discuss prevention and control strategies. METHODS: (1) Pathological observation of hepatic specimens: hepatic tissue pathogenic microorganisms laboratory-acquired infections. Methods PubMed, Embase, Biosis and Webs of Science covering SCIE, SSCI, CPCI-S and CPCI-SSH are chosen as data sources, "laboratory-acquired (associated) infections" are searched as the key words to search laboratory-acquired infections literature published from 2000 to 2009, from which information and data are accessed to be collected, analyzed and researched. RESULTS: There are 19 species of pathogenic microorganisms causing laboratory-acquired infections in the last 10 years, including 15 species of bacteria, accounting for 78.9%; 4 species of virus, accounting for 21.1%. There are 83 cases reported, of which there are 60 bacterial cases, accounting for 72.3%; and 23 virus cases, accounting for 27.7%. Ingestion and inhalation are main routes of infections, respectively accounting for 32.5% and 31.3%, which are mainly due to accidents, accounting for 47.0%. CONCLUSION: In recent years, pathogenic microbiology laboratory-acquired infections continue to occur, and it is mainly due to accidental infections, which expose laboratory workers' low sense of safety and deficient operation methods. Laboratory staff should strengthen their senses of safety and comply with safe operation procedures, which are still the key to prevent laboratory-acquired infections.

[Laboratory-acquired brucellosis]. / Laboratorieoverført brucellose.

Brucellosis is a rare disease in Denmark. We describe one case of laboratory-acquired brucellosis from an index patient to a laboratory technician following exposure to an infected blood culture in a clinical microbiology laboratory.

Atypical clinical presentation of laboratory-acquired meningococcal disease.

We report a case of laboratory-acquired meningococcal disease in a 31-y-old female research assistant. The clinical presentation of the case was atypical with polyserositis affecting knees, pleura and pericardium, without septicaemia or meningitis. The diagnosis was made by positive PCR for Neisseria meningitidis (genogroup C, genosubtype P1.7, 16, 35 and without mutations of the penA gene) in the patient's right knee. Serology confirmed the diagnosis after recovery. This case had an atypical clinical picture, exemplifies the use of non-culture methods for diagnosis and characterization, and reminds us about the importance of safe routines for the laboratory work.

Pseudo-outbreak of Bordetella bronchiseptica infection associated with contaminated rabbit blood used as a broth culture supplement.

A cluster of clinical isolates of Bordetella bronchiseptica was identified by microbiology laboratory personnel. A clinical and molecular epidemiologic study determined that this cluster represented a pseudo-outbreak due to bacterial contamination of rabbit blood used as a broth culture supplement. This pseudo-outbreak highlights the importance of quality assurance programs in the laboratory.

Assessing the risk of laboratory-acquired meningococcal disease.

Neisseria meningitidis is infrequently reported as a laboratory-acquired infection. Prompted by two cases in the United States in 2000, we assessed this risk among laboratorians. We identified cases of meningococcal disease that were possibly acquired or suspected of being acquired in a laboratory by placing an information request on e-mail discussion groups of infectious disease, microbiology, and infection control professional organizations. A probable case of laboratory-acquired meningococcal disease was defined as illness meeting the case definition for meningococcal disease in a laboratorian who had occupational exposure to an N. meningitidis isolate of the same serogroup within 14 days of illness onset. Sixteen cases of probable laboratory-acquired meningococcal disease occurring worldwide between 1985 and 2001 were identified, including six U.S. cases between 1996 and 2000. Nine cases (56%) were serogroup B; seven (44%) were serogroup C. Eight cases (50%) were fatal. All cases occurred among clinical microbiologists. In 15 cases (94%), isolate manipulation was performed without respiratory protection. We estimated that an average of three microbiologists are exposed to the 3,000 meningococcal isolates seen in U.S. laboratories yearly and calculated an attack rate of 13/100,000 microbiologists between 1996 and 2001, compared to 0.2/100,000 among U.S. adults in general. The rate and case/fatality ratio of meningococcal disease among microbiologists are higher than those in the general U.S. population. Specific risk factors for laboratory-acquired infection are likely associated with exposure to droplets or aerosols containing N. meningitidis. Prevention should focus on the implementation of class II biological safety cabinets or additional respiratory protection during manipulation of suspected meningococcal isolates.

Laboratory exposures to brucellae and implications for bioterrorism.

Brucellae are class 3 organisms and potential agents of bioterrorism. Because of effective public health measures, brucellosis has become a rare disease in industrialized countries, and clinical microbiology laboratories are frequently unfamiliar with the genus. A low index of suspicion by physicians or failure to notify the laboratory, equivocal Gram-stain results, misidentification of the organism by commercial systems, unsafe laboratory practices, and laboratory accidents have been responsible for numerous cases of exposure to the organism and laboratory-acquired disease in recent years. Discovery of a laboratory exposure to brucellae should prompt an exhaustive investigation of the event and its circumstances, definition of the population at risk, enforcement of safe laboratory practices, and antimicrobial drug prophylaxis for exposed persons. Inadvertent exposures to brucellae in the clinical laboratory indicate a widespread lack of preparedness to cope with eventual biologic threats involving use of the organism.

Four laboratory-associated cases of infection with Escherichia coli O157:H7.

An investigation of four cases of infection with Escherichia coli O157:H7 among laboratorians from different clinical laboratories revealed that the DNA fingerprint pattern of each case isolate was indistinguishable from that of an isolate handled in the laboratory prior to illness. These data suggest that the infections were laboratory acquired, and they demonstrate the importance of laboratorians strictly adhering to biosafety practices recommended for the handling of infectious materials.

Biosafety: guidelines for working with pathogenic and infectious microorganisms.

This unit, in conjunction with local and national guidelines and regulations, provides the basic biosafety information needed to perform the procedures detailed in this manual. Topics discussed include routine precautions when working with biohazards, disinfectants, disposal of biohazards, biosafety levels (as established by the U.S. National Institutes of Health, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention), animal facilities, and clinical laboratories. In addition, resources for more information are provided in the Literature Cited and Key References sections and in URLs given text and within the Internet Resources section.

A survey of latent tuberculosis infection among laboratory healthcare workers in New York City.

OBJECTIVE: To determine the prevalence of positive tuberculin skin tests (TSTs), incidence of TST conversion, risk factors for positive TSTs, and history of active TB among HCWs in microbiology laboratories in New York City. DESIGN: Two-year survey from May 1999 to June 2001. SETTING: Nineteen microbiology laboratories. RESULTS: During the first year, interviews were conducted with 345 laboratory HCWs (mean, 18 HCWs per site; range, 2 to 51) to assess the prevalence of positive TSTs, but 3 (1%) could not recall their result and were excluded from further analyses. The mean age of the remaining 342 HCWs was 48 years; 68% (n = 233) were female, 54% (n = 183) received bacille Calmette-Guerin (BCG) vaccination, and 71% (n = 244) were foreign born. The prevalence of a positive TST was 57% (n = 196), but only 20% (n = 39) of the HCWs received isoniazid. The incidence of TST conversion in the second year of the study was 1% (1 of 108). Multivariate analysis identified age (odds ratio [OR] per year, 1.05; 95% confidence interval [CI95], 1.02-1.08), foreign birth (OR, 3.80; CI95, 1.98-7.28), BCG immunization (OR, 4.89; CI95, 2.72-8.80), and employment in a mycobacteriology laboratory (OR, 2.14; CI95, 1.25-3.68) as risk factors for a positive TST. Only one HCW had been treated for active TB. CONCLUSIONS: The prevalence of positive TSTs was high among laboratory HCWs, but the TST conversion rate was low. Higher rates of treatment for latent TB infection are desirable.