WE economy: Potential of mutual aid distribution based on moral responsibility and risk vulnerability.

Reducing wealth inequality is a global challenge that requires the transformation of the economic systems that produce inequality. The economic system comprises: (1) gifts and reciprocity, (2) power and redistribution, (3) market exchange, and (4) mutual aid without reciprocal obligations. Current inequality stems from a capitalist economy consisting of (2) and (3). To sublimate (1), the human economy, to (4), the concept of a "mixbiotic society" has been proposed in the philosophical realm. In this society, free and diverse individuals mix, recognize their respective "fundamental incapability," and sublimate them into "WE" solidarity. Moreover, the economy must have a moral responsibility as a co-adventurer and consider its vulnerability to risk. This study focuses on two factors of mind perception-moral responsibility and risk vulnerability-and proposes a novel wealth distribution model between the two agents following an econophysical approach, whereas the conventional model dealt with redistribution through taxes and institutions. Three models are developed: a joint-venture model in which profit/losses are distributed based on their factors, a redistribution model in which wealth stocks are redistributed periodically based on their factors in the joint-venture model, and a "WE economy" model in which profit/losses are distributed based on the ratio of each other's factors. A simulation comparison reveals that WE economies are effective in reducing inequality, resilient in normalizing wealth distribution as advantages, and susceptible to free riders as disadvantages. However, this disadvantage can be compensated for by fostering fellowship and using joint ventures. This study presents the effectiveness of moral responsibility and risk vulnerability, complementarity between the WE economy and joint economy, and the direction of the economy in reducing inequality. Future challenges include developing an advanced model based on real economic analysis and economic psychology and promoting its fieldwork for worker coops and platform cooperatives to realize a desirable mixbiotic society.

The Ethics of Electronic Tracking Devices in Dementia Care: An Interview Study with Developers.

Wandering is a symptom of dementia that can have devastating consequences on the lives of persons living with dementia and their families and caregivers. Increasingly, caregivers are turning towards electronic tracking devices to help manage wandering. Ethical questions have been raised regarding these location-based technologies and although qualitative research has been conducted to gain better insight into various stakeholders' views on the topic, developers of these technologies have been largely excluded. No qualitative research has focused on developers' perceptions of ethics related to electronic tracking devices. To address this, we performed a qualitative semi-structured interview study based on grounded theory. We interviewed 15 developers of electronic tracking devices to better understand how they perceive ethical issues surrounding the design, development, and use of these devices within dementia care. Our results reveal that developers are strongly motivated by moral considerations and believe that including stakeholders throughout the development process is critical for success. Developers felt a strong sense of moral obligation towards topics within their control and a weaker sense of moral obligation towards topics outside their control. This leads to a perceived moral boundary between development and use, where some moral responsibility is shifted to end-users.

Advocacy and Bioethics: Aspiration, Obligation, and Negotiation.

AbstractA long-standing tenet of healthcare clinical ethics consultation has involved the neutrality of the ethicist. However, recent pressing societal issues have challenged this viewpoint. Perhaps now more than ever before, ethicists are being called upon to take up roles in public health, policy, and other community-oriented endeavors. In this article, I first review the concept of professional advocacy and contrast this conceptualization with the role of patient advocate, utilizing the profession of nursing as an exemplar. Then, I explore the status of advocacy in clinical ethics and how this conversation intersects with the existing professional obligations of the bioethicist, arguing that the goals of ethics consultation and ethical obligations of the clinical ethicist are compatible with the role of professional advocate. Finally, I explore potential barriers to professional advocacy and offer suggestions for a path forward.

The Ethics of Life as It Could Be: Do We Have Moral Obligations to Artificial Life?

The field of Artificial Life studies the nature of the living state by modeling and synthesizing living systems. Such systems, under certain conditions, may come to deserve moral consideration similar to that given to nonhuman vertebrates or even human beings. The fact that these systems are nonhuman and evolve in a potentially radically different substrate should not be seen as an insurmountable obstacle to their potentially having rights, if they are sufficiently sophisticated in other respects. Nor should the fact that they owe their existence to us be seen as reducing their status as targets of moral concern. On the contrary, creators of Artificial Life may have special obligations to their creations, resembling those of an owner to their pet or a parent to their child. For a field that aims to create artificial life-forms with increasing levels of sophistication, it is crucial to consider the possible ethical implications of our activities, with an eye toward assessing potential moral obligations for which we should be prepared. If Artificial Life is larger than life, then the ethics of artificial beings should be larger than human ethics.

Values-Based Medicine Is an Ethical Concept for Implementing the Ethical Principles in Daily Practice.

Values-based medicine (VsBM) is an ethical concept, and bioethical framework has been developed to ensure that medical ethics and values are implemented, pervasive, and powerful parameters influencing decisions about health, clinical practice, teaching, medical industry, career development, malpractice, and research. Neurosurgeons tend to adopt ethics according to their own values and to what they see and learn from teachers. Neurosurgeons, in general, are aware about ethical codes and the patient's rights. However, the philosophy, concept, and principles of medical ethics are rarely included in the training programs or in training courses. The impact of implementing, observing the medical ethics and the patients' value and culture on the course, and outcome of patients' management should not underestimate. The main principles of medical ethics are autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, justice, dignity, and honesty, which should be strictly observed in every step of medical practice, research, teaching, and publication. Evidence-based medicine has been popularized in the last 40-50 years in order to raise up the standard of medical practice. Medical ethics and values have been associated with the medical practice for thousands of years since patients felt a need for treatment. There is no conflict between evidence-based medicine and values-based medicine, as a medical practice should always be performed within a frame of ethics and respect for patients' values. Observing the principles of values-based medicine became very relevant as multicultural societies are dominant in some countries and hospitals in different corners of the world.

What Do Prospective Parents Owe to Their Children?

I consider the question of what moral obligations prospective parents owe to their future children. It is taken as an almost axiomatic premise of a wide range of philosophical arguments that prospective parents have a moral obligation to take such steps as ensuring their own financial stability or waiting until they are emotionally mature before conceiving. This is because it is assumed that parents have a moral obligation to lay the groundwork for their children's lives to go well. While at first glance such a premise seems benign, I will argue that when it is applied to arguments in assisted reproductive technology, as it is in Julian Savulescu's procreative beneficence argument or as it is in Daniel Groll's recent argument for open gamete donation, we see problems with this premise. Problems in Groll's argument also become apparent when it is scrutinized in connection with this premise.

Moral obligations towards human persons' wellbeing versus their suffering: An analysis of perspectives of moral philosophy.

What do we owe other persons? Are we as much obliged to promote their wellbeing as we are to reduce their suffering? This question is crucial for a range of social institutions and welfare services, and especially for the health services. To address this question the article investigates prominent positions and arguments in moral philosophy. It finds that while classical utilitarianism claims that there is symmetry in the moral obligation with respect to peoples' wellbeing and their suffering, a wide range of other positions and perspectives argue for an asymmetric relationship with stronger moral obligations towards other persons' suffering than towards their wellbeing. This difference in obligations is supported ontologically by basic differences inherent in wellbeing and suffering and axiologically by a relative (gradual) difference in value. The many well-founded arguments for stronger moral obligations towards other persons' suffering than towards their wellbeing has important implications for health policy; especially for priority setting. Avoiding and reducing suffering should have priority to the promotion and enhancement of wellbeing.

Jewish Ethics of Inmate Vaccines Against COVID-19.

PURPOSE: The COVID-19 pandemic broke out at the end of 2019, and throughout 2020 there were intensive international efforts to find a vaccine for the disease, which had already led to the deaths of some five million people. In December 2020, several pharmaceutical companies announced that they had succeeded in producing an effective vaccine, and after approval by the various regulatory bodies, countries started to vaccinate their citizens. With the start of the global campaign to vaccinate the world's population against COVID-19, debates over the prioritization of different sections of the population began around the world, but the prison population has generally been absent from these discussions. APPROACH AND FINDINGS: This article presents the approach of Jewish ethics regarding this issue, that is, that there is a religious and a moral obligation to heal the other and to take care of his or her medical well-being and that this holds true even for a prisoner who has committed a serious crime. Hence, prisoners should be vaccinated according to the same priorities that govern the administration of the vaccine among the general public. ORIGINALITY: The originality of the article is in a comprehensive and comparative reference between general ethics and Jewish ethics on a subject that has not yet received the proper attention.

Abolishing morality in biomedical ethics.

In biomedical ethics, there is widespread acceptance of moral realism, the view that moral claims express a proposition and that at least some of these propositions are true. Biomedical ethics is also in the business of attributing moral obligations, such as "S should do X." The problem, as we argue, is that against the background of moral realism, most of these attributions are erroneous or inaccurate. The typical obligation attribution issued by a biomedical ethicist fails to truly capture the person's actual obligations. We offer a novel argument for rife error in obligation attribution. The argument starts with the idea of an epistemic burden. Epistemic burdens are all of those epistemic obstacles one must surmount in order to achieve some aim. Epistemic burdens shape decision-making such that given two otherwise equal options, a person will choose the option that has the lesser of epistemic burdens. Epistemic burdens determine one's potential obligations and, conversely, their non-obligations. The problem for biomedical ethics is that ethicists have little to no access to others' epistemic burdens. Given this lack of access and the fact that epistemic burdens determine potential obligations, biomedical ethicists often can only attribute accurate obligations out of luck. This suggests that the practice of attributing obligations in biomedical ethics is rife with error. To resolve this widespread error, we argue that this practice should be abolished from the discourse of biomedical ethics.

A critical take on procreative justice.

Herjeet Kaur Marway recently proposed the Principle of Procreative Justice, which says that reproducers have a strong moral obligation to avoid completing race and colour injustices through their selection choices. In this article, we analyze this principle and argue, appealing to a series of counterexamples, that some of the implications of Marway's Principle of Procreative Justice are difficult to accept. This casts doubt on whether the principle should be adopted. Also, we show that there are some more principled worries regarding Marway's idea of a strong pro tanto duty not to complete injustices through one's procreative choices. Nonetheless, we believe Marway's arguments point in the right general direction regarding duties and structural injustice. Thus, in the final part, we suggest a positive proposal on how it would be possible to respond to the cases we raise. More specifically, we explore the suggestion that agents have a pro tanto duty to participate in eliminating structural injustice. Importantly, this duty can be satisfied, not only in procreation choices but in multiple ways.

Identity Theft, Deep Brain Stimulation, and the Primacy of Post-trial Obligations.

Patient narratives from two investigational deep brain stimulation trials for traumatic brain injury and obsessive-compulsive disorder reveal that injury and illness rob individuals of personal identity and that neuromodulation can restore it. The early success of these interventions makes a compelling case for continued post-trial access to these technologies. Given the centrality of personal identity to respect for persons, a failure to provide continued access can be understood to represent a metaphorical identity theft. Such a loss recapitulates the pain of an individual's initial injury or illness and becomes especially tragic because it could be prevented by robust policy. A failure to fulfill this normative obligation constitutes a breach of disability law, which would view post-trial access as a means to achieve social reintegration through this neurotechnological accommodation.

A critical view on using "life not worth living" in the bioethics of assisted reproduction.

This paper critically engages with how life not worth living (LNWL) and cognate concepts are used in the field of beginning-of-life bioethics as the basis of arguments for morally requiring the application of preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and/or germline genome editing (GGE). It is argued that an objective conceptualization of LNWL is largely too unreliable in beginning-of-life cases for deriving decisive normative reasons that would constitute a moral duty on the part of intending parents. Subjective frameworks are found to be more suitable to determine LNWL, but they are not accessible in beginning-of-life cases because there is no subject yet. Conceptual and sociopolitical problems are additionally pointed out regarding the common usage of clear case exemplars. The paper concludes that a moral requirement for the usage of PGD and GGE cannot be derived from the conceptual base of LNWL, as strong reasons that can be reliably determined are required to limit reproductive freedom on moral grounds. Educated predictions on prospective well-being might still be useful regarding the determination of moral permissibility of PGD and/or GGE. It is suggested that due to the high significance of subjective experience in the normativity of beginning-of-life bioethics, the discipline is called to more actively realize the inclusion of people with disabilities. This regards for instance research design, citation practices, and language choices to increase the accessibility of societal debates on the reproductive ethics of genetic technologies.

Brain Pioneers and Moral Entanglement: An Argument for Post-trial Responsibilities in Neural-Device Trials.

We argue that in implanted neurotechnology research, participants and researchers experience what Henry Richardson has called "moral entanglement." Participants partially entrust researchers with access to their brains and thus to information that would otherwise be private, leading to created intimacies and special obligations of beneficence for researchers and research funding agencies. One of these obligations, we argue, is about continued access to beneficial technology once a trial ends. We make the case for moral entanglement in this context through exploration of participants' vulnerability, uncompensated risks and burdens, depth of relationship with the research team, and dependence on researchers in implanted neurotechnology trials.

The End of Personhood.

The concept of personhood has been central to bioethics debates about abortion, the treatment of patients in a vegetative or minimally conscious states, as well as patients with advanced dementia. More recently, the concept has been employed to think about new questions related to human-brain organoids, artificial intelligence, uploaded minds, human-animal chimeras, and human embryos, to name a few. A common move has been to ask what these entities have in common with persons (in the normative sense), and then draw conclusions about what we do (or do not) owe them. This paper argues that at best the concept of "personhood" is unhelpful to much of bioethics today and at worst it is harmful and pernicious. I suggest that we (bioethicists) stop using the concept of personhood and instead ask normative questions more directly (e.g., how ought we to treat this being and why?) and use other philosophical concepts (e.g., interests, sentience, recognition respect) to help us answer them. It is time for bioethics to end talk about personhood.

Exit Duty Generator.

This article presents a revised version of negative utilitarianism. Previous versions have relied on a hedonistic theory of value and stated that suffering should be minimized. The traditional rebuttal is that the doctrine in this form morally requires us to end all sentient life. To avoid this, a need-based theory of value is introduced. The frustration of the needs not to suffer and not to have one's autonomy dwarfed should, prima facie, be decreased. When decreasing the need frustration of some would increase the need frustration of others, the case is deferred and a fuller ethical analysis is conducted. The author's perceptions on murder, extinction, the right to die, antinatalism, veganism, and abortion are used to reach a reflective equilibrium. The new theory is then applied to consumerism, material growth, and power relations. The main finding is that the burden of proof should be on those who promote the status quo.

Welfare, Abortion, and Organ Donation: A Reply to the Restrictivist.

We argued in a recent issue of this journal that if abortion is restricted,1 then there are parallel obligations for parents to donate body parts to their children. The strength of this obligation to donate is proportional to the strength of the abortion restrictions. If abortion is never permissible, then a parent must always donate any organ if they are a match. If abortion is sometimes permissible and sometimes not, then organ donation is sometimes obligatory and sometimes not. Our argument was based on the following ideas: (a) that a fetus has full moral status, (b) that parents have special obligations to their offspring, fetus or not, and (c) that this special obligation is to protect them. The result is the conclusion that abortion restrictivists cannot also consistently deny that organ donation should be compulsory.

How do roles impact suicidal agents' obligations?

In this paper, I assess the role responsibility argument that claims suicidal agents have obligations to specific people not to kill themselves due to their roles. Since the plausibility of the role responsibility argument is clearest in the parent-child relationship, I assess parental obligations. I defend a view that says that normative roles, such as those of a parent, are contractual and voluntary. I then suggest that the normative parameters for some roles preclude permissible suicide because the role-related contract includes a promise to provide continuing care and emotional support. I propose that as we have established criteria for morally acceptable reasons for cancelling, voiding, or amending a contract, we can apply these to the role responsibility argument to establish grounds for releasing a parent from his role-related and contractual obligations. Failure to fulfil one's contractual roles may not be blameworthy, depending upon the circumstances. I propose the factors determining culpability in failure to fulfil one's role-related obligations are: intention, voluntariness, diminished responsibility, mental capacity, and foreseeability.

Potentiality switches and epistemic uncertainty: the Argument from Potential in times of human embryo-like structures.

Recent advancements in developmental biology enable the creation of embryo-like structures from human stem cells, which we refer to as human embryo-like structures (hELS). These structures provide promising tools to complement-and perhaps ultimately replace-the use of human embryos in clinical and fundamental research. But what if these hELS-when further improved-also have a claim to moral status? What would that imply for their research use? In this paper, we explore these questions in relation to the traditional answer as to why human embryos should be given greater protection than other (non-)human cells: the so-called Argument from Potential (AfP). According to the AfP, human embryos deserve special moral status because they have the unique potential to develop into persons. While some take the development of hELS to challenge the very foundations of the AfP, the ongoing debate suggests that its dismissal would be premature. Since the AfP is a spectrum of views with different moral implications, it does not need to imply that research with human embryos or hELS that (may) have 'active' potential should be completely off-limits. However, the problem with determining active potential in hELS is that this depends on development passing through 'potentiality switches' about the precise coordinates of which we are still in the dark. As long as this epistemic uncertainty persists, extending embryo research regulations to research with specific types of hELS would amount to a form of regulative precaution that as such would require further justification.